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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXVI.

JANUARY, 1874.

ARTICLE I.—ARMENIA AND THE ARMENIANS.

As all nations are affected to some extent by the climate, soil, and other physical circumstances by which they are surrounded, some notice of the geography of Ancient Armenia becomes necessary in order to a proper understanding of the Armenian race.

The boundaries of Armenia have changed so often that it is now somewhat difficult to define them; the most accurate description appears to be that of Saint Martin in his "*Mémoires sur L'Arménie*." According to this author, Armenia Major was bounded on the north by Georgia and the Caucasian Mountains; on the south by a line which would pass through Diarbekir, at about 38° north latitude; on the west by the western Euphrates; and on the east by the Caspian Sea. The Greek geographers frequently mention *Armenia Minor*, which lay to the west and south of Armenia Major and included portions of *Northern Syria*, *Cilicia*, and *Karamania*. Oorfa on the east and Cesarea on the west belonged to Armenia Minor. The original home, however, of the Armenians was *Armenia Major*. The elevation of this portion of the earth's surface

above the nearest seas is shown by the fact that several large rivers take their rise in Ancient Armenia; among these are the Kizil Irmak, the ancient Halys, which flows west and north into the Black Sea; the Aras (Araxes), which flows east into the Caspian; the Tigris and Euphrates, which flow southeast into the Persian Gulf. Lake Van, which may be taken as a central point of Ancient Armenia, is more than 4,000 feet above the Black Sea. Armenia has ever been celebrated for its cold and healthy climate, its pure water, its rich pasture lands, its fertile valleys and plains, and lofty mountains. The winters are long and severe; the summers short and pleasant; flowers abound during the months of June and July; the atmosphere is very clear and light; the heavens, at night, shine with the greatest splendor. Altogether the physical aspects of the country are well fitted to make it the home of a hardy, liberty-loving race. At present the country has a barren appearance; the villages are squalid; only a small portion of the soil is cultivated; the inhabitants have long been oppressed by Turks and Kurds; yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, there is a certain indescribable charm about the physical nature of the country, which may, to some extent at least, account for the passionate attachment which all Armenians have for the home of their race. It is worthy of notice, however, that Armenia has ever been at the confluence of several great empires; in ancient times, Persia was on the east and the Roman Empire on the west; in more modern times, the Saracens and Turks have been on the south and Russia on the north. These empires have not only contended fiercely for the possession of Armenia but when marching their troops against each other have crossed and recrossed her territory and have fought many bloody battles on her soil. This was especially true when the Romans were contending with the Persians. In this respect, the geographical position of Armenia was a great obstacle to the permanence of the Armenian kingdom.

The origin of the Armenian race is lost in the obscurity of the past, yet there are many reasons for believing what all Armenians claim, that their race is one of the oldest in the world. One of the names which the Armenians give to their country is *Askhanzean*; this is derived plainly from *Askenaz*, who was the

brother of *Togarmah* and the son of *Gomer*. Another name which they themselves give to their country is *Doon Torkomah*, the "House of Torkomah" or *Togarmah*. St. Martin well says (vol. i, p. 254), "If we fix our attention on the names of the people who are mentioned in Jer. li, 27, it seems very 'probable that the posterity of *Askenaz* inhabited a portion of Armenia."

These statements are confirmed by the traditions of the people. We have frequently asked uneducated Armenians, in the villages in Armenia, who was their great ancestor, and the immediate reply has always been "Turkom," which is but another form of *Togarmah*. Without entering more fully into the subject, we may say in general that there seems no reason to doubt that the Armenians have occupied Armenia ever since the nations were dispersed over the face of the earth, and that they retain, to a great extent, the early characteristics of the race. This is not more remarkable in their case than in the case of the Nestorians, the Kurds, or the Arabs. The Kurds have undoubtedly the same characteristics which they had when Xenophon marched through their country on his retreat from Mesopotamia more than 2,000 years ago. Strabo tells us that the horses of Armenia were held in high esteem (xi, 529), and the prophet Ezekiel says (chap. xxvii, 14) that the people of *Togarmah* (Armenia) traded with *Tyre* in horses and mules. Herodotus (Book i, 194) describes the manner in which the people of Armenia descended the Tigris on rafts to Babylon. Another proof of the antiquity of the race may be found in their language; but upon this we will not dwell.

It may be thought that we have spoken at too great length in regard to the origin of the Armenian race; the subject, however, is not only interesting in itself but it helps to illustrate the character of the people. It surely is worthy of note that, amid all the revolutions of the eastern world, they have preserved their existence as a people and have retained their national characteristics, and form to-day one of the links that connect the immediate present with the remote past of human history.

In physical structure the Armenians are of medium height, squarely built, complexions rather dark, hair a glossy black, dark and beautiful eyes, their frames firmly knit so that they

are capable of a great amount of physical labor. Many of the men have great strength. The marriage relation is guarded with the greatest sanctity; illegitimate births are almost unknown among the Armenians; marriage ties are seldom broken or marriage vows violated; for many centuries intermarriages of relations have been prohibited both by law and custom. These causes, combined with a bracing climate, have produced a people remarkable for health and physical strength. Many of the females of the higher classes, especially in youth, are very beautiful.

The Armenians have a high degree of mental capacity; this is shown in their ready mastery of the details of business; in the rapid progress they make in study whenever the opportunity is presented to them; their young men generally take a high stand in scholarship when admitted into the schools and colleges of Europe and America. Though fond of pleasantries, as a rule they are sober, thoughtful, somewhat suspicious and jealous of each other, but all animated by a true national pride which often degenerates into national vanity and conceit. They are strong and tender in their attachments, while, under the hard discipline of the Turks, they have learned to suppress their feelings of hatred and dislike to a remarkable degree. They have a sincere reverence for the aged, and delight in recounting the deeds of the great heroes of their race. In comparing them, in respect to their mental characteristics, with the civilized nations of the west, we should remember their history, a history which, for several hundred years, has been one sad tale of oppression and sorrow. If we bear this in mind we shall wonder at the great amount of mental life and activity now existing among this interesting people. They enjoy social life to a greater degree probably than any other race in Turkey; their habits are simple, the family relation is maintained with religious sacredness; the great masses of the Armenians, in the interior of the country, are poor and obliged to earn their support by hard labor; but they are industrious, frugal, temperate, and virtuous. Of course, exceptions to all these statements may be found; we speak, however, not of the few exceptions, but of the great mass of the people. If we turn to the religious history of the Armenians, we shall find it one of peculiar inter-

est. It is difficult now to ascertain the precise form of their religion previous to their conversion to Christianity. According to St. Martin (vol. i, p. 305), the Armenians who preceded Tiradates had a religion which was the same as that of the *Parthians*, a mixture of the opinions of *Zoroaster*, somewhat changed, with the worship of Greek divinities and with certain superstitions brought in from *Scythia*. "The gods whom the Armenians regarded as most powerful were *Aramazt*, the same as *Ormuzd* of the Persians and Jupiter of the Greeks; the goddess of *Anahid* or *Venus* and *Mihir* or *Mithra*." That they were idolaters is admitted by all, but what was the precise form of their idolatry is not well understood. This much is certain, that the nation never returned to idolatry after it had once embraced Christianity. No greater insult can now be offered to an Armenian than to call him a "*Karabasht*" or "*Pütparest*," i. e., a worshipper of idols.

Christianity was known in the country in the second century, but did not obtain a firm foothold until the beginning of the fourth century.* In 302 *Tiradates* an Armenian king, the last of the *Arsacidæ*, and many Armenian nobles were baptized by *Gregory the Illuminator*.† Mr. Gibbon says (vol. ii, p. 275),

* There was a Christian church at *Edessa*, the ancient *Ur* and the modern *Orfa*, as early as 202 A. D., and this church was probably *Armenian*. In 170 the symbols of *Baal* had disappeared from the coins of *Abgar*, the Armenian king of *Edessa*, and the cross was substituted in their stead.

† The following appear to be the well authenticated facts in respect to this eminent Reformer. He was born at *Vagharchhabed*, the ancient capital of Armenia, in 257 A. D. and died about 332. He was the son of *Anag*, a prince of the royal family of *Arsacida*. *Anag* had assassinated *Choeroes I*, king of Armenia, and was therefore put to death with all his family except Gregory, who was then two years of age. He was taken to *Cesarea*, in *Cappadocia*, by a Christian nurse. On becoming of age he married a Christian woman, but after three years they separated by mutual consent, as he wished to devote himself to an ecclesiastical life. He went to Rome, and without disclosing his religion or his parentage he joined *Tiradates II*, the king of Armenia, who was then in Rome. Gregory accompanied *Tiradates* to Armenia; there he refused to sacrifice to idols, and was cast into a dungeon near *Antazala*; here he remained fourteen years; at the end of this time the king became a Christian and received baptism at the hands of Gregory. Gregory afterwards went to *Cesarea* and was made *Metropolitan* of Armenia; he then returned and preached the Gospel both east and west of the *Euphrates*, destroyed many idol temples and built many Christian churches. Having made his son *Aristarchus* his successor, he withdrew from public life.

"The renowned *Tiradates*, the hero of the East, may dispute with Constantine the honor of being the first sovereign who embraced the Christian religion."* And Dean Milman adds, "St. Martin has likewise clearly shown that Armenia was the first *nation* that embraced Christianity." There seems no reason to doubt that the Armenian Church for several centuries was thoroughly orthodox and evangelical; so late as the twelfth century the Armenians were not reconciled to the sight of images; in theology they were *Augustinian*; they adopted the *Apostolic*, the *Nicene*, and the *Athanasian* creeds. In the sixth century, a majority of the church accepted monophysitical views; at that time the following may be said to have been the doctrinal position of the Armenian Church; the majority at least held that the human nature of Christ was absorbed in the divine; that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father alone, in this respect differing from the Latin and agreeing with the Greek Church; that man is redeemed from original sin by the sacrifice of Christ, and this redemption is *appropriated* by *baptism*; that redemption from *actual* sin is secured by penance and auricular confession; they hold the seven Sacraments of the Roman Church, the mediation of the Saints, the doctrine of transubstantiation. They give the communion in both kinds to the common people; deny the doctrine of purgatorial penance, yet think that prayers for the dead will help the departed. The Armenians rejected the authority of the Council of Chalcedon in 536 and renounced all connection with the Greek Church. In 1145 the Armenians were for a short time connected with Rome; in 1323 a portion of the church united with

* *Tiradates* was the son of *Thoeroes*; when an infant his father was assassinated; he was saved by his friends and educated under the auspices of the Roman emperors. Armenia was then in the hands of the *Persians*. In the third year of Diocletian, or A. D. 287, *Tiradates* was restored to the throne of Armenia by the Romans; he was received with great joy by the Armenian people. He became a Christian in 302 and was baptized by Gregory the Illuminator. In a few years he was expelled a second time from his kingdom by the Persians. He took refuge in the court of the Roman emperor. Diocletian resolved to support him; he came to Antioch, and the decisive battle was fought east of the Euphrates on the plain of *Carrha*; the Romans were defeated, but were subsequently victorious under *Galerius*, who confirmed *Tiradates* in his authority. "He died at length," says Gibbon, "after a reign of fifty-six years, and the fortune of the Armenian monarchy expired with him."

Rome, and again in 1441 there was another attempt at a union of Armenians and Jacobites with Rome. With these slight exceptions, the Armenians have kept themselves resolutely independent of both the Greek and Latin Churches. At the present time there may be 800,000 Roman Catholic Armenians out of a population of about 3,000,000. The Roman Catholic Armenians are wealthy and influential; they are found mostly in the large cities, as *Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo, Erzeroom,* and *Adrianople*. The Roman Catholic Armenians are restless under the Papal authority; of late years very serious divisions have existed among them, that have called for the active interference of the Turkish Government.

One feature in the religious history of the Armenians is worthy of special notice; we refer to their profound reverence for the Word of God. The Bible was translated into their language in the fifth century. As Armenian scholars did not know Hebrew, the translation was made from the *Septuagint*; so well was the work done, however, that some biblical scholars have called the Armenian Bible the *Queen of the Versions*. This ancient version of the Scriptures has doubtless been the instrument in preserving whatever of Christian life has remained among the Armenians; certain it is that they have the most sincere regard for God's Word, and have ever held fast to the idea that every man is at liberty to read and understand that Word for himself.

Besides the Bible they have an extensive Liturgy in the ancient language; this Liturgy was prepared at an early day and is still used in all Armenian churches.* Many of the Armeni-

* Those who are anxious to pursue this subject will be interested in a pamphlet prepared by the eminent linguist, the *Rev. S. C. Malan, M. A.*, and published in London by *David Nutt*, 270 Strand, 1870. It is entitled, "*The Divine Liturgy of the Armenian Church, of St. Gregory the Illuminator*;" translated from the Armenian; with an introduction and notes. From this pamphlet we quote the following prayer, as a specimen of the ancient prayers of the Armenian Church. This is a prayer to the Holy Ghost, and is to be offered by the ecclesiastic who officiates at the communion service.

"O Almighty, beneficent God of all things and Lover of men, Creator of things visible and invisible, Saviour and Preserver, Protector and Giver of Peace, Mighty Spirit of the Father, we entreat Thee with open arms, with humble, earnest prayer, in Thine awful presence. We draw nigh in great fear and trembling, in order to offer this reasonable sacrifice; first to thine unsearchable power, being, as Thou

nian prayers in the ancient language are not only very evangelical in sentiment, but very beautiful in style. The chants also of the ancient church are greatly admired by all Armenians. The national acceptance of Christianity by the Armenian people was followed by many bitter and bloody contests, in which the Christian party was generally supported by the Roman and the pagan party by the Persian power. At the beginning of the sixth century the greater part of Armenia had come under the Persian yoke; the Persian kings found Christianity so firmly rooted among the people that they were compelled at last to allow to the Armenians the free exercise of their religion. In the minds of most Armenians the period of these earnest contests for the "faith once delivered to the Saints" is the brightest epoch in their whole history. We could not expect that the Armenian Church would escape the general darkness and corruption of the Middle Ages; it may be fairly claimed, however, that she emerged from that darkness less corrupt than the great mass of the Greek and Latin Churches. At the beginning of the present century her condition may be described generally as one of *ignorance*; with minor exceptions her doc-

art, equal in throne, in glory, and in creative energy, with the unchangeable Majesty of the Father; and Searcher as thou art also of the hidden, deep counsels of the Almighty Father of Emmanuel, who sent Thee, He who is Saviour, Verifier, and Creator of all things. Through Thee was made known to us the threefold personality in one essence of the Godhead; of which Three Persons Thou art known as one and incomprehensible. By Thee and through Thee did the first race of the patriarchal house, called seers, declare aloud and clearly the things past and to come. The Spirit of God announced Thee to Moses, even Thee, whose moving on the surface of the waters, as an energy which no one can restrain, and by thy solemn going to and fro while brooding over them, and under thy sheltering wings fondly calling new beings into life, didst foreshadow the mystery wrought at Holy Baptism; who after this pattern, and ere the vault of the firmament above was spread on high, like a veil, didst, as Absolute Ruler, create the complete natures of all beings that are, from all things that are not. In thy creating power shall all men by Thee be renewed at the Resurrection, at the last day of this existence, but the first of heavenly life. Thee also did the Father's firstborn son, Thy fellow and of the same essence with the Father, in one likeness obey Thee with oneness of will, as of the same substance as his Mighty Father; He declared that blasphemy against Thee should never be forgiven, thus cutting short the railing accusations of Thine impious gainsayers, while He, the just and innocent Creator of all, forgave his accusers; He, who for our sins was betrayed to death and rose again for our justification. Unto him be glory through Thee, unto Thee praise, blessing with the Father Almighty, for ever and ever; Amen."

trinal position might have been called Orthodox, while the morals of both priests and people were certainly not as bad as those of other professedly Christian nations both in the East and on the continent of Europe. The church seemed ready for a Reformation; little did its leaders anticipate that those who should sound the first notes of that reformation would come from a land beyond the seas and oceans, a land whose very existence was unknown to Europe for a thousand years after the baptism of the first Armenian king! so wonderful are the shifts and changes in the great drama of the world's history.

The first American missionaries to Palestine were sent out by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in the year 1821-2. When at Jerusalem their attention was arrested by a class of pilgrims of whom they had not before heard. "Who are these good looking men," they asked, "with black hair and dark eyes and with such thoughtful, intelligent faces?" The reply to this question was the seed corn that has since multiplied into the rich harvests now ready throughout all Turkey for the Christian reaper. We shall state, in the briefest possible manner, the results of the operations of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions among the Armenians.

In the year 1831 the Rev. Wm. Goodell and wife took up their residence at Constantinople as the first missionaries to the Armenians; they were soon followed by *Schauffter*, *Dwight*, *Riggs*, *Schneider*, *Powers*, *Ladd*, *Benjamin*, *Hamlin* and others. Some of these excellent men have fallen asleep; others are still living, actively engaged in the work and witnesses of results which could not have been anticipated when they began their labors. The first great obstacle that met the missionaries was the profound ignorance of the people, and the first question presented to them for solution was, how can this ignorance be removed? How can the people be enlightened in regard to the simple and fundamental doctrines of the religion of which they are so proud? The answer to this question shaped the first and all subsequent efforts of the missionaries. The Bible must be given to the common people; tracts must be distributed, schools must be established, the Gospel must be preached not only to congregations but to men by the way-side, in their homes, in the khans; men must be invited to visit the missionaries, the

truth must be pressed home in private conversation ; religious newspapers must be published ; a Christian literature must be created ; men must be trained for the ministry. At the end of the first ten years no evangelical church had been formed, no separate civil community of Protestants had been organized, but many Armenians had become convinced of the errors of their church. Some of these had been driven from their homes into exile ; at *Constantinople, Nicomedia, Brusa, Trebizond, Erzroom* and other places men had been aroused to seek after the truth ; fourteen missionaries and their wives had joined the mission ; Mr. Hamlin had begun that work of education in Turkey to which he has devoted his life. In 1841, after ten years of missionary labor, the state of the Armenian mind may be described as in a *ferment* ; the opposition of the ecclesiastics was strong and bitter ; persecution only awakened a new interest and stirred up greater enquiry.

If we pass over another ten years to 1851, we find that the current of new ideas has become broader, deeper, more irresistible in its course. The battle for religious liberty in Turkey has been fought and won ; the death-penalty for apostasy from the Mohammedan religion is forever abolished by a Royal Firman ; eight evangelical churches have been organized among the Armenians, and the Gospel has been preached throughout *Bitthynia*, in ancient *Armenia*, in *Cilicia*, in *Mesopotamia* and *Kürdistan*. The Press has begun to pour forth its flood of light ; the number of missionaries has increased to twenty-four ; a Female Seminary has been established at Constantinople ; the missionaries have begun to ordain native pastors over the churches ; the Protestants have begun to receive civil protection from the Turkish Government, though not yet recognized as a separate Christian community. The translation of the Scriptures is going forward prosperously ; hymns are prepared and sung in many languages. Passing over another period of ten years to 1861, we find that missionaries are living and working throughout the whole of Asia Minor, at *Nicomedia, Brusa, Smyrna, Trebizond, Erzroom, Sivas, Tocat, Harpoot, Arabkir, Marash, Oorfa, Aintab, Antioch*, and *Adana*. We find that the one mission to the Armenians has expanded into the three missions of *Western, Eastern, and Central Turkey*. We find that forty-two

churches have been organized, that one hundred and nine common schools have been established, that forty-six men have been trained for the ministry, of whom ten have been ordained as pastors of churches; that the entire Bible has been translated and published in both the Armenian and the Armeno-Turkish languages; that Theological Schools for the education of young men for the ministry have been established at *Aintab* and *Harpoot* as well as at *Constantinople*. We find that the policy of *self-support* has been inaugurated in all parts of the country, and that the evangelical churches and communities begin nobly to bear their share in the work of evangelizing the empire. The number of missionaries has increased to forty-four; the newly organized churches begin to think of forming ecclesiastical associations or "*Unions*," that they may work together for the common cause. Hundreds of women have learned to read the Bible intelligently for themselves; a Female Seminary has been established at *Aintab* in Central Turkey; public opinion begins to favor and demand the elevation and education of women. Missionaries have established themselves in the very heart of *Kürdistan*; others have faced death itself at the hands of the robbers of the Taurus Mountains. In 1861 the contest has become a pitched battle in which the native Protestants, led by missionaries, native pastors, preachers, and teachers, boldly attack the enemy everywhere. The principal weapon is "the sword of the Spirit;" it appears more and more evident that the whole Armenian nation is becoming enlightened, at least intellectually, and that the real work of reformation is going on *outside* of the Protestant churches and communities.

If we pass over another period of ten years, to the end of 1871, we find that there are *seventy-six* evangelical churches among the Armenians, with *four thousand and thirty-two church-members*; that there are *fifty* ordained native pastors, and *fifty-six* educated licensed preachers; that 222 common schools contain 5,080 scholars, and that the number of registered Protestants has increased to 19,471; that there are 202 places where the gospel is regularly preached, and that 128 Sabbath schools are attended each Sabbath by over 8,000 persons. We find that during this ten years, from 1861 to 1871, 305,700 copies of the Bible and portions of the Bible have been sold in Turkey

for nearly \$90,000 in gold. We find that the whole number of bound volumes issued from the press from the time of its first establishment is 711,700, besides all the books and tracts published in the languages of Turkey by the Bible and Tract Societies of England and America. We find four schools for the training of young men for the ministry at *Marsovan*, *Harpoot*, *Mardin*, and *Marash*; that there are eleven well organized schools exclusively for the education of girls under the care of ladies from America, and that in these schools several hundred Armenian girls are fitting themselves to exert a silent but mighty influence in the work of reformation.*

Stated in their baldest form, these are some of the results of the operations of the American Board among the Armenians. To our minds these facts are very suggestive; they show that the Armenians were prepared for reformation and were quick to appreciate the advantages placed within their reach by the missionaries; and the same facts give us hope for the future.

Much is said just now about working for the *permanent* races. Here is a race that can trace back its history as far as history goes, and that it appears to have a noble future before it. The geographical position of this race is such as to give it the widest possible influence in *Turkey*, *Persia*, and *Russia*. The dangers that threaten the Armenians in the future are internal rather than external; unity of action in securing the results of their newly-acquired freedom and intelligence are essential to their prosperity, yet they seem slow to realize this fact. The wealthy and influential Armenians at Constantinople seem jealous of each other and quite unwilling to act together for the national good. In other parts of the country there seems among the Protestants to be quite a disposition to break away from the leadership of the American missionaries. It would be foolish to claim that those missionaries have made no mistakes; no one can assert for them that they are all men of the profoundest wisdom and of the gentlest manners; the campaign in which those missionaries have, for forty-two years, been

* No one can become acquainted with the recent religious history of the Oriental churches without examining the exhaustive work of the Rev. Rufus Anderson, D.D., entitled "*Republication of the Gospel in Bible Lands*," or "*Missions to the Oriental Churches*." Congregational Board of Publication, 1873.

engaged, has taxed heavily the patience, the endurance, the tempers of the officers in command. Taking a broad view of the results of the campaign, the officers have no reason to be ashamed of their record. Much, however, remains to be done; the battles are not all fought; in fact, the great contest with the giant system of Mohammed has only begun. In the great battle of the future the evangelical Armenian churches ought to be in the very front. Will they be? Much will depend on the training which they receive, but more on the spirit which actuates them. If our words could reach all the parties concerned, we would urge the missionaries among the Armenians to give to the native *pastors, preachers, and teachers* the most thorough training possible; they are to be the leaders in the work of evangelizing Turkey; the native churches are beginning to demand well-educated ministers; many of the native pastors themselves feel that they are but poorly qualified for their work; it seems morally certain that if this demand for a more thoroughly trained ministry is not met by the American missionaries, the native churches will apply to other sources for aid. Do not the real interests of the reformation in Turkey require that this movement in the direction of a higher education be guided and kept under the control of the practical sense of Americans? We are glad to know that many Armenian youth are pursuing their studies in the Robert College at Constantinople, and that the missionaries and the officers of the American Board are aiding the evangelical churches in Central Turkey to establish a first-class college at *Aintab*.*

* We cannot forbear quoting the following recommendation of the proposed college at Aintab. It is from the Rev. Cyrus Hamlin, D.D, President of Robert College at Constantinople. No man is better qualified to speak on such a subject than Dr. Hamlin.

Constantinople, Sept. 1, 1872.

"The present is the era of education in the Turkish Empire. After the conquest of Constantinople there was a long period in which Turkish fanaticism, not without some excellencies of administration, bore sway; then followed a still longer period of decay and death. The missionaries came in at the right moment to commence their work. The Greek revolution had given a rude arousing shock to the empire. European modes of warfare must be learned. Four centuries before, Turkey had taught Europe the art of war, Europe must now teach her; the steamboat also appeared in Turkish waters. The dense stolid mass of ignorance and self-conceit was riven here and there. The missionaries gave to the empire common schools,

We would urge the Armenians themselves to remember that, notwithstanding all their real or supposed defects, the best and most thoroughly tried friends of the Armenian race are the American missionaries; the dust of many of those missionaries is now mingling with the dust of the ancestors of the Armenian people. Many an American mother has buried her loved children in the sacred soil of Armenia. Ethnologically the Armenians and the Americans are second cousins; they ought to regard each other with mutual respect, to love each other, and to labor for each other's good. Considering what has been accomplished for the Armenians by their transatlantic cousins, especially by such men as *Hamlin, Riggs, Dwight, Schneider, Pratt*, and others, it ill becomes that interesting people to attempt to disparage or belittle the work of the American missionaries in Turkey. The reformation of the Turkish Empire is one of the great enterprises of modern times; those in charge of this enterprise cannot afford to waste their time and spend their strength in contending with each other. Those Christian friends in England and America who seem disposed to encourage distrust and jealousy in the minds of native pastors and preachers towards the missionaries, can hardly realize what a vital blow they are striking at the very life of the whole enterprise. For many centuries the Armenians have been an oppressed people; in lifting them from darkness into the light let us be patient, hopeful, forbearing. We should remember that they are a people justly proud of their antiquity, their native country, and the heroic deeds of their ancestors. Scattered throughout *Turkey, Persia and Southern Russia*, there can be little doubt that they are to exert an important influence in those countries during the next cen-

with beautiful intelligible school books in the spoken languages; they gave also the Word of God. Attentive observers know how silently, widely, and mightily, these new forces have wrought, where neither missionaries nor their agents have ever been. The intelligence of all these many peoples has been wonderfully aroused. But now another great step has been taken—the people everywhere demand a higher education—the highest that can be had. The history of the College in Central Turkey, now proposed, is proof of this. In great poverty and depression a noble beginning has been made. Those who aid it will throw the transforming power of a high Christian education right into the heart of this great and dark empire. To what nobler purpose can wealth be applied?"

ture. The officers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions have shown true wisdom in extending a sympathizing hand to that people in their hour of need. We believe that the name of that Board will be mentioned with heartfelt gratitude by generations yet unborn among the mountains and valleys of Armenia.

This old yet ever young nation appeals to its brethren beyond the seas in the words of the Macedonian cry: "Come over and help us." Shall they appeal in vain? It will require many years of patient toil for *America* to perfect the reformation of *Armenia*, but the work is well begun and can be accomplished; that reformation has a solid basis in the physical strength, the virtue, the mental ability of the Armenians. Let, then, the youngest of the nations stretch out its hand to the oldest; let the blood of the new world flow into the veins and arteries of the old. Once reformed and educated, why should not the Armenians become the pioneers of a Christian civilization that shall renew the youth of the dead empires of the East?

ARTICLE II.—CONSTITUTION-MAKING.

The Constitutional Convention ; its History, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding. By JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, Judge of the Superior Court of Chicago, and Professor of Constitutional Law, &c., in the Law Department of the Chicago University. New York and Chicago. 1867.

Historical Notes on the Constitutions of Connecticut 1639-1818. Particularly on the Origin and Progress of the Movement which resulted in the Convention of 1818, and the Adoption of the present Constitution. By J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL. Hartford: Brown & Gross. 1873.

Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Connecticut, held at Hartford in 1818. Printed by order of the Legislature. Hartford. 1873.

CONSTITUTIONAL government means, in the language of the British empire, a certain balance of powers in the State—a partly traditional and partly statute arrangement which enables the crown, the aristocracy, and the common people, to hold each other in check. More especially it means that the crown can raise no money but by act of Parliament, and that money-bills must originate in the House of Commons. In the language of the United States, constitutional government means government under a written constitution—government constituted and limited by a certain statute or written law which it can neither overrule nor change, and which differs from all other statutes in that it is the sovereign charter, from which the power to ordain all other statutes is derived. The constitution creates the government; and, by the distribution which it makes of the various powers essential to a government, it provides for the enactment of laws, for the administration of justice according to law, for individual liberty, for the security of right against power, and for the conservation of all those common interests which are recognized as coming within the sphere of government. Our idea, therefore, and that which is current among

our British kindred, are alike to this extent: a constitutional government is one in which various powers essential to the State are so adjusted that, while each is helpless without the others, each is in a measure independent of the others. The difference is that in the British empire "the constitution" is essentially unwritten, an agglomeration of statutes and traditions, liable to be swept away by "the omnipotence of Parliament," or (in a closer analysis) by the omnipotence of the House of Commons; while with us "the constitution"—whether of a State or of the United States—is always a written instrument ordained by the people, and incapable of being changed or swept away by any of the powers which it delegates to the servants of the people.

Thus it is that, in this country, the process of making or amending written constitutions—especially the constitutions of the several States—is almost always going on somewhere. A new State, coming into existence as a member of the Union, must form for itself a constitution, and after a while that constitution will need amendment—perhaps a thorough revision. A thriving State may outgrow the organic law which was once well suited to its character and condition. Changes not only in the number, but in the distribution and character of its population, may require some political reconstruction to which ordinary legislation is incompetent. Changes in the occupations and industry of the people, and in the amount and distribution of wealth, may be so great that the constitution which was sufficient for the State when almost every citizen cultivated his own farm, and lived in a frugal independence, has become an inconvenient anachronism. In the general progress of the age, corporations of immense wealth, controlled each by an individual who wields it as if it were his own, and continually entering into more formidable combinations with each other, may have grown till the State has suddenly found itself overshadowed by a power which its legislature, under existing arrangements, cannot resist. The progress of political science, guided by experience, may indicate new methods of maintaining individual liberty, of securing intelligence and purity in legislative bodies, and uprightness in the administration of public affairs, or of guarding the people against that tendency

by which power passes, unobserved, from the many to the few ; and a revision of the constitution may be necessary in order that the State may incorporate into its institutions the best results of political science or of its own experience in self-government. At this time, the question of constitutional revision is a question immediately practical in Michigan, in Pennsylvania, in Connecticut, and in other States—we need not remember how many.

Judge Jameson's volume, referred to at the head of this Article, is learned, discriminating, sound in its theory of society and government, and judicious in its discernment and application of principles. It is, therefore, a work of great value in our country, and might be of equal value in any country where the people are endeavoring to establish a government limited and controlled by a written constitution. It is unique, we believe, in its subject and plan—the first of its kind.

We have also referred to a valuable pamphlet by the Hon. J. Hammond Trumbull, a scholar eminently learned and accurate in the history of his native State. Under the modest title of *Historical Notes*, he has given a mass of information on the successive constitutions of Connecticut, and especially on the origin of the constitution which was framed by a convention in 1818, and ratified by the people. That constitution has been greatly changed by the process of amendment—many of its most important provisions have been set aside—in other respects it has long been acknowledged to be seriously defective; and yet the convention that framed it, fifty-five years ago, is the latest for such a purpose in the history of Connecticut. We believe there is no other State in the Union which has not had at least one constitutional convention within the last half century. It is not, however, our intention to discuss in this place any question of purely local interest. We prefer rather to avail ourselves of Mr. Trumbull's notes for the illustration of a much wider question,—when and where was the first constitutional convention, and what was its work? When and where did this eminently American habit of constitution-making have its beginning?*

* In the following paragraphs, we make free use of a "Discourse on the Early Constitutional History of Connecticut, delivered before the Conn. Historical Society, Hartford, May 17, 1843.

The earliest instance of what is now so familiarly known as a written constitution—a distinct organic law, constituting a government and defining its powers—is found in the history of Connecticut. The middle ages had abounded in charters; but those charters were of the nature of a treaty between a people in arms and its sovereign, or of grants from the sovereign to a community. The “Great Charter” which the English barons wrested from King John, is not what we call a constitution; nor is the charter of a city or borough recognized by that name. The Pilgrims at Cape Cod, when they were about to land in the wilderness, entered into a formal compact, written out and subscribed with their names, “combining themselves into a civil body politic;” and by virtue of that compact they undertook “to enact, constitute, and frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices as should be thought most meet and convenient for the general good.” But this was not what we now understand by a constitution; it was only a voluntary compact under which any kind of government from an absolute democracy to an absolute despotism might have been constituted. Still less can we recognize as a constitution, in our American meaning, the charter granted by Charles I. to a trading and colonizing company in England, and afterward brought over by Winthrop and his colleagues, as a legal warrant for transferring the government of their colony from the Old England to the New. That was a bold stroke of statesmanship, and the world is indebted to the mind that formed the project and the courage that carried it into effect. What was intended to be the charter of a business corporation, governing with arbitrary power a colony three thousand miles away, became a charter of political rights and powers for the colony itself. But Massachusetts never set the example of constitution-making till 1779, when the Puritan colony had become an independent State.

The founders of Connecticut came from the colony, then six or eight years old, which had been established in the territory and under the charter of “the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay.” Before leaving their homes in that colony, they had negotiated with the representatives of certain Puritan noblemen and gentlemen in England who claimed, by a title

indirectly derived from the crown of England, the territory now included in the State of Connecticut; and, by the consent of all parties, a temporary government for the proposed expedition was appointed. The new settlements on the river were to be made by a body of emigrants from Massachusetts; and, at their desire, inasmuch as they "judged it inconvenient to go away without any frame of government," eight of the intending emigrants were commissioned by the General Court of Massachusetts with so much authority as was necessary "that some present government may be observed." Those eight persons, two of them among the settlers at Springfield, were to act as magistrates for the time being, and were invested with authority "for the peaceable and quiet ordering the affairs of the said plantations;" but the commission was not to extend "any longer time than one year from the date thereof." Evidently it was supposed that some other government, more permanent in its character, would be established within a twelvemonth. That commission expired by its own limitation on the 3d of March, 1637. In the mean time, courts had been held by the commissioners (the provisional government) at each of the three towns afterward named Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield; but never at Springfield, and only once with either of the two Springfield commissioners present; causes had been tried; boundaries had been settled; and various regulations for securing the welfare of the nascent State had been established. But when the commission expired, no sign of any change appears upon the record—no intimation that the provisional government had been superseded. On the 21st of February, orders were issued that were "to take effect on the first of April next;" and on the 28th of March—more than three weeks after the expiration of the commission—we find the same commissioners or magistrates holding a court at Hartford without any intimation of a change in the source or the extent of their authority,—save as one name unaccountably disappears from the record and is succeeded by another. But on the first of May we find a "General Court," consisting of the six commissioners (as we have called them) together with "committees"—a committee of three from each of the three towns. By that "General Court," convened we know not how, war was declared, an army of

ninety men was raised, and all needful military stores were provided by assessment on the several towns, and one month later (June 2) it was ordered that thirty men be sent forth "to set down in the Pequot country and river, in place convenient to maintain our right that God by conquest hath given to us."

All this makes it evident that in place of the provisional and merely temporary government originally appointed by the General Court of Massachusetts, there had begun to be something more permanent. How it happened we know not; but in some way those three towns, planted beyond the limits of the Massachusetts corporation, had become a commonwealth with its own General Court. Governments have ordinarily come into being by use—by the exercise of power on the part of those who happened to have power—by the submission and implied consent of the people; and in some such way government seems to have been growing up and becoming an established fact in the little commonwealth on the Connecticut. Perhaps the question how to constitute their government had been discussed among the planters without arriving at a decision. Perhaps there had been some expectation that the Puritan lords and gentlemen, patentees under the Earl of Warwick, would be able to obtain for them some charter of political rights. Be that as it may, the General Court at Hartford which waged war against the Pequots and took possession of "the Pequot river and country" by right of conquest, was a government *de facto*, and therefore (according to the principle affirmed by the Apostle Paul, "The powers that be are ordained of God") it was, so long as it could maintain itself, a government *de jure*. As yet, the relation of Springfield to the other towns on the river was undetermined. Without notice or explanation, the names of the commissioners for that town disappear from the record, after November, 1636. But in February, 1638, it was "ordered that the General Court now in being shall be dissolved;" and at the next General Court (March 8=18) names of members from Agawam (not yet named Springfield) reappear. Thomas Hooker says, with obvious reference to that date: "At the time of our election, the committees from the town of Agawam came in with other towns, and chose their magistrates, installed them into their government, took oath of them for the execution of justice according

to God, and engaged themselves to submit to their government."*

It appears, then, that by some process, the government had passed from the hands of provisional commissioners into the hands of the people. Magistrates were chosen "at the time of election," and were inducted not without public solemnity. They were installed by making oath to execute justice according to God; and on the part of the people there was a reciprocal engagement to sustain the magistrates by loyal obedience. But no trace appears of any other fundamental law than the will of the people, enlightened and guided by the book which they recognized as the Word of God.

Just then, while the government of the young commonwealth was shaping itself without any extrinsic authority or aid, and while much discussion of the primary questions of political science was going on (we may be sure) throughout the colony—the pastor of Hartford, Thomas Hooker, in a Thursday lecture, May 31, took for his text those words of Moses (Deut. i, 13), "Take you wise men, and understanding, and known among your tribes, and I will make them rulers over you." Shaping his discourse according to the homiletic fashion of those times, he first explained the text by referring to the distribution of powers among rulers in the Hebrew commonwealth,—“captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, and captains over fifties, and captains over tens, and officers among the tribes”—and then propounded these points of “doctrine:”

“I. That the choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people, by God’s own allowance.

“II. The privilege of election, which belongs to the people, therefore must not be exercised according to their humors, but according to the blessed will and law of God.

“III. They who have power to appoint officers and magistrates, it is in their power, also, to set the bounds and limitations of the power and place unto which they call them.”†

* Coll. Conn. Historical Society, i, 13.

† Coll. Conn. Hist. Soc., i, 20. Henry Wolcott, jr., of Windsor, born 1610, was a diligent hearer of sermons; and, after the Puritan fashion, he wrote down in short-hand characters all the sermons which he heard. A volume filled with such reports of sermons—less legible than the arrow-headed legend on a brick from Nineveh—came into the library of the Historical Society at Hartford; and, many

Next the "reasons," or *rationale*, of these three doctrinal propositions were set forth, for to that extent all the old preachers were rationalists. It was always expected that the preacher, after deducing his doctrine or doctrines from his text, with added "proof" from other Scriptures, would commend the truth, as reasonable, to the intelligence of his hearers. In the sermon now referred to, the "reasons" for the doctrines were these. "1. Because the foundation of authority is laid, firstly, in the free consent of the people." In one way or another, the authority of every government rests, primarily, on the consent of the people governed, and *therefore* the choice of magistrates belongs to the people "by God's allowance."—"2. Because, by a free choice, the hearts of the people will be more inclined to the love of the persons chosen, and more ready to yield obedience." Surely there is no better way of ensuring the regard of the people for the men entrusted with power.—"3. Because of that duty and engagement of the people." If the people are bound to honor and obey the magistrates set over them, surely it is reasonable that they choose for themselves the men to whom that honor and obedience shall be due. The "uses" with which the sermon closed, and in which its doctrinal teaching was brought home to the conscience, were, *first*, of thankfulness, "in the manifestation of God's faithfulness toward us, and the permission of these measures that God doth command and vouchsafe." God, in his faithfulness toward us, doth vouchsafe to us permission to frame our commonwealth according to the rules and measures of his word. "2. Of reproof,—to dash the conceits of all those that shall oppose" the people's right and duty in this matter. "3. Of exhortation—to persuade us, as God hath given us liberty, to *take* it. And lastly—as God hath spared our lives and given us them in liberty, so to seek the guidance of God and to choose *in* God, and *for* God."

So carefully and devoutly did the founders of the three towns on the river search out the profoundest principles of political philosophy. In those days the Thursday lecture had an importance which is now not easily estimated. It stimulated

years also, the fact that nobody could read it, provoked the strenuous mind of Mr. J. Hammond Trumbull. The consequence was that very sufficient "notes" of two political sermons by the first pastor of Hartford were recovered and published.

thought and gave direction to opinion on political and ethical themes as well as on matters of theological dogma and religious experience. The points of such a sermon as that, from Thomas Hooker, with its "doctrines," its "reasons," and its "uses," could not but be discussed in church meetings and in town meetings, by many a fireside as well as in the field, and where neighbors met by the wayside. The seed sown by Hooker, and doubtless by others, fell into a receptive soil, and out of such discussions there came, before another year was completed, a written constitution of government, established by the people.

On the 14th=24th of January, 1639, the "free planters" of the three towns, Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield, came together, not by their representatives but personally, in the first constitutional convention of which history has any knowledge. It would be idle to suppose that there had been no special preparation for that assembly. The leading men in the various towns must have held conferences in which the plan for a government was considered, and all the particulars adjusted. A draught of the instrument to be laid before the assembled people must have had careful attention and repeated revision, till every contingency had been provided for and every obscurity made clear. Probably one short winter day was enough for the constituent convention. If any changes were made, or proposed, in the draught submitted to the assembly for adoption, we have no knowledge of them. We only know that the instrument, whenever and by whomsoever prepared, was adopted and became the fundamental law of the commonwealth.

The preamble of that instrument recognizes, first, the fact of divine providence that the persons assembled were already a people dwelling together as neighbors in relations of common interest and mutual duty; and, secondly, the principle, certified to them by the Word of God, that "to maintain the peace and union of such a people there should be an orderly and decent government established according to God." In other words, it holds and professes that the existence of the body politic, to govern and to be governed, is a divine fact, and that civil government is a divine institution. It proceeds to declare, "We the inhabitants" of these three towns "do therefore associate and conjoin ourselves to be as one public STATE or COMMON-

WEALTH ; and do, for ourselves and our successors and such as shall be adjoined to us at any time hereafter, enter into combination and confederation together, to maintain and preserve the liberty and purity of the gospel of our Lord Jesus which we now profess, as also the discipline of the churches which, according to the truth of the gospel, is now practiced among us." Then follow eleven articles or "Orders" (sections of a constitution, they would now be called), according to which the civil affairs of the commonwealth were to be guided and governed,—the imperial phrase, "It is ordered, sentenced, and decreed," being prefixed to each in succession.* Those eleven articles are what is now called a constitution. They guard the rights of the people. They provide for the annual election of officers in the commonwealth. They assign to each office by name its duties, and mark the limit of its powers. They distribute among those annually elected officers the various functions of legislative and executive administration, guarding against usurpation and mutual encroachment, and especially taking care that "the SUPREME POWER of the commonwealth" shall be and remain with the people.

The essential features of that constitution, framed in 1639, have continued to this day. Not to speak of the constitutional changes which other commonwealths and kingdoms have undergone since that date, the changes in the British constitution have been far greater than in the constitution of Connecticut. The government of the State to-day is essentially the same with that which was constituted by the inhabitants of Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield so long ago. According to that constitution, a chief magistrate bearing the title of "Governor" was to be annually elected by the people ; and, on the first Wednesday in May last, the people of Connecticut completed the two hundred and thirty-fourth annual election of a "Governor,"—the year 1688, when Sir Edward Andros had seized upon the government in the name of King James the II, being the only

* It is not always remembered that the enacting phrase—"Be it enacted,"—prefixed to every section of a parliamentary statute, was originally a petition to the sovereign that there might be such a law. But Haynes, Ludlow, Hooker, and the others remembered what that phrase meant, and used that other phrase, "*It is ordered, sentenced, and decreed*" intelligently.

year in which the election has not taken place according to constitutional forms. The towns were to be represented by their "Deputies" in a legislative assembly; and, save while that brief reign of violence endured, the towns have been represented in "the General Assembly" every year till now. There was to be also a body of "Magistrates," chosen not by the towns but by the general suffrage of the people, to assist the deputies or representatives of towns in legislation, and to assist the governor in maintaining order and justice according to law; and these Connecticut has to-day under the names of Senators and Judges, between whom the powers originally given to "Magistrates," or "Assistants," are divided.

That constitution made no profession of allegiance to the King of England, nor did it acknowledge any dependence on the English Parliament. On the contrary, it expressly claimed for the assembled people "the supreme power of the commonwealth," and it empowered and directed the Governor and Magistrates "to administer justice according to *the laws here established*, and for want thereof, according to *the rule of the Word of God*." The men who make that constitution knew what they were doing; and they intended that English law, as English, should have no force in their commonwealth. The common law, as well as the statutes of England, recognized and presumed a royal government upheld by feudal institutions, a hereditary aristocracy, an established prelacy in the church, a prescribed liturgy in worship; and the men who were assembled in that constitution-making convention had come across the Atlantic Ocean for the purpose of being beyond the reach of laws which had not been satisfactory to their experience. No small portion of American history, from the first age through many ages yet to come, has been determined by this one feature of primitive New England legislation.

That constitution was adopted almost two years before the beginning of the Long Parliament. While the little republic on the river, coördinate with the New Haven jurisdiction on the Sound, was quietly shaping itself, and enjoying the immunities of political independence, the ancient monarchy in their mother country fell before the wrath of the people whose liberty the King was subverting, and then rose again because

the people were as yet incapable of self-government. After a few years of almost continual revolution, royalty was restored in England; and not royalty alone, but the royal family of the Stuarts. The infatuation and helplessness of the nation placed Charles II. on his father's throne, with no stipulation for liberty or for justice, but such as his treachery, aided by the art and cunning of his ministers, was able to violate without shame or fear. It was a perilous time for all the New England colonies, and especially for Connecticut and New Haven, with no charters to legalize their institutions. For a little while the impoverished settlements in a distant wilderness might be overlooked by hungry courtiers, eager for offices and for lands. But surely they would soon attract attention, and then they must be at the mercy of unscrupulous and malignant rapacity. Their constitutions, created by themselves, and resting on no basis but the laws of God and of nature, would be of no account in the courts of Westminster Hall. No man held, by any title which the English laws would recognize, the land which his own labor had changed from a pathless forest into a fruitful field, and which had been purchased of aboriginal proprietors in amicable treaty, or won from the murdering Pequot in a legitimate war. The weakness of the colonies, then in their infancy, forbade them to defend their hard-earned possessions with the sword. By a single stroke of the pen, that King of England, in some hour of drunken generosity, or at the instigation of any of their enemies, might give away to a parasite or a harlot all that they called their own. What were they to do? They had no resource but in submission and the arts of negotiation.

The sagacious eye of the second John Winthrop, who was at that time Governor of Connecticut, saw the peril; and his experienced skill in public affairs perceived, as in a moment, the only safe course. Under his guidance, the legislature, without any loss of time, determined to apply to the King for a charter which should recognize and establish their rights. In so doing, they could not but acknowledge their dependence on a king, and make profession of allegiance. Yet the people of Connecticut, in taking measures to obtain a royal charter, proceeded not as individuals but as a political body. Their agent was

their Governor. Their petition to the King was entitled "The Humble Petition of The General Court at Hartford, upon the Connecticut, in New England," and it bore the official signature of their secretary. They asked for a charter which should give validity in English courts to the jurisdiction which they were already exercising. Fortunate in their agent, and no less fortunate in the opportunity which they had so promptly seized, they obtained all that they dared to ask for; and the republic, which their voluntary compact had created, became, without any change in its internal government, a municipality, acknowledged and protected by the King.

It is true that in some points the provisions of the charter differ slightly from the "Orders" of 1689. But, as Mr. Trumbull shows, the right to modify and amend those constitutional orders had been, from the first, "understood to remain with the freemen in General Court assembled," and was repeatedly exercised. Either an express determination of "the Freemen," or a settled usage, had authorized almost every difference, however minute, between the orders of 1689 and the charter of 1662. The "Magistrates," named in the one, were called by the other "Assistants," and—though the original constitution, while providing that the three towns then existing should be equally represented by deputies, had also provided that the representation of such towns as might afterward be established should be determined by the general court "*in a reasonable proportion* to the number of freemen in said towns"—the charter ordained (what had already been settled by the consent of the people) that the "Deputies" should be not more than two from every "town or city." With no other change, the entire frame of the already existing government was confirmed. "The Governor and Company of the English Colonies of Connecticut, being incorporated with municipal privileges, were qualified "to plead and be impleaded," in any of the King's courts; and their right to their lands and liberty and local self-government was guarded by an instrument as valid in law as the Great Charter of England itself.

The Declaration of Independence changed the relations of Connecticut to the King of Great Britain, but made no change in the constitution of the old commonwealth. In June, 1776,

the General Assembly, by a unanimous vote, directed that its delegates in the Continental Congress should propose to that body "to declare the United American Colonies Free and Independent States, absolved from all allegiance to the King of Great Britain." A few days later, Governor Trumbull received official notice that such a declaration had been made, and, the assent of Connecticut having been given beforehand, there was no need of any ratification. Only a few slight changes—such as the substitution of "State" for "Colony," and the omission of all reference to the King—were made in the forms of justice and of legislation; and the government went on, just as it had gone on from the 14th of January, 1639,—the same democracy in towns, the same annual election of Governor and Assistants, the same General Assembly, the same laws.

What we call "the Revolution" was, therefore, no revolution in the constitutional government of Connecticut. At the October session of the General Assembly, 1776, the Declaration of Independence was approved; and a resolution was put upon record "that this Colony is and of right ought to be a free and independent State, and the inhabitants thereof absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown." A declaration was also made, "that the form of civil government in this State shall continue to be as established by charter received from Charles the Second, King of England, so far as an adherence to the same will be consistent with an absolute independence of this State on the Crown of Great Britain." In other words, as there was no internal revolution when the Colony acknowledged its dependence on the Crown of England by asking for a royal charter and accepting it, so there was none when that dependence was abolished. The identical "form of civil government" which was created by the "Orders" of 1639, and which, twenty-three years later, was "established" and made valid in English law by the Charter, remained unshaken.*

At the next semi-annual Assembly (May, 1777) a new form of the Freeman's Oath was prescribed. From time immemorial

* "The application of the people for the charter, and their voluntary acceptance of it, gave efficiency to the government it constituted,—and not the royal signature." Mr. Trumbull quotes this pregnant sentence from Swift's *System of the Laws of Connecticut*, i, 56.

every man admitted to the privileges of a Freeman in the Colony had taken a certain oath of fidelity. But, thenceforward, the Freeman must swear "to be true and faithful to the Governor and Company of this State, and the *Constitution* and government thereof." The State was no longer a colonial dependency of the British Crown, but "the constitution and government thereof" had undergone no change.

At the end of the war which "established" the independence of the State, declared in 1776,—as the Charter had "established" the form of civil government set up in 1639,—there was a revision and new edition of the Statutes; and in the preamble of "an Act containing an Abstract and Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the People of this State," there was this formal declaration: "The people of this State, being, by the Providence of God, free and independent, have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent State, and having from their ancestors derived a free and excellent constitution of government, whereby the legislature depends on the free and annual election of the people, they have the best security for the preservation of their civil and religious rights and liberties;" and for twenty-three years more there was no modification whatever in that "free and excellent constitution of government."

It would have been well if, when the independence of the United States had been established as a fact within the cognizance of Westminster Hall, the General Assembly of Connecticut had taken measures not only for a revision of the Statutes, but also for a revision of the Constitution. In common estimation, that ancient form of government, though instituted by the people, had been identified with the charter which only confirmed it; and for that reason a new grant of power to the government from the people was desirable. A revision of the fundamental law, by delegates chosen for the purpose, was not unreasonably demanded after the lapse of a hundred and forty-five years from the day when the planters of the three towns on the river organized the first government that ever derived its powers from a written constitution. Every other State of the Thirteen, with one exception, had framed, or was framing, an organic law for itself in the name of its sovereign people.

In some respects the time was favorable for a Constitutional Convention in Connecticut. Whatever changes were desirable might have been made then, in a conservative spirit, by the men whose experienced sagacity had conducted the State through the revolutionary crisis without a revolution. That opportunity was lost. The constitution, as it was, seemed to be working well; and the desire of some for a new organic law, to be framed by a convention and ratified by the people, was deemed, by those who had the control, unworthy of attention. But the minority grew;—certain features in the old constitution became more conspicuously incongruous with the political ideas of the new era;—certain combinations of parties interested in a change were formed;—and at last, in 1818, came the Convention which framed what was called a “new” constitution for Connecticut. In the lapse of a hundred and seventy-eight years there had been no such change of the fundamental law as was then proposed by the Convention and adopted by the people.

Yet that instrument—though not in form an amendment or series of amendments—was essentially the old constitution, revised, and, in some important particulars, reformed. It made some extension of the right of suffrage; it changed the “Council” or “Upper House” of twelve “Assistants” into a “Senate” of twelve members; it lessened somewhat the powers and dignity of the governor; it provided for a yearly instead of a semi-annual General Assembly; and it did some other things of about the same significance. But at the same time it made two great changes, more beneficial than all the rest; it created an independent judiciary; and, by sweeping away the ancient laws which required every taxable citizen to contribute somewhere for the support of public worship, it severed the last thread of special connection between the Congregational churches and the civil government.

The constitution of 1818 is still prefixed to the Connecticut Statute-book with a long series of appended amendments, which have been proposed by the legislature and adopted by the people, and some of which, certainly, are amendments only in name. As we look at those so-called amendments, remembering when and why they were made, it becomes evident that, in the States

of this Union, a Constitutional Convention, revising the entire structure of the government, and chosen expressly for the purpose, is necessary, from time to time, in order to undo what is blunderingly or mischievously done by the ordinary process of constitutional amendment in distinction from the process of constitutional revision.

The process of amendment is substantially the same in most of the States. That in Connecticut may be taken as an example. While the organic law, with judicious forethought, provides for its own amendment, it carefully guards itself against sudden and inconsiderate changes. A proposal for amendment must be moved in the House of Representatives, and must be recognized by a majority as necessary. Then it must wait for a twelvemonth, and must be approved by a vote of two-thirds in each house of the next annual legislature. After that, the people have the opportunity of ratifying or rejecting it. In the words of Judge Jameson, "Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves,—they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine."

For this reason, it seems necessary that a constitution should provide for its own amendment by permitting changes to be initiated by the legislature and ratified or rejected by the people. But it may be doubted whether the power of amendment, thus given to the legislature, carries with it the power of revising the entire instrument and introducing another in the place of it. Admit that what is called a "new" constitution, introduced in the place of an old one, is only an amended constitution—the old one in a new draft with modifications supposed to be improvements;—the distinction is nevertheless real between specific amendments, one after another as occasion seems to demand, and a general revision in order to a new draft. Specific amendments may be, reasonably enough, initiated by the legislature; for the more serious work of general revision, a Constitutional Convention seems necessary. When a state constitution has been tinkered for half a century by the legislative method of

amendment, it will be sure to need such a revision and reconstruction as cannot be had without a Convention. Judge Jameson says:

"The amendments to our Constitutions are very commonly of no great extent; a doubt has arisen, perhaps, as to the construction to be put upon a particular clause; a change may be desired in the qualifications for the suffrage, or in the basis of representation; a branch of the administration is found to be too cumbrous for use; or a new distribution among the agencies of government of their constitutional powers is thought to be advisable to facilitate the transaction of business, or to render public operations more safe, or more economical. For amendments of such a stamp, separately considered, the mode by legislative action is well adapted; and it is adapted to no other. It ought to be confined, in my judgment, to changes which are simple or formal, and, therefore, of comparatively small importance. For a general revision of a Constitution, or even for single propositions involving radical changes as to the policy of which the popular mind has not been informed by prior discussion, the employment of this mode is impracticable or of doubtful expediency" (p. 495).

"The legislature is a body chosen for temporary purposes. It is a mirror of political passions and interests, and, with the best intentions, cannot be expected to be free from bias, even in questions of the highest moment. It is composed, moreover, in general, of politicians rather than of statesmen. Indeed, if a man shows himself, by culture and the breadth of his views, to be fitted for the highest trusts, it is nearly certain that he will not be found in the legislature, but be left in obscurity at home. But when a Convention is called, it is sometimes possible to secure the return of such men. It is not necessarily because such a body is recognized to be, as it is, the most important ever assembled in a State, but because the measures it is expected to mature bear less directly on the interests of parties or of individuals. Party management, therefore, is not usually so much directed to the seeking of control of a Convention as of a legislature. Besides, the proper function of the latter body, that of municipal legislation, being one of the highest vested by the sovereign in any governmental agency, it cannot but be inexpedient, on a general view, that there should be added to it that of organic legislation, requiring different and higher gifts, and wider experience and study" (pp. 494, 495).

To these considerations it may be added that in a Convention, the State may call to its service, for the revision of its organic law, any of its most distinguished citizens who, by reason of their being employed in other important public trusts, are ineligible to either house of the legislature. The Governor of the State, its highest Judges, and its Senators and Representatives in Congress, can sit in a Constitutional Convention. Men, too, of recognized wisdom, and of experience in public affairs, who have retired from what is called political activity, and who are for that reason the more honored by their fellow citizens, may be called out of their retirement to serve the State once more on so

great an occasion. There are also men who, though, as lawyers, they have seen the working of the Constitution and have had reason to take notice of its defects, cannot, without too great a sacrifice, submit to the drudgery of service in the legislature,—but who might be persuaded to serve in a Convention. If a State would employ its best wisdom, its profoundest jurisprudence, and its most experienced statesmanship, in a revision of its fundamental law—the law which is to control all other legislation, it must call together an assembly very different from its ordinary legislature.

It is a true saying that a legislature “is composed, in general, of politicians rather than of statesmen.” For that reason it is to be expected that constitutional amendments proposed and carried by the legislative method will be designed to facilitate the management and operation of political parties, rather than to promote, in any broad and generous view, the welfare of the State. For example, if no man can obtain a seat in the legislature without receiving a majority of the votes in the constituency which he desires to represent; and if it happens that, for several successive years, a considerable minority of the electors refuse to accept the nominations made by either of the two leading parties, and insist on voting for candidates of their own selection, thus, by their impracticableness, defeating the “regular nominations;” then look out for a statute—or, if need be, a constitutional amendment, which shall make a plurality of votes as effectual as a majority,—or, in other words, which shall leave to the elector no choice except between the candidates nominated by the two leading parties. Or, to suppose another case,—it may be that the constitutional arrangement for the election of a Senate is such that if a man desiring to be a Senator is not known to a great constituency, and recognized as a man of mark and merit, he can hardly get votes enough to elect him. Then look out for a constitutional amendment which shall make it easier for petty politicians, the manipulators of ward-meetings and district conventions, to dishonor the Senate by winding their way into it.

An elected legislature, even though elected only for a year, is ordinarily as tenacious of its prerogatives, and as reluctant to surrender any of its powers, as a hereditary aristocracy can be.

If, then, it happens that the judges, in a certain State, are elected by the legislature, that assembly of politicians will never—save under an outside pressure too formidable to be resisted—consent to relinquish the power of appointing judges. And if, through inadvertence on the part of the people, a constitutional amendment has been ratified which impairs the independence of the judiciary, by changing the tenure of judicial office and requiring judges to keep in view the chances of a re-election, it will be found that the legislature in that State is quite unwilling to abdicate the power of re-electing the judges after limited terms of service.

It has sometimes been maintained that if a state constitution entrusts to the legislature the power of proposing amendments, the people of that State have abdicated the right of reforming their organic law in any other way. But it may be and, as has been shown by specifications, it is a fact in at least one State—that “the method prescribed in the constitution for amending it, so that it may conform to the will of the people, is used as the very method of preventing them from getting what they want.”* If there be such a case, is there no remedy save in the inalienable right of revolution? If a State has outgrown its constitution, and finds its legislature largely representative of rotten boroughs; if it finds that it is governed, in fact, by juntos of politicians who know how to manipulate the elections in the rotten borough constituencies; if it finds that year after

* The quotation is from an able pamphlet by Albert S. Bolles, Esq., of Norwich, Connecticut, entitled “The Revision of our State Constitution.” After admitting that the time required for effecting changes in the organic law should be long enough, and the process difficult enough, to bring out “the reason and honest wishes of the people,” Mr. Bolles adds: “But who can doubt that the present mode of amending it is too slow and difficult for the accomplishment of any general plan of revision, and so prevents some changes at least which, unquestionably, a large majority of the people desire. Think of the way by which the judges of the higher courts are elected. Formerly their election was by the legislature for life, or till the age of seventy. But in 1856 an amendment was made, providing that they should be elected for the term of eight years only. Experience, however, has proved the old way to be the better, modified perhaps so as to require the governor to nominate and the legislature to elect him. Yet the legislature, reluctant to give up its powers in this respect, will not do its part toward remedying this great and obvious defect, although the people would quickly do their part if they had the chance. One reason, therefore, why a Constitutional Convention is desired is, to make changes which the people want but cannot now get.”

year its legislature, in both the houses, is less and less competent to deal intelligently and vigorously with the public business, and increasingly swayed by the button-hole persuasion and the marvelously diversified influence of a thriving lobby; if it finds that the elections of its United States senators and of its judges are controlled by that most irresponsible power, a legislative caucus of the party which happens to be the majority; and if, at the same time, everybody knows that every proposal for the reformation of such evils will be considered and decided in the legislature with a supreme reference to the interests of political parties, and with very little reference to the honor and good government of the commonwealth;—has that State no remedy against the power of its own rotten boroughs? Is there no legitimate possibility of its reforming its own constitution so long as a minority of one-third in either house, having a vested interest in the existing arrangements and the consequent abuses, is determined to obstruct the needed reformation? We hold that in such a case it is clearly in the power, and is therefore the duty, of the legislature, proceeding in the ordinary forms of legislation, to enact such a statute as will enable the people to exercise, without any revolutionary movement, their “undeniable and infeasible right to alter their form of government in such a manner as they may deem expedient.” Surely the man who, in derogation of that “undeniable and infeasible right,” expressed or implied in all our constitutions, will venture to affirm the unconstitutionality of an act providing an orderly method in which the people—the State itself as a political unit—may decide the question of a Convention to reform the state constitution, and in which the several constituencies, if the State shall order such a Convention, may elect their delegates,—cannot maintain his position by showing merely that the existing constitution is silent in regard to such an enactment. He must adduce the words in which the act is expressly forbidden.

Judge Jameson, having mentioned the historic fact that twenty-five Conventions, for revising and reforming constitutions, have been “called by the respective state legislatures, under their general legislative power, without the special authorization of their constitutions,” adds these two observations:

" 1. That whenever a constitution needs a general revision, a Convention is indispensably necessary; and if there is contained in the constitution no provision for such a body, the calling of one is, in my judgment, within the scope of the ordinary legislative power; and, 2. That, were it not a proper exercise of legislative power, the usurpation has been so often committed with the general acquiescence, that it is now too late to question it as such. *It must be laid down as among the established prerogatives of our General Assemblies, that the constitution being silent, whenever they deem it expedient, they may call Conventions to revise the fundamental law*" (p. 209).

ARTICLE III.—REVIVALS OF RELIGION.

HOW TO MAKE THEM PRODUCTIVE OF PERMANENT GOOD.

THE phrase "A Revival of Religion," or as more briefly used, "A revival," has in this country a somewhat narrow and technical meaning. It has lost its wide, historic sense, in which reference is had to a period of some length, to facts of varied nature, and to the experience of an entire country or of all Christendom: such as the national religious reformations under Luther, Calvin, and Knox. It means in our American newspapers, magazines, and books, a more local and transient excitement, which may be limited to a single congregation, or may pervade a district of country, and which implies an increase of conversions from a worldly to a spiritual life, and a large accession of communicants to the church. The circumstances may vary in nearly all the incidental particulars. The revival may come with or without a resort to special means, such as more numerous meetings, the preaching of an evangelist, or the labors of some minister other than the pastor; with or without a previous state of doctrinal or of practical declension; with or without careful and intended preparation; with or without peculiar measures in the way of manifesting feeling, testing earnestness, and directing inquirers. Revivals may differ in the degree of prominence of the ordinary exercises,—singing, prayer, the exhortations of laymen, and the sermons of clergymen. They may be unlike in the frequency of their return to the same community, in the rapidity or simultaneousness of their effects, in the duration of the special influence, and in their freedom from mixtures of superstition, animal excitement, and fanaticism. It is simply claimed, by the name in question, that, with whatever peculiarities or imperfections, there has been a truly religious influence, manifested with more than usual power, and so operating through social sympathies and channels as to affect large numbers, in a short space of time, with regenerative results. The name represents a reality. It may not stand for the

highest type of experience, in the individual or in the church ; but it represents a Christian force, which deserves study, which has rewarded use, and which such a mind as that of Jonathan Edwards thought worthy of defense and explication.

The word revival is peculiarly precious to our American churches, from its relations to their past history, and to their present attitude before the hosts of unbelief. At critical times, the spiritual interests of the nation have been saved by them, while not a few churches have owed their existence to the local revivals in border settlements, and in older communities ; the sudden conversion of great numbers to a religious life having furnished the needed material for new organizations. A large proportion of the churches in the evangelical denominations will testify that, by this instrumentality, they have been greatly if not chiefly enlarged and strengthened. And now that faith in the Bible is losing its hold on many minds, and a supernatural religion is pronounced in high quarters to be an absurdity, there is a moral sublimity in the aspect of earnest souls, who value revivals because in them the presence and agency of the Holy Spirit are manifest, and the modern as well as the ancient gospel is seen to be "in demonstration of the Spirit and of power." If still there are Pentecostal effusions, primitive Christianity survives in one of its chief characteristics, and will yet vindicate its reality and potency by a repetition of early victories.

In learning how to make these seasons of spiritual exaltation and conquest productive of permanent good, we must guard against conceptions and acts which, from a misunderstanding of their nature, limit the use of revivals, or introduce into them vitiating influences. We need to understand their philosophy to such an extent as to enable us to seek them rationally, and to employ them in a wise harmony with other instrumentalities. That a revival should not be productive of permanent good seems indeed to be a contradiction in terms, and the supposition is warranted only as the word is used to cover a mixed experience, in which human errors and sins appear by the side of phenomena referable only to divine action. We proceed, then, to answer the question proposed, by indicating the leading truths which require to be kept in mind, and by which our specific judgments and decisions should be shaped.

1. *We must keep steadily in view all that is implied in the divine authorship of revivals of religion.* If every truly converted soul is "born of God," and, through conversion, is introduced into a divine kingdom, whose victories are precisely of this spiritual nature, then a revival is the product of divine forces, and the result of a previous divine plan. It is such an event as a battle in a military campaign; and, whether it occur in a large city upon the scale of the day of Pentecost, or as a limited movement in some obscure village church, it marks the development of the scheme of the great leader. God cannot be indifferent to such phenomena, or separate from them. As conquests of his foes, they are acts of his power. He has put his will into them, as a general puts his will into the plan and conduct of a campaign, with its resultant battles and victories. For the Holy Spirit is a person and not a mere influence. He therefore enters into revivals, not as a material force, such as water, or steam, enters into machinery, being let on or shut off, by infallible and inflexible methods, and producing uniform results under uniform appliances; but He enters into them as sensitive, intelligent, voluntary divine mind acting upon similarly characterized finite minds. There is then scope and demand in revivals for everything which recognizes on our part this divine activity; for desire and love, for prayer and faith, for encouragement and submission, for joy and humility. The good is to be secured in the spiritual and not in the material kingdom of God. The effect is to be wrought by a conscious and purposed divine influence, in a way which introduces us to that which, as above the realm of mere natural causation, is therefore in the free realm of spirit, or the *super-natural*, though not ranked in the category of miracles. It will save us from many mistakes in connection with revivals to look this fact always in the face, and to study its many relations. Under its light we shall see that there is ample space for a divine choice and sovereignty in the part which revivals shall have in the religious forces of a given country, community, or church, and in the use to which God shall put given individuals. No absolute outward uniformity can be predicted, even when men imagine that they are arranging a similarity of circumstances. The richest blessing of a revival is never to be found in the unwarranted assumption that it has been the product of a fixed spiritual force in the moral world,

parallel to the law of gravity in the natural world, which can always be counted upon, and used at will, by a happy adjustment of the appropriate machinery. Not so must it be interpreted, would we give due honor to God, and cultivate in our own souls the purest joy, the truest humility, and the deepest reverence. That we may be privileged with other such scenes of power, and may have the richest resultant piety, we must cherish the thought that God, as the Head of the Church, has strictly personal relations to these revival occasions, and in wisdom and love exercises his own judgment as to time, place, men, measures, and results. With humble prayer and faith should we seek his appearing; with grateful joy and reverence should we hail his presence and accept his gifts: then may we reasonably hope to see the churches used, through revivals, as instruments of divine power.

2. *We must as carefully recognize the fact, that revivals, coming in a line of spiritual causation, involve human agency, and therefore varied methods and attendant imperfections.* It is not true that divinely induced results imply an exclusively divine operation, uniform methods, or freedom from imperfections. In his moral kingdom God deals with associated minds, and under the limitations of their ignorance and sin. He influences them not only individually but socially; not only directly but indirectly. He reveals truth gradually and in many ways; he introduces human agency; he institutes organized religion, the Church, the ministry, the sacraments; he uses the providential incidents of national and individual history; he works through all appropriate second causes as they exist at the time. This plan involves a variety of methods in producing revivals of religion. These must be adapted to the peculiarities of particular periods, nations, classes in society, and individuals, according to varying degrees of knowledge and culture, changing moods, shifting tendencies to faith or unbelief, and differing temperaments. Facts confirm the conclusions of theory. No little astonishment has been caused by the variety of instrumentalities and methods connected with revivals, and the outward diversity of results. Some have been stumbled at the marked contrast of the phenomena, till they have doubted the reality of a divine power therein, and the wisdom of seeking to renew such scenes.

But variety is characteristic of all God's works; in the spiritual as well as in the natural realm. Consider the variety of authorship, style, and contents in the books of Scripture; resorted to, plainly, as a means to reach minds, in every age and of every degree of development. Similar is the variety of revival agencies and methods, which are to work upon the German, French, Scotch, Irish, English, or the conglomerate American character; upon the higher, the middle, and the lower classes of society; upon sanguine and sluggish temperaments; upon the children of the Church and the neglected masses of the highways and hedges. It is to be expected that, in this work, men will be used according to their personal availability in relation to those to be influenced. A tasteful, scholarly minister, with methods ordered by culture, will usually have his chief power with the educated and refined; and, in a revival, God will give him a work to do among them. But a coarser-grained man, with less knowledge and ruder speech and action, will ordinarily see his work prepared for him on his own level, and will find favor with the common people. Very few possess a humanity as broad as that of Jesus, who could reach the extremes of society. Religion does not overlook natural affinities. To gain its full revival power, as a permanent force in the Church, we must so far lay aside our personal likes and dislikes as not to make them a rule for others, or to seek to confine the grace of God to the channels which might be prescribed by our ideas of taste, dignity, and propriety. All fish are not caught with the same hook, or with the same bait, and God must be allowed to select his "fishers of men" according to their skill in winning souls from particular classes, or in special circumstances. Permanent good will result from revivals only as ministers and churches learn to be as wisely comprehensive in their measures as God is: or as they grow into the spirit of Paul, in their passion for souls, and are ready to be "made all things to all men," that they may "by all means save some." Otherwise, suspicion will supplant confidence, alienation will take the place of co-operation, favorable opportunities will be lost, valuable instrumentalities will be thrown away, and important results will be disesteemed.

And of course these varied methods in revivals will involve a multitude of human imperfections—of knowledge, character, and effect—intermingled, painfully and humiliatingly, with the divine influences. Chemical laws hold good in muddy as well as in clear waters, and the sun shines as brightly on heaps of refuse as on fields of grass. The church and ministry are confessedly imperfect as organizations, and in their individual elements. It is for no one to say with how much of imperfection the Holy Spirit, in his condescension and meekness, may consent to be associated, in reaching all orders of mind and classes of society. Revivals may have many elements of error, of superstition, of fanaticism, of disorder, of hypocrisy even, and yet be of God, who advances his cause in the church as well as in the civil state by excitements and revolutions which incidentally call into action the worst as well as the best characters, and which bring forth mixed results of good and evil. To allow wisely for such facts, and to train Christians to a considerate estimate of revival phenomena, is absolutely necessary to permanently happy results. Otherwise there will be an interminable debate and division over men and measures, over doctrines and converts, till religion is scandalized, churches are rent asunder, and revivals become a fear to the saints and a scoffing to the wicked.

A chief difficulty arises from the disposition to claim that a revival is a divine endorsement of certain men, doctrines, and measures; as though God could associate his saving power only with that which is true and good, and as though anything human possessed only those qualities! A pastor is blamed for an inconsistent life, or for erroneous teaching: his labors are attended with a spiritual blessing, and his friends at once claim that his character and doctrine have received the divine endorsement. A church is rent with discord, and one party secedes and establishes a new organization: in a few months a revival occurs, and God is supposed to have testified in favor of that faction. An institution of learning is established amid much dispute as to its necessity, the wisdom of its management, the reputation of its leading officer, or the soundness of the peculiar principles which it represents and propagates: but the Spirit of God converts some of the students, and immediately it is an-

nounced that God has put his seal of approbation upon the enterprise. An evangelist goes through the churches, preaching much truth, but subjecting himself to deserved criticism; and his blinded friends claim each successive revival in connection with his ministrations as God's answer to the objections brought against him. This attempt to press revivals into improper service, to put upon them an unwarranted interpretation, tends to weaken confidence in their genuineness, and to make the disgusted listeners to such reasoning reject both the conclusion and the work of grace. For, plainly, such an argument overlooks the most obvious facts and principles; not considering that, unless we are prepared to prove that God never uses any but perfect characters and instrumentalities, no one is competent to declare the degree of error, or of depravity, which will inevitably prevent an outpouring of the divine Spirit. When God converts souls in a revival, it is the direct gospel truth which he uses with saving power, and this he may employ in despite of many undesirable accompaniments, even as in secular history he secures important, beneficent results under every form of civil government, and by the instrumentality of men of the most varied characters. It would make God endorse the most contradictory doctrines and measures, moreover, to apply the test in question; for sure it is, that he has sent powerful revivals in connection with the efforts of Calvinists and of Arminians, of Baptists and of Pædo-Baptists, of Prelatists and of Non-Prelatists, of Protestants and of Romanists, of New Measure and of Old Measure men, of Radicals and of Conservatives, of eminent saints and even of those who afterward proved to have been self-deceived or hypocritical.

Nor is it for our partial vision and limited judgment to decide, whether the true spiritual occasion for the revival, in the Lord's view, did not rather lie in its relation to his "hidden ones," in the bearing of some quite obscure or unknown fact; such as the persevering and importunate prayer of even a single devoted saint, some wrestling Jacob of whom neither the church nor the world has much knowledge, or some humble widow whose closet opens directly into heaven. To render revivals a permanent blessing, then, we must study into their phenomena sufficiently to avoid all narrow and party interpretations

of their meaning, and must accept them with their incidental human imperfections. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God and not of us."

3. *We must remember that revivals, however precious in their results, cover but part of the ground of divine action and of the religious life and work of the church.* Forgetfulness of this truth has operated disastrously, leading the friends of revivals to exalt them unduly, and to cast into the shade important Christian duties and instrumentalities; thus exciting a measure of suspicion in regard to such experiences in the minds of other good men, and limiting, in a degree, the comprehensiveness of their own labors. The word revival may be taken, indeed, out of its technical meaning, and made as broad as the idea of progress in religion, in all departments and by all instrumentalities; in which case, no such objection can apply. But, as generally used in this country—to denote a powerful religious movement on the minds of the unconverted, attended by an awakened zeal of the church—in their behalf, with the employment, commonly, of special efforts to reach and save them—the idea covers only a part of the work assigned to the Christian by the Master. It relates to external conquest simply; the advancement of the kingdom by the subjugation of its pronounced foes. But this, as in the case of a nation, which has properly been affirmed to be in certain respects analogous, by no means exhausts the conception of progress; which ought to be largely internal, by growth rather than by conquest, by development rather than by accretion. If we consider the nature of piety, and the circumstances in which it must live and act, we shall see that its ordinary work must be to maintain holy character in life's daily routine. There will be its conflict and its victory, its beauty and its power. Indeed, until its reality and vigor have been tested in that sphere, it will have little influence beyond. For there it comes in contact with the mass of men, in practical work, in concrete form, in a manner open to inspection and sure to be judged. Its first work, therefore, is, to build up right character and a pure and impressive life; to exhibit industry in labor, fidelity in trusts, truthfulness in speech, interest in all departments of

needful action, fortitude in suffering, courage in danger, sympathy with sorrow, liberality of sentiment, generosity in giving, firmness in resisting temptation, forgiveness of injuries, complacency in moral goodness, high principle in conduct, and an unworldly state of mind in the midst of great worldly activity. Then it starts from vantage ground to urge a Christian life upon the unconverted. Indeed, it will find its desired results already half accomplished, according to the implication of our Saviour's words: "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father, who is in heaven." This, probably, is the explanation of the fact, that the New Testament so constantly insists upon holy living, and dwells so little upon the methods to be used in laboring for the impenitent. Obviously, then, the church must be largely occupied in, what Paul calls, "maintaining good works." (See Titus iii, 8.) This includes life in the family, in the various forms of secular business, in the discharge of duties as a citizen and as a friend and neighbor, and in helpfulness to the poor and distressed; to which may be added the maintenance of social and public religious worship in connection with the church, on the Lord's Day and at other times. To live industriously, peaceably, benevolently, conscientiously, devoutly, usefully, and joyfully, in the position providentially assigned, must comprehend a large part of Christian duty.

If now one looks to the *growth* of the church or Christian community, that will be seen to depend greatly on a properly religious nurture of her children in the family, as well as upon individual adult conversions and the aggressive power of what we term revivals; and we must so employ the latter as not to overshadow the former. When Christianity first started forth, to fulfill the command to "teach all nations," it necessarily operated mostly upon adult minds, and relied upon the outpouring of the Spirit on Jew and Gentile in a manner often resembling that of modern revivals. And this would continue to be a leading instrumentality for outside effort, as the gospel was pressed upon opposers, and was carried to additional nations. This must be true now, in connection with foreign missionary labors, and with efforts to reach the mass of unconverted adults in nominally Christian lands. That Pentecostal

scenes will be renewed, with the most striking results, in the simultaneous conversion of great multitudes, may be gathered not only from the moral necessity of the case, as we look out upon the mass of ungodliness in the world, and from past scenes in the history of the church, but also from the promise of Scripture that "a nation shall be born at once," as it were in a day, in those times when a "little one shall become a thousand, and a small one a strong nation." But this is outside work, and meanwhile there will be going on the natural growth of the church from within, as its own children are "trained up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." At this the church has ever aimed, and with as much success as its measure of wisdom, of earnestness, and of faith would warrant. To this means of increase have looked the great body of Christians; some through the ideas associated with infant baptism and a subsequent confirmation, and others apart from those usages. And American Christians, who are accustomed to rely so extensively upon revivals, and to count upon them each winter, as at the season most favorable for special services to this end, must not forget that, in other lands, this instrumentality has been less used, and that there the growth has been almost wholly through the regular means of grace, the cultivation of family religion, and a church education of the children by catechism and liturgy. There must be, as there ought to be, great power of development in the church on this side. It is the natural method of increase; it accords, also, with the inspired explanation, through Malachi, of God's intent in the institution of marriage and of the family,—“that He might seek a godly seed;” and it produces the most perfect type of character, free from the angularities and crudities of adult conversions, and beautifully rounded out into the symmetry of a complete and gradually formed mind and heart. Indeed, there is reason to think, that, in ordinary communities, where the ingatherings from revivals are mostly of youth from twelve to twenty years of age, a large proportion of the so-called “converts” are really persons regenerated in childhood, and awakened by the revival to a new and more intelligent consciousness of the divine life in the soul. The influence of the family and of the Sunday school at least prepared the soil and sowed the seed for the seemingly sudden harvest of the revival.

What is needed, then, in this direction, to make revivals productive of permanent good, is, to recognize their true relation to other Christian experiences, and to other modes of Christian progress toward the final triumph of the Redeemer's kingdom. Made exclusive in their demand, they falsely turn every other condition of the church into a declension, draw off attention from equally important duties, and give to piety a vacillating character, changing from the heights of excitement to the inevitable reactionary depths of insensibility or of depression. But no such distorted view of revivals need be cherished. They do not constitute the whole of religious work, but they belong in the Christian system, and have a place of special honor and power under the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. Doubtless, also, they have their law, in the mind of God, though no one has yet succeeded in definitely stating it, or in bringing them under fixed conditions of time and circumstance. While, as a general rule, spiritual results will be according to the prayerful use of appropriate means, God wishing to encourage prayer and to reward faithful labor, yet Christians are often disappointed in the results of prayer and effort in specific cases; so that no man can surely predict the range and power of revivals in particular localities. What pastor has not been surprised by a powerful revival in spiritual circumstances seemingly unfavorable; and again disappointed at its non-arrival when its conditions appeared to be more fully met?

They come in very variant circumstances, and therefore the old divines have associated them with the sovereignty of God; but to God, we may well suppose that a sameness of principle appears throughout. They are to be regarded as glorious additions or supplements to the ordinary working of spiritual forces; in which God seizes upon a conjuncture of facts and favoring occasions to work saving results on a large scale and with great rapidity, exalting the faith of his people and striking terror into the heart of his foes. In the United States, revivals have thus been conspicuously used, at eventful periods, to save the land from prevalent infidelity and worldliness. In the days of Jonathan Edwards, after there had been a wide-spread deadness in religion, accompanied by an invasion of error, the "Great Awakening" was spiritually the salvation of the country.

Again, after the Revolutionary War had left religion in a low condition, and French infidelity had infected large numbers, God used the powerful revivals at the beginning of this century, to give new life to religion in the nation. Similarly, the second war with Great Britain, the mercantile prosperity and subsequent reverses, twenty years later, and also the financial crash of 1857, were followed by extensive and powerful revivals. And now, in accordance with the inspired declaration, that "when the enemy shall come in like a flood, the Spirit of the Lord will left up a standard against him," the praying and believing ones are expecting that the present spread of skepticism will furnish the occasion for mighty outpourings of the Holy Spirit, which shall demonstrate the divine character of the Gospel, and shall convert the very leaders of unbelief into apostles of the faith.

They may therefore properly be objects of desire, of prayer, and of effort, on the part of ministers and of churches, while not allowed to interfere with the steady prosecution of ordinary Christian work, and the expectation of a continual success in the conversion of sinners and in the upbuilding of personal character. Indeed, as the special activities of a merchant in his spring and fall trade subside into the regular routine of industry during the remainder of the year, so when the excitement and labor of a revival pass, it should be to allow steady play to the regular duties of family, social, and church life; it being understood, that piety equally inspires both modes of action, and that the converts of a revival need subsequently to be trained to obey the unexciting demands of the details of a daily life that shall be inspired by faith in Christ, and love to God and their neighbor. In this light, that pastor is most wisely a friend of revivals, who follows them most faithfully with the use of the ordinary means of grace, and with a recommendation of piety in its everyday aspects. That church also gives the best evidence of having received permanent good from a revival, which accompanies its zeal for conversions with an equal care for the growth and education of "the babes in Christ," and for the exhibition by the older members of a proportionate character, and a readiness for all forms of usefulness, whether these be technically religious or secular. The converts will thus be

made to understand, that the revival is religion in only one of its phases, and in one of its forms of power; and that a church does not necessarily decline in piety when those special scenes pass, but often goes on to greater trials and triumphs of Christian principle, which require daily communion with God and an abiding faith in the perpetual aid of the indwelling Spirit, in order to "overcome the world."

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ARTICLE IV.—A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW REFORM.

INTERNATIONAL LAW itself, and proposed improvements in it, are of the highest interest to the friends of progress. Every real advance is a water-mark showing how the tide of Christian civilization is rising. No questions of a great and grave public character are more momentous. "It is the immortal glory of Grotius, through a new dispensation of international right," says "Historicus" (Preface to Letters reprinted from the *London Times*) "to have evangelized the society of nations brutalized by a licentious carnival of force. It has been the shame of others to have degraded the palladium of law into the minister of the temporary passion of governments and the servile instrument of the interests of States." "The practices of war between civilized nations have been sensibly mitigated," says Wheaton, "and a comparison of the present modes of warfare with the system of Grotius, will show the immense improvement that has taken place." "The law of nations has improved with the general improvement of civilization, of which it is one of the most valuable products." The question whether this shall continue, resolves itself, says Dr. Woolsey, "into the broader one, whether true civilization, built on sound morality and religion, is destined to advance or decline." "It is probable that the advance will be more rapid than heretofore, although by no means easy or unopposed."

The *North American Review* for April, 1872, contained a vigorous attack by Hon. John Norton Pomeroy upon the proposition to make the private property of belligerents, except contraband, &c., free from destruction or capture on sea or land. The "Draft Outlines of an International Code," by David Dudley Field, Esq. (New York, Nov., 1872, printed for criticism and revision), prepared by that gentleman as a member of the Committee of the "Social Science Congress," Manchester, 1866, contains the following Article and note, pp. 589, 541.

"846. Private property, whether tangible or intangible, on

land or at sea, and belonging to the enemy or a neutral, cannot be in any manner taken or violated, under pretext of war, except in the cases and to the extent allowed by the provisions of this book."

(Note.) "The principal exceptions are, 1. Contraband; 2. Property forfeited by offences of the owner; and, 3. Property taken under military necessity."

Dropping the exceptions out of view, as not in dispute, the question is narrowed and made simple.

Mr. Pomeroy admits that the principle is equally just on the land and on the sea; but he maintains, without qualification, that there is "no rule of international law, no practice of civilized States, which exempts private enemy property from capture or destruction *on land*," though he admits that it is "not so systematically taken and confiscated on land as on sea." Mr. Field says: "The rule that private property on land ought to be respected as far as possible may now be regarded as fully recognized," and he points out as "the most important change in existing rules proposed" (Draft, chapter lxiv, p. 526, *seq.*), "the exemption of private property from capture, at sea as well as on land." Both writers refer for the most part to the same authorities. Such conflicting statements will surprise no one who has ever traced the progress of a new principle of public law or policy through its mixed treatment, as a question of fact and of right (the two being often blended and confounded) by a multitude of writers and publicists.

Mr. Pomeroy devotes eight or ten pages to authors, statesmen, and international transactions, recognizing, as he says, the freedom of private commerce; such as the Abbé Mably, Galiani (—doubted, except as to capture by privateers—), Chateaubriand, Presidents Monroe and Pierce, Secretaries Marcy and Fish, Blunt-schli, Pinheiro-Ferreira, Pradier-Fodéré, Massé, Cauchy, the late Dr. Lieber, Laboulaye, Franklin's Treaty with Prussia of 1785, the Act of the French Legislative Assembly of 1792, the Americo-Prussian *projet* of 1823 (identical with Art. 23 of Franklin's Treaty), the amendment proposed by the United States to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the Bremen Merchants' declaration of 1859, the Prusso-Austrian declarations of 1866, and the Prussian Royal Proclamation of 1870.

Some of these authorities are a little vague, and they all referred to the freedom of the seas to merchant vessels as the unsettled point; but Franklin's Treaty specified "houses," "goods," and "fields" first, and then "all merchant and trading vessels;" and the Bremen declaration mentioned both land and sea property, and asked for the general "inviolability of persons and property domiciled in belligerent States." The writers of treatises cited argue for the *justice* of the principle, rather than affirm its adoption in practice, though Bluntschli both says, "the international law absolutely interdicts the acquisition of booty in time of war," and "although maritime war should be directed against the State and not against individuals, and although by the natural law private property should be respected on the sea as well as on land, yet many maritime powers still recognize in maritime war the right of seizing ships which are the property of persons within the jurisdiction of the enemy country, and of confiscating goods found on board such ships."

Mr. Field concedes that "the earlier authorities sustained the right of taking booty on land," but affirms that the opposite rule is "the modern rule," "sufficiently settled to need no further discussion." He cites,—besides Bluntschli, and Pradier-Fodéré,—Vattel, against detaining persons or property when war is declared, and Fioré (*Nouveau Droit International*) to the effect that "war is now a relation between nation and nation, and that therefore private property, at sea as well as on land, must be respected as far as possible." Also Martens and Heffter. Also, the fact that Prussia in 1824 recommended the general adoption of this principle, "and it is said to have been established by treaties between the South American Republics in 1851 and 1856." It was so recognized in the war between Austria and Italy in 1866, that Dr. Lushington says "the private property of the enemy at sea was as completely exempt from hostile capture as private property on land." In the Franco-Prussian war, the North German Government first announced the principle, and then withdrew it on the capture of German ships by France, as a measure of retaliation. He cites instances of restitution after hostilities, e. g., France to Spain, 1823; England to Holland, 1832; France, Italy, and

Austria to each other, 1859; France to Mexico, 1865; Brazil to the U. S., in the Paraguayan war, 1870. Also, there have been provisions in many modern treaties establishing the modern rule in case of future collision between the contracting parties,—Treaty between France and Peru, 1861. England and France in the war with China—contrary to practice in other cases—wholly suspended the right of maritime capture.

On the other side, Mr. Pomeroy cites—as in general of the opposite opinion,—“the great public jurists from Grotius down to Phillimore and Twiss,”—including Hautefeuille, “the great champion of neutral rights and of free neutral commerce,”—the omission of the principle of Franklin’s Treaty from that made by him with France in 1778 (seven years earlier), and with Sweden in 1783 (two years earlier), and from that made by John Adams with the Low Countries in 1782 (three years earlier), the instructions to John Quincy Adams to omit it from the second Treaty with Prussia in 1798, the conduct of France inconsistent with it, the positions of Count Nesselrode in 1824, of Palmerston in 1859, and of Mr. Justice Strong in 1870. But his strongest authorities are the destruction of private property by Gen. Sherman in Georgia and South Carolina, the confiscation acts of 1861 and 1862, and the plunderings and requisitions of Prussia in the case of the free commercial cities in 1866, and of the French people in 1870. Our own government—as having led in upholding the principle as a “speculative dogma,”—he vehemently accuses of falsehood and disgusting hypocrisy.

Mr. Field adds Ortolan’s argument under seven heads on the same side, making an exception, however, in favor of fishing coasters, and suggesting a restoration of the value of the goods in specified cases. (So Bynkershoek as to immovables.) He says: “According to many authorities, a nation has the right, *stricti juris*, to seize and confiscate any property of an enemy found in the country on the happening of war. *Dana’s Wheaton*; 1 *Kent’s Commentaries*; *Halleck’s Internat. Law*; *Woolsey’s Internat. Law*; 8 *Cranch’s U. S. Reports*. The English text-writers, like the American, are of opinion that the law of nations is not settled against the right, but in fact admit it. *Manning, Law of Nations*; *Phillimore, Intern. Law*; *Twiss*,

Law of Nations" (as to restoring immovables). "The right to confiscate *debts* is contended for on theoretic grounds by some authorities who, however, are not, we think, sustained by modern usage, or by the weight of opinion." Twiss, Wildman, Kent, and Manning are cited against it. And even Bynkershoek might have been. Some of these citations, it seems to us, are to be taken with some qualifications. Thus, Dr. Wheaton—although his last editor is zealous for the right and its exercise—himself says (Ed. 1846, p 347), commenting on Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel, *pro and con*: "It appears to be the modern rule of international usage that property of the enemy found within the territory of the belligerent State, or debts due to his subjects by the government or individuals at the commencement of hostilities, are *not* liable to be seized and confiscated as prize of war. This rule is frequently enforced by treaty stipulations, but unless it be thus enforced, it cannot be considered as an inflexible, though an established, rule. "The rule," as it has been beautifully observed" (Marshall, C. J., in 8 Cranch's U. S. Reports), "like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign,—it is a guide which he follows or abandons at will—and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on political considerations, which may vary." Wheaton says further: "The modern rule would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an enemy, and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not to be immediately confiscated; and in almost every commercial treaty an article is inserted stipulating for the right to withdraw such property. This rule appears to be totally incompatible with the idea that war does, of itself, vest the property in the belligerent government." (*Id.*, p. 351; cf. p. 396—also touching land property, with exceptions.) "The progress of civilization has slowly, but constantly, tended to soften the extreme severity of the operations of war by land; * but it still remains unrelaxed in respect to maritime warfare." (*Id.*, p. 405.) Dr. Woolsey also says, in a passage not cited by Mr. Field: "Capture of private property has nearly disap-

* So Ortolan, even, see *post*.

peared from land warfare, but is allowed by international war, as well in the case of neutrals as of enemies. at sea. The same humane principles, however, which have put a stop to it on the one element, are at work to abridge its sphere on the other. The rule already adopted by the principal European powers, that free ships engaged in lawful trade make free goods, is sure to become universal; and if so, the hostile property exposed to the cruisers of the other belligerent may become so considerable, that the trade of plundering on the sea will be hardly worth carrying on. . . . We indulge that 'pious chimæra,' as it has been called, that all private property on the sea, engaged in a lawful trade to permitted ports, ought to cross the seas in safety; we have the sanction of the authority of Franklin, and of sober propositions made by our own government, for regarding such a rule as both desirable and practicable; we must esteem it nearer to justice, and certainly to humanity, than the present inequality of risk on the two elements; and it will probably be found, owing to the new rule in favor of neutrals, that marine captures will not be worth retaining." (§ 139, pp. 236, 237; cf. § 130, p. 224, on immunity of private property on land.)

An analysis of the facts and authorities on both sides—the above survey of which is pretty exhaustive—shows that Mr. Pomeroy goes altogether too far in his unqualified statement that there is neither international rule nor practice protecting private property in war. From the conflict of statements there emerges the clear evidence that the question is in just such a state as a progressive change from an old rule of non-exemption to a more humane modern rule of exemption from capture would occasion. Both principle and practice are mixed, with a plain inclination toward the fixed establishment of the later rule, of which its incorporation into two such works as Bluntschli's *Le Droit International Codifié*, and our countryman's *Draft Outlines of an International Code*, are in evidence.

We turn now to the argument for and against the principle. But, in the first place, Mr. Pomeroy's argument that it *cannot* be a rule of international law, deserves a moment's attention. One point is, that so many nations from policy have violated

it! which, by parity of reasoning, would warrant us in saying that nothing is a law in human society, in violation and disobedience of which the crime or wrong it forbids is committed by men,—a singular fallacy, which can be accounted for by supposing that the writer, without noticing it, passed from the use of “rule” or “law” in the sense of requirement, to “rule” in the sense of prevailing fact. Scientific men and statisticians fall into this confusion of thought constantly. But even in the latter sense, it was incumbent on him who denied the rule to prove that as matter of fact it is now violated in the clear majority of instances, since proof of this at some former period, if the practice or the tendency of practice has since been changing, would only show, not that exemption of private property “cannot” be the rule, but only that once it was not, while it is now. Another of Mr. Pomeroy’s points is, that nations cannot be “called to account” for violating it, which would go to show that nothing whatever can be international law—a defect necessarily belonging to this kind of law, in every article and principle of it—which, indeed, the proposal for an *International Code*, to receive sometime the sanction of the governments, is made to remedy as far as possible. And another point is equally without force, viz: that in the stress of conflict the principle could “only be enforced by overwhelming hostile power.” Mr. Pomeroy adds, in this connection:

“The very exception which the writers of this school universally make—namely, the exigencies, the necessities of the military movements and operations—utterly destroys the possibility of any rule similar to the one assumed by them; for the sole judge of these exigencies, of these necessities, must either be the commander in the field, or the government whose agent he is, and from the decision of either there can be no appeal, no review. Where all is left to the discretion of a man with an army at his back, and that discretion arbitrary because uncontrolled and uncontrollable except by a more powerful army, it would seem that the rule which the university professors have so neatly constructed can exist only on paper.”

All this simply goes to show, it is evident, not the impossibility of the rule, but the difficulties attending its observance.

In other words, the writer has blended and confused in his own mind the two different meanings of the terms—"rule" or "law." The *requirement* is what he means "can exist only on paper,"—which is true enough, but proves nothing; the *observance of the requirement* is what he denies as fact. But it was incumbent on him to show that non-observance is and must be prevailing fact; in other words, that the violation of the requirement, instead of being exception, must needs be the rule, in the sense of prevailing fact—and could not be prevented—or that the requirement could not possibly be obeyed. This Mr. Pomeroy has not attempted. And even if this were so in the present state of international law, it would prove nothing as to what would be the case under an accepted code embodying the rule. The first Article of Mr. Field's Draft Outlines is as follows:

("Adopting Clause.")

"Article 1. The following rules are established and declared, by the nations assenting hereto, as an International Code, by which those nations, and their members, respectively, shall be governed in their relations with each other."

It is also provided, Article 214, that "each nation, on demand made by another nation, &c., must deliver up to justice persons" "charged with an offense (public) against any provision of this Code," "within the jurisdiction of the latter, (and) found within the jurisdiction of the former." And still further, Article 1003, "The punishment of any act which is declared to be a public offense by the provisions of this Code, shall be that which is prescribed by the law of the place where the conviction is had, for the same or a similar infraction of its criminal law." Possibly under such a Code,—with "appeal" and "review," it is to be noticed, and ample means of punishment provided,—the prevailing facts might change, and though still physical prevention of unlawful destruction of private property,—(which is all the language quoted above goes to show is impossible, and other expressions about the necessity of "an overwhelming hostile power" to enforce the rule "in the very agony of an armed contest, while each combatant is putting forth its mightiest efforts, and the passions of each individual citizen are aroused to the highest pitch,")—could not be effected, of course, by the

rule, it could effect all that any rule on any subject, in any kind of law, could effect. It is conceded that military necessity is—at least at present—an “ill-defined exception” (Field, p. 526), but it has not been shown, on the other hand, that it is more than an exception.

It may disencumber the subject somewhat if we also touch here upon Mr. Pomeroy's two great instances of the destruction, in recent years, of private property on a vast scale in war, even on land, viz., the course of Prussia, and that of the United States. It might be admitted that they are examples of glaring national inconsistency in two great powers that lead in civilization,—and emphatically so, as Mr. Pomeroy suggests, in the very powers who “were the first to formulate the doctrine of free belligerent commerce in a treaty, and have frequently since that time published it with the assurance of those who believed it and practiced it.” With still greater severity it might have been observed, that these two powers, nearly a hundred years ago, formulated the doctrine in respect to *the sea*, where it has been most resisted, and now have violated it *on the land*, where it has been less frequently trampled down by others. Still it is incumbent on the critics to prove that these are not instances of military necessity, or do not fall under some other principle, in order to give effect to language which can hardly be called temperate. That Prussia, having agreed in 1866 with the other belligerents to the freedom of merchant vessels, and having declared the same in 1870 without regard to reciprocity, did not apply the same principle on the land, may have been,—for aught that appears in this discussion,—because no such military necessity existed on the sea as on the land. That when the French government in 1870 refused to relinquish the right of capture and actually captured German merchant ships, Prussia receded from its own previous exemption, is only an illustration of the old principle of reciprocity, which is as old as Magna Charta. It also illustrates the unsettled condition of the whole question. It has always been understood that Gen. Sherman's course in Georgia and South Carolina was governed by military necessity; and when Mr. Pomeroy taunts Secretary Stanton with inconsistency, and the government with treason to “its time-honored principles,” he has just as good reason for taunting

Mr. Lincoln with the same for respecting slave property during the earlier part of the rebellion, and at last emancipating the slaves on the ground of military necessity. We make nothing here of any distinction between the treatment of alien enemies in foreign war and citizens guilty of the high crime of treason in rebellion or civil war. If military necessity could be a good reason in any case—and Mr. Pomeroy even admits that all of Gen. Sherman's acts, "except the burnings, were actually done in the interests of humanity"—it certainly and preëminently could be in a rebellion, and such a rebellion. The writer happened to be in London in 1864, when the *London Times*, having previously exhausted itself in condemning the course of Sheridan and Sherman, turned square about for reasons of policy, and justified both Generals in every particular,—avering that any English general in the same circumstances would have done precisely the same,—as any one who knows aught of British military history might safely venture to say! It should be added, however, that the progress of civilization ought both to render such dire military necessities less frequent, and narrow their limits when they occur. The confiscation acts of 1861 and 1862 are, however, the crowning instances of our country's shameless and hypocritical inconsistency cited by her critic in the *North American*, acts now enforced "without any pretense of military necessity," which perhaps should have suggested to him that they do not belong to this subject altogether. Confiscation is a legislative measure, not a military measure. It requires the agency of a legislature and a court, not that of a commander. As long ago as the war of 1812, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the necessity of "some legislative act expressly authorizing confiscation," and that even "the law of Congress declaring war was not such an act." (Wheaton, p. 349; also Dana, Note, p. 482.) Belligerent right is its foundation, as Mr. Justice Strong (11 Wallace's U. S. Reports) and Mr. Sumner (Speech upon his Confiscation and Liberation Bill, May 19, 1862) maintain,*—for war itself is its occasion,—but no one would, therefore, confound its exercise with military operations, and it is certainly not open to the charge of lawless-

* The general right, we take it, arising from the simple fact of war.

ness, or of being uncontrolled and uncontrollable save by force in the field. Nor do the "confiscations *following* a subdued rebellion," to which Hallam refers, and those effected *during* a rebellion (as in our case), differ in essential legal character. Everything is not war that takes place in time of war and because of a state of war. One might approve lawful confiscation, for traitors, at least, and yet not be obliged logically to sustain military destruction of private property. He might, on the contrary, be opposed to all wars, and a member of the Peace Society. You may take that by due process of law which you cannot seize by summary process, much more by force of arms. Mr. Sumner claimed the utmost rights of war against the slave-holding rebel in arms, pronouncing him a public enemy—"an enemy as completely responsible in all his property, real or personal, as a hostile government or prince,"—and a criminal as well, and on this double view based his argument for confiscation, and especially for liberation of slaves; but he admitted that "the private property of an enemy on land" (which was the case of slave property) "according to the modern practice of nations, is exempt from seizure, simply as private property." "It is still liable to seizure" (Manning's Law of Nations, p. 136) "under circumstances constituting in themselves a necessity, of which the conqueror is the judge. This *extraordinary* power must be so used that it shall not assume the character of spoliation. The obvious reason for any exemption is, that a private soldier is not personally responsible, as the government or the prince. *But every rebel is personally responsible.*" (Speech, p. 8.) And it might be still further urged that confiscation visited upon rebels in arms is "penalty," as Webster's Dictionary somewhat loosely terms it.* And still further it may be noted, that one of Mr. Field's exceptions to his rule is, "2. Property forfeited by offenses of the owner." A good deal could be said by Prussia to bring the property of those unfortunate "Frankforters and Frenchmen" under this exception, and by the United States

* In the debates in Congress the forfeiture in fee was always treated as lawful punishment for treason, inflicted not upon alien enemies in a foreign war (*who are incapable of this crime against the United States*) but upon citizens of the United States, in the ordinary exercise of governmental sovereignty, and, in the very case provided for in the Constitution, Art. III, sect. iii, clause 2.

Government to bring that of Southern rebels under the same. But all this separates the subject of confiscation, especially as a measure "still in force,"—as well as Mr. Pomeroy's two great national examples,—from the subject before us.

Having thus limited and disencumbered this question of international law reform, we can now estimate accurately the force of the arguments for and against it. In the natural order, the reasons for the old rule come first into view. It is to be considered as respects both land and sea. Dr. Woolsey says: "There is some pretence of reason for the difference of practice upon the two elements. For, *first*, an enemy's intercourse with other States by sea more directly increases his capacity to sustain and protract the war. And, *secondly*, there is a difference on the score of humanity between land and maritime capture. On the land, interference with private property, by stripping families of their all, is often the source of the deepest misery. It also embitters feeling, and drives non-combatants into guerilla warfare or into the regular service. Invasion always arouses a national spirit; but the invasion with plunder rather defeats the end of war than promotes it, until a nation is bowed down to the dust. And at that point it disables the conquered from giving the compensation for which the war was set on foot.* But capture on the sea is effected for the most part without much fighting; it rather deprives the foe of his comforts and means of exchanging his superfluities than destroys the necessities of life; and it afflicts more directly the classes which have some influence upon the government, as well as the resources of the government itself, than the day-laborer and the cultivator of the soil, who have special claims to be humanely treated." (§ 120, pp. 205, 206.) And he adds later: "The only specious pretexts for marine capture are these two, that the enemy's commerce furnishes him with the means of war so that it may be justly obstructed, and that the captured vessels are pledged for the reparation of injuries. The former pretext will amount to nothing if hostile trade can be conducted in such a way as to exempt it from cap-

* There is less force in this than when Dr. Woolsey wrote, in view of the terrible reduction of France by Germany, and the immense war indemnities France has since paid.

ture. The other pretext will require that ships and goods captured be regarded, until peace settles all questions between nations, as simply retained to be restored, or have an equivalent paid for them if necessary." (§ 139, p. 237.)

Dana, the last editor of Wheaton,—who concedes that land property is exempt from confiscation,—says in a note to that author, *in loco*, of marine capture: "It takes no lives, sheds no blood, imperils no households; has its field on the ocean, which is a common highway, and deals only with the persons and property voluntarily embarked in the chances of war, for the purposes of gain, and with the protection of insurance. War is not a game of strength between armies or fleets, nor a competition to kill the most men and sink the most vessels; but a grand valiant appeal to force, to secure an object deemed essential, when every other appeal has failed." (p. 876.) Wheaton himself says: "This inequality in the operation of the laws of war, by land and by sea, has been justified by alleging the usage of considering private property, when captured in cities taken by storm, as booty; and the well-known fact that contributions are levied upon territories occupied by a hostile army in lieu of a general confiscation of the property belonging to the inhabitants; and that the object of wars by land being conquest, or the acquisition of territory to be exchanged as an equivalent for other territory lost, the regard of the victor for those who are to be or have been his subjects naturally restrains him from the exercise of his extreme rights in this particular; whereas, the object of maritime wars is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navigation, the sources and sinews of his naval power—which object can only be attained by the capture and confiscation of private property." (Ed. 1846, p. 406.) Much of this has now become irrelevant. Ortolan, as summarized by Mr. Field, makes the additional points that ships and seamen engaged in the merchant service are "potentially an auxiliary of the naval forces of the nation, and a means of extending its power beyond its proper territory;" that if only ships of war could be taken, the enemy might keep them in port, and "carry on intercourse by private ships with impunity;" that the freedom of the seas.—which a belligerent cannot seize and hold in possession as

territory,—carries with it the right of each belligerent to obstruct the enemy's right of passage on the seas by capturing his ships; that ships are personal property, which on land is inviolable only for a time, and its value taken in requisitions and levies, while there is no real property on the sea to be inviolate, and ships, &c., are the only private property at sea to be captured; that "without capture of private property, war at sea would be imperfect and, in so far, interminable;" that "the object of war is to compel a peace, by injuring the enemy;" and that it "is a question of conflict between national and private rights, and private rights being the less important, must yield so far as incompatible with the greater interest."

To these points—which he expands—Mr. Pomeroy adds that the object of war is "to produce a peace in the shortest possible time, but with as little destruction of human life, with as little injury to human bodies, as possible;" that the destruction of the foreign commerce of either belligerent powerfully promotes this end in this way; that humanity, and the natural or divine moral law, and Christian civilization require this, and do not, therefore, forbid the destruction of private property in war; that the new rule, if established, would lengthen wars, and make them more bloody; that it would promote the interests of absolutism and favor continental nations above others; and that it would especially arrest maritime supremacy from the United States and Great Britain. This writer goes far beyond other opponents of reform, and seems almost, if not quite, to agree with Bynkershoek that belligerent rights against private property are unlimited.

To the arguments of Ortolan Mr. Field replies that the right of requisition on land is restricted and requires compensation; that the capacity of a merchant ship to serve in war could at most be ground for detention only, not for forcible appropriation of ship or contents; that captures at sea depend so on fortuitous circumstances—such as weather, number, and strength of vessels meeting, &c.,—"as to have in modern times but slight connection with the ultimate fortunes of the war;" that "the freedom of the seas and the possibility of a belligerent avoiding maritime war by ceasing to send out ships of war, and the suggestion that maritime war will become inconclu-

sive without the right of private capture, may well be urged as arguments in favor of the reform against which they are cited. The objection that commerce on land (even) is interrupted by war is entitled to the weight of analogy under existing rules;" but would have none under an international code allowing the interruption of commerce on land "only between places in the actual possession of the belligerents, or when it directly subserves the purposes of war. The advantage of the existing rule is the pressure it puts upon the enemy to submit; the disadvantage includes, besides the actual loss of property and derangement of commerce during war, the immense losses sustained on account of the apprehensions of war during time of peace. The *measure* of the advantage, on the one hand, is not the actual loss inflicted during the war, but only the pressure indirectly brought to bear on the hostile government through the sufferings of its citizens by those losses; while the *measure* of the disadvantage exceeds the actual losses, and includes those derangements of commerce which are so quickly felt when an apprehension of war arises, and from which recovery is so slow after peace has been established." This is a fitting reply also to much that Mr. Pomeroy says about the small number of vessels actually seized in any war, the small amount of merchant and other private property actually destroyed (and this taken from surplus products), and also about the fact that the injury is not permanent. Mr. Field contends that the interests of peace are "much broader and more sensitive than those of war;" that "the sea is the highway of nations, and may well be dedicated, by common consent, to peaceful uses;" and concludes that "private property can be spared without seriously impairing the efficiency of military measures for the settlement of disputes between nations bound closely in pacific relations," and that this is demanded, with proper qualifications, "by the interests of nations and individuals, and is not incompatible with the maintenance of efficient and adequate military power as a final arbiter in international controversies." It is worth noticing here, that even Ortolan recommends compensation, at least at the close of hostilities, and the *entire exemption of vessels, &c., employed in coast fisheries, as being chiefly means of subsistence for inoffensive persons*,—an exception which could be

justified on no principle which would not include other cases. And Bynkershoek, laying it down as universal law that commerce ceases between enemies, admits nevertheless that trade is often continued, and "sometimes a mutual commerce is permitted generally," and thus,—it is an ingenuous confession—"the utility of merchants and the mutual wants of nations have *almost got the better of the laws of war.*" Recalling the unsettled and fluctuating condition of the whole question since Franklin's Treaty, with the evident tendency toward a more civilized and humane rule than the previous one, the time seems opportune for its incorporation, if not into a code of international law, then into the body of principles recognized as such. "The history of recent great wars has demonstrated that there may be such a thing as a peace for commerce during a war of arms. Private war having become illegal, private peace should be secured so far as possible." (Field, p. 527.)

As to arguments against this not specifically answered, and as to the whole body of objections taken together, we venture to suggest that a little logical analysis will show that they rest—with one exception or two hereafter to be noticed—upon three main assumptions. These failing, the arguments and objections fail also, and further specific answers are unnecessary.

I. It is assumed that the difference between the two elements—land and sea—obliges a different international law for each. This is the assumption relied upon by those who would admit the modern rule upon land, to some extent, but insist upon the ancient rule at sea. Abolish the taking of private property altogether, and the difference between the two elements becomes at once of no account. In other words, it is a difference simply that requires, *if private property is destroyed*, different specific rules for the destruction, in manner and extent, but not one that requires different principles—destruction for the sea and protection for the land. Indeed, the two elements so differ that *if* different principles are allowed they should be transposed. "On land, some injury of private property is necessarily incidental to the pursuit of the enemy; and, so far, such injury is allowable; at sea, the capture of private ships is not incidental to the right to pursue the enemy, and these should not be allow-

able." (Field, p. 529.) Of course it is not meant allowable anywhere without compensation, even when necessary as incident. Military necessity stands on the footing not of such common incident, but of exception.

II. It is assumed that we may do *anything* against property that will determine or shorten war. This is one of Mr. Pomeroy's assumptions. Excluding malicious motives, every belligerent State is at liberty to attain the end sought through war in the way that will most surely accomplish it. The argument proves too much, and therefore is worthless. If it were necessary to state it boldly in the discussion, its sheer barbarism would appear. But as an assumption it slips in unchallenged. The fact is, it requires the destruction of a good deal more than private property; it requires severities that not even the critic in the *North American* would venture to commend. The "great limitations imposed upon the operations of war by land," of which Chancellor Kent speaks, and the disregard of which has been so severely condemned "in all ages by the wise and virtuous," unquestionably lengthen war and prevent the attainment of its objects. The spoliation of the cultivators of the soil which even Cyrus of Persia forbade, would as unquestionably hasten the end of a war, with tenfold more effect than the spoliation of the commerce of a people. The very reason assigned for their exemption always, and which led Ortolan even to claim exemption for fishing vessels, is a preëminent reason for their non-exemption, on the principles of the anti-reformers. "If the conqueror," says Kent, "destroys private dwellings, or public edifices, devoted to civil purposes only, or makes war upon monuments of art and models of taste, he violates the modern usages of war, and is sure to meet with indignant resentment, and to be held up to the general scorn and detestation of the world." But why? "The conclusion is inevitable," to adopt Mr. Pomeroy's style of reasoning, "that it is more in accordance with the instincts of humanity to inflict injury upon an enemy State, and thus to force a peace, by capturing or destroying (such) property, than to reach the same result by killing and maiming men." "Temples of religion and repositories of science," says Wheaton, "are exempted from the general operations of war." (So Woolsey, § 131, p. 226.) Mr. Field enumerates many other

instruments of peace,—lighthouses, storm-signals, submarine telegraph cables, halls of legislation, hospitals and other charitable establishments, libraries, observatories, “and all other institutions of civil education and culture.” It is proposed to exempt all of these. (Art. 840, p. 536.) But how much less likely would this be to deter nations from war, and hasten the return of peace. Nay, on these new humane principles savage retaliations now abandoned, piracy, and enslavement of captives, can be justified. Mr. Pomeroy makes great ado about directing the forces of war against property rather than against men. But his various arguments do not hold together, and the principle of producing a peace “as soon as possible” is not even consistent with “as little destruction of human life as possible.” Mr. Pomeroy puts the destruction of private property on the same ground with improvements in weapons, as means of making wars shorter and less bloody; but we hope we may trust to the latter—and a civilization growing more humane—without advocating the former. He protests that we cannot apply personal morality to nations; but only thus has war to any extent been mitigated, at the risk of material disadvantages; only thus could we prefer to destroy property rather than men; only thus are we liberated from the ancient barbarism under which, to use Dr. Woolsey’s statement, “wars were ravaging forays into a hostile country, and the more harm was done, the sooner, it was thought, could redress be procured.”

III. It is assumed that the private citizen is an enemy as well as his government. That was the old idea. It regarded “every human being pertaining to the enemy’s country as a foe.” (Woolsey, p. 220.) Kent is unqualified in declaring it. “A state of war puts all the subjects of the one nation in a state of hostility with those of the other.” (Vol. i, part i, sec. v, p. 94. So Halleck, Twiss, and others.) “This legally imputed hostility it now so far mitigated by treaty provisions, and by ameliorations in the usages of war, and is so much opposed to the tendency of modern opinion, that it seems proper to recognize a different rule.” (Field, p. 468, note; also p. 527. Nations, not their members, enemies.) Accordingly Mr. Field lays down the following:

"705. War is a relation of nation to nation, or of community to community, and does not affect the relations of individuals with each other, except within the limits allowed by this book."

"704. The term "war," as used in this Code, designates a hostile contest at arms, between two or more nations, or communities claiming sovereign rights."

"744. Except where a different intent plainly appears, the term "enemy," as used in this Code, without qualification, designates the hostile nation or community, and all individuals identified with it, as active enemies, according to Article 746."

"746. The following persons, and no others, are deemed active enemies :

1. Those impressed with a military character by the belligerent.

2. Those who not being (so) impressed, &c., are unlawfully waging hostilities.

3. Those who unlawfully give aid and comfort to the opposing belligerent.

4. Spies ; and 5, Pirates."

These provisions are in accordance with the doctrine that "the right to injure the enemy is a right to injure the State and not its non-combatant members;" (Id., p. 529) with the teachings of foreign text-writers quoted early in this paper,* and with the hope expressed by Dr. Woolsey that the old theory from which such savage consequences have flowed may be abandoned and disappear altogether. (§ 119, p. 205.) "The true theory seems to be that the private persons on each side are not fully in hostile relations, but in a state of non-intercourse, in a state wherein the rights of intercourse, only secured by treaty and not derived from natural right, are suspended or have ceased ; while the political bodies to which they belong are at war with one another, and they only." Commenting upon Hamilton's letters of Camillus, in which the opposite theory is maintained, Mr. Field adds that there is no exception to this theory, not even in the case of the foreigner who has acquired property within the territory of a belligerent State ; though he should be under no risk. "according to the

* Mr. Pomeroy quotes in full the argument of Massé.

true principle of justice, because his relation to the State at war is not the same with the relation of his sovereign or government; because, in short, he is not in the full sense an enemy." (§ 119, p. 205, and note.) Later he quotes the words of Portalis from Heffter: "It is the relation of things, and not of persons, which constitutes war; it is the relation of State to State, and not of individual to individual. Between two or more belligerent nations, the private persons of which these nations consist are enemies only by accident; they are not such as men; they are not even as citizens; they are such solely as soldiers." (p. 225, note.) "Strictly speaking," says Bluntschli, "the States are the enemies." Neither reason nor law will sustain any other position, nor is any other consistent with the fact that private individuals *cannot make war*. Talleyrand's despatch to Napoleon, Nov. 20, 1806, is also quoted by Dr. Woolsey as follows: "The law of nations does not allow that the rights of war, and of conquest thence derived, should be applicable to peaceable, unarmed citizens, to private dwellings and properties, to the merchandise of commerce, to the magazines which contain it, to the vehicles which transport it, to unarmed ships which convey it on streams and seas; in one word, to the persons and the goods of private individuals." So Massé.

But the contrary could only be maintained on the old assumption of the hostile character of all citizens; and if this is given up, all destruction of citizen property, *on both elements*, must be given up with it.

But Mr. Pomeroy, *without defending the old assumption by a word*, still objects that this reform would reduce war to "a duel between hostile armies." What there would be so deplorable in this, it is impossible to see. It would still be a grand, valiant appeal to force. Only military persons and property would be exposed—as they are exposed now. What is there to regret in this? Probably war itself would be discouraged, if only those responsible for it and for its operations should immediately suffer. And why not?

Still further it is objected, that the exemption of private property would work "in the interests of absolutism." But does not war itself work in the same interests? and would not

any and every mitigation of it favor the nations that maintain absolutism and great standing armies? So far as the interests sustained by force merely are concerned, absolutism thrives by any form of war, somewhat. If any one or more of the powers of Christendom shall choose to act the part of bully and ruffian toward others, it will secure, in any case, the advantages that belong to such a course; but is there any good reason in this why others should lose the benefits of the progress of civilization? Armed navies might decline with such supremacy as attends them, as is predicted; but merchant navies, in which are the true grandeur and hope of modern nations—especially those of England and the United States—would flourish. "It is to this" (exemption), said Talleyrand, "that Europe must ascribe the maintenance and increase of her prosperity, even in the midst of frequent wars." Moreover, the benefits of it must accrue to all the powers alike, not, like military improvements, only to those who make them in advance of others.

Once more it is objected that we, as a nation, are commercially better off with the Treaty of Paris,—making only neutral commerce free,—and that under it the carrying trade of the world, when Europe is embroiled in war, will be ours, "the commerce of both continents. But if this commerce be made free for the belligerents themselves, all these advantages are lost, sacrificed to a mere sentiment. The advocacy of free belligerent commerce by Americans is, therefore, simply suicidal." This sounds very like what we have heard in other connections! The three new rules of the Treaty of Washington were condemned in some quarters—English and American—as a concession to a sentiment. That England did not break the blockade during the Rebellion—in other words, that she endured the cotton distress without seeking relief by force—has been ascribed to a mere sentiment. It is well for the peace and progress of the world that sometimes even nations yield to the power of a sentiment. If it be a right one, the foregoing of exceptional commercial advantages, like those here held out, can be endured. Besides, all such questions are as broad as they are long, and from the rule that neutral commerce alone is to be free, we, in turn, should suffer as much in succeeding

American wars—if such should unhappily arise—as we should gain in European ones. The international equities will be better secured every way by the proposed reform.

There is hardly any need now—the foregoing observations having covered the ground—to argue for this reform on the score of philanthropy and Christian civilization. Its opponent in the *North American Review* flatly asserts that there is nothing in the argument but “bald assumptions and frothy declamation.” We venture to hope that neither of these will be found in what we have written. He stigmatizes its advocates as “the sentimental school of publicists.” Their “assumptions are false,” their “pretences hollow.” He is as sure of this as that their doctrine is not properly called the American doctrine. This is because they would confine war to professional soldiery. He charges upon them the astounding assumptions that property is to be respected more than life, &c.,—that “loss of products (is) a greater evil than loss of producers;” “they regard soldiers or combatants as mere machines, ignoring their humanity, and placing them in importance below the material wealth of citizens who stay at home and trade.” What shadow of warrant is there for this rude denunciation? Who has ever written a word to even provoke it? If it were proposed that the person of the private peaceful citizen should be exposed to hostilities *in place of* his property, we could imagine what had suggested it; or if the soldier or combatant were to go harmless in his humanity, provided peaceful commerce *in his stead* met the shock of war. But there is no such alternative between property and life. Who ever thought of one? The professional soldier *must* suffer in life and limb any way. The civilian, innocent and peaceful, is already respected in war. But it is an old principle, a very old one, that war gives an equal right over persons and property. Where it does not give any over persons, why should it—in reason—over their property? The logic of this accusation is amazing; what shall we say of the spirit of it? Is it not just barely possible that the publicists accused,—valuing life and humanity as we all should,—also value even property interests as we all should, and would save more than others would from the wreck of war? We should be glad to know upon whom among the

European text-writers and statesmen the atrocious sentiments suggested are to be fastened. Upon M. Massé? Upon M. Bluntschli? Or is it upon the late Dr. Lieber? Among living advocates of the reform is the eminent name of Charles Francis Adams, who closed his New York Historical Society address, in 1870, upon the American doctrine of Neutrality, by declaring in favor of such improvements in international law that there shall be "peace to non-combatants everywhere," and further, "that no innocent, unarmed private voyager of any country, found on any ocean of the globe, shall take harm to himself or his property merely from the fact that he belongs to a belligerent nation." Another eminent name is that of Charles Sumner. There is before us the highest warrant (though hitherto unpublished) for saying that he desired in the Treaty of Washington more than the securing of *any and all* claims, "the complete enfranchisement of the seas, and the recognition of those humane principles which our government at the beginning proclaimed by the pen of Franklin. Such a triumph would have been more than any damages." Is either of these distinguished men to be suspected of the preposterous comparative estimate of person and property broached in the *North American Review*?

It should be added that the "Draft Outlines" of Mr. Field, whose materials have here been largely used, is a volume of 670 pages, and more than a thousand sections, disclosing everywhere very great ability of treatment, and touching other topics which recent public events have clothed with unusual interest,—some of which deserve discussion as much as that to the present condition of which this paper is devoted. So admirable a piece of work by a learned and accomplished American—containing the results of extraordinary research and information crowded into the most condensed form and the fewest possible words, and marked by insight and judgment of the very highest character—it has seldom been our good fortune to see. It is sufficient basis, alone, for a first class reputation in its own line of things. The labor involved must have been very great.

Since this Article was sent to the printer, an interesting and—it is to be hoped—influential “congress of jurisconsults” and others interested in international questions has been held in Belgium. But meagre reports of the meeting and its discussions and results have yet been received in this country, but it is understood to have been attended by the gentlemen appointed by the Social Science Congress to draw up an International Code. Mr. Field, Rev. James B. Miles, D.D., of Boston, Sec. Amer. Peace Society, and Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D.D., LL.D., now of Berlin, were present from the United States. The meeting was held at Brussels, a preliminary meeting having been had at Ghent. The first subjects considered were arbitration, an international code, and the topic discussed above.

ARTICLE V.—EVOLUTIONISM *VERSUS* THEISM.

Pater Mundi; or Doctrine of Evolution. By Rev. E. F. BURR, D.D., Author of *Ecce Coelum* and *Ad Fidem*, and Lecturer on the Scientific Evidences of Religion in Amherst College. Second Series. Boston: Noyes, Holmes & Co. 1873.

THIS book is written in the interest of theism. The author, deeming evolutionism and the evidences of theism incompatible, has in downright earnest attempted to demolish the one, that the foundations of the other may stand undisturbed. It is manifest that whatever touches our Christianity comes very near his heart—a feeling in which we presume most if not all our readers will fully sympathize.

Dr. Burr has been an efficient and a successful worker in the field of the Christian evidences. He has in an eminent degree united eloquence and power in the various works he has put forth. While therefore we are compelled to think he has been less successful in this his latest book, we desire to suggest that any strictures we make upon it will not diminish the value of his previous efforts. We are constrained by personal acquaintance and friendship to record our wish not to seem antagonistic to him individually, but to be working together with him in endeavors to find solid and immovable ground for our Christian faith.

Our first inquiry will be whether the attempt made in this volume to overthrow the doctrine of evolution has been successful. We will then consider whether atheism be not a result which even the evolutionist himself can not logically arrive at.

"The Doctrine of Evolution," as the author defines it, "in its ripest form, is that all things we perceive, including what are called spiritual phenomena, have come from the simplest beginnings, solely by means of such forces and laws as belong to matter" (p. 9). These first beginnings are nebulous matter diffused through space. This is developed by means of the forces inherent in it into worlds and world-systems. The world is developed till it becomes a fit abode for living beings, and then

these are spontaneously produced, commencing with the lowest and simplest forms and gradually ascending to the highest, both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, up to man himself. The difficulties of the scheme cluster around four points. 1. The nebular origin of worlds. 2. Spontaneous generation of living organisms. 3. Transmutation of species by which the higher organisms spring out of the lower. 4. The rational soul springing out of the cerebral and nervous organization. The fourth of these Dr. Burr does not make a separate point. We deem it the most important of the whole. These four points are none of them dependent upon any of the others; the establishment of one establishes neither of the others; the overthrow of one disproves none of the rest. Whoever would establish a godless cosmogony must make good all four of them; but the theist may reject some and admit others if he sees reason to do so, and as far as he goes in admitting them he will be an evolutionist. Dr. Burr expressly rejects the three he takes up and would certainly reject the fourth.

He has especially concentrated his force upon the nebular hypothesis. In reference to the origin of the solar system he brings a series of objections under five heads. 1. The amount of heat in the sun. 2. The different chemical constitution of the various members of the system. 3. Certain mechanical relations among them. 4. The rotations. 5. The revolutions. Some of these embrace several particulars. They are as follows. 1. The present heat of the sun, after such an immense period of cooling, implies an intensity of heat in the original fire mist incredible and improbable. 2. The various members of the system should have the same chemical constitution throughout, which does not seem to be the fact. 3. There ought to be, but is not, either a uniformity or a regular gradation in such matters as size, density, presence or absence of air and water, position, number of satellites. 4. The axis of rotation should be, but is not, perpendicular to the planes of the orbits; also the law of the periods the same for both planets and satellites; and the axis, instead of being always parallel to itself during the entire revolution, should always be inclined at the same angle to a line drawn to the central body: taking for instance the earth at the winter solstice, the north pole, being then

turned away from the sun, should during the entire revolution lean equally away. 5. The revolutions of the system should be, but are not, all in the same direction, all exactly circular, and all exactly in the plane of the sun's equator. The five heads contain thirteen particulars. (See Lecture 7th.) We will examine them seriatim.

1. The present heat of the sun, after so immense a period of cooling, implies an original heat beyond possibility of belief. To this we oppose two considerations. *a.* The emission of heat does not necessarily imply a reduction of temperature. Water, e. g., at 32° Fahrenheit, gives out one hundred and forty degrees of heat in changing from the liquid to the solid form, without any diminution of temperature. The present heat of the sun is supposed to be due, in part at least, to chemical changes going on within it, rather than to the wasting away of its already accumulated stores, and these chemical changes may be far more active now than in the earlier periods of the process of world formation.

b. But leaving out of view this source of heat, still there could never have been the augmented intensity of heat which the author supposes, because the surface from which the heat was given out was so vastly greater, when the mass was expanded to fill the circumferences of the planets in succession, that the intensity of the heat would be correspondingly diminished, and because in an expanded substance much of the heat is latent which becomes sensible upon contraction. It is said that the present amount of heat given out by the sun could all be supplied from this source alone, with an amount of contraction so small as to be entirely inappreciable even in long periods of time.

Whatever difficulties there may be in accounting for the source of the heat now emitted by the sun, they are not escaped by a denial of the nebular hypothesis; they press just as hard upon any other supposition as upon this. In fact, we know of no hypothesis which offers so rational an explanation of the present heat of the sun as this same nebular hypothesis.

2. The various members of the system, says Dr. Burr, should have the same chemical constitution throughout. But the evidence of the spectroscope on which we rely for our know-

ledge of the chemical constitution of any heavenly body, is largely negative. Because it does not reveal the presence of any particular element, we may not therefore infer its absence. The spectroscope is especially uncertain in its revelations of bodies that shine by reflected light. The difference in chemical constitution among the various bodies of the solar system may be far less than our author seems to think. Some differences there doubtless ought to be. For in the original nebulous mass, the denser portions would tend toward the centre, the lighter toward the circumference, so that each ring, as it should be thrown off, would be formed from the lighter portions of the mass from which it was separated. Thus there would be a gradual increase of density from the remotest planet to the centre, *which is a general fact*, with such slight irregularities as might be expected from peculiar circumstances modifying the condensations. There might well thus result some sifting of the elements, and an unequal distribution of them among the various members of the system. If it be objected to this that the sun has far less density than it ought on this supposition, since it should be the densest of all, and besides that it abounds in hydrogen, an extreme among all known substances for lightness, the answer is that we see the gaseous photosphere surrounding the sun, and not his solid substance, which may be of any density required, and that the hydrogen may have been so abundant as to secure its continuance in every part of the system, or it may have early entered into such combinations as would form substances which would subside toward the centre, and that the free hydrogen now in the sun may have been liberated by the increasing heat, resulting from the contraction of the mass or by other causes. The chemical constitution of the system, so far as known, argues for the nebular hypothesis rather than against it.

3. There ought to be, we are told, but is not, either uniformity or regular gradation in such matters as size, density, presence or absence of air and water, position, number of satellites.

Of the density see the preceding paragraph.

As to size, we should at first thought look for the largest on the outside, as being formed when the great nebulous sphere was largest, and we should expect a regular diminution of size

toward the centre. What do we see? The second planet, Uranus, is slightly less in size than the first, Neptune; but not so much less as it seemingly ought to be. But a second thought reminds us that when one planet had been formed, its attraction outward upon the remaining mass, coöperating with the centrifugal force in that mass, would make the second ring larger than it would be from the action of the centrifugal force alone. This exterior force increasing with each new planet, it is not strange that Saturn comes off with greatly enlarged mass, and that Jupiter should next appear, "the giant of the system." But now the process upsets itself. The mass of Jupiter is three and a half times that of Saturn, its distance from the outer asteroid less than half its distance from Saturn. Halving the distance quadruples the force of attraction exerted. The differences of distance and mass both will give to Jupiter some fifteen times as great a disturbing force upon the mass beneath him as Saturn had upon the mass from which Jupiter was separated. The result would be that before a complete ring could be formed, the portion directly underneath Jupiter would be greatly heaped up, and soon the crest of this protuberance would be thrown off, like a globule of mud from a carriage wheel. This would happen not once but many times, until the whole of the more than one hundred and twenty asteroids now known, and the scores perhaps yet to be discovered, were all thrown off, and the process went on till the distance of the remaining mass became too great to have its portions pulled off in drops, and the original method of world formation was resumed. But enough of the exterior force remains to separate Mars, while yet very small. The next one, the earth, is larger, as we should expect. But now comes in another fact to interfere with the farther increase of size. The central mass has now become so much diminished, that the successive films of matter which it gives off, being collected from a surface so much reduced, must for this reason be again diminished in quantity. The surface diminishes more rapidly than the diameter, the one being as the square of the other. Accordingly Venus is of about the same size as the earth, Mercury is smaller, and the supposed new planet Vulcan, if it exists, is doubtless smaller still. The gradations in size of the planetary worlds argue not against their nebular origin, but for it.

Under the head of position, Dr. Burr argues that each ring would most probably break itself up into several planets, instead of being collected all into one. Perhaps we should have expected this, and yet we are unable to see any special improbability that the whole ring should gather itself into one mass, nor even that it should have done so with all the uniformity our present system exhibits.

The variations in number of satellites is what we should expect on the nebular hypothesis. The larger planets have them, the smaller not; those beyond the asteroids have each a family of them—Neptune probably has more than the one now known—while of those within the asteroids the largest, the earth, has one, the rest none. Saturn has the largest number, eight, and has the rings besides, a fact explained by his rarity being greater than that of any other planet.

Again we are told: "If one member of the system is without atmosphere and water, all the other members should also be without them." "We turn to our moon and find it without sign of water or atmosphere; while the earth, from whose surface it was cast off, is well supplied with both." (pp. 210, 211.) But the indications are that the moon was also once well supplied with both, and geology affords us a probable explanation of the reason of their disappearance, at the same time hinting that the earth will in process of time follow suit.

Thus the alleged objections arising from the mechanical relations of the system prove without force: most if not all of them on examination turn into arguments for the hypothesis.

We group the author's objections under the fourth and fifth heads together, for convenience in meeting them. They are these. The axis of rotation should be, but is not, perpendicular to the planes of the orbits—the law of the periods the same for planet and satellite—the axis should always lean equally away from the centre instead of being always parallel to itself—the revolutions of the system should be all in the same direction, but some are retrograde—they should be exactly circular—they should be all exactly in the plane of the sun's equator. (pp. 216, 223.)

First, as to the orbits being exactly in the plane of the sun's equator. It is most manifest that in the formation of a ring

to be thrown off from the great globular mass, the material to form it would come up from this part and from that, with different densities and with varying velocities, with numerous eddies and counter movements. Gravities, cohesions, affinities, being very various and constantly shifting, the disturbing forces would be such as would be almost sure to throw the plane of the planet's revolution somewhat away from that of the equator of the central mass. That the revolutions should all be in the plane of the sun's equator would be well nigh impossible. If more than half of the matter of which a ring was formed came from one side of the equatorial plane, or if for any reason the balancing of the centrifugal forces was one side, the mass thrown off would be carried to the other side. And if such variations would be comparatively small, the deviations of the orbits from a common plane are also small. Moreover, such a predominance of force on one side would be likely to result in a corresponding overbalance on the other, when the next ring should be formed, and thus an oscillation would ensue, giving us alternate inclinations each side of a central plane. And this is just what we find. Taking a plane between the two exterior planets, we have alternate variations from this plane ranging from half a degree to three and a half, till we come to Mercury, "whose ejection was on an advance and not return swing, and then we have the sun's present equator still a trifle in advance of the orbit of Mercury."* The orbits of the asteroids are not, indeed, confined within these limits of variation, which is just what we should expect from the manner in which we have supposed them to have been formed. So much for the inclinations of the orbits.

Next, as to the perpendicularity of the axis to the plane of the orbit, and the retrograde movements of the satellites of Uranus and Neptune. As the matter of a ring should go on to aggregate itself into a sphere, similar perturbations and variations and disturbances of balance would occur, only now in an increased degree. The different portions of matter would come into the forming sphere with all possible obliquities to the axis of rotation. The resulting balance of forces would be almost sure to throw the axis out of a perpendicular to the plane of

* Hickok's *Creator and Creation*, p. 256.

revolution. The amount of the displacement varies from almost nothing in the case of Jupiter to more than ninety degrees in that of Uranus. When the axis had been carried ninety degrees from the perpendicular, it would then lie in the plane of the orbit, and as it went still farther the pole, which was at first south, would be turned northward, and the direction of the rotation would be changed, becoming from east to west, instead of from west to east. After the planet had assumed this position, the satellites which it threw off would have a corresponding situation, and so their motion is apparently retrograde while it is really direct, the axes of their orbits being turned about one hundred and ten degrees away from a perpendicular to the orbit of their primary. Thus the inclinations of the axes are explained and the retrograde movements are shown to be only apparent.

Again, we are told the law of the periods should be the same for both planet and satellite. The moon turns once on its axis while it revolves once around the earth, and the same fact is assumed for the other satellites, while none of the planetary rotations are known or believed to follow the same law. But the moon is the only satellite in the system whose period of rotation is known.* That the other satellites are like ours in this respect is only conjectural. And if, as Proctor maintains, Jupiter and Saturn are not yet cooled off, but are still giving out light and heat, it then becomes probable that while these planets are not fit abodes for living beings, their satellites may be, and that their rotations follow the pattern of the planets and not that of our moon. Besides, it is supposed that the moon had originally a more rapid rotation, one conforming to that of the planets, and that by tidal action, in conjunction perhaps with other causes, it has been retarded and brought to its present movement, and that the same causes will eventually reduce the earth's period of rotation till it becomes the same as the moon's.†

Again, it is claimed that the axis of rotation should always lean equally away from the centre instead of being always parallel to itself. The argument to establish the claim is this: If

* See Winchell's *Sketches of Creation*, p. 405.

† See Proctor's *Other Worlds than Ours*, p. 196.

the axis of a planet lay in the plane of its orbit and in the line of a radius of the orbit; if we suppose the radius to revolve with the planet, the axis will always continue in the line of the radius, so that the pole which points toward the sun at any one time will always point toward it, and the other pole directly away during the entire revolution. Then if one pole be raised above this orbital plane, the other being in like manner depressed beneath it, it will still hold true that the pole which is toward the sun will always continue so, the other being constantly turned away—the angle which the axis makes with the plane of the orbit not changing. To this we reply, the original position of the axis would be not in the plane of the orbit but perpendicular to it, in which position it would, as the author himself says, always remain parallel to itself. Any deviations, therefore, would be from the perpendicular instead of from the horizontal position. But again, it is not true that if the axis were coincident with the radius of the orbit, it would continue so during the revolution of the planet. For the momentum of a rotary motion tends to keep the axis stationary, and whatever other movement the revolving body may have, the rotary movement will be separate and independent of it. The axis will still be relatively stationary when it has ceased to be absolutely so: it will therefore always point not to the central sun but to the distant star, i. e., will be always parallel to itself. This is illustrated by the movements of a top. If the axis of a whirling top leans, it tends to point always in the same direction, notwithstanding any advance movement the top may have, whether this movement be in straight lines or in curved. And it will always so point, only so far as it is deflected by the friction at the point on which it spins, or by the disturbing force of gravity, both of which forces are to be distinguished from the rotary momentum and from the impulse which gives the forward movement. These two latter are the only forces concerned in the movements of the planet, and under their influence alone top and planet alike will keep the axis always parallel to itself. And yet again, if Dr. Burr's reasonings on this point were correct, they ought to govern the position of the axis, on whatever theory we attempt to account for the origin of the system. The planets have no business in any

case to be revolving with their axes always parallel to themselves.

Again, it is asserted that the revolutions should all be in orbits exactly circular, but they are elliptical. Now that circular orbits should be looked for, is so far from being the case, that it is impossible there should be a single circular orbit in the whole system. For circular motion cannot be stable unless in the absence of all disturbing force. If we had but a single body revolving around the sun and no disturbing force came from the stellar worlds, then, if the centripetal and centrifugal forces were precisely adjusted for a circular orbit, such an orbit might exist and might continue. But the moment a third body is introduced into the system we have a disturbing force, and circular motion is no longer possible. The centrifugal force acts always in the line of a tangent to the orbit and the centripetal in the line of the radius. In a circle these will always be at a right angle with each other. Any new force acting upon the body must necessarily disturb the balance of these two and give one of them the predominance. Take the case in which the centrifugal force predominates. The planet will now be carried forward in a course lying between the circle and the tangent. This will carry it farther from the sun, so that the lines of direction of the two forces will begin to form an acute angle, and so far they will act in contrary directions. For the centripetal force may now be resolved into two, one at right angles with the tangent, the other directly against the motion of the planet. This will tend to retard that motion and so to destroy a part of the centrifugal force. The curve in which the planet moves will be elliptical, and the excess of the centrifugal force will be overcome when the planet arrives at the extremity of the minor axis of the ellipse. The two forces will now be rightly adjusted to each other for circular motion again, but this can not now be resumed because the two forces do not here act at right angles with each other. The retardation of motion must therefore still go on, and it will continue until the planet reaches the extremity of the major axis of the ellipse. The two forces are here again acting at right angles, but we can not have circular motion now because the centripetal force has become deficient. The planet has de-

scribed half a revolution, and in the other half a similar but reverse process takes place. This completes the circuit and brings the planet back to the starting point, and back to the same adjustment of forces with which we started. An elliptical orbit is therefore established and must continue. Subsequent disturbances may change the ellipticity, but a circular orbit is impossible forever.

Motion in an ellipse is stable because it is a result of a balance of forces poising themselves by a perpetual swing on each side of a central mean. Of such rhythmical or oscillatory movements our own world is full, the starry heavens are full. Circular motion then, instead of being demanded by the nebular hypothesis, is absolutely forbidden under any hypothesis.

There is a statement given upon the authority of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. 29, 1860,* that the earth's equator is not a perfect circle but an ellipse. Not only is the earth flattened at the poles, giving an elliptical form to the meridians, but there is a slight flattening in the other direction also. The diameter of the equator, which has one of its extremities in central Africa, is longer by two miles than the one at right angles to it. This seems to indicate that, when the earth was in an attenuated state, the various portions of the substance of which it is composed, as they revolved separately around the axis, fell into elliptical orbits, and that the waters of the oceans are now made to conform to this resulting figure under the guidance of the same laws of motion.

These are the objections to the nebular theory which Dr. Burr derives from the solar system. He makes much indeed of the comets. But the principles we have brought forward involve a sufficient reply to what he has said of them, even granting, as he supposes, that they had their origin within the system. But if we take the commonly received opinion that they are stragglers from without, they present no difficulty whatever. That these wisps and shreds of nebulous matter should have been thrown off into space to wander afterward as they should fall under the attraction of the larger bodies—that they should have been thus thrown off in the course of the

* *Scribner's Monthly*, June, 1873, p. 188.

manifold throes, rendings, burstings, explosions, ejections, which occurred, is but what we should have looked for. But on the theory of direct creations of worlds by the fiat of the Almighty Will, how can they be accounted for? What can they be but freaks of the Creator?

There are in the system eight planets and more than one hundred and twenty asteroids. These all revolve around the sun and all in the same direction, from west to east. They are all approximately in one plane. Their orbits are all elliptical, having the sun in one of the foci. Their periodic times all fall under one law. Then we have a score or more of satellites, and these all revolve around their respective primaries with like similarities, each family having all its members approximately in one plane and agreeing with the planets in the other particulars just mentioned, even to the direction of their motion, for the seemingly retrograde motion of the satellites of Uranus and Neptune is, as we have shown, only apparent. Every one of the hundred and fifty bodies is believed to rotate upon an axis—all that admit such observations as would determine the point are known so to rotate—and the rotations that are known are all in one direction and all in the same direction as the revolutions of the system, viz: from west to east. Now here are agreements by hundreds; the disagreements that have been alleged are comparatively few, and even these disappear upon examination. The witnesses all, when brought upon the stand and cross-examined, give their testimony decidedly and solely in favor of the opponent of the party who subpoenaed them. But marvelous are the uniformities, and these point clearly away from the theory of separate creations; they point to a common origin and a common history. If one says that these things might have been as they are just as probably on the theory of direct creations by the power of the Divine Will, he is on the same ground with those who would say that God undoubtedly might have created the rocks, with all the fossils they contain already in them, by direct fiat, six thousand years ago, in the space of six literal days—but who believes He did? There is, we understand, scarcely a scientist of eminence at present who does not accept the nebular hypothesis as having greater probabilities in its favor than any

other, save Proctor, and he has a theory of his own, which is a sufficient explanation of his non-reception of this.

We can not follow the author into the regions beyond with the same particularity. Nor need we. The hypothesis may be true of the solar system and not be true of the stellar universe. We may believe that each fixed star is a sun having a retinue of planets, and probably of satellites, and that each system has been developed from a nebulous mass the same as our own, without believing that all came previously from one great nebulous mass containing all the material of the entire universe. The evidence which would extend the theory thus to include the whole universe, is not so full, nor from the very nature of the case can it be, at least in the present state of astronomical science. But analogy points that way, and many of the things we can observe point that way. Dr. Burr's objections to this part of the scheme in the lecture on stellar astronomy, spring from taking our system as an exact pattern in its details of the greater evolution without the system. But the details may have been altogether different, nay, we should confidently expect to find them so. Indeed, as the result of the process of formation is different, so ought the process itself to have varied. If the reader will consult Dr. Hickok's *Creator and Creation*, Book 2, chap. 2, part 3, he will find drawn out a supposed process, by which the stellar worlds as we find them could have been all evolved from a universal matter.

As to the Lecture on Nebular Astronomy, we may say in a word that the revelations of the spectroscope have as yet but just begun. It is only since the year 1859 that Spectrum Analysis has entered into the service of astronomy, and though its performances thus far have been astonishing, we can by no means conclude that they are ended. It is premature to pronounce with confidence what will be its final indications. Many of its revelations favor this hypothesis, and if there are some which we know not how to reconcile with it as we now construct it, it would seem the part of wisdom to wait for more of its beautiful light, instead of pronouncing with confidence that the question is already settled. The spectroscope and nebular astronomy have not settled it against the hypothesis.

We have been thus particular in our examination of the

author's treatment of the nebular hypothesis, because he has devoted his main strength to it, because he manifestly thinks the main strength of his argument lies here, and because it seems to us he has here been most of all unsuccessful. Upon the other two divisions of the subject we will be very brief. These are, the theory of the spontaneous generation of living beings, and that of the transmutation of species. Here he lays down these principles. "No being can reproduce itself in kind. No being can produce its own equal, much less its superior. No mere combination of beings can produce essentially new properties; the properties resulting must be properties or modification of properties already possessed by the constituent beings" (p. 91). And so he denies "that ordinary parentage explains the continuance of races." "It is a pure impossibility in the nature of things." "Parents are no sufficient explanation of their offspring." "In no case can a plant or animal reproduce itself." These and more to the same effect (pp. 95 to 99). His position then is that the new beings which arise need always and everywhere to be accounted for, independently of those from which they spring. Does he mean that there must be a new creation in each case? Did every kernel of the millions of bushels of wheat of last year's harvest come by a separate creative act on the part of God? Or did it come into being by any *special* action of His? What is clearer than that the new seed springs from the old under the working of natural forces by natural laws? So in the animal kingdom, parents beget offspring without supernatural agency. Dr. Burr would surely admit this. But this is all the evolutionist claims. Life, he says, results from certain combinations of matter without supernatural agency. Whether this be true or not, we can not see how Dr. Burr's propositions, taken so as to consist at all with facts, disprove it. But to get the living out of the non-living—this is something more than to get plant or animal from a progenitor like itself. The effect is greater than the cause. The stream rises higher than its source. "No being can produce its superior" (p. 91). Yet "children are sometimes, both physically and mentally, *greatly* the superiors of their parents. What a poor explanation do their parents give of such offspring as Milton and Newton and Pascal" (p. 97).

Was there then a supernatural intervention to produce these men? Dr. Burr would reject traducianism probably and say, yes, every human being comes direct from the hand of God, separate and underived. But the traducianists are not all dead nor silenced. And if they were, the argument is not saved, for is not the physical man often superior to the parents from whom he sprung? Does not the animal often excel its parentage in size, strength, vigor, sagacity, in fineness of qualities of every sort? So in the vegetable kingdom. There is a coming forth of what exceeds that from which it came, without any intervention of the supernatural. And this is all the evolutionist asks. Higher individuals do come from the lower, why not higher species? And why not the organic from the inorganic? Whatever objections we may entertain to these conclusions, we cannot see how these arguments of the author affect the conclusions.

The fifth and sixth Lectures, entitled "Conflict with Geology" and "Conflict with the Science of Probabilities," seem to us to have much force as against the atheistic evolutionist, but to be without force to the theist, who, believing that God made all things, yet deems that the method of His making was through these processes of evolution. In this case everything was foreseen—all provided for at the first to be just as we find it—all involved in the original universal matter which He would have evolved in all time to come, and all which He did not wish to have subsequently come forth kept out of the original germ.

We come now to our second inquiry, can evolutionism logically result in atheism? It is not claimed indeed that it would be a necessary result. Dr. Burr says: "A positive proof of the law scheme would do just nothing toward disproving a creating God" (p. 10). But he thinks it undermines the evidences of His existence. If evolutionism is true, God may exist but we can not prove it. "It is perfectly inconsistent with all *evidence of His existence*" (p. 17). It is true indeed the atheistic evolutionist so regards it. And we hear him crying out, "We have no need of a God. For see how everything is accounted for without him. The supposition of a God therefore being needless is unphilosophical, and so it is foolish. The ignorant may receive it, but the intelligent must discern that it is with-

out proof and so must reject it." To this claim of the atheist Dr. Burr yields. "It is not too much to say," says he, "that in effect it [evolutionism] suppresses *all* theistic evidences, for after I have admitted that the properties of matter itself will account for all we find within the bounds of nature, what shall hinder a philosopher from saying, 'These atoms are just as easily conceived of as being eternal as is an infinite mind.' No satisfactory answer can be made to this" (p. 13). From this opinion we must decidedly dissent. Just here we believe theism entrenches itself with absolute invincibility. If matter were inert and motionless, it might be difficult to disprove its eternity. But such is not the matter we have to do with. It is matter endowed with its various forces—active forces producing effects—forces that are all the while carrying it onward in a process of development. Moving matter must move in time. The motion must have commenced at some definite point of time, or it must have come down from a past eternity without beginning. If it had a beginning, there must have been some cause for it, and this cause is God. That it should have come down from eternity without beginning, we maintain to be demonstrably just as impossible as that $7+5=1200$ should be a true equation. "Those scholars," says Dr. Burr, "who hold to eternal atomic forces and laws which are able of themselves to build up all the various natural structures are universally atheists" (p. 14). Of course they are, but their prime error lies in the assumption that the "atomic forces and laws" can be "eternal," and this assumption is no necessary part of evolutionism. All that this requires is that we begin with the original world substance or at most with the universal matter all in a single mass, and from it derive the existing worlds with all their contents. This will imply indeed a subsequent development onward into the future to a final consummation or winding up of the whole.

Let us here pause a moment and look at the scheme as it now presents itself. Starting with an original nebulous matter, the present system of revolving worlds is easily derived from it, and the probability of such derivation is such as commands a reception of the theory by astronomers well nigh universal. It is certainly possible that the formless void, mentioned in Gen. i, 2, as the original state of the earth, refers to the nebulous matter in some stage of the earth's formation from such matter,

and that the light which was brought into being so long before the appearance of the sun and moon was that resulting from the chemical action of the elements entering into their various combinations. The solid earth once formed, geology indicates the steps of the process by which it has come to its present condition and points to future changes in the same line. But the living creatures upon the earth geology does not account for. How did they arise? Was it by separate creative acts of the Divine Being, or was it a part of the process of development? The evolutionist says the latter. The first beginnings of life sprung up spontaneously from inorganic matter. But no, says the objector. From the lifeless and inorganic to the living and organic, though it be only in the simplest forms, is too great a stride. There is a chasm there. The approaches to this chasm from either side may be such as to create an expectation that we might pass directly across it, but when we come to it we need a bridge. Arrange your experiment; let us see the living issuing spontaneously without any germ; this will be the bridge we want. Well, the experiment has been attempted, and success has been claimed for it. But a closer scrutiny casts doubt upon it. The germ had not been excluded with sufficient care; the life brought out was not spontaneous after all. But wait, says the evolutionist; we shall succeed presently; everything promises success; you have only to wait till we can adjust the details of the experiment with the requisite care and skill. Huxley, while expressing his emphatic conviction that the experiments in question do not really prove the point, yet adds: "I must carefully guard myself against the supposition that I intend to suggest that no such thing as abiogenesis ever has taken place in the past or ever will take place in the future." "Expectation is permissible where belief is not, and if it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions, which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter. That is the expectation to which analogical reasoning leads me." (*Lay Sermons*, pp. 366, 367.) Now while we do not share in these so confident expectations that spontaneous generation

is going to be proved, we yet think it would be too much to affirm that it will not be proved. The indications that point to and favor it are such that the expectations of those who are looking for it are not to be hooted down as visionary. Let them prove it if they can. We can maintain that God is the author of life equally whether He produced it by successive creative fiat as each new order of living beings was brought upon the stage, or brought them by processes of development from lower forms of being. The same things may also be said of the transmutation of species, which would give us the higher orders springing out of the lower. Huxley believes "that experiments conducted by a skilful physiologist would very probably obtain the desired production in a comparatively few years." (*Lay Sermon*, p. 295.) Many of the scientists talk and write as if the theory were already established, but it is not. We may well doubt whether it ever will be, but let us not be too confident. Let them prove this also if they can, yet will not we fear. In regard to the derivation of the rational soul of man from his cerebral and nervous organization, it appears to us that the chasm is far broader and far deeper. That this should ever be made out seems especially improbable. But the study of physiological psychology now attracting so much attention may make manifest what now would seem impossible. If it should finally appear that even the soul of man was generated by this process, we would still maintain its immateriality and its immortality, and would maintain that God was its framer as well if He framed it by the process as if He called it into existence by a separate creative act.

Let us now suppose these chasms all bridged over, and the derivation of everything we now see from an original nebulous mass made out. Carrying the same line of development onward into the future, we shall come at length to a time when the fires of the sun shall have burned out, and it shall cease to give out its light and heat, and when planets and satellites, having their centrifugal force overcome by the resistance of the ether which fills the heavenly spaces, shall rush together into one, even as they originally came forth from one. Perhaps in the vastly more remote future, all suns and systems will in like manner rush together into one common mass. And the doctrine of the conservation and equivalence of forces

teaches us that the destruction of motion in such Titanic concussions must result in enormous manifestations of force in some other form, and it is deemed not impossible—it is by some regarded probable—that this should be sufficient to unlock the combinations of matter both mechanical and chemical, and throw all back into the separated elements, i. e., into the original nebulous condition from which it came in the outset. When this happens, a complete cycle has been run; we are at the point where we first began, ready to start on a similar round again. Nay, more, cycle may follow cycle without limit; the process is capable of extension *ad infinitum*. But the atheistic evolutionist turns upon us and says, “Well, if it may go on in the future without end, it may have come down in like manner from the past without beginning. An eternal succession of universes being established, the eternal God is thereby ruled out.” Such is indeed the conclusion of the atheist. It is a dire conclusion to come to, at the end of so long a race, but let us not be frightened. God is not annihilated so easily.

For the supposition of a past eternity thus made up is utterly contradictory. It is absurd; it is impossible. It is grounded in a misapprehension of what is involved in infinity. The infinite is not, and cannot be made by an aggregation of units. No heaping up of finites will ever constitute it; it cannot be constituted; it is a simple idea; the mind must grasp it directly. It does not come by successive additions. These may give us the vastly great, that which is so great that the imagination staggers in the effort to reach it, so great that the mind cannot grasp it. And the mind, overcome by the attempt to reach the immeasurably great, may, by a last convulsive effort, imagine a heaping together of these intangible magnitudes in numbers that are equally unmanageable, and may conclude that such a process continued sufficiently will at length reach infinity. But this is so far from being the case, that the goal we seek does not lie in that direction. We are travelling in the wrong road, and are no nearer the goal when the weary wings of the exhausted imagination fail, and let us drop, than we were before we started; we are just as far from the infinite at the last as at the first. We have been seeking a goal; the infinite has no goal. And coming back from our adventurous excursion to

the starting point, we can, standing just there, apprehend this simple idea, the unlimited, the boundless, the infinite, just as accurately and just as completely as we can standing on the dizzy heights we have attempted to reach. And once apprehending the idea, we perceive that no aggregations can constitute it, since it is by its very nature not so much beyond aggregations as aside from them—without them. If now the infinite we are seeking to fill be one of duration, as is the past eternity of the atheist, it refuses to be made up by units of time. It makes no difference what the units are; they may be simple days of solar time; they may be those cosmical cycles stretching from nebula to nebula again, each of which would multiply itself beyond the geologic aeons to a multiple higher, perhaps, by far than that by which these stretch themselves beyond our single days. Let now the atheist begin from the present, and reckon back into the past by cycles; let him put in as many cycles as there are days in each, and then as many of the periods thus constituted as they each have days, and so on; each new period added being the square of the preceding, and let him heap up even such periods to imagination's utmost stretch, and then plunge his imagination into the unknown void beyond: all this brings him no nearer to the eternity he seeks to fill than we now stand to-day. For by the very supposition, he is seeking to fill up the measure of that which is without measure. No aggregate of finites can do it. That the material universe should have come down from a past eternity without beginning, is therefore an impossibility, a contradiction, an absurdity. It must then have had a beginning, and *in the beginning God*.

But it will be said, we do, notwithstanding all such reasonings from the nature of infinity, admit a future eternity without end; how then can we gainsay the past eternity without beginning? Why must we not admit the one equally with the other? The answer is we do, just that and no more. What is implied in a future eternity? Simply this, that go as far into the future as we will, we may then go still farther. Sail down the stream never so far, the stream stretches on still beyond. But the time never can come in the future when, reckoning forward from this present to it, the period will not be finite and definite, with

simply more to come. That is what infinity of time means, more to come at whatever point of the line we may stand. And that more to come is precisely the same, standing just here at this present, as it will be at any imaginable point of the remotest future. It is at once seen, that any attempt to fill up and complete this future infinite duration is absurd, because it subverts the very foundation of the idea, the more to come. And it manifestly makes no difference whether we reckon from the present forward into the future, or backward into the past. Infinity of past time simply means more preceding, go as far back as we will. And if we go back over the greatest number of the cosmical cycles imaginable or unimaginable, the backward gaze from that point is not a whit changed from what it is here at this present. But the past eternal succession of cycles of the atheist implies, that by a count of units the bounds of that which is boundless have been actually reached. It is a heaping up of the finite until it reaches the infinite. When the possibility of accomplishing this in the future is demonstrated, it can be admitted for the past. If the claim for the past is valid, if the universe has come down from the past through a succession of cycles without beginning, if this has been not hypothetically constructed in the mind, but actually realized in fact, actually finished up and completed, then it is possible for a future eternity to be also finished up and completed, that its completion become an actually realized fact. That is to say, we may reach the end of that which is without end. The absurdity is the same whichever way we look. It is just as possible in the one case as in the other and no more.

Succession without a beginning is an impossibility. To affirm it, is the same as to affirm a succession without end actually realized. If then it were made out that the cosmical periods do succeed each other in cycles, all that we could affirm of the past portion of the series would be that we could never reach a point where we could say, here God must have begun the work. We could not fix the beginning, because there could be no point where some preceding terms of the series might not have existed. All the past eternity the atheist can get for his universe is this, that we can never get so far back but that there is a possibility of innumerable cycles preceding.

He can have a series whose limit we can not fix. And he confounds the series whose limit can not be determined with that which has no limit, the indefinite with the infinite. His infinite is only the inconceivably great. The truth is there can be no actually existing series which is not limited in both directions. It must be made up of an exact number of terms fixed and definite. And all that can be meant by an infinite series is, that whatever be the number of terms we may actually have, it is possible to add other terms indefinitely. Whether the additions be made at one extremity of the series, or the other, or both, will not alter the case. While additional terms are always possible, the number of actual terms must always be finite and definite. If then universes follow each other in cycles, the time never can come when the number of cycles that have actually existed will not be finite, a series having both beginning and end. There can not be succession without a beginning. We can not fix the beginning, but we can know there must have been one somewhere. An eternal succession of worlds is then impossible; there must have been a beginning, and *in the beginning God*.

Again, it may be said, reason as you may, we have behind us an entire past eternity, and we have only to put one of the cosmical cycles into the corresponding space of time, through all the spaces of this actually existing eternity, and we have our infinite series of cycles made out. The proof that they can not be made out must then go for nothing, since by this easy supposition they are made out, and we have them standing before us. But this supposition contains the same impossible elements. It speaks of an entire past eternity. It undertakes to grasp it as a whole. It comprehends the infinity of past duration in its totality. But the infinite can have no such totality as this supposition contemplates. No such whole is predicable of it. For a whole is correlative with parts, a whole is made up of its parts. But as we have already shown, no aggregation of finite parts can reach the infinite. Totality and infinity then are incompatible terms; either excludes the other. Let the totality come where it may, infinity leaps beyond it. For that is what infinity means, that go where we will we can go farther; be the sum total what it may, more may yet be added.

Let one form any conception he is able of the whole of infinity, any possible conception of it. Whatever it can mean, it either admits of additions or it does not. If any thing can be added to it, then it is not the whole; we must enlarge the borders of it to take in the addition before we have the whole. If it is not possible to add any thing to it, it is not infinite, since it contradicts the very idea of infinity, viz: that something can *always* be added to whatever we may actually have. The whole of infinity is therefore impossible; there can be no whole without a limit, and infinity excludes limit. The entire past eternity of the atheist, therefore, instead of being the infinite in time, is only the inconceivably great; it is but an outside finite. It is going back as far as he can get, taking a leap into the dark, fathomless abyss beyond, and calling it eternity. But it is not eternity; it is but a vast totality, and so is not without its limit. It must then have had a beginning, and *in the beginning God*.

But yet again, it may be said, though it is not possible to reach infinity by putting together any definite number of units, we have only to increase the number to infinity, and the infinite sum will be made out. As long as the number of terms is finite, it is true the sum will be finite; but an infinite number of terms being given, the difficulty is obviated and infinity results. Take any given measure of extension, and repeat it an infinite number of times, you will have infinite extension in space, and in like manner any definite period of duration repeated to infinity will give infinite duration. While, therefore, it may be true that no multiplication of finite factors will give infinity, it is only to make one of the factors infinite to have the product the same. Give the evolutionist then an infinite number of cycles, his past eternity is made out, and he can laugh at all our reasonings. The value of the single terms of the series may be small as well as great, all he wants is an infinity of terms. Whether he reckons by the cosmical cycles, or by days, hours, or minutes, will be all the same, an infinite number of them will give him infinite time. But this reasoning uses the same jugglery of words. There is and can be no such thing as an infinite number. It is a contradiction in terms. The phrase contains two ideas that are mutually ex-

clusive. To number is to numerate, to count, and a number is that which can be counted or reckoned. Whether we look at its etymology or its usage we get the same meaning. But this excludes the infinite by its very definition. The infinite number then, if it can be counted, is not infinite; if not, is not a number. And yet we do speak of infinite numbers sometimes, e. g., the infinite series in mathematics is said to have an infinite number of terms. But this is only an accommodation of language. It no more implies an actual infinite number than the rising or the setting sun implies a stationary earth with the sun actually circling around it. All that can be meant by the infinite number of terms of a series is, that, whatever number of terms we may assign to it, more can be added. The number of terms actually taken must always be definite, and the infinity of the terms means nothing else than infinity means always and everywhere, viz: that more can always be added, that go as far as you may there is room for more beyond. The infinity belongs not to the number of terms but to the series. The series is infinite. It is infinite with respect to the number of its terms. And this means simply and solely that the series always stretches beyond any and all possible number of terms.

But it may be said, this is true as long as the numbers have an assignable value, but there are numbers which are beyond assignable value, and it is these numbers which express the terms of our infinite series. But what is meant by numbers that are beyond assignable value? or how do we come by such numbers? All that can be meant is that we have not the means of determining the value. If a number is indeterminate, it is because we lack the data or the conditions requisite for determining it. The data given or the conditions furnished, we could fix the number and write it down in plain figures. No infinity then can lurk in indeterminate numbers. But the number of terms of the atheist's series of cycles of past time is simply indeterminate. He can not tell how many there are, therefore they are beyond all count! It is a number without number! It is these indeterminate numbers that make the mischief. The infinite of the mathematician sometimes means these. "The infinite in mathematics is not invariably beyond the power of measurement, not absolutely boundless, but be-

yond the need of measurement." (*Appleton's Cyclopaedia*, Art. Infinitesimal.) It may be beyond human power of measurement, but not absolutely beyond all power of it. We might, for instance, inquire what would be the value of the last term of the series of natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, &c., written compactly in a column reaching from here to the sun. We might inquire the sum of the terms of a rapidly increasing geometrical series, whose number of terms would require for counting them all the time of the geologic ages of the earth past and future. Such quantities as these would be mathematical infinities, but no real infinities. Each of them would be a number exact and definite, though we could not get at it. And the reason why we can not compass these numbers lies in the limitation of our faculties. But the reason why we cannot compass infinity does not lie in any such limitation of power. On the contrary, our denial of the possibility of compassing it is founded upon the very power we do possess, the power of discerning what the infinite is, the power of perceiving it as something beyond compass, and which can not therefore be constituted. Divine power is no nearer to making it up than human, because it is a matter to which power does not apply, and this fact our faculties enable us to discern.

There is then no possibility of an infinite number which can give the atheist terms enough in his series of cycles of past time to reach infinity. In his strivings to reach it, he may wing his way upward till he comes into the region of the clouds, where he can see no farther, and from the dimness of his circumscribed vision he may draw the conclusion that he has got the gauge of the infinite heights. But he has but to return to terra firma, and direct his eye to the clear height of a cloudless heaven, and by the simple intuition that God has given him, he may discern the infinite, not as any continuation or enlargement of the finite, not a mere negation of the finite, but a positive dictum of his reason, which when grasped excludes the finite and so can not be made up by repetitions of the finite, even should the Infinite God himself be supposed to undertake the task, since such a supposition involves a bald contradiction. There can be no infinite number of cosmical cycles, no totality of an infinite series of them. If such cycles have preceded the pre-

sent, they have a number, they are capable of being counted. In our ignorance we can not know what the number is, but by our knowledge we can know assuredly that it is. We can know that it is definite and finite. It had a beginning then, and *in the beginning God*. Let the atheist conjure with his cycles as he may, he can never get out of them an eternity of past duration until infinity ceases to be infinity, and even then his eternity can never be without beginning.

Once more the atheist may say, even if we concede the validity of these reasonings from the nature of infinity, the theist gains nothing by them, since in disproving an eternal succession of universes, he at the same time disproves the eternity of God. If worlds cannot have existed through a past eternity, neither can God. Whatever difficulties beset the one supposition must lie equally against the other. It is therefore still true that we can as well conceive of the forces of nature acting eternally as of God so acting. Herbert Spencer, speaking of the atheist's self-existent universe, says: "To form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past time implies the conception of infinite past time, which is an impossibility." (*First Principles*, p. 31.) But he has the same difficulty with regard to a self-existent God. For he says; "Those who cannot conceive a self-existent universe, and who therefore assume a creator as the source of the universe, take for granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator. But they delude themselves." "As unlimited duration is inconceivable; all those formal ideas into which it enters are also inconceivable." (*Id.*, pp. 35, 36.) Thus he consigns universe and Deity alike to the limbo of the unknown and unknowable.

Now such notions spring from a wrong conception of what is involved in the eternity of God. They take for granted that it is made up of consecutive periods of time. But this cannot be. If this were what is meant by the eternity of God, that eternity would be not only inconceivable but impossible. The reasoning above would be valid against it. We are creatures of time. Far other is He. "The high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity" is raised above the confines of time. His

eternity is independent of time ; it is altogether aside from it. His very infinity raises Him above it. There can be no such operations of His intelligence as are these of ours, which come to us in succession. There is no such succession to Him ; if there were, there must have been a beginning. Our comprehension being limited, different objects of comprehension must come to us in succession, but infinite comprehension must grasp all together. Finite knowledge must add each new increment to its stock of knowledge successively ; infinite knowledge contains all things, there is nothing to be added to it. We must learn in time ; God cannot learn, for there can be nothing of which He is ignorant. Every perception, whether by the senses or by the reason, puts us into possession of that which before we had not, and so must come after our previous state ; the Infinite cannot perceive, for there can be nothing which is not already within His grasp. We recall the past by bringing that again before the mind which has once been there and then been lost out of sight ; the Infinite cannot lose sight of anything and so cannot remember. We reason from premises to conclusion, arriving at new knowledge by the process ; all conclusions—all that would be conclusions to us—are under the immediate intuition of infinite knowledge ; there can be no process of discernment and nothing new to be known. God seeth not as man seeth, for man must open his eyes upon what he would discern, and then can bring but a speck of the wide universe within the range of his vision ; to God all things are naked and open ; they are open to Him ; He need not open an eye upon them. The infinity of space, the infinity of time, the universe of objects in time and space, all possible universes, everything in everyone, through the whole circuit of its existence, all are open to Him. They are known to Him by no effort of His understanding ; His all-comprehending infinitude does in and of itself contain them all. Man occupies a given space, he has locality and can pass from one portion of space to another only in a succession of time ; God is not held by the confines of space and never goes from place to place.

In such ways as these it appears that while man's existence is one continuous movement occupying time, it is not so with God. With Him is no development, no evolution, no progres-

sion, no succession. He is the unchanging One, and is so by the very infinitude of His nature. All creation is in a perpetual flux, and it is so by the very finiteness of its nature. But such flux is impossible to the infinite by reason of the infinity. The river flows in its channel, *Labitur et labetur in omne, volubilis, ævum*. The ocean rests in its bed, which it fills, and by its very fulness it cannot run like the stream. So this infinite *πλήρωμα τῆς Θεότητος*—this “Fulness of Him that filleth all in all” because it is unbounded, can make none of our time-requiring movements; it must abide forever unchangeable in that timeless eternity which only can be its abode. By the infinity of His power He could produce the creation and give it all its changes. He could produce it such that all its evolutions would follow—all that any evolutionist would argue—Himself involving at the beginning whatever should be evolved through all the cycles of time, however long and however numerous they might be. The stream of events may broaden as it will, it may lengthen as it will, but it cannot, as we have proved, be without a source. That source is God. He is the great fountain whence it flows. In producing such a universe as He did, the categories of time and space became necessary for its existence. Matter would not be matter unless it were extended, and for extension there must be space. Spirit would not be spirit without its activities, and for these activities there must be time. Who will venture to say that God could not have made a universe which should have been neither material nor spiritual, and which therefore should have required neither space nor time as conditions of its existence, requiring perhaps instead of them some other conditions of which we now can have no conception? And who will declare that time and space would in that case have had existence, any more than the supposed conditions of our hypothetical creation now have, save only in the infinite mind of God, which must be supposed to contain all things possible as well as all things actual? “We are constrained to believe,” says Dr. McCosh, “that space and time have an existence independent of us, but we are not compelled to believe that they have an existence independent of everything else, and least of all independent of God; we must keep ourselves from falling into the heathen sin of deifying Chronos.” (*Intuitions*

of the *Mind*, p. 186.) The eternity of God is before all time, above all time; it is without time. God is the great fountain whence time flows, the creation which we know is all afloat upon its stream; but it was He that launched it, and so its every movement is His, since all times are in His hand. Time then had a beginning but not eternity. This is without beginning of days or end of years, without days or years at all. And so God is without beginning, but He is not so because His existence has been running on through an infinity of periods of time past, for His existence is not a movement as is ours, but He is without beginning because He inhabiteth eternity; and time, though it makes up our experience, does not enter into His. He comprehends time as He comprehends space, He rules one as He rules the other, He fills the one as He fills the other. But we do not conceive of Him as filling space by being an infinitely extended substance diffused through space, and no more should we conceive of Him as filling time by living through it as we do. All we can mean by His filling space, all we can mean by His omnipresence, is that His omniscience extends and His omnipotence rules over all objects that exist in space; and all we can mean by His filling time, is that the same knowledge and power reach through time in like manner as they reach through space, comprehending whatever exists in time the same as what ever exists in space.*

* "We hear those who would be startled at the assertion of the independent existence of matter, speaking of a nature of things as limiting God's action, and constituting laws external to Him; of geometrical principles and of right as assigning superior rules to His rational and moral nature. This conception is that of a necessary framework of order found by Deity, anticipating and giving conditions to His action. Thus God ceases again to be the absolute, in Himself the complete and only source alike of all things, events, and their rational forms. God as the supreme, uncreated reason, finds every law of thought, of rational action in Himself, and under the laws of His own mind, as frameworks of order, He constructs a universe. That nature of things which we find, which rules our thoughts and actions, is to God His own nature. Geometric principles arising from the nature of thought, of mind, do not flow in upon God from matter, but out from God on matter, to and through His universe, receiving its fixed, necessary constitution from those rational powers which shaped it. The immutable foundations of nature are not laid in itself, but rest back on the rock—the Rock of Ages. Mind is the source of law to nature, not nature to mind." (Prof. Bascom in *Bib. Sac.*, Oct., 1867, p. 727.)

Time then had a beginning, and in the beginning God created the universe to which we belong. Before the creation, time was not, for there was no succession, no revolution of days or years, no periods, no cycles, no changes of any kind, nothing but God and He without change. And when we say that God was before all worlds, it is not that the time of His existence antedated the worlds, for that would be to carry the element of time back into His eternity, it would be to suppose a time previous to existing time, to suppose time to be before time began. It can only mean that from him as its source sprang the creation, from Him as He is in His timeless eternity came the universe—the universe with all its times and its spaces—the universe to be the abode of rational beings, to whom time and space are such realities that we are unable to conceive of their non-existence.

We are indeed unable to form an adequate notion of God's timeless eternity. We are compelled to conceive of Him as coexisting with us, i. e., as existing in time as we do. We have no experience of any mode of existence different in this respect from our own, and we can have no observation of any. By reason of the limitation of our faculties, therefore, we are unable to form the notion of God's timeless existence, but it is not above our comprehension that there can be such an existence. We may see that it is, without being able to see how it is. And seen in this light the self-existence of the Eternal One is no longer the "inconceivable" and the "unthinkable" idea which it is to Herbert Spencer and his fellows, as they look upon Him only as dwelling among temporal things—Himself temporal like unto them. We seem to hear His voice saying to such a man, "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself."

There is self-existence somewhere; the fact of existence in any wise necessitates self-existence as the starting point. The universe can not be self-existent because it must have had a beginning. The eternal God, whose eternity precludes a beginning, must be self-existent if He is at all, and He must be, else there is no accounting for the things that did begin. Nay, no sooner is it seen that there is a mode of existence for Him which does not carry Him into the region of the unthinkable

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and unknowable, than the logical mind must grasp the idea as the key that unlocks the mystery of the existence of the universe. For the Eternal One must also be infinite, and infinite power conjoined with infinite wisdom is adequate to the production of all possible effects. God's existence being once made conceivable, we should be obliged to assume it even if we could also conceive of an infinite series of worlds. For were the infinite series of worlds possible, even this would not adequately account for the existence of the worlds, as has been well stated by Herbert Spencer himself. He says, "Even were self-existence conceivable"—he is speaking of the self-existence of the universe—"it would not in any sense be an explanation of the universe. No one will say that the existence of an object at the present moment is made easier to understand by the discovery that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year ago; and if its existence now is not made in the least degree more comprehensible by its existence during some previous finite period of time, then no accumulation of such finite periods, even could we extend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehensible. Thus the Atheistic theory is not only absolutely unthinkable, but even if it were thinkable *would not be a solution*. The assertion that the Universe is self-existent does not really carry us beyond the cognition of its present existence, and so leaves us with a mere restatement of the mystery." (*First Prin.*, p. 81.) And if its bare existence would fail thus to be accounted for, much more the wonderful order and harmony that pervades every part of it—much more the evidences of adaptation and intelligent design of which it is full to overflowing, which press themselves so strongly upon the attention, and which to the popular apprehension will doubtless always be the chief considerations among the evidences nature can give us. If what exists needs accounting for at all, we can not follow any track in our attempts to do it that will not lead us ultimately to God. If we "take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts," whether of space or of time, we shall be able to find no infinite stretch of either where His hand shall not lead us and His right hand hold us. There is no escaping this conclusion, let us take what path we may in accounting for the things that

are. Only by denying either the necessity of the inquiry, or the competency of our faculties to make it, can we fail to find God eventually. And in the end we believe the brunt of the battle for theism will be, not where just now its greatest noise is heard, viz: in the domain of physical science, but upon a different and a more difficult field. Our knowledge—what are the grounds of its certitude? Where lie its foundations? Are the senses the only inlet of our knowledge, or does it come through the intuitions of the reason also? Is experience the primary ground of belief or are there native born convictions, which we not only may but must use or stop reasoning altogether, and relying on which we may know that our foundations can not be shaken? Is there an infinite or is there nothing but an immeasurably great? Are causes and effects to be to us matters of mere sequence or is there a veritable bond uniting them—a power, an efficiency, a force whose origin we may seek and find? It is the battle of the philosophies. These and kindred questions settled and settled aright, the rest will follow. Here is the citadel. The other questions are the outposts. When the citadel is carried the outposts will fall. Let the fight go on indeed all over the field, and we know the right shall prevail.

ARTICLE VI.—THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH.

THE recent convocation of the Evangelical Alliance held in New York, if it did not claim or have the authority of an œcumenical council, was a significant event as marking the advance of a true idea in the world. Its occurrence in the New World itself showed progress in the widening circle of liberal Christian sentiment. The meeting was a far more impressive and important one than had been anticipated by its most sanguine advocates. It was the testimony of all who watched its progress that it grew upon them steadily, that its interest was profound and wide-spread, and that its spirit was of a primitive type of Christianity. It was characterized by a forgetfulness of what was narrow and selfish in the past, and by a large and scriptural hopefulness prophetic of greater things to come. Were it not too bold an expression we would say that the Spirit of God took possession of this simple instrumentality to teach men divine lessons, and there flowed forth from the meeting a secret power of good which was confessed by all who participated in it, and was confirmed by the enlargement and elevation of spirit that resulted from its silent influences. Many who came from curiosity went away deepened in their religious convictions and purposes. The whole Christian community was unexpectedly ripe for it, and it met the earnest though undefined yearnings of hundreds and thousands of souls, in all sections of the Church, for a freer common expression of thought and feeling upon themes that belong to man's higher nature, and that rise above the incessant clamor of temporal interests—who were tired of differences and wished to show their common love for Christ. Even if it aroused opposition and has stirred up controversy upon new and old issues, that showed it was a power. As its crowded sessions went on day after day with increasing enthusiasm, calm but deep, it was seen by all, whether friends or enemies of Christian faith, that Christianity possessed an intellectual vigor at least equal to the demands of the age; that it was also thoroughly in earn-

est to cope with the living problems of the day, and that, on the same platform, the earnest worker gained for himself as close a hearing as the ablest thinker; that there was no repression of humor and the human element, and that they who took part were evidently among the happiest as well as most loving of men; that there could be disagreement among members in matters of opinion, and strenuous discussion even upon radical points, without the disturbance of fraternal feeling; and, above all, it was seen that Christians of various churches, languages, cultures, garbs, and complexions, from all parts of the earth, were, in a deeper sense, truly one. That was the significant fact. That was what made the meeting a kind of spiritual nilometer, indicating the height to which the waters of religious opinion and sentiment had risen.

There may not have been, and, from the nature of the organization, could not have been, in this meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, a positive expression of the unity of the Church, although there was an expression of the unity of true Christians; but, nevertheless, a gain was made toward the practical recognition in the world of the great idea slowly and wearily struggling to make its way in men's minds and hearts, of the unity of the Christian Church.

This truth undoubtedly now exists as an ideal truth, or, we should rather say, it is a truth which has not as yet wrought itself out into an objective fact, although there is no more real truth. It is true,

1. From the nature of things. In every object, philosophically conceived, its unity precedes its diversity. Both in an absolute and relative sense the law of unity is a fundamental law of all being. The arguments that prove the absolute being of God also go to prove his unity, even as the very existence of the human soul proves its unity. First the one, then the many. First unity, then variety in unity. And especially is this essential law of unity true in the relative sense of the term, as comprehending the relations of things to one another. Nothing is perfect which stands alone, or which is cut off from its true relations to other objects. Through all creation runs this law of interdependency, of union, of mutual support and perfection, binding the stars together in their

courses. This comes from a common plan enstamped upon all things by a one common Creator. When we apply this principle to man, especially in his highest religious nature and relations, we cannot escape from the binding force of the law of unity. In origin, all men are one. In the law of righteousness which is impressed upon their consciences and hearts, they are one. In the consequences of their actions, their aims and destinies, they are one. In their mutual wants, sympathies, feelings, and affections as members of the human family, they are one. And is it to be supposed that in their spiritual interests they can be separated? Can they live in these without mutual dependency and union? Can they exist in exclusiveness? Can they break the law of unity in these higher spiritual things where they come nearer to the one Divine Will and Spirit? The best minds, therefore, in all ages discerning the one original plan of God in men's natures, have yearned for a true religious as well as political unification of the race. The longings for "the city of God" have been transferred by great and devout minds to a future state, only because it seemed impossible that there should be even an approximate realization of this high and joyful truth on the earth. Roman Catholicism, from an inherent error in its theory, has not succeeded in its attempt to carry out the idea of a universal church; but this ill-success by no means proves that the idea is not philosophical, is not one that is true in the nature of things, is not one that is intuitive to the human mind when freed from prejudice and selfishness, is not one that is possible and shall be finally realized. As sure as men, made of one blood, shall be at length united in a broad political brotherhood, recognizing the equal rights of each nation and each individual before the law, and binding themselves to mutual acts and responsibilities for each other's temporal safety and welfare, so there shall be, by the constitution of things, a like union in religion, a world-church comprehending the whole human race, one holy Catholic Church, whose members are members one of another, recognizing each other in every right, in every sympathy, in every duty and responsibility, and bound together in a unity where nature is made doubly nature by the Spirit of God.

2. From the testimony of Scripture and the type of the primitive Apostolical Church. The church of the first disciples was the "one body" of Christ. "For as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ; for by one spirit we are all baptized into one body." There was in the apostolic period a true corporate union existing among all the various members of Christ's body, the Church—not merely a spiritual, but a bodily, or, in a true sense, vital and organic union. This union embraced all believers, and was as wide as the world. Neander, who as a Church historian unites philosophic profundity with the most reverent care for the truth, speaks thus of the typical idea of the Apostolic Church: "But this consciousness of divine life received from Christ, is necessarily followed by the recognition of a communion which embraces all mankind, and passes beyond the boundaries of earthly existence, the consciousness of the Holy Spirit as the spirit producing and animating this communion,—the consciousness of the unity of the divine life shared by all believers, a unity which counterbalances all the other differences existing among mankind, as had been already manifested at the first promulgation of Christianity, when the most marked contrarieties arising either from religion, national peculiarities, or mental culture, were reconciled, and the persons whom they had kept at a distance from each other became united in vital communion."* Again: "This is no abstract representation, but a truly living reality. If in all the widely spread Christian communities, amidst all the diversity of human peculiarities animated by the same spirit, only the consciousness of this higher unity and communion were retained, as Paul desired, this would be the most glorious appearance of the one Christian Church in which the kingdom of God represents itself on earth; and no outward constitution, no system of episcopacy, no council, still less any organization by the State, which would substitute something foreign to its nature, could render the idea of a Christian Church more real or concrete."†

To bring this idea of the one apostolic and universal church

* *Planting and Training*, B. vi, C. i.

† *Id. note.*

into something like a definite statement, we would say, that he who studies with unprejudiced mind the scriptural account of the planting of the primitive Church, freeing his mind from the influence of subsequent historical developments and following the New Testament record pure and simple, must come to the conclusion that, during the life of the apostles, who, under Christ established the constitution of the Church, the Christian Church was formed of various communities of believers, in and out of Jerusalem, and also in cities and nations other than Jewish, who, though varied, still all held together as the real members of one body, with recognized relations to each other, and with mutual duties and responsibilities arising from such a corporate union. They were one body. The apostles never thought of anything else. Christ was not divided. The doings of the Church in Antioch were a common and serious concern of the Church in Jerusalem. The membership of the Church in Ephesus was a membership of the Church in Antioch. A man was a member of the Church of Christ rather than of the Church of Jerusalem. The Church at Jerusalem was only one of the doors, or inlets, by which he entered into the one temple and kingdom of Christ. This kingdom was world wide; this Church was a universal Church. It was a greater idea than that of the Roman Empire. An idea like that fired the hearts of the first disciples and evangelists to go forth to the conquest of the whole world for Christ, and because we have lost this great idea, we have grown cold in our zeal for the world's redemption.

This then, we conceive to be the type of the primitive Apostolic Church, a unity in diversity in which the diversity was as nothing to the unity,—in which the diversity was chiefly human and the unity divine. It was a union not only spiritual but visible, or organically corporate. When numerous minor churches began to be formed, differences began to develop themselves, since neither Christ nor his apostles laid down a uniform model of church organization. Such differences already existed between the Jewish and Hellenic Churches in the apostles' time—but these did not break the union; they did not divide the body of Christ. True brotherhood, communion, equality, sympathy, the reciprocal reference of difficul-

ties, the recognition of mutual responsibility and help, the common service of Christ the Head, continued constant and unbroken. It was a real union, whereas with us it is only an ideal or theoretic union.

Here then we have set before us a type of the Christian Church which is not even ideal, for it was absolutely realized. From this divine type, received fresh from the hands of Christ that were pierced for the world's redemption—from this perfect and glorious body of Christ, which shone before the eyes of the first disciples in simple but resplendent beauty—the Church very soon departed. It became corrupt and could not sustain the divine unity in its purity. It fell away from the Head, and thus also the body was broken up into many irreconcilable parts and schisms. But to this apostolic type of the Christian Church once set clearly before us we should and must return, keeping it ever in view as a stimulating object of aspiration and attainment.

One of the great and at first sight insurmountable obstacles in the way of return to the apostolic idea of a united Church of Christ on earth, is the undue love, may we not say selfish love, which lingers in the minds of Christians for their own denominational and national ecclesiastical communions. It is the spirit of ecclesiasticism intensified by the spirit of clanship and nationality. In the discussion upon this topic before the Evangelical Alliance, Dr. Hodge, in his able and valuable essay, made use of a classification, which, if in the main it is correct, is assuredly in one particular (the New Testament being witness) far from being correct. The term *ἐκκλησία* is employed, he affirms, in the New Testament, in three ways:

1. As denoting scattered believers in every part of the world without regard to their ecclesiastical organizations.
2. As applied to local church organizations.
3. As signifying national or denominational churches.

No national, or denominational church, we are confident, is spoken of in the New Testament. There is no "Church of Asia," there is no "Church of Europe." There are "Churches of Asia," "Churches of Macedonia," "Churches of Judea." There is not even the church of a city spoken of exclusively as such, as the "Church of Antioch," the "Church of Jeru-

salem;" but it is rather the "Church at Jerusalem," the "Church at Antioch," the "Church in Smyrna;" it is the community of believers that are collected in a certain city, by which local or geographical name it is most conveniently designated. The translation in our English version of the "Church of Ephesus," the "Church of Laodicea," etc., when critically examined will bear out this view. Special pains seems indeed to have been taken by the writers of the New Testament to give no shadow of authority or recognition to the view that the Church of Christ is ever narrowed down or applied to a nation, a province, or even a city. Neither is it limited to a Christian denomination, or "a church," as it is now called, of whatever name, "for while one saith, I am of Paul; and another, I am of Apollos; are ye not carnal? Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but ministers by whom ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man? For other foundation can no man lay than is laid, which is Jesus Christ." Can we doubt that the same apostolic rebuke applies in its spirit to that denominationalism—in so far as it is divisive and is built upon a purely human foundation—which is expressed in the name of "Lutheran, Calvinist, Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Baptist, Congregationalist, whether the name spring from a minister, an office, a rite, or a polity? Who can doubt but that the old war-names of Roman Catholic and Protestant lie under the same apostolic censure, and that when the Church returns to the pure types set by Christ and His apostles they will vanish away?

As to the meaning and use of the word *ἐκκλησία* in the New Testament which is fundamental to this subject—not to draw out the discussion, which is intended to be brief, to too great length—we would offer the following classification, which, as we think it could not be essentially improved, we have taken, with some modifications, from the work of an English writer on ecclesiastical polity. It applies:—

1. To all true believers who ever have existed, or ever will exist, who compose the whole body of Christ.—"the general assembly and church of the first-born, which are written in heaven."

2. To all Christ-confessing disciples of whatever name or nature on the earth, the whole visible Church of Christ, as in

the passages: "The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved;" "Give none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the Church of God."

8. To every distinct community, assembly, or even household of Christian believers, gathered together for the purpose of religious worship and service in any given place, as "The Churches of Asia salute you," "The Church which was in Jerusalem," "The Church which is in his house."

These three instances of the use of the word in the New Testament will be found, we believe, to cover all cases. The more comprehensive use originates and modifies the more restricted uses. First the one, then the many. Wherever used, the term represents the real body of Christ, either as a universal whole, or as an integral part and member of this whole. The arm is not the body, but still we call it our body. The member of the body of Christ, which was represented by the Church at Antioch—call it the arm—was still one with the body of which Christ was the Head. It represented a variety of the unity. It expressed a living union, not life isolated and independent, but life springing from and nourished by the one common source—"for by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body"—"one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all." Hence, from the very nature of the Christian Church there is an irresistible gravitation toward unity; men cannot help it even if they resist it; it is inherent in the origin and constitution of the Church of Christ; it is a living and divine law ever operative to purify the Church of its corruptions, and of its merely human, imperfect, and selfish elements, and to bring out in it the perfect image of the glorious and undivided body of Christ.

Having thus endeavored to establish, from reason and Scripture, the truth of this idea of the unity of the Church, the question now arises, which we can only touch upon, how is this scriptural and essential unity—this unity which exists now as truly as it did in the days of the apostles, although obscured and corrupted—to be redeemed from obscurity, and restored to full power and beneficent working in the Christian Church?

Like the summer when it steals over an ice-bound continent and melts all nature into one green-waving ocean of bloom, so

the warm breath of the Spirit shall at some day bring about this change, and men will become one brotherhood in Christ Jesus, without knowing that they were ever other than brethren ; but what are Christians themselves to strive after, in order to hasten this blessed day of the Lord, when all shall be one as Christ is one with them and with the Father?

Roman Catholicism has tried and failed. In the line then of the Roman Church, and of all hierarchical churches, by laboring to bring about an external uniformity in church organization and rule, founded upon a *jure divino* assumption, the problem cannot be solved. The dominion that Pope Innocent III. laid upon the whole world, and all its powers, has been growing less and less, and that arrogated ecclesiastical unity, or universality, which is vitiated by the simple fact that an earthly head is put in the place of the spiritual Head, has been passing slowly off the surface of the world like a cloud, nation after nation emerging into the light of a clearer faith. We do not say this in hostility to the Roman Church, or in denial of its claims to being historically and essentially a Christian Church, though bound to most corrupting and almost fatal errors ; but we say that it has failed to represent the apostolic idea of the one universal Church. We honor even the falsified but majestic shadow of this idea which Catholicism has held up, and perhaps it will be her mission, when purified of the papacy and other "adulterating ingredients," as Coleridge calls them, and brought to a spiritual faith, to teach us this great lesson. But it will not be in the line of external uniformity of rule and government, or of sacerdotal and sacramental theories. Different forms of church organization, different ecclesiastical denominations, if you choose to call them so, will continue to exist ; and, as far as they are the genuine expressions of honest even if partial theories in regard to the outward form of the Church, they are useful. We are not in favor of dead-level uniformity. We are not opposed to denominations as expressive of freedom and life. Better the narrowest sectarianism than spiritual death, and religious wars than Buddhist nihilism. Still as real union in the Church grows, denominational differences will measurably diminish, and in forms of church polity and administration there will be more of assimilation. What the ages have

proved to be good and wise, in the various forms, will be interchanged, and the whole will be re-organized, simplified, and strengthened.

The Protestant has also tried the experiment, and—we had almost said, though this perhaps is not quite true, as he has not yet wrought out the problem wholly, or the scriptural truth committed to his charge—has failed. This unity in like manner fails to be realized by efforts, however sincere, to bring about an internal doctrinal unanimity. The clocks cannot be made to strike together. The creeds cannot be squared. While we see here as through a glass darkly and the perfect has not yet come, there must be allowed to all believers untrammelled liberty of search and opinion. Men must be left to the free teachings of the Spirit and the Word. The doctrine is precious, true, and pure, but the human formulas of the doctrine are imperfect and changeable. In theology there is not unity. While there exists the instinct of order in the human mind as truly as there is an instinct of faith itself, the science of theology will live, and will draw to it the greatest minds in the world; it will always be the queen of the sciences: but theology is not faith. Theology is not love. Theology is not religion. Theology is not the uniting principle that joins men to God, or to one another in the Church of Christ.

We would attempt to answer the question, that has been proposed, in a very simple way. We believe that the only method by which Christians can themselves truly aid in hastening the consummation of this great truth of the unity of the Church, is, by striving to have restored in their own hearts the primitive condition of the Christian Church, by having re-awakened in their hearts *the real sense of brotherhood* that was a living and operative principle in the apostolic times. Christians should have faith enough to apprehend the divine nature of which all partake and to which the selfish or separating principle is alien. Thus by the expulsion of selfishness, the one higher life in Christ will be realized both in the consciousness and outward life. By increase of faith there will be increase of unity; and love, which is the grand unifying principle, will work in all the members to the perfecting of the saints and of the body of Christ. In the mean time, however, there are certain acts,

duties, and lines of conduct on the part of Christians and Christian Churches, which may be said to be practically within the power of such, if so disposed, to pursue, and which strongly tend to union; and if Christians and Christian Churches are not so disposed to do these things, it may then be clearly seen who are the true schismatics that destroy the unity of the body of Christ. We would mention but three of these possible or practicable measures, that, if carried out faithfully, would surely make for peace and union.

(1.) The equal rights of all Christians and Christian Churches to be mutually recognized and practically acknowledged. A true Church of Christ, whatever its name, ought to be regarded by other Christian Churches as entitled to all the rights and privileges that belong to a true portion and member of the body of Christ. Its ministers, or officers, regularly ordained and accredited, should be recognized by other churches as ministers of the Church of Christ, especially since the ordination of a Christian minister does not derive its prime validity from the act of man but from the appointment of Christ. Its members, under due tests and restrictions, should be held to be members of the Church of Christ, and entitled to the privilege of full communion and fellowship in all other churches. There might be, we grant, at first, great practical difficulties in the way of carrying out this plan or mode of inter-ecclesiastical action, but the difficulties would grow less and less as the churches became more pure and more filled with the love and charity of the gospel. Mutual concessions must be made for the sake of higher objects.* The recognition of the true membership of Christ's body would be a slow process, and caution would have to be employed in the extension of Church fellowship to low types of Christian faith and of so-called Christian Churches. The tests of the gospel, looking to the reality of character, to the work of Christ's Spirit in the heart, to the existence of the common evangelic-life implanted by the grace of

* The Dean of Canterbury recently preached by invitation in the Chapel of Yale College, and was listened to with marked attention and respect. If President Porter were to be invited to preach in the Dean's pulpit, the circle of Christian liberality and courtesy would be complete. It is fair to surmise that if it depended upon the Dean there would be little difficulty in the case.

God in ways and methods, and under forms of religious education and worship quite varied oftentimes from ordinary standards, perhaps in heathen lands as well as in highly civilized de-christianized communities, would have to be applied with a pure discrimination and a broad charity, following the blessed example of Christ and the instructions and spirit of His Word. The largest liberty is not to be feared so long as a true faith in Him who is the meaning, and beginning, and end, and glorious divine life of the Church, is maintained in the hearts of those who are called after His name, and who are appointed to perpetuate and extend His kingdom in the world.

(2.) The community of Christian living, which also includes working, to be observed among all the followers of Christ. There should be open and hearty coöperation among all who call themselves Christians, of whatever Church or denomination, in Christian life and activity. This life proceeds from an inward power imparted by his Spirit to all who serve Christ, and this life therefore should be manifested in common among all Christians as something superior to outward differences. This union was a very practical thing in the apostolic times, and exerted a powerful influence upon the daily life of Christian disciples; it was a great force constantly brought to bear upon the shaping and ordering of their conversation and all their actions: "Wherefore,"—said the apostle, clinching the instructions with the strongest reason that an inspired mind could employ,— "putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbor; *for we are members one of another.*" A common love, a common aim to serve the Master, should bring all together in one, should break down every partition wall, and all hearts and hands should join in the work of doing good, of preaching the gospel to the poor, of building up Christ's kingdom of righteousness on the earth. The individualism of our churches—seemingly growing more and more narrow and divisive—renders these efforts at grand, united, aggressive missionary work almost an impossible thing.

3. Communion in worship. We may as churches and individual believers formally repeat the apostolic creed, *credo in sanctam ecclesiam catholicam, sanctorum communionem*, but unless as Christians we pray together in the spirit, our faith in the

catholicity of the Church and the communion of saints may be doubted. As the purity of spiritual worship increases, and as the divine fact of Christ's intercession as our only High Priest, by whom through the Spirit we all have access to the Father, is more truly recognized, then the differences even in modes and forms of worship will more and more be done away. Devotion is a bond of unity. It is woven by the thousand-fold breath of prayer. If the devotional communion of all Christian Churches should ever gain ground, they would pray themselves into one. They would be benefitted also in the methods and power of public worship—the Protestant worship would gain in richness from the beauty and copiousness of the ancient liturgies, the liturgical Churches would learn the language of primitive spontaneous devotion; but in the breath of common supplication the whole Church would be brought by one Spirit into the unity of the gospel, and closer to the heart of Christ, the ever-living source of a common life, faith, and love.

In a word, this unity of the Church must be a real matter, something more than an easily affirmed and boasted spiritual unity. The spiritual union, it is true, is the essence of the bodily union, but it must be so genuinely spiritual that it shall truly manifest itself, that it shall be seen in the united life of the whole body of Christ on earth. It must not be so inwardly invisible that it is not visible at all. It must not be put off to heaven while Christians are fighting here below; each sect, or church, jealously standing on the defensive on its own fortified hill. We are not opposed, as has been remarked, to those different church-zions. Let them still exist, but let their walls be demolished. Let grain and fruit-trees be planted where once the frowning battlement and grim weapon of defence stood. Let each church cultivate its own field and vineyard in peace, welcoming, however, the mutual help and the common products of its neighbors. We would not have the earth, religiously speaking, to become a monotonous agricultural farm-school, but rather a garden of the Lord, with its infinite variety and beauty. Let those who by education, affinities, and tastes are Congregationalists, or Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, each take good care of

his own—they would probably do more good in this way—but at the same time let them be careful to work not so much upon the line of denominationalism, or narrow ecclesiasticism, as upon the higher plane, of the one universal Church and kingdom of Christ; and we would here commend to all our brethren the words of Dr. Parker of London, that seem to have been inspired by the influences of the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance:—"Men separated from each other by the widest ecclesiastical distances have looked each other in the face, have bowed in common prayer at the same altar, and extended to each other the right hand of Christian recognition and fellowship. From that advanced line of brotherhood there must be no retreat. The good vow has been spoken and must never be recalled. For my own part my decision is taken, a decision to seek out lines of sympathy and union rather than to magnify points of antagonism and alienation." A noble resolve which all should imitate! "From that advanced line of brotherhood there must be no retreat,"—and there must be also further advance. The evangelical alliance of the future must not be all on the side of Protestantism, but must sweep a wider circle, and comprehend all who, even though in much imperfection, under rites and forms of pure superstition, or in the barrenness of religious ignorance, still recognize in their hearts Jesus Christ as the way of life to sinful men, and as the hope of the world. The next Evangelical Alliance which is formed should not assume an adverse or antagonistic attitude to any, but like the universal gospel which it aims to express, should take into its efforts, prayers, thoughts, and loving sympathies, the whole brotherhood of man.

ARTICLE VII.—THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH
OF ENGLAND TO THE OTHER PROTESTANT
CHURCHES.

CERTAIN events connected with the recent Conference of the Evangelical Alliance in this country have brought up anew for discussion the attitude of the Church of England, at present and in the past, towards the other Protestant churches. It is well known that there is now, and long has been, a party in the Episcopal Church, who have refused to hold communion with other Protestant bodies, for the reason that these discard the Episcopal polity, and that their ministers are not ordained by bishops. This party, which goes by the name of the High Church, is composed of two subdivisions. The one class is made up of those who carry their views of doctrine and their notions of worship to the verge of Romanism, and look with more or less yearning towards the Greek and Latin Churches, whose doctrine of transubstantiation is regarded with less aversion than that which is felt to the prevailing opinions of Protestants respecting the sacrament. The other class are hostile to Rome, and to the Ritualism that copies her ceremonies, but maintain the exclusive sanctity of Episcopal ordination, and, therefore, stand aloof from the other churches of the Reformation. The Church of England, with its offshoots and branches, is, in their system, the one true Church, with which alone it is lawful to have ecclesiastical communion. All other churches are shut out of ecclesiastical fellowship, either as being non-episcopal, or, like Rome, as being corrupt.

Now there is a class of writers of the High Church party who seek to convey the impression, sometimes by direct assertion, and sometimes by more indirect means, that the Church of England, in the first century after the Reformation, or in the period prior to Laud and to the act of uniformity under Charles II, professed the theories which they now profess, and stood in the isolated and exclusive position in which their party, since the middle of the seventeenth century, have striven to hold her. We do not mean to impute this gross perversion of

historical truth to all writers of the High Church school. There are candid scholars among them, like Keble, who discern and acknowledge facts, even when they militate against a party interest. Much less do we charge this kind of misrepresentation upon the writers of the Episcopal Church generally. Historical students who pursue these investigations without being warped by theological prejudice, are generally well agreed on the facts of the English Reformation. Hallam, Macaulay, and the other standard historians, state with substantial correctness the transformations which took place between the time of Cranmer and the eras of Laud and Sheldon. Authors who are strongly averse to Puritanism, and warmly attached to the Episcopal side in the controversy between Churchman and Puritan, but who are too honest to be misled, or to mislead their readers, through partisan feeling, are equally commendable. The following passage from Lathbury's *History of English Episcopacy*, the work of a writer of this stamp, will illustrate our remark, and, at the same time, present some of the facts, which we shall establish in the course of this Article:—

“The English Reformers did not contend for any system of government or discipline in the Church, as being *jure divino*; things indifferent, as ceremonies and clerical habits, were left to the civil magistrates. Nor did they refuse to recognize the validity of ordination in those foreign churches that had renounced Episcopacy.” “The question of church government was vehemently agitated at this period [the reign of Elizabeth]. The Reformers were agreed that no precise form was laid down in the New Testament; but when the Puritans became divided into two parties, the Presbyterian party advocated the divine right of their system. Cranmer and all the Reformers asserted that the form of government was left to the civil magistrate to determine, according to times and circumstances. The prelates of this reign maintained the same views; but like the earlier Reformers, they considered Episcopacy, as retained in the English Church, to have been the apostolic practice. They did not, however, consider any mode of government essential to the constitution of the Church; hence the validity of ordination as exercised in those reformed churches where Episcopacy was not retained, was admitted. By an act passed in the thirteenth year of this reign, the ordinations of foreign re-

formed churches were declared valid, and their ministers were capable of enjoying preferment on receiving a license from the bishop.* Many who had received ordination abroad were allowed to exercise their ministry in the Church of England, provided they conformed. Travers, Whittingham, Cartwright, and many others had received no other, and their ordination was never questioned.† At a subsequent period this practice was denounced; and in 1662, it was ordered that no minister should exercise his office in the Church of England who had not received Episcopal ordination. It appears that the Reformers did not contend for the superiority of the office of bishop as a distinct order from the priesthood, but as different only in degree. Nor did any member of the Church of England claim this distinction, till the year 1588, when Bancroft, in his celebrated sermon at Paul's Cross, asserted it." "Laud's notions on the subject of church government were at variance with those adopted by many of his predecessors, who, until the time of Bancroft, never claimed a divine right for the government of the English Church; and even Bancroft admitted the validity of Presbyterian ordination; for when it was suggested, in 1610, that the Scotch bishops elect should be ordained presbyters, he opposed on the ground that ordination by presbyters was valid."‡

We quote the passages, not because we approve every sentence, but as, on the whole, a just exhibition of the facts, and as showing how a fair-minded churchman, who is, also, a thorough student, is capable of writing.

The following extract is from a writer of another type of theology and of churchmanship, but an accomplished historical scholar, Dean Stanley :—

"Whether from policy or necessity, the whole settlement of modern Scottish Episcopacy was far more Presbyterian, far less Episcopal and Catholic, than in any country in Europe. Doubtless this was partly occasioned by the fact, that in England itself the sentiment toward Presbyterian churches was far more generous and comprehensive in the century that followed the Reformation than it was in that which followed the Restoration. The English Articles are so expressed as to include the recognition of Presbyterian ministers. The first English Act of Uniformity was passed

* Strype's *Annals*, 524.

† [That is, until the new spirit, described in the next sentence, arose.]

‡ Lathbury, *History of the English Episcopacy*, pp. 19, 63, 170.

with the expressed view of securing their services to the English Church. The first English Reformers, and the statesmen of Elizabeth, would have been astonished at any claim of exclusive sanctity for the Episcopal order.”* “It was not Knox, but Andrew Melville, who introduced into Scotland the divine right of Presbytery, the sister-dogma of the divine right of Episcopacy, which Bancroft and Laud introduced into England.” “It is this [the Church of Scotland] for which every English churchman is asked to pray, by the canons of the English Convocation, which enjoins that prayers are to be offered up ‘for Christ’s Holy Catholic Church, that is, for the whole congregation of Christians dispersed throughout the whole world, especially for the Churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland.’ ‘There can be no doubt,’ says the candid and accurate annalist of Scottish Episcopacy, ‘that the framers of this have meant to acknowledge the northern ecclesiastical establishment, at that time Presbyterian, as a Christian Church.’”† “The very first declaration which the sovereign makes—taking precedence even of the recognition of the rights and liberties of the English Church and nation, which are postponed till the day of the coronation—is that in which, on the day of the accession, the sovereign declares that he or she will maintain inviolate and intact the Church of Scotland.” “In the Act of Union itself, which prescribes this declaration, the same securities are throughout exacted for the Church of Scotland as were exacted for the Church of England; and it is on record that, when that act was passed, and some questions arose amongst the peers as to the propriety of so complete a recognition of the Presbyterian Church, the then primate of all England, the ‘old rock,’ as he was called, Archbishop Tenison, rose, and said with a weight which carried all objections before it, ‘the narrow notions of all churches have been their ruin. I believe that the Church of Scotland though not so perfect as ours, is as true a Protestant church as the Church of England.’”‡

* See this well drawn out in Lord Macaulay’s correspondence with the Bishop of Exeter; and in Principal Tulloch’s Article on the English and Scottish Churches, in the *Contemporary Review*, December, 1871.

† See the discussions of the canons of 1603, in Grub [*Ecc. Hist. of Scotland*], ii, 282.

‡ Carstairs’ *State Papers*, 739, 760. [Stanley’s *Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland*, pp. 47, 66, 67, (Am. ed.)

The drift of the representations of secular historians of the highest credit, may be learned from the following passage from Hallam, himself a churchman, and an authority of the first rank upon questions of legal and constitutional history :—

“The system pursued by Rancroft and his imitators, Bishops Neyle and Laud, with the approbation of the king, far opposed to the healing counsels of Burleigh and Bacon, was just such as low-born and little-minded men, raised to power by fortune’s caprice, are ever found to pursue.” “They began by preaching the divine right, as it is called, or absolute indispensability, of Episcopacy ; a doctrine of which the first traces, as I apprehend, are found about the end of Elizabeth’s reign. They insisted on the necessity of Episcopal succession regularly derived from the apostles. They drew an inference from this tenet, that ordinations by presbyters were in all cases null ; and as this affected all the Reformed churches in Europe except their own, the Lutherans not having preserved the succession of their bishops, while the Calvinists had altogether abolished that order, they began to speak of them, not as brethren of the same faith, united in the same cause, and distinguished only by differences little more material than those of political commonwealths (which had been the language of the Church of England ever since the Reformation), but as aliens to whom they were not at all related, and schismatics with whom they held no communion ; nay, as wanting the very essence of a Christian society.” In the foot-note, Hallam adds that “it is evident, by some passages in Strype, attentively considered, that natives regularly ordained abroad, in the Presbyterian churches, were admitted to hold preferment in England ; the first bishop who objected to them seems to have been Aylmer. Instances, however, of foreigners holding preferment without any re-ordination may be found down to the civil wars.”—*Annals of the Reformation*, ii, 522, and Appendix, 116 ; *Life of Grindal*, 271 ; Collier, ii, 594 ; Neal, i, 258.*

Since the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, Bishop Cummins, in a letter to the *New York Tribune*, referred to the fact that Presbyterian ministers, in the period following the Reformation, had been admitted to parishes in England without re-ordination ; and he referred, among his authorities, to Prof. Fisher’s work on the Reformation. The statement was denied by the Rev. Dr. Drumm, in communications to the same journal.

* *Const. History* (Harpers’ Am. ed.), p. 226.

Prof. Fisher published two letters in the *Tribune* in proof of the assertion; and these Letters we propose to transfer to our pages, partly for the purpose of giving them a more permanent form, and partly in order to illustrate their contents by further proofs and observations, such as could not well find place in the columns of a daily newspaper. As several topics belonging to the same general subject are handled in these Letters, and will be considered in the pages which follow, we set forth distinctly the main propositions, which we conceive to be as capable of being established as any facts in the ecclesiastical history of England:

1. The first and second generation of English Reformers, Cranmer and his associates, Jewel and his contemporaries, did not hold the *jure divino*, or exclusive, theory of Episcopacy.

2. The Church of England, in the sixteenth century, was in full communion with the other Protestant churches of Europe.

3. The greatest divines in the Church of England in the seventeenth century agreed with Hooker in acknowledging the validity of Presbyterian ordination, and in the recognition of the foreign Protestant churches. This was true of Ussher, Hall, and Stillingfleet, and of others of hardly less distinction.

4. The fellowship with the foreign churches on the part of the English Reformers was not owing to forbearance in them, but to the common opinion that each nation, or church, could shape its own polity, and that Episcopacy might be adopted or rejected as each church or nation should see fit to determine.

5. Notwithstanding the changes in the Prayer-Book and in the law of England, at the Restoration, the Church of England has never, by law or synodal action, discredited the validity of the ordination practiced in other Protestant bodies.

We print below the first Letter, in the form in which it was published in the *Tribune*, premising that the marginal notes are now added for the first time.

To the Editor of the Tribune.

SIR: In two communications which have lately appeared in your journal, I am mentioned among writers who have stated that, for a considerable period after the Reformation, persons who had only received non-episcopal ordination were admitted to parishes in the English Church, no objection being made to the validity of

their orders. As the correctness of this assertion is directly impugned by the Rev. Dr. Drumm, and as the question is a historical one of some interest, and a question, too, that need not provoke sectarian asperity, I beg leave to offer a vindication of the truth of the statement which your correspondent has called in question.

The statement is usually made as one illustration of the fact that the founders of the Anglican Church in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Elizabeth—Cranmer and his associates, Jewel and the Elizabethan bishops and divines of his time—did not hold to the *jure divino* theory of Episcopacy. That is to say, they did not consider bishops, meaning a class elevated above presbyters, essential to the existence of a church, and they did not regard Episcopal ordination as indispensable to the exercise of the functions and prerogatives of the Christian ministry. On the contrary, they looked upon the Protestant ministers on the Continent in the Lutheran Church, and in the Reformed Churches of Switzerland, France, and Holland, as on a perfect equality with themselves with regard to clerical rights and qualifications. Differences arose among the Protestant Churches on the subject of the Eucharist, but as to controversy about Episcopacy, in that age there was none. When Cranmer called eminent divines from the churches on the Continent to help him compose the formularies of the Anglican Church, and to train the ministers of England at Oxford and Cambridge, this was not an exceptional act, but in keeping with his avowed principles and constant practice. No one who is acquainted with Cranmer's opinions, can suppose that the circumstance that Martyr and Bucer had once taken orders in the Roman Church had a feather's weight in determining him to invite them to England, any more than a like fact influenced him in the case of John Knox, who was made Chaplain-in-ordinary to Edward VI, was commissioned for several years as a preacher in the north of England, was offered the parish of All-Hallows in London, and finally a bishopric. Fagius, who was the companion of Bucer and Martyr, had been a minister in Germany, made such, of course, without Episcopal consecration; and it is not true that he was called merely to teach the Hebrew language at Cambridge, as a Jew might teach. He was to expound the Old Testament, beginning with the prophet Isaiah, and he was welcomed from the beginning by Cranmer as an intimate counselor and friend. That Fagius, a minister of high stand-

ing in Germany, would have accepted such an appointment from those who denied his right to exercise the ministry, is something quite incredible. Cranmer went so far as to declare, in a written document, in 1540, that no consecration of bishops or priests is necessary, "for election or appointment thereto is sufficient." (Burnet, I, ii, *Collection of Records*, iii, 21.) That Cranmer referred to ordination, and not to institution merely, is made perfectly clear by the same document. The voluminous correspondence of the eminent English divines and reformers, which has been published principally from the archives of Zurich, must convince every candid person who examines it, that no suspicion of a want of validity in the orders of the Helvetic ministers, whose advice they so frequently sought, and whose hospitality they enjoyed, ever entered their minds. No man who has read, for example, the numerous letters of Bishop Cox, a warm defender of the English liturgy against the Puritans, to Gualter, the son-in-law of Zwingle—his "beloved Rodolph," as Cox styles him—will have the effrontery to affirm that the English bishop looked on his Swiss friend and adviser as one who had no right to exercise the functions of the ministry. In the last days of Edward VI, Cranmer was corresponding with Calvin, Bullinger, and Melancthon, in order to bring together a general synod of the Protestants, where a platform of doctrine might be made, in which their disagreement respecting the Lord's Supper—the only serious point of difference—might be adjusted. There is no trace of the exclusive, or *jure divino*, theory of Episcopacy, in the writings of Cranmer, Parker, Grindal, and Whitgift, the first four Protestant archbishops of Canterbury. Whether Bancroft broached it in his sermon at Paul's Cross, is still a controverted point. Hallam maintains that he did not. That this theory, which, in its logical consequences, would "unchurch" the other Protestant religious bodies, and discredit the orders of their ministry, does not appear until about the time of Hooker, is granted by Keble in the elaborate essay prefixed to his edition of Hooker's writings. It certainly sounds strange to hear Keble, all whose prepossessions were on the side of the High Church doctrine, charged with error for conceding what, if the evidence in the case had not required, he would surely have been very loth to admit. But Keble had carefully and thoroughly explored the historical question, as his essay abundantly shows.

The opinion of Protestants of the English Church in the sixteenth century on this subject was closely connected with two other facts which deserve special attention. The first was the prevailing doctrine at that time that bishops do not constitute a distinct order in the ministry, but that bishops and presbyters are different grades of the same office. This was a common view in the Roman Catholic Church in the middle ages, since an ecclesiastical arrangement was thought to have the force of an *institutio divina*. The miracle of the Eucharist being the highest act which the clergyman could perform, and this being open to the priest, it was plausibly argued that there can be no order of ministers above him. This ground was taken, even by a pope, Urban II, and is sanctioned by the most orthodox of the schoolmen. Those who are curious to see the proofs of this statement may be referred to Gieseler's *Church History*. (Am. ed., I, p. 91, N.) The same fact respecting the mediæval opinion is proved in a work which has always been held in high honor by Episcopalians, Field's *Treatise on the Church*. (B. III, p. 39).^{*} Cranmer subscribes to this old opinion of the original and essential identity of the office of bishop and that of presbyter. He held that "in the New Testament there is no mention made of any degrees or distinctions in orders, but only of deacons or ministers, and of priests or bishops." Thirteen bishops, with a great number of other ecclesiastics, subscribed to this proposition. (See Burnet's *Collection of Records*, II, i, iii, 21.) Bishop Jewel, one of the great lights of the English Reformation, in his celebrated "Defense" of the Church of England, and in his "Apology," took no other ground. He falls back on the doctrine that "bishops are greater than presbyters by order and

^{*} "These being the divers sorts and kinds of ecclesiastical power, it will easily appear unto all that enter into the due consideration thereof, that the power of ecclesiastical or sacred order, that is, the power and authority to intermeddle with things pertaining to the service of God, and to perform eminent acts of gracious efficiency, tending to the procuring of the eternal good of the sons of men, is equal and the same in all those whom we call presbyters, that is, fatherly guides of God's Church and people: and that only for order's sake and the preservation of peace there is a limitation of the use and exercise of the same." Dean Field states that the Romanists themselves concede this, and adds: "Whereby it is most evident that that wherein a bishop excelleth a presbyter, is not a distinct power of order, but an eminency and dignity only, specially yielded to one above all the rest of the same rank, for order sake, and to preserve the unity and peace of the Church." That Dean Field is here stating his own opinion is made perfectly evident by the context. See, also, B. V, c. 27, where the same doctrine is laid down.

custom of the Church, and not by the truth of God's ordinance." (*Jewel's Writings*, Parker Soc. ed., I, p. 379.)* This is the explicit doctrine of Dean Field, in the passage to which I have just referred.

The second circumstance which it is important to notice, is the prevalent belief in the system of national churches, and the adoption by many, of the Erastian theory of the supremacy of the civil magistrate in ecclesiastical affairs. The first Reformers in England were of this mind, and the English Reformation was effected under this theory. Calvin opposed it, and fought out the battle at Geneva in behalf of the right of the Church, by its own organs, to excommunicate unworthy members. Calvinists generally resisted the Erastian doctrine in its extreme form; yet they conceded to the magistrates of each country a large measure of power in matters of religion. The bishops of Elizabeth found it very hard, how-

* "St. Hierome saith generally of all bishops: *noverint Episcopi se magis consuetudine, quam dispositionis dominicæ veritate, presbyteris esse majores*: 'let bishops understand that they be greater than the priests by order and custom (of the Church), and not by the truth of God's ordinance.' If Christ, as St. Hierome saith, appointed not one priest above another, how then is it likely he appointed one priest to be, as M. Harding saith, prince and ruler over all priests throughout the whole world?" In another place, Jewel says: "Is it so horrible an heresy as he [Harding] maketh it, to say that by the Scriptures of God a bishop and a priest are all one." Then Jewel proceeds to quote Chrysostom, Jerome, and other fathers in support of the doctrine that they are the same. P. III, p. 439 (*Defence of the Apology*). Thomas Becon, Chaplain to Cranmer, and Prebendary of Canterbury, writes, in his Catechism: "*Father*.—What difference is there between a bishop and a spiritual minister? *Son*.—None at all: their office is one, their authority and power is one. And, therefore, St. Paul calleth the spiritual ministers sometime bishops, sometime elders, sometime pastors, sometime teachers, &c." The same doctrine is in "*The Institution of a Christian Man*," published by authority in 1537. Pilkington, the first Protestant Bishop of Durham, writes in 1561: "The privileges and superiorities which bishops have above other ministers, are rather granted by man for maintaining of better order and quietness in commonwealths, than commanded by God in his Word. Ministers have better knowledge and utterance some than other, but their ministry is of equal dignity." (Pilkington's *Works*, Parker Soc. ed., p. 493.) The same doctrine is taught by Fulke, Master of Pembroke College. In Blunt's *Annotated Prayer-Book*, the notes to which are from the High Church point of view, it is said: "It was not until the close of the sixteenth century that the distinction between the orders of bishops and priests was asserted. On Feb. 9th, 1589, Dr. Bancroft, in a sermon, maintained the superiority of bishops *jure divino*; the doctrine was completely acknowledged during the primacy of Laud, and enforced by Bishop Hall in a well-known treatise on the subject" (p. 566). Of Bishop Hall's qualified form of the *jure divino* doctrine, we shall speak hereafter.

ever, to yield up to their imperious sovereign that extent of control which she demanded; as the suspension of Archbishop Grindal and many other events of like character illustrate. The main point here is that the Anglican divines paid a great respect to national churches and to the right of each country to frame its own church institutions, and to order its own church affairs.

The conflict with the Puritans, which began with the accession of Elizabeth, had become stern and bitter in the time of Whitgift. But this inflexible enemy of Puritanism never calls in question the validity of the method of ordination prevailing in the churches abroad. He conducts his whole controversy with Cartwright, the Presbyterian champion, without any assertion of the *jure divino* doctrine of Episcopacy. Field, the celebrated Dean of Gloucester, the warm friend of Hooker, also, as we have said, defends the foreign churches, and maintains the sufficiency of their orders. Whether Hooker himself holds that the right to establish or abolish Episcopacy is included in that broad legislative jurisdiction which he attributes to the Church, is a question of interpretation on which opinion is divided. In settling this question much depends on our judgment respecting the integrity of the last three books of his treatise. This is certain, however, that he recognized the validity of the ordination of the ministers of the Reformed churches on the Continent. He finds in their circumstances an excuse for their practice. Hooker never questioned, or thought of questioning, the right of a Huguenot or a German minister to dispense the sacraments.

There was nothing, then, in the principles of the Church of England, in the period of which we are speaking, that was incompatible with the granting of a parish to a minister ordained through presbyters alone. That is, there was no difficulty from any supposed defect in his ordination. The statute of the thirteenth of Elizabeth was a part of her coercive measures for securing uniformity. It required all ministers who had been ordained by any other method than that prescribed under Edward VI, to present themselves before the bishop, and give their approval of the Articles of Religion. The terms of the act cover the case of Roman Catholic priests, and also the case of Protestant ministers who might have been ordained abroad, whether in Scotland, or on the Continent, during the period of exile in the preceding reign. That the law was designed to refer to this second class, as well as to the other, has been affirmed by English historians and theolo-

gians of every party. Strype says that they were "undoubtedly" meant. It is now denied by your correspondent that such cases ever existed. He sets aside the authority of Hallam, who deliberately affirms that "instances of foreigners holding preferment without any re-ordination may be found down to the civil wars." (*Const. Hist.*, Harper's Am. ed., p. 226.) To contradict Hallam on a matter of this sort one should be very sure of his ground. Your correspondent dismisses Macaulay in an equally summary manner, as one "full of party prejudice." Macaulay is a somewhat rhetorical writer: and in the multitude of details which crowd his history, a few errors have been detected. But no man was more familiar with the times of which he wrote, and he is not an inaccurate author. Your correspondent likewise dismisses Bishop Burnet with a disparagement which I believe to be scarcely less unjust. Even Strype, he thinks, is not to be trusted. But here came Bishop Fleetwood and Bishop Cosin.* Both are witnesses of unimpeached veracity. Bishop Cosin had personally known of individuals who had taken English parishes with only Presbyterian orders, and knew of many other cases before his time. This would strike one as conclusive testimony. But as Bishop Cosin did not specify the cases, his declaration is not to be accepted! Fleetwood was born sixteen years after 1641, the latest date at which instances of this sort could have occurred, and therefore he is not to be believed! As if persons who took parishes before 1641 might not have lived long enough for Fleetwood to know them; and as if a man cannot get credible information respecting anything prior to his birth! It would be instructive to see what would become, on such principles of reasoning, of accepted arguments from what Irenæus and other fathers say of the constitution of the Church before their time.

* Fleetwood became a bishop in 1708. He says: "During the reigns of King James and King Charles I, and to the year 1661, we had *many ministers* from Scotland, from France, and the Low Countries, who were ordained by presbyters only, and not bishops, and they were instituted into benefices with cure * * * and yet were never re-ordained, but only subscribed the Articles." Bishop Cosin says of the ministers of the French Reformed Church, that in the event of "their receiving a public charge or cure of souls among us (as I have known some of them to have so done of late, and can instance in *many other* before my time) our bishops did not ordain them." "Nor," he adds, "did our laws require more of such ministers than to declare their public consent to the religion received amongst us, and to subscribe the Articles established." (Letter to Mr. Cordel.) Bishop Cosin, a leader of the High Church party, was born in 1594. He retired to France during the civil war, and at the restoration was made a bishop. Bishop Hall's perfectly decisive testimony we present on a later page.

These witnesses, then, to whom your correspondent alludes, fully establish the fact which he seeks to disprove. But there are other proofs, equally if not more decisive. Lord Bacon probably wrote his "*Advertisement concerning Controversies of the Church of England*," in 1589. In the course of this tract he adverts to the gradual sharpening of the antagonism between the two contestants, the Puritan and the Churchman. He says that stiff defenders of Episcopacy were beginning to condemn their opponents as a "sect." "Yea," he adds, "and some indiscreet persons have been bold in open preaching to use dishonorable and derogative speech and censure of the churches abroad; and that so far as some of our men, as I have heard, ordained in foreign parts, have been pronounced to be no lawful ministers. Thus we see the beginnings were modest, but the extremes were violent, so as there is almost as great a distance of either side from itself as was at the first of one from the other." This he accounts for on the ground that the partisans of the High Church side had become "exasperate through contentions." I cannot imagine how this piece of evidence can be invalidated, unless, indeed, it should be said that Lord Bacon did not mention names! There were ministers—"our men," they are called—ministers in the English Church, who had not been episcopally consecrated, and, hence, were denounced as having no right to exercise the ministry.

The cases of Whittingham and Travers, to which your correspondent appeals, so far from tending, when they are fairly stated, to support his position, strongly tend to overthrow it. Whittingham had written a preface to Goodman's book against the government of women, which was a companion piece to Knox's famous "*Blast of the Trumpet*," on the same theme.* He was opposed to the imposition of the vestments, and wrote against it. On the 19th of July, 1562, he had been made Dean of Durham. There was a kind of standing conflict between him and Sandys, Archbishop of York, his Metropolitan. The Archbishop at length attempted to depose him by denying that he had ever been ordained. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed, which came to no result. In 1578, a second Commission was appointed. The

* Whittingham was one of the leaders of the Anti-Liturgical party at Frankfurt, during the reign of Mary. He retired to Geneva, and took part in the translation of the Geneva Bible. There is the best reason for believing that if Whittingham and Travers had not been obnoxious on account of their Puritanism, there would have been no proceedings against them.

Dean, who was powerfully supported, died before the affair was terminated or a decision reached. It is true, as your correspondent states, that he claimed to have been ordained at Geneva, according to the method of the Reformed Church there. But there is another most material fact which your correspondent leaves out. This statement of Whittingham was denied by Sandys, who claimed that he had not been thus ordained, but had been ordained by a few lay persons in a private house. The proceeding was looked upon by many as a reflection upon the Church of Geneva. This was the feeling of the Lord President, the Earl of Huntington, who wrote to Burleigh that "his lordship could judge what flame this spark was likely to breed, if it should kindle; for it could not but be ill taken by all the godly learned, both at home and in all the foreign churches abroad, that we should allow of the popish massing priests in our ministry, and disallow of the ministers made in a Reformed Church." On the other side, the Archbishop's Chancellor reported that Whittingham had not proved that he had been ordained "at Geneva according to the order of the Genevan [office or book], by public authority established there." (Strype, *Annals*, Oxford ed., II, ii, 170.) The Archbishop asserted that "neither in Geneva nor in any Reformed Church in Europe it could be proved that any such orders were ever used or allowed of." In short, the attempt to depose Whittingham was defended on the ground that he had *not* been ordained according to the Geneva method; and there is a pretty strong implication that, if he had been, there would be no ground for the proceeding against him. Is it not a case of *exceptio probat regulam*?

Travers was a candidate for the office of Master of the Temple, where he was a preacher at the time when Hooker was appointed to the place. Travers was a strict Calvinist and a strenuous Puritan. On this last ground he was peculiarly obnoxious to Whitgift. Whitgift resolved to silence him, and alleged as a reason that he had not been properly ordained. Travers replied that he had been ordained at Antwerp, after the method of the Dutch Churches; and asserted that many others, who had been ordained in Scotland and elsewhere abroad, had held offices in the English Church—a statement which, as he was a man of acknowledged veracity, must be believed. He appealed to the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth. Whitgift is careful not to deny the validity of Presbyterian ordination, such as was practiced in the

foreign churches. His ground was that Travers had gone abroad out of dislike to the "order of his own country"—the method of ordination in the English Church; that he had been ordained by such "as had not authority to ordain him." The charge was that Travers was a schismatic; that, being in the Church of England, he ran abroad—"gaddeth into other countries"—and there got himself ordained, as was said, by Cartwright and Villers, a Frenchman. In this case, as in that of Whittingham, there is no impeachment of the ordination of foreign ministers generally, but rather an implied admission of its validity. Travers urged that Christ's Church being one, every person who has received ordination in one branch of it must be received as a minister in every other. Whitgift, in his annotations upon Travers' paper, refers to the fact that the French Church, when a minister comes to them from abroad, require something more than proof of his ordination, and subject him to an additional "calling." When the Archbishop, in his note, remarks that the churches which allowed of Presbytery "are an exception to the rule," he refers to the rule to which Travers appealed, viz: that a minister in one place is a minister everywhere. The Presbyterian Churches, Whitgift means to say, did not sanction this rule. Whitgift, as we have said, in all his conflicts with the Puritans, never denies the validity of Presbyterian ordination, as established in the foreign Protestant churches. Travers, notwithstanding his deposition, which was accomplished with difficulty, was called to Dublin by Archbishop Loftus, and made Master of Trinity College, where he had for one of his pupils Archbishop Ussher, then in his youth.

The act of the 13th of Elizabeth continued in force until the Restoration of Charles II, when, in 1662, the statute for uniformity was passed, which forbade any person to hold any benefice, or to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper "before he be ordained a priest by Episcopal ordination." This statute took away the last protection which the law afforded to clergymen who had not been ordained by a bishop.

The different attitude in relation to other Protestant bodies and to their ministry, which the English Church assumed under Laud, as compared with its position during the first three Protestant reigns, is a fact as well attested by the consent of historical scholars of various and conflicting schools as anything else in the ecclesiastical history of England. The reign of James I.

formed the transition to this new position. The participation of dignitaries of the English Church in the Synod of Dort, was one of the last conspicuous acts of fellowship with the Reformed Churches of the continent. The Puritan controversy naturally led to this result. The Puritans were at first treated as schismatics, mutineers against the National Church established by public authority. It was natural that the churches abroad, whose principles the Puritans espoused, should eventually be included in the same condemnation, and be pronounced destitute of a duly ordained ministry. Especially was this natural when a great part of the Puritans themselves claimed a *jure divino* sanction and an exclusive right for their own favorite system of polity.

To enter into the merits of this great controversy, which rent English Protestantism in twain, is no part of my present purpose. Even at this late day it may not be perfectly easy to hold the scales of judgment even; but there ought to be no dispute about the facts.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

Yale College, Nov. 9, 1873.

To the list of witnesses to the fact of the admission of ministers, not ordained by bishops, to spiritual preferment in England, is to be added the name of Bishop Hall, who was the most conspicuous defender of Episcopacy just prior to the civil war. In his "*Defence of the Humble Remonstrance*," which was written at that time, he says: "I know those, more than one, that by virtue only of that ordination which they have brought with them from other reformed churches, have enjoyed spiritual promotions and livings, without any exception against the lawfulness of their calling." Such testimony would seem to be sufficient to convince the most skeptical. The gravest objection which is urged against proofs of this character is that the witnesses do not give names! Then, when the Evangelists tell us that many people went to hear John the Baptist, we must discredit them because they do not mention names and places of residence. As we have brought forward proofs derived from Episcopal sources, we may certainly be permitted, by way of corroboration, to add the statement of the learned Puritan historian, Neal, whom it is too much the fashion of the High Church school to disparage. Speaking of the state of things about the year 1580, he says: "The statute of the 13th

Eliz, cap. xii, admits the ministration of those who had only been ordained according to the manner of the Scots, or other foreign churches: there were some scores, if not hundreds, of them now in the Church."* The case of John Morrison, who was licensed by Archbishop Grindal, in 1582, to preach and administer the sacraments in the province of Canterbury, has often been referred to. The license was issued, with the assent of the Archbishop, by Dr. Aubrey, the Vicar-General; and it describes Morrison as one who had been ordained according to the "laudable form and rite of the Reformed Church of Scotland," which at that time was essentially Presbyterian. There is no reason to doubt that his ordination was by the Synod of the County of Lothian.

The following is Prof. Fisher's second letter to the *Tribune*.

To the Editor of the Tribune.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the courteous tone of the Rev. Dr. Drumm's communication, in which he makes another attempt to disprove the statement that Presbyterian ministers were once admitted to parishes in the Church of England without re-ordination. But, after having read his acute and learned argument, I must still decline to comply with his invitation to retract the assertion, for the reason that I am fully convinced of its truth. The testimony of Lord Bacon, which Dr. Drumm does not notice; of Bishop Cosin—I know of no reason for questioning the genuineness of his letter—of Bishop Fleetwood, of Bishop Burnet, and of Strype, not to speak of other proofs, appears to me quite sufficient to establish the fact.† The circumstance that the witnesses do not mention the names of persons and of parishes only shows the absence of all anticipation that at some remote day their statement would be called in question. I am confirmed in the opinion that they are correct, from the fact that the validity of Presbyterian ordination was not questioned in the Church of England at that time, and that the relations of England with Scotland, and with the Continent, especially after the defeat of the Protestants in Germany by Charles V, and during the Marian period, were such as would naturally bring into England ministers who had received ordination in the Protestant churches abroad. I am further strengthened in this opinion by the authority of such

* *History of the Puritans*, P. I, c. vi.

† For the conclusive testimony of Bishop Hall, see p. 136 of this Article.

historians as Hallam and Macaulay, to say nothing of Lathbury and others of less note, and by the concurrence of Episcopal theologians who have studied the subject, like Keble.*

I have no occasion to engage in a debate with Dr. Drumm about the merits of English historical writers. I would only remind him that Hallam published his last revision of the *Constitutional History*, the best and most thorough of all his works, in 1846. Dr. Drumm is mistaken in saying that Hallam offers no evidence of his statement in regard to the admission of Presbyterian ministers to parishes. Dr. Drumm probably referred to the second passage in which Hallam makes this assertion, and overlooked the first, with which the marginal references are connected. Everybody knows that Macaulay paints in strong colors; but a few instances of error, as when he confounds George Penn the pardon-broker with William Penn the Quaker, only set in relief the miraculous retentiveness and almost unfailing accuracy of his memory. As to Burnet, I think Macaulay right, who says of the charge of inaccuracy brought against him: "I believe the charge to be altogether unjust. He appears to be singularly inaccurate only because his narrative has been subjected to scrutiny singularly severe and unfriendly." Burnet was born in Scotland about the beginning of the civil war in England; he was personally familiar with both countries, and with the churches abroad; and he was an honest man. When, therefore, in explaining the Act of Uniformity of 1661, he says (in the *History of his own Time*): "Another point was fixed by the Act of Uniformity, which was more at large formerly: those who came to England from the foreign churches had not been required to be ordained among us; but now all that had not Episcopal ordination were made incapable of holding any ecclesiastical benefice"—I believe that he tells the truth.

Dr. Drumm seems to differ from me in relation to the date when the *jure divino* doctrine of Episcopacy began to be promulgated in the Church of England. He attributes this doctrine to Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the closing years of Eliz-

* Keble says: "Nearly up to the time when he [Hooker] wrote, numbers had been admitted to the ministry of the Church in England, with no better than Presbyterian ordination, and it appears by Travers's *Supplication to the Council*, that such was the construction not uncommonly put upon the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth, permitting those who had received orders in any other form than that of the English Service Book, on giving certain securities, to exercise their calling in England."—*Preface to Hooker's Works*, vol. 1, xxvi.

abeth's reign. In this Dr. Drumm is surely wrong. If the passage which he quotes warranted the inference which he draws from it, it would stand in flagrant contradiction to the whole tenor of Whitgift's writings, and to his explicit affirmations. By the *jure divino* doctrine is meant not simply that Episcopacy existed in the Apostolic age, under the sanction of the Apostles, but that it is a perpetual and indispensable form of polity. Whitgift believed in the Apostolic origin of Episcopacy, and that it ought to be continued; but he did not deny that churches, with a lawful ministry, could exist without it. In the Letter to Beza, from which Dr. Drumm has quoted, which was written as late as 1593, he says: "There is no mortal man more studious of the peace of the Church than myself; nor one who, from his soul, more truly wisheth that every particular church would mind its own business, and not prescribe the laws of rites and the manner of government to others." This practice it is, he adds, "which bringeth forth that unhappy estrangement of souls among brethren." He agrees with Beza that "liberty was to be left to every church, in rites and such externals, so that they be made to edification." "I pray," he says, "that you would go on, by your daily prayers poured forth to God, to help us and the whole Church of England, which we do diligently for you and your church settled there with you." In the same Letter, Whitgift says that Sutcliffe's book (published in 1591) was the first attack that had been made in England against the Presbyterian system as it existed abroad; and that this was provoked by the long-continued aspersions cast upon the English system by the Puritans and by their foreign abettors.* In the preface to the "Defense" against Cartwright, Whitgift says of "the order of things external, touching the government of the Church and administration of the sacraments:" "We do not take upon us (as we are slandered) either to blame or to condemn other churches, for such orders as they have received most fit for their estates." Elsewhere he says: "That any one kind of government is so necessary that without it the Church cannot be saved, or that it may not be altered into some other kind thought to be more expedient, I utterly deny." He cites with approval the declaration of Calvin that "in ceremonies and external discipline, He [God] hath not in Scripture particularly determined anything, but left the same to his Church, to make or to abrogate, to alter or continue,

* Strype, *Life of Whitgift*, B. IV, c. x.

to add or to take away, as shall be thought from time to time most convenient for the present state of the Church." "Wherein," says Whitgift, "do we agree with the Papists? or wherein do we dissent from the Reformed Churches? With these we have all points of doctrine and substance common; from the other we dissent, in the most part both of doctrine and ceremonies."* The Episcopacy which Whitgift advocates is a superiority of one minister over other ministers in office or degree, as an arrangement of government, for the sake of union and discipline. Rome to him is still "Antichrist," and the foreign churches of the Protestants are recognized and honored as they were by Cranmer and Parker.

The *jure divino* theory dates from the era of Laud. It is intimately connected with the sacerdotal idea of Episcopacy which, prior to that date, however it may have been suggested, had not gained a foothold in the Church of England, and had been repudiated in the teaching of her greatest reformers and divines. It was one item in that accusation against Laud which cost him his head, that, as a part of a scheme for "Romanizing" the Church of England, he had broken off communion with the Protestant churches abroad, and had tried to lead Bishop Hall to lay down a theory of Episcopacy that would exclude them from fellowship. Clarendon, describing the causes of the civil war, states how, a few years before its commencement, the foreign churches in England, which had before been cherished and protected, were broken up, on the ostensible ground that they lent aid and comfort, by their example and otherwise, to the Puritans. This harsh measure of the government he explains by the fact "that the power of churchmen grew more transcendent, and, indeed, the faculties of the lay-counselors more dull, lazy, and inactive." Then he relates how a new policy was adopted by the English ambassadors abroad, which turned the foreign Protestants against the English king:—

"Whereas in all former times, the Embassadors, and all foreign Ministers of State, employed from England into any parts where the reformed religion was exercised, frequented their churches, gave all possible countenance to their profession, and held correspondence with the most active and powerful persons of that relation, and especially the ambassador lieger at Paris, from the time of the Reformation, had diligently and constantly frequented the church at Charenton," "some advertisements, if not instructions,

* These passages are from *Whitgift's Writings*, Parker Soc. ed.

were given to the ambassadors there 'to forbear any extraordinary commerce with that tribe.'” Lord Scudamore, the English ambassador, Clarendon further states, fitted up a chapel, in ritualistic fashion, in his own house, and took pains to say “that the Church of England looked not on the Huguenots as a part of their communion,” “which,” adds Clarendon, “was too much and too industriously discoursed at home.”

Dr. Drumm concedes that, in the age following the Reformation, there was an ecclesiastical fellowship between the Church of England and the Protestant churches abroad. However it may suit the convenience of certain writers to ignore or deny this fact, it is established by most convincing and multiplied proofs. One might as well deny that Edward VI. and Elizabeth ever reigned, or that Cranmer, Ridley, Jewel, Parker, and their cotemporaries ever lived, as to call in question the fact of an uninterrupted and cordial fellowship on their part with the Protestant, and especially the Zwinglian and Calvinistic Churches of the continent. It is high time that the attempt of a school of partisan writers to cover up this fact should cease; if, for no other reason, to save themselves from the contempt of all well-informed students of English history. The invitation given by Cranmer to foreign theologians, to take posts of high influence and honor in the English Church, is only one of a multitude of circumstances which illustrate the ecclesiastical communion, as well as the personal intimacy that subsisted between the Anglican and the Continental divines. If Bishop Potter now held in his diocese the station which Cranmer held in England, and if he were to invite the Rev. Dr. Schaff and the Rev. Dr. William Adams—or two Presbyterian ministers of equal distinction from Europe—to take chairs in the General Theological Seminary, where Episcopal clergymen are trained; if he were, also, to request them, as Cranmer requested Bucer and Fagius, to translate the Bible into Latin, with “explanations of the difficult passages in each chapter, and the addition of summaries and parallel places,” the whole to be subsequently rendered into English for the use of preachers and people;* if he were to ask them, further, to furnish criticisms of the Prayer-Book with a view to the revision of it, and to aid him in drawing up a creed to which the clergy of his diocese should subscribe; if Bishop Potter were to do all this, he would surely be judged not to have any decided repugnance to Presbyterian ordination. But Cranmer

* *Original Letters*, I, 334.

and other leaders of the English Reformation have left on record direct and conclusive evidence of their opinions on this subject. Their opinions, it may be here remarked, are not ascertained by inference from a few old phrases left standing in the Prayer-Book, but from their personal declarations, supported and illustrated as these are by their uniform conduct.

Dr. Drumm concedes that the Church of England was in communion with the other Protestant churches; but he sets forth a hypothesis to account for it, which I cannot but consider historically groundless. His explanation is, in substance, that the Reformers generally believed in Episcopacy as the true and right form of church government, and that, for this reason, the English kept up their connection with their Protestant brethren, and maintained communion with them until forbearance ceased to be a virtue. The real explanation is, that until the conflict with Puritanism had reached its height, the English accorded with the Continental Reformers in regarding Episcopacy as among things indifferent, which a church might adopt or reject at its will. If there was toleration or forbearance on either side, during the period to which I refer, it was exercised toward the English more than by them, and was so understood by both parties.

At the outset of the Protestant movement, Luther, in his Address to the Nobles of the German Nation, struck at the root of the tree by denying the existence of a priestly class in the Church, and by asserting the universal priesthood of disciples. A company of pious laymen, in a desert, could choose one of their number to be their minister, and "the man so chosen would be as truly a priest as if all the bishops in the world had consecrated him." This doctrine was the key-note to the Reformation. It was professed in its essential principle by the Reformers in all countries, and by none more emphatically than by Cranmer. With him it was mingled with a very strong infusion of Erastianism. "If all the bishops and priests in a region were dead," he says, it is not forbidden by the divine law that "the king of that region should make bishops and priests to supply the same." He declares that bishops and priests are originally and intrinsically the same class of ministers, and that ordination and consecration are "comely ceremonies," but are not necessary. It is true that the Lutheran Reformers had no objection to Episcopacy as an ecclesiastical arrangement, existing *jure humano*. Bishops were retained in Sweden, and, in the form of superintendents, in Den-

mark. The Lutherans expressed their view in the Smalcaldic Articles, where they affirm the parity of the clergy, declare Episcopacy, or the precedence of one over others, a human institution, and assert that when ordinary bishops become enemies of the Church, or refuse to ordain, the Church can dispense with them, since with the Church rests the right to call, elect, and ordain her ministers. Melancthon wanted bishops, and Luther would not have objected to them, as a preventive of disorder and a counterpoise to the apprehended tyranny of the civil authority. In England, generally speaking, the same views prevailed; and in the reign of Edward VI, bishops frequently went by the name of superintendents.* The principles of Calvin on this subject were in harmony with those of Luther, Melancthon and Cranmer. I am acquainted with the story of the intercepted letter, which Strype has taken up in his Life of Parker; but I know of no evidence to lead one to think that Calvin wished to have Episcopacy introduced into the Reformed Churches which had given it up. But he recommended the King of Poland to retain bishops, and he felt no repugnance to the exercise of a presidency, superintendence, or official superiority by one minister, who should be appointed to such a duty by the Church. Such a station in reality, though not in name, he held himself at Geneva. When Swiss divines came to England they generally found many things which they wished to see reformed; but to bishops, as such, they had no repugnance. When English divines went to Strasburg, Zurich, or Geneva, they felt not the slightest scruples on account of the parity of the clergy which they found to be there established.

This was the state of things until the Puritan controversy grew warm. This controversy grew up partly out of the fondness which English divines acquired, during their exile, for the polity and worship of the Helvetic Churches. For a long period the advocates of the Anglican polity acted on the defensive. This was not from any spirit of forbearance, much less of condescension, toward the foreign churches, but because they had no thought of claiming for their polity a *jure divino* sanction, and never dreamed that the foreign churches were under any obligation to adopt it. A *jure divino* theory of church polity was first broached on the Puritan side. The Anglicans opposed it by denying that forms of church government are prescribed by positive law. As the conflict waxed hot, in the latter part of Elizabeth's reign, a class of

* See Strype, *Annals of the Reformation*.

defenders of Episcopacy arose, of whom Hooker is the chief, who held that this polity being, in their view, Apostolic in its origin, having generally prevailed, and being conducive to order, should be everywhere retained, unless peculiar circumstances forbid its acceptance. These writers, however, do not assert the *jure divino* theory, in the proper sense of the terms, since they recognize the foreign Protestant churches as true churches, and their ministry as lawfully ordained. Substantially this position is taken by several of the foremost Episcopal divines of the seventeenth century, as Archbishop Ussher and Bishops Hall and Stillingfleet. Ussher thought that the Churches of Holland had less reason for dropping Episcopacy than the Churches of France; yet he says, "I do profess that with like affection I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch ministers if I were in Holland, as I should do at the hands of the French ministers if I were at Charenton." Hall loves and reveres the Protestant churches abroad as the "dear sisters" of the English Church.

Another element was requisite to constitute the full-blown doctrine of *jure divino* Episcopacy. This was the sacerdotal theory; the doctrine of a continued, particular priesthood, which the Reformers had unanimously rejected. It began to be claimed that the clergy are, by virtue of the exclusive right of the Episcopal order to consecrate and ordain, a self-perpetuating body, transmitting through an unbroken channel the grace that qualifies the ministry for their office; so that the Church—the body of the laity—have lost out of their hands the power to create and ordain their ministers. This theory logically carried with it the rupture of communion with the non-episcopal Protestant bodies, and as far as it was received, it effected this result.

As to the alleged forbearance of the Anglican Church and of its divines, nothing is more apparent in the history of the English Reformation than the deference felt and expressed by the Anglican leaders towards the Reformers on the Continent, who led in the great revolt against Rome, and were the guides of the Protestant religious communities abroad. The circumstances of England, in the long and doubtful struggle with the Roman Catholic party, naturally led the English Reformers to seek the counsel and lean upon the sympathy of their continental brethren. Certain it is that the former perpetually turned to the foreign divines for advice. When the troubles arose among the English exiles at Frankfort between the adherents of the Liturgy, led by Cox, after-

ward Bishop of Ely, and their opponents, led by Knox—the first manifestation of the differences that led to the Puritan controversy—one minor point of dissension was on the question whether the ministers should be equal in power, or whether precedence should be given to one of them.* Both factions, by a common instinct, appealed to Calvin for advice. Afterward, when the Puritan controversy broke forth in England, both parties applied for encouragement and support to Zurich and Geneva. The personal influence of Calvin and Bullinger in England, especially after Ridley and Cranmer adopted the Swiss doctrine of the sacrament, was for a long time well-nigh authoritative. Their treatises were the text-books in theology, recommended to the clergy, and everywhere in their hands. Their names were spoken with reverence. We see in the writings of Hooker, at a time when the contest with the Puritans was beginning to break up this old habit of unqualified respect for Calvin, how much of this feeling still remains. Hooker not only says that Calvin did the best he could in his church arrangements at Geneva, but he pronounces an elaborate and glowing eulogy upon him and his writings—an encomium which I fear that many who are accustomed to praise Hooker without stint have never read. If it be said that in the Puritan conflict the Anglican divines long abstained from direct attacks on the Presbyterian system, and from expressions disparaging to the foreign churches, this is true. Whitgift asserts this fact, and perhaps may be said to exemplify it. But this reserve, due in great part though it was to fraternal feeling, was partly consequent on the old sentiment of respect for the Helvetic Reformers and their churches. This it is which leads Whitgift to quote Calvin, Zwingli, Bullinger, and the others, on almost every page, not simply because his Puritan adversaries rested on their authority, but because he himself regarded them with profound respect and esteem. In the first three Protestant reigns we do not find the Anglican Church, nor any party in the Anglican Church, taking airs in reference to other Protestant bodies. There was no temptation to this sort of arrogance; and if it had shown itself, it would have met with a swift rebuke from the great men who were guiding the fortunes of Protestantism on the Continent.

The sacerdotal theory of the ministry is responsible for the separation, as far as it exists, of the Church of England from the

* *A Brief Discourse of the Troubles begun at Frankfort, etc.*, pp. cxxxv, cxlvi, et al.

other Protestant churches. In England, however, the Puritan churches were shut out, on an independent ground, as being schismatical. The sacerdotal theory is a contribution of the school of Laud. Germs of it may, perhaps, be found earlier. It may be implied in isolated expressions of former Anglican writers; but it takes more than one swallow to make a spring. Thomas Becon, the Chaplain of Cranmer, earnestly contends, in his voluminous Catechism, that "priest," in the Eucharistic service, is the equivalent, not of "sacerdos" but of "presbyter," and that it means only "minister," with which term it is there used interchangeably. Passing on to Hooker, we find him saying that a minister may be called a priest, as Paul calls fish flesh; that sacrifice is "now no part of the Church ministry," and that though the term "priest" is not inadmissible, yet the word "presbyter" "doth seem more fit, and, in propriety of speech, more agreeable than 'priest,' with the drift of the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ."* I do not concur with all of Keble's interpretations of Hooker, but I deem it a mark of candor in Keble to concede that there is a marked distinction between Hooker's conception of Episcopacy and of the Succession, and that of "Laud, Hammond, and Leslie in the two next generations." Hooker's Episcopacy is predominantly one of jurisdiction and government; the latter theory is a full retrogression to sacerdotalism.

In concluding, I beg leave to say that I have written without any reference to any recent movements or controversies in the Episcopal Church. In the evening service of the Prayer-Book, after the supplication for the clergy and congregations of the Episcopal Church, there follows, in the simple but majestic style of the Liturgy, an impressive prayer for the "holy church universal," that "all who profess and call themselves Christians" may be led aright. In this prayer, with its catholic idea of the Church, as well as in the supplication that precedes it, I can heartily join.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

Yale College, Dec. 6, 1873.

In the foregoing Letter, reference is made to the opinions of Ussher, Hall, and Stillingfleet. The most learned defender of Episcopacy in the seventeenth century was James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland. From early life he

* Hooker (Keble's ed.), ii, 469, 470.

had an inextinguishable thirst for the study of history and antiquities. This taste was awakened and stimulated by a passage in Cicero, where he says: "*Nescire quid antea quam natus sis acciderit id est semper esse puerum*"—not to know what happened before you were born is to be always a boy. The struggle that was going on between Protestantism and Romanism in the field of argument, and especially Stapleton's "*Fortress of the Faith*," a Roman Catholic polemical book, in which the antiquity of the Romish creed was maintained, in opposition to the alleged novelty of the Reformed Church, impelled Ussher to undertake the reading of the entire body of patristic literature—a task which he is said to have accomplished in eighteen years. By this means he armed himself for conflict with the advocates of the Church of Rome, for the most learned of whom he was more than a match. No one can examine any of Ussher's works—his "*Antiquities of the British Churches*," for example—and not be struck with the vast extent of his erudition. Truly there were giants in those days.

Ussher first printed in 1641 two short essays on the Episcopal controversy. The first was entitled "*The Original of Bishops and Metropolitans*;" the second was "*The Judgment of Dr. Rainoldes touching the Original of Episcopacy, more largely Confirmed out of Antiquity*."* The sort of Episcopacy which Ussher set out to uphold may be seen from this extract from "*The Judgment of Rainoldes*," which is given by Ussher himself at the outset of his second essay: "When elders were ordained by the apostles in every church to feed the flock of Christ, whereof the Holy Ghost had made them overseers, they, to the intent they might the better do it, by common counsel and consent, did use to assemble themselves and meet together. In the which meetings, for the more orderly handling and concluding of things pertaining to their charge, they chose one amongst them to be the president of their company and moderator of their actions." This arrangement for a presidency in the board of elders or ministers in a church was countenanced and sanctioned, Ussher maintains, by the Apostles. His great arguments are the angels of the Apocalypse, whom he takes for

* Ussher's *Works*, vol. vii.

bishops or head pastors—contrary to the prevailing view of the best critics now, including Dr. Lightfoot: and the Ignatian Epistles, which were then fresh and seem to have made a strong impression on Ussher's mind. It is this mild sort of Episcopacy, and nothing more—a superintendence or presidency exercised by one presbyter over his peers—that the Archbishop tries to prove to have had an apostolical origin. But even for this system he does not claim any *jus divinum*; that is, a church can exist without it. He nowhere pretends that a church cannot exist without it. It was this form of synodal Episcopacy which was drawn out by Ussher in writing, and which Baxter and his associates proposed, at the time of the Savoy Conference, as a basis for agreement between the Presbyterian and Episcopal parties. Apostolic succession, regarded in the light of a vehicle for the transmission of grace and as indispensable to the existence of a lawful ministry, is something utterly foreign to Ussher's whole theory and way of thinking. It is governmental, not sacerdotal Episcopacy that he favors. "The intrinsical power of ordaining," says Ussher, "proceedeth not from jurisdiction, but only from order. But a presbyter hath the same order *in specie* with a bishop—*ergo*, a presbyter hath equally an intrinsical power to give orders and is equal to him in the power of order; the bishop having no higher degree in respect of intention or extension of the character of order, though he hath a higher degree—i. e., a more eminent place in respect of authority and jurisdiction in spiritual regiment."

Baxter, in his "Life," relates an interesting conversation which he had with Ussher on this subject. "I asked him, also, his judgment about the validity of presbyters' ordination. Which he asserted, and told me that the King [Charles I.] asked him, in the Isle of Wight, wherever he found in antiquity that presbyters alone ordained any; and that he answered, I can show your Majesty more, even where presbyters alone successively ordained bishops, and instanced in Hierom's [Jerome's] words of the presbyters of Alexandria choosing and making their own bishops from the days of Mark till Hero-dius and Dionysius."

Respecting the foreign Protestant churches Ussher writes thus: "I have ever declared my opinion to be that *Episcopus et Presbyter gradu tantum differunt, non ordine*, and consequently that in places where bishops cannot be had the ordination of presbyters standeth valid; yet, on the other side, holding, as I do, that a bishop hath a superiority in degree over a presbyter, you may easily judge that the ordination made by such presbyters as have severed themselves from those bishops, unto whom they have sworn canonical obedience, cannot possibly by me be excused from being schismatical. And howsoever I must needs think that the churches which have no bishops are thereby become very much defective in their government, and that the churches in France, who, living under a Popish power, cannot do what they would, are more excusable in this defect than the Low Countries, that live under a free state, yet for testifying my communion with these churches (which I do love and honor as true members of the Church Universal), I do profess that with like affection I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch ministers, if I were in Holland, as I should do at the hands of the French ministers, if I were in Charenton." "The agreement or disagreement in radical or fundamental doctrines, not the consonancy or dissonancy in the particular points of ecclesiastical government, is with me (and I hope with every man that mindeth peace) the rule of adhering to or receding from the communion of any church."* Considering that Ussher was a contemporary of Laud, and lived in the heat and ferment of the Puritan controversy, these extracts do credit at once to his learning and to the native liberality of his mind. They show, first, that he considered the episcopate an arrangement of government, not a vehicle for the transmission of grace; secondly, that a polity that dispenses with the episcopate he considered less desirable, but in given circumstances admissible; thirdly, that he had no disposition to break off communion with the other Protestant bodies abroad. The distinction which Ussher makes between Dissenters or Separatists in England and the foreign churches is worthy of special attention. His objection to the Puritans was

* *Works*, Appendix, vii.

founded not on their polity in itself considered, but on what he considered the schismatical character of their movement. They had no just ground, as he thought, for renouncing the government of the Church of England. The Dutch and French Churches he honored and loved. The Puritans, under substantially the same polity, he could not approve and recognize. It required another step (and a very long one) to be taken before the High Church ground could be reached, where the absolute necessity of Episcopal ordination is affirmed and all the Protestant churches of Europe are cast out of fellowship. As the Puritans and the Dutch were alike among the first settlers in this country, and as we have no national church, it must be somewhat difficult, on Ussher's principles, to make out a case of schism against the churches which they here established.

Bishop Hall, being then Dean of Norwich, had sat, as one of the deputies sent by James I. from the Church of England, in the Synod of Dort. In various writings—for example, in his *Apology against the Brownists*—he had expressed his affection and veneration for the Protestant churches abroad, the “sisters” of the Church of England, as he repeatedly styles them. The expulsion of Episcopacy from Scotland, and the formation of the Solemn League and Covenant, in 1638, sharpened his polemical feeling against the opponents of the Episcopal polity. At the request of Laud, he wrote his work on the Divine Right of Episcopacy. Laud, at the outset, was dissatisfied with the positions which he proposed to take; for he was careful to avoid all condemnation of the churches abroad.* How far Hall fell short of the *jure divino* doctrine, in the proper sense, may be seen from the following passage in his subsequent *Defence of the Humble Remonstrance for Liturgy and Episcopacy*:

“The imputation pretended to be cast upon all the Reformed Churches which want this government, I endeavored so to satisfy, that I might justly decline the envy which is intended thereby to be raised against us: for which cause I professed that we do ‘love and honor those our sister churches as the dear spouse of Christ,’ and give zealous testimonies of our well-wishing to them. Your

* See the correspondence, in Hall's *Works*, vol. x. Also, Lawson's *Life of Laud*, ii, 334 seq.

uncharitableness offers to choke me with these scandalous censures and disgraceful terms, which some of ours have let fall upon those churches and their eminent professors; which I confess it is more easy to be sorry for than on some hands to excuse. The error of a few may not be imputed to all.

My just defence is that no such consequent can be drawn from our opinion; forasmuch as the divine or apostolical right, which we hold, goes not so high as if there were an express command, that upon an absolute necessity there must be either Episcopacy or no church; but so far only, that it both may and ought to be. How fain would you here find me in a contradiction! while I one-where reckon Episcopacy among matters essential to the Church; anotherwhere deny it to be of the essence thereof! Wherein you willingly hide your eyes, that you may not see the distinction that I make expressly betwixt the being and the well-being of a church; affirming that those churches to whom this power and faculty is denied lose nothing of the true essence of a church, though they miss something of their glory and perfection. No, brethren; it is enough for some of your friends to hold their discipline altogether essential to the very being of a church; we dare not be so zealous."

"The question which you ask concerning the reason of the different entertainment given in our Church to priests converted to us from Rome, and to ministers who in Queen Mary's days had received imposition of hands in Reformed Churches abroad, is merely personal, neither can challenge my decision. Only I give you these two answers. That what fault soever may be in the easy admittance of those who have received Romish orders, the sticking at the admission of our brethren returning from Reformed Churches, was not in case of ordination, but of institution: *they had been acknowledged ministers of Christ, without any other hands laid upon them*; but, according to the laws of our land, they were not perhaps capable of institution to a benefice unless they were so qualified as the statutes of this realm do require. And, secondly, I know those, more than one, that by virtue only of that ordination which they have brought with them from other Reformed Churches, have enjoyed spiritual promotions and livings, without any exception against the lawfulness of their calling."*

* Hall's Works, ix, 355, 356.

Bishop Hall wrote his *Humble Remonstrance* in 1640–41, and the defence of it, from which this extract is taken, afterwards. Nothing can be more definite and satisfactory than the proof which it affords that the ordination of the foreign churches was then allowed to be lawful and sufficient. Difficulties were sometimes raised about their institution; but, notwithstanding these difficulties, Hall knew of instances in which they were admitted to benefices.

Few of the divines of England in the seventeenth century, that golden age of English theology, equal in vigor of reasoning powers and in extent of erudition, not to speak of perspicuity and force of style, Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Norwich. His *Origines Sacræ* may be somewhat antiquated in respect to its learning, through the wider reach of Oriental studies in modern days; but in power of argument and in the intellectual mastery of the theme, it remains a noble defence of the Christian faith and a worthy memorial of the genius and attainments of its author. Stillingfleet did not fear to measure swords with Locke on questions of metaphysics; and it was the letter of the Bishop of Norwich that drew from the philosopher the nearest approach to an explicit assertion of an *a priori* source of knowledge, which really goes beyond the function of sensation and reflection.

When Stillingfleet was only twenty-four years of age and Rector of Sutton, he published "*The Irenicum*, a Weapon-salve for the Church's Wounds." The second edition appeared in 1662, the memorable year when the Act of Uniformity was passed, by which two thousand of the ministers of England, and those among the best for knowledge, piety, eloquence, and pastoral fidelity, were driven from their parishes, and thrown into the ranks of non-conformity. The *Irenicum* is directed against the assumed divine right of particular forms of church government. Among the mottoes on the title-page is a sentence of Casaubon, in which it is asserted that if a proper discrimination were made between "divine right"—*jus divinum*—and positive or ecclesiastical law, controversy among good men would cease to be bitter or of long duration. This sentence is followed by another from Grotius of the same purport. Stillingfleet aims to win non-conformists over to the Established Church by

demonstrating that there is no definite form of government prescribed to the Church ; that neither the Episcopal nor the Presbyterian system can claim divine, or exclusive, authority ; and that, therefore, there is no reason why a dissenter should not reconcile himself to the system of the English Church, whatever may be his preference in the matter. He seeks to make good his thesis, first by an inquiry into the dictates of the law of nature, and, secondly, by an examination of positive or revealed law ; his aim being under each head to disprove the claim to a sanction from either source for the exclusive pretensions of the Episcopal or the non-episcopal method of organization. Later in life, Stillingfleet thought that, from a desire for peace, he had conceded too much to dissenters ; but there is no reason to think that he ever renounced the main principles of his work, or came to question the justice of its principal arguments. Taken as a whole, it is one of the finest pieces of historical and theological reasoning within the compass of English theological literature.

We advert to Stillingfleet's famous *Irenicum*, in this place, chiefly in order to call attention to his excellent statement of the position of the Anglican Reformers and divines before his time, and to the absence in them of the *jure divino* theory of Episcopacy—the theory that bishops are indispensable to the constitution of a church, and to the validity of orders. This lucid and correct statement is given in chapter viii, of Part II. He does not confine himself to English divines, but shows “that the most eminent divines of the Reformation,” at home and abroad, “did never conceive any one form of church government necessary.” He proves his proposition ; first, by referring “to those who make the form of church government mutable, and to depend upon the wisdom of the magistrate and of the Church.” This he declares has been the opinion of most divines of the Church of England since the Reformation. He quotes, in full, Cranmer's Erastian declarations, which go so far as to dispense with the *necessity* of ordination altogether. Archbishop Whitgift, Bishop Bridges, Hooker, and others, it is shown, advocated the same general view. Secondly, he refers to the divines who had believed in the original parity of the clergy, yet considered Episcopacy lawful. Here are placed Cal-

vin, Beza, Melancthon, and others. Thirdly, he enumerates those who judge Episcopacy to be the primitive form, yet look not on it as necessary. Here come Bishop Jewel, Fulk, Field, and many more. All these men who are named under the three heads, whatever were their views respecting the origin and antiquity of Episcopacy, considered it neither necessary on the one hand, nor wrong and intolerable on the other. They held it to be one of various admissible systems of polity, neither of which is necessary to the existence of a church, and either of which is of such a character that a Christian may live under it and submit to it with a good conscience. There are slight errors in Stillingfleet's classification. Jewel does not maintain the Apostolic institution of Episcopacy, as distinct from the office of presbyters, but intimates that the distinction rests on human authority alone. Generally speaking, however, Stillingfleet's historical statements are correct, and they present a most conclusive refutation of the High Church assumption that the fathers of the Anglican Protestant Church denied the validity of the orders of non-episcopal churches. The whole treatise of Stillingfleet contains wholesome reading for partisans of whatever stripe.

The following Letter, in reply to criticisms of an Episcopal clergyman, is reproduced here, for the reason that it handles a special theory, brought forward to account for the ecclesiastical sympathy between England and the Continent in the period following the Reformation.

To the Editor of the Tribune.

SIR: In consequence of a letter of mine to the *Tribune*, written simply to prove that Presbyterian ministers were once admitted to parishes in the Episcopal Church of England without re-ordination, the Rev. Hugh Miller Thompson has felt called upon to give his opinion respecting my personal qualifications to discuss questions of this nature. Assuming that I do not believe in the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, he proceeds to say that I consider questions of this kind "of no importance," and come to them "with a contempt for the whole business of orders." A vague allegation of this sort it is, of course, impossible to disprove. By way of illustrating his statement, he says that in my "*History of the Reformation*" I have not mentioned the fact

that Bucer and certain other persons were ordained as priests. In the case of all the individuals mentioned, except Zwingle, I had no occasion to touch on their early history, except with the utmost brevity; and when I stated that Zwingle became a pastor at Glarus, I supposed that every reader of ordinary cultivation would understand that he had not taken that office without ordination. To the charge of calling Cranmer and his associates "founders of the Anglican Church," I must plead guilty, since I was so indiscreet as to suppose that my readers would supply the term "Protestant," and understand me to be speaking of the Anglican body in its separation from Rome. Dr. Thompson thinks that I have strangely "missed the meaning" of the fact that scholasticism taught that bishops and priests were one order; and then he proceeds to give as the first ground of the scholastic opinion the very origin that I had assigned for it.

But these are trivial points. What proposition of mine does Dr. Thompson deny? Does he mean to assert that Cranmer and his associates, and Jewel and his associates, believed that bishops were necessary to the constitution of a church? Apparently not; and yet he dwells on the fact that the first generation of preachers in the Protestant churches were mostly ordained in the Roman Catholic Church—as if the question about the necessity of Episcopal ordination was not a practical one. "Their orders," he says, "were all alike to begin with." Were not hundreds of new preachers going forth from Wittenberg, and afterward from Geneva? But, apart from this fact, the difficulty in the way of all such pleas as your correspondent makes on this point is that the English Reformers do express themselves explicitly on these questions. They declare their opinions without ambiguity. They knew, moreover, perfectly well the constitution of the Lutheran Churches, and of the Churches of Geneva, Zurich, Holland, France, and other Protestant countries, and they make their constitution no barrier in the way of fraternal recognition and church fellowship. I have not been so heedless as to confound personal friendship with ecclesiastical fellowship; but, apart from the direct evidence in the case, the personal intimacy of the English and the foreign divines involves, under the circumstances, convincing proof of such ecclesiastical fellowship. Your correspondent criticises my statement of the opinion of Jewel. If he will turn to the seventh book of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*, he will find a reference to Jewel's belief on the origin of bishops. Hooker

speaks of that opinion "which many have thought good to follow, and which myself did sometimes judge a great deal more probable than now I do, merely that after the Apostles were deceased, churches did agree among themselves, for preservation of peace and order, to make one presbyter in each city chief over the rest." In the margin Hooker refers to Jewel among those who held this theory, and to his reply to Harding. It is probable that Hooker knew the opinions of his revered master, and the proper interpretation of the reply to Harding quite as well as anybody at the present day.

The insinuation, by whomsoever made, that the recognition of the foreign Protestant churches and of their ministry, by the bishops and divines of the Church of England, was owing to the excitement or disorder of the times, or to the immature form of the polity of the various Protestant bodies, is in violation of historical truth. The contest with the Roman Catholics caused all the questions connected with ordination to be freely and fully discussed. This recognition was far from being confined to the first three Protestant reigns. There is no more honored name among the prelates of the seventeenth century than that of Bishop Hall, the author of "*The Contemplations*." In his "*Apology against Brownists*" (fol. ed., p. 498), Bishop Hall says: "I reverence from my soul (so doth our Church, their dear sister) those worthy foreign churches which have chosen and followed those forms of outward government that are every way fittest for their own condition." In another place, after referring to the recognition of the English Church by the foreign divines, and to the fact that Laski "was the allowed bishop of our first Reformed strangers in this land"—that is, pastor of one of the foreign churches in England*—Bishop Hall says: "These sisters have learned to differ, and yet to love and reverence each other; and in these cases to enjoy their own forms without prescription of necessity or censure." Hall, as is well known, was employed by Laud, at a later time, to defend Episcopacy against the Puritans; and Laud was dissatisfied with the concessions which even at that day he proposed to make in favor of the foreign churches. It would be interesting to trace the rise and progress of the sacerdotal theory of Episcopacy in the English Church, and to show how it gradually supplanted, in the minds of a large part of that Church, the old

* Laski was superintendent of the Churches of the German, Italian, and French Protestants, residing in London.

governmental theory which was held by the Reformers, and, in the seventeenth century, by such men as Ussher and Stillingfleet. But even the hospitable *Tribune* would hardly find room for a full treatment of this theme. Episcopacy was first advocated in the English Church as a tolerable, expedient, a very ancient, and, by some, as the most ancient form of polity. Then it came to be defended as decidedly the best form, and the only legitimate one where circumstances will permit it to be adopted. This is the doctrine of Hooker. Then followed, in the era of Laud, the High Church or sacerdotal theory. These facts are notorious; they are familiar to students of English history. They are conceded by writers of the Anglican Church of the highest repute for knowledge and impartiality.

Why not frankly and honestly admit them, as Keble does, instead of resorting to various and incongruous methods of evading them? It was the contest with the Puritans that developed among their opponents the *jure divino* doctrine. The Puritans first set up this exclusive claim for their own system.* The leading antagonists of the Puritans, for a long period, fought them by asserting that there is no particular form of polity prescribed in the Bible for all time, and therefore of perpetual obligation. They took substantially the ground which Stillingfleet assumed in his "*Irenicum*." Even Hooker makes room for the foreign churches, and founds his whole discussion on the distinction between eternal and positive laws. He distinctly affirms (in B. VII, Keble's ed., vol. iii, p. 165) that the Church, for urgent cause, by general consent, is competent to take government away from the hands of her bishops. By degrees defenders of Episcopacy imitated their opponents, and asserted for their own system a *jure divino* sanction and an exclusive right. The Puritans, thrown on the defensive, generally retreated to the old position of their adversaries, and contended that no form of polity is binding on Christians forever. In this long combat, Hamlet and Laertes have exchanged rapiers—an event that not unfrequently occurs in political and theological warfare.

Your correspondent calls for the proof of a recognition, by conciliar or formal synodal action of the Church of England, of any

* It should be said, however, that Presbyterians did not generally question the validity of ordination by bishops, or deny that Episcopal ministers may lawfully administer the sacraments. The Episcopal system they asserted to be inconsistent with Scripture.

orders but Episcopal. In view of the known action of the Church of England, in the past, and the avowed opinions of her—I had almost said “founders”—Reformers and noblest divines, one may well inquire whether the burden of proof is not on the other side. By what conciliar or synodal action have the orders of other Protestant churches been discredited? It may be said that ministers who have not been ordained by bishops, are re-ordained when they pass over to the Episcopal Church. But this proceeding may perhaps be defended by some on the Low Church ground, taken by Archbishop Leighton, when he was ordained a second time as presbyter, viz: that ordination is merely a ceremony of induction to the ministry and service of a particular church, and may, therefore, be repeated. These are questions, however, with which I have nothing to do. I trust that I shall not be thought to have taken part in this discussion in your columns from any impulse of sectarian feeling, or from any sentiment of hostility to the Episcopal Church. Such an imputation would do me great injustice. If the tone of my book fails to satisfy your correspondent, I can only express my sincere regret, although I may be permitted to add that the approval which it has received from some distinguished scholars of his Church, abroad as well as at home, and on the score of impartiality, also, has afforded me much gratification.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

Yale College, Nov. 27, 1873.

A student derives from converse with the documentary sources of various kinds, which pertain to any period of history, impressions respecting the state of things, which may be verified by adducing special proofs, but which no single items of evidence, however convincing, can transfer to the reader in their full force.

In illustrating the intimate relations of the Church of England with the Helvetic Churches, in the seventeenth century, we have more than once referred to the correspondence of the Reformers.* There are a multitude of Letters written by Cranmer, Coverdale, Hooper, Cox, Horn, Pilkington, Sampson, Sandys, Jewel, Foxe, Parkhurst, Grindal, Humphrey, and other

* Two volumes, published by the Parker Soc., contain letters during the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Mary. Two additional volumes, united in one in the second edition, cover the reign of Elizabeth.

Reformers, bishops, and leading divines, of the Church of England, to Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Bullinger, Gualter, Martyr, and other continental divines, with their Letters in return. This correspondence stretches over an interval extending from the establishment of Protestantism in England to the closing part of Elizabeth's reign. Yet in all these free, unreserved communications, in which the differences among Protestants, as on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, are frequently considered, there is no hint of any trouble, alienation, or want of sympathy, on account of the difference of the English polity from that of the continental churches. The authors are engaged in a common cause, fighting under a common banner, and the question of Episcopacy does not excite a ripple of discontent with one another. This silence, under the peculiar circumstances, is a more impressive proof of ecclesiastical sympathy than any overt declaration would be. Why, as late as 1573, Sandys, then Bishop of London and, afterwards, Archbishop of York, reports to Bullinger, the pastor of Zurich, the platform of the party which was aiming at the destruction of Episcopacy, and says: "I anxiously desire, most learned sir, to hear your opinion, and those of masters Gualter, Simler, and the rest of the brethren, respecting these things; which for my own part I shall willingly follow, as being sound and agreeable to the Word of God. For if the whole matter in controversy were left to your arbitration, it would doubtless much contribute to the peace of our Church. These good men are crying out that they have all the reformed churches on their side."*

In 1580, a prayer was issued, by public authority, to be used on Fridays in the churches of England, in which, after a prayer for the Church, we read: "And herein (good Lord) by special name we beseech Thee for the Churches of France, Flanders, and of such other places." Then follows a supplication for "this Church of England." In the prayers to be used by the English armies, who are fighting by the side of the Huguenots in France, and in the prayers to be offered at home for their success, the Protestants of France are spoken of as the members and representatives of the true Church, in arms against Antichrist. We "most heartily beseech Thee, through the merits of Jesus

* Zurich Letters, p. 440.

Christ, our Saviour, to protect and strengthen thy servants, our brethren in France, that are now ready to fight for the glory of thy name." "Go before them, fight the battles of thy children, and subdue their enemies: so shall that proud generation have no cause to exult over thy true Church, and over thy servants," etc.*

The churches of the foreigners, which were established in London, under the auspices of Edward I, furnish an illustration of the sentiments of the English Reformers towards their foreign brethren. The foreigners in London were to have four ministers, under the superintendence of John à Lasco. In the letters patent which were granted, in the fourth year of Edward, to these ministers, and constituting them a corporation, the motive assigned for the act is the duty of kings to care for the diffusion "of pure and uncorrupted religion," and for the preservation of a church "constituted in truly Christian and apostolical doctrines and rites." The grant is made with the intent that the gospel may be preached, and the sacraments administered "according to the Word of God and apostolical observance, by the ministers of the Germans and of the other foreigners."† Lasco states, in a letter to the King of Poland, that Edward, his Council, and Cranmer were zealously favorable to his enterprise. The King hoped, through the influence of these foreign churches, to be aided in carrying forward the work of reform in England.‡ At Glastenbury, the weavers from Strasburg were organized into a church. They ordained their ministers by a method similar to that of the French churches. The ordination of the ministers of the churches of Lasco was, also, Presbyterian. If this reception of the foreigners and incorporation of them into churches had been merely an act of toleration extended to strangers, it would not have taken place in that age, had there not been an ecclesiastical recognition of them and sympathy with them. But there was more than bare toleration; there was efficient encouragement and patronage. An edifice was given them in London, in which to meet for worship, and their ministers were treated with marked respect and fraternal confidence.

* *Liturgical Services*, etc., in the reign of Elizabeth, p. 578.

† *Ibid*, p. 649. J. à Lasco, *Opera*, ii, 280, 281.

‡ *Letters of Lasco to the King of Poland*, *Opera*, ii, 10.

The Articles of the Church of England exhibit no trace of the theory which gives an exclusive sanctity to Episcopacy. They are obviously drawn up according to the idea which prevailed when they were composed under Edward, and revised under Elizabeth, that each national church is to determine its own polity and ceremonies. In Art. xix, the visible Church of Christ is defined to be a congregation of faithful men in which the gospel is preached in its purity, and the sacraments administered in conformity, as to essentials, with Christ's ordinance. Here are the notes of the Church, as they are given usually in Protestant creeds. Episcopacy is not among them. In Art. xxiii, the choice and call of ministers is declared to be in the hands of men "who have public authority given unto them in the congregation" for this purpose. In Art. xxxiv, we read: "It is not necessary that traditions and ceremonies be in all places one and utterly like, for at all times they have been diverse, and may be changed according to the diversities of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be ordained against God's Word." Then the wrong of breaking from ceremonies "not repugnant to God's Word," and approved by authority, is asserted. The most that is claimed by implication is that the rites of the Church of England are not inconsistent with Scripture, nor forbidden by the Word of God. This was the old ground taken in the contest with the Puritans. The same Article ends with ascribing to "every particular or national church" the authority "to ordain, change, and abolish ceremonies and rites of the Church," so far as they are of human authority. There is a fact respecting this Article which bears on the interpretation of it. There is a close resemblance in its language to the 11th Article in the thirteen which were drawn up as the basis of an agreement between the English and German divines, at their conference in London, in 1538.* It was a platform on which Lutherans and Anglicans could alike stand. The xxxivth Article relates to the "consecration of bishops and ministers." Here, if anywhere, we should look for the exclusive theory; but there is not a word of it. The Ordinal of the Prayer-Book is declared "to contain all things

* See *Cranmer's Miscellaneous Writings* (Parker Soc. ed.), p. 477. Compare the Latin Articles of the English Church, in Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum*, p. 608.

necessary to such consecration and ordering ;" "neither hath it anything that of itself is superstitious and ungodly." All who are consecrated or ordered according to that form, are said to be "rightly, orderly, and lawfully consecrated and ordered." The Article is, so to speak, merely defensive. That there is no other lawful method of ordination is not in the faintest manner implied. That any one should suppose himself able to draw any sanction for the exclusive theory from the Articles would occasion astonishment, if we did not know that a class of theologians have professed to find in them an assertion of Arminianism. After such a feat of interpretation, nothing in this line is surprising.

We turn now to the Ordinal ; for this is the last refuge of the defenders of the *jure divino* construction of Anglican law. We are far from asserting that the Anglo-Catholic party has nothing to found itself upon. Such a party has existed from the beginning. The Prayer-Book contains various features which bear witness to the desire of its compilers to conciliate old prejudices and opinions, or to their inability to overcome them. But that party was comparatively weak when the formularies of the Church of England took their shape, in the period of the Reformation. Had Edward VI. lived longer, or had Elizabeth been less conservative and less domineering, other changes would have taken place ; for the Reformers averred that they considered their work far from complete. However, the party to which we refer did not succeed in incorporating their shibboleth into the law of the Church. The Preface to the Ordinal is the principal source of argument for the advocates of the exclusive interpretation of the Anglican system. We print in brackets the words that were added in 1661, after the Restoration :

It is evident unto all men diligently reading the holy Scripture and ancient authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church ; bishops, priests, and deacons, which offices were evermore had in such reverend estimation, that no man might presume to execute any of them, except he were first called, tried, examined, and known to have such qualities as are requisite for the same ; and, also, by public prayer, with imposition of hands, were approved and admitted thereunto by lawful authority. And therefore, to the intent that

these orders may be continued, and reverently used and esteemed in the Church of England; no man shall be accounted or taken a lawful bishop, priest, or deacon in the Church of England, or suffered to execute any of said functions, except he be called, tried, examined, and admitted thereunto, according to the form hereafter following [or hath formerly had episcopal consecration, or ordination].

On this document we have several remarks to make.

1. The preamble simply asserts that from the Apostolic age there have been in the Church these orders of ministers. It does not affirm, or imply, that this arrangement is prescribed by the divine law; much less, that a church cannot exist without it, or that where there is a modification of this system, the validity of ordination is destroyed. The intent is only to preserve this system in the Church of England—"this Church of England," as the phrase ran, in the Revision of 1552,—not to impose it, as a condition of ecclesiastical communion, on other churches.

2. The form of ordination is presented exclusively as a condition of holding office in the Church of England.

3. The invalidity of the ordination of Roman Catholic priests was never asserted, although they were not ordained by the Anglican form. How, then, can the invalidity of Presbyterian ordination be inferred from this injunction of the Preface? Moreover, the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth opened the way for the institution of Roman Catholic converts, and, as we have shown, of Protestant ministers ordained abroad.

4. The validity of the ordination of the other Protestant churches was admitted by those who framed the Ordinal, and has been admitted by a numerous body of the most eminent doctors of the English Church. This fact ought to settle the interpretation of this document.

5. If the term "orders" was meant to be taken in the strict, technical sense, then the Preface says that bishops have existed as a distinct order in the Church since the apostolic age. Under this view of the term, a fact is asserted, and nothing more; and this assertion was allowed to enter into the preamble, without being challenged by such as held bishops and presbyters to be of the same order. But, in point of fact, the term "order" was not unfrequently used in a loose and

general sense by those who held that the difference between the two classes of ministers is one of degree only. We will give a marked instance. Jewel, in his *Apologia*, says: "Credimus varios in ecclesia esse ordines ministrorum; alios esse diaconos, alios presbyteros, alios episcopos," etc. In the edition of the same work in English (1563), the passage reads: "Furthermore, that there be divers degrees of ministers in the Church, whereof some be deacons," etc.* The word *ordines* is rendered *degrees*. We know that Cranmer, who is supposed to have had a leading part in shaping the Ordinal of 1549, held bishops and presbyters to be different degrees of the same order. The revision of 1551, which resulted in Edward's second book, of 1552, was made under the direct or indirect influence of men like Peter Martyr, Alasco, Bucer, and Calvin.† The next revision, on the accession of Elizabeth, was accomplished by Parker, Cox, Pilkington, Grindal, Sandys, and others. Of those who were actually concerned in forming and revising the Ordinal, some of the most prominent are known to have held that bishops and presbyters differ only in degree. We know that many of the bishops of the Episcopal Church, of the highest repute, from Cranmer to Ussher, and since Ussher's time, have entertained this opinion. The High Church editors of the Prayer-Book say: ‡ "The distinction of the order of bishops from that of priests was definitely asserted for the first time in 1661," although they maintain that it was previously implied in the Preface to the Ordinal. "It was not," they add, "until the close of the sixteenth century that the distinction between the orders of bishops and priests was asserted." Very little can be made from the mere use of the word "orders" in this Preface.

6. The changes made in the Ordinal in 1661 are very significant as to its original character. To the Preface were added the words: "or hath had formerly Episcopal consecration or ordination." Why this addition, if the Preface without it wholly excludes non-episcopal ministers from service in the Church of England? But the alterations of 1661

* Jewel's *Works* (Parker Soc. ed.), iii, 10.

† Blunt's *Annotated Prayer-Book*, p. 536.

‡ Ibid. 566.

are obviously with a view to make a distinction between bishops and presbyter, such as the Ordinal had not recognized. The phrases, "Episcopal consecration or ordination," "*ordained* or consecrated a bishop," "form of *ordaining* or consecrating a bishop," for the first time definitely asserted the distinction of order between bishop and presbyter.* In the ordination of a priest, after the words "Receive the Holy Ghost," there were added the words: "for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God now committed to thee by the imposition of hands." Analagous phraseology was added in the service for the ordination of a bishop. Thus the distinction of the two offices was affirmed by implication, in a way in which it had not been affirmed before. Various other minor changes in the revision of 1661 indicate plainly the same design. But there was one alteration which deserves special attention. Prior to 1661, Acts xx, which describes the meeting of the Ephesian elders with Paul, and I Tim. iii, were read both at the ordaining of a priest and at the consecration of a bishop. Both these portions of Scripture were now assigned to the service for the consecration of bishops exclusively. The latter passage—I Tim. iii, 1-8—relates to the character and work of a "bishop." Before 1661, this chapter was deemed appropriate for the ordination of a presbyter; then it was not. No one can look at the alterations effected in the Ordinal by the reactionary party of the Restoration, and not see that they spring from different ideas of the Episcopal office from those which the original framers of the Ordinal entertained.

It is sometimes said that, when the Ordinal was composed, Cranmer had changed the opinions which he had expressed at an earlier day respecting Episcopacy. The extreme Erastianism which led him to consider the king a proper fountain of Episcopal authority, so that even ordination from any other source might be dispensed with, is certainly not recognized in any formal action of the English Church or State, unless the commission granted by Henry VIII. to Bonner, and that taken out by Cranmer after Henry's death are counted as excep-

* *Annotated Prayer-Book*, p. 566.

tions.* Certainly the "*Institution of a Christian Man*" (1536), and the "*Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christian Man*" (1543) give to the secular authority no such function, but reserve it to the Church and to its ministers. The king's authority enables them to perform acts within his realm, for which the Church has previously empowered and qualified them. A Declaration, which defined the relation of the clergy to the civil authority in a similar way, was made in 1538, and was signed by Cranmer, Cromwell, and many others. The opinion of Cranmer, which attributes to the king this extraordinary power, bears the date of 1540. Whatever may have been his final conviction on this matter, whether he had any settled view or not, there is no evidence of any modification of his ideas upon the relation of bishops to presbyters. The essential equality of the two classes of ministers is assumed in all the documents to which we have just referred. Just before the death of Edward, Cranmer was busy in trying to procure a general assembly of representatives of the various Protestant churches, for the formation of a common creed. He was writing to Melancthon, Bullinger, and Calvin on the subject. In his Letter to Calvin (March 20, 1552), he says: "Shall we neglect to call together a godly synod, for the refutation of error, and for restoring and propagating the truth?" He is very anxious to procure an agreement on the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. If he had suddenly become convinced of the necessity of Episcopacy to the being of a church, or if he had attached much importance to the differences in polity among the Protestant bodies, it is hardly possible that he would not have made some allusion to the subject, on such an occasion. The representation that he had changed his opinions when the Ordinal was composed, is a pure myth. Lasco informs us that he had special encouragement in the formation of his foreign churches in England from Cranmer, as well as from the King's Council. "The Archbishop of Canterbury," he says, "promoted it with all his might." Lasco was urged to organize his

* This matter is discussed in the *Correspondence of Lord Macaulay with the Bishop of Exeter* (2d ed., 1861). We have observed a note of Henry VIII. to "*the Institution of a Christian Man*," which appears to suggest this lofty notion of his prerogative. Cranmer, *Miscellaneous Writings*, p. 97.

churches according "to the divine Word," and not to follow "the rites of other churches." *

A modern writer of the Church of England, who is quite removed from all sympathy with Puritanism, remarks that, "till the passing of the act of uniformity in the reign of Charles II, the ordination conveyed by presbyters, though resisted by the governors of the Church, had never^e been disowned by the legislature." However theologians of the school of Laud might have exerted their power to exclude all ministers not ordained by bishops, the law of England could not be used as an instrument for their purpose. But the legislation at this epoch was shaped by the extreme partisans of Episcopacy. "The substitution," says the same writer,† "in the Prayer-Book, of 'church' for 'congregation,' the specific mention of bishops, priests, and deacons, instead of a more general designation, the re-introduction of *Bel and the Dragon* into the Calendar, and other similar alterations, though none of them new in principle, seemed designed to convince the non-conformists that instead of any wish to admit them to further power or privilege within the Church, there was a distinct and settled desire to restrain or exclude them."‡ This writer would not have erred if he had attributed these measures to the bitter resentment of a formerly depressed, but now victorious party.

The Revolution of 1688 offered a splendid opportunity for undoing this bad work, and for a new measure of comprehension, such as justice and policy alike called for. The King and Court favored such a measure. The churchmen of noblest gifts, of whom Tillotson was one of the chiefs, strove to accomplish it. Among the concessions which Tillotson proposed, and which are recorded as having been sent by him, through Stillingfleet, to the Earl of Portland, stands the following: "That for the future those who have been ordained in any of the foreign reformed churches, be not required to be re-ordained here, to render them capable of preferment in this Church." At first, Tillotson and his associates expected to carry the measure which they proposed. But it failed. One reason of its failure was the recent forcible expulsion of Episcopacy from Scotland,

* See the Works of Lasco, ii, 10, 278 seq.

† Cardwell, *History of Conferences, &c.*, p. 419.

‡ p. 389.

where, as Cardwell observes, there was "no stated liturgy in general use," and where "they allowed the validity of Presbyterian orders."* Another reason was the fear that the Jacobite non-jurors, in case the Liturgy should be altered, would organize a formidable schism under the name of the old and true Church of England. These considerations lent their aid to the party which, on theological grounds, were hostile to the offering of any concessions to the dissenters.

It is, therefore, the misfortune of the Episcopal Church that it inherits, not the constitution that was given to it by the Reformers, but the same as amended for the worse, in the middle of the seventeenth century, by the controlling faction at the restoration of the Stuarts. But, even in this form, although it shuts out from service in the Church of England all ministers not ordained by a bishop, it pronounces no condemnation upon the orders of non-episcopal churches. In an opinion which was given not long ago by three eminent ecclesiastical lawyers, not only is the liberal interpretation of the statute of the 13th of Elizabeth sanctioned, and this statute, in connection with the xxiiird Article, and with the practice of the Church of England, prior to the act of uniformity, declared to preclude the seeming exclusiveness of the Preface to the Ordinal, but these lawyers express doubts whether even now, since the act of uniformity, it is illegal for non-episcopal ministers to preach occasional sermons in any Church of England, with the permission of the incumbent.†

When a clergyman of the Church of England, like the Dean of Canterbury on a late occasion, finds himself in a foreign country, there is nothing in the law of England, or of the Church of England, to prevent him from performing acts of ecclesiastical communion with the churches and ministers of non-episcopal bodies. The Episcopal Church in this country is not a national Church. It is only one among various denominations of Christians, which are equal before the law. The first settlers of this country, in establishing new political communities, availed themselves of the right, universally conceded

* *History of Conferences*, p. 421.

† This legal opinion is referred to by Principal Tulloch, *Contemporary Review*, December, 1871.

by Protestants to every people, to shape their Church polity to suit themselves. Some of them were from the Church of Holland; some were Huguenots; and some were English non-conformists. These Christian non-episcopal denominations are not dissenters or schismatics, in any proper or intelligible sense of the terms. They stand on the same footing in relation to the Church of England as do the Lutheran Churches of Germany and Sweden, or the Protestant Church of France. Whoever raises an objection to such an act as that of the Dean of Canterbury in taking part in the communion service with a Presbyterian clergyman, has a right to his notions as to the law of the Church of England, but he has no moral right to condemn others, who do not share in them, for obeying their own convictions. Certain it is that the great divines of the Church of England, for more than a century after the Reformation, would have lifted up their hands in amazement on hearing anybody object to such an act of fellowship with foreign non-episcopal churches as Dean Alford performed at Berlin, or Dean Smith in New York. The circumstance that the law of England requires certain formalities before an Episcopal clergyman from abroad can officiate in a pulpit of the National Church, is not apposite to the case in hand. Apart from the difference, that here there is no national church, whose clergymen are bound by civil regulations, the analogous case would be that of an American Episcopal minister officiating in a Methodist or Independent chapel in England. Mere questions of ecclesiastical etiquette we must leave for experts to determine. Moral obligation, however, is higher than conventionalities. A liberal-minded Anglican clergyman, visiting America, is not bound to submit himself to the supervision and control of local bishops, who hold that all Protestant denominations, except their own, are destitute of an authorized ministry and of the sacraments, and whose conceptions of Episcopacy are derived, not from divines like Cranmer, Jewel, Ussher, and Whately, but from the interpretations and theories of Laud and Sheldon. John Wesley was complained of for preaching in parishes, not in the church but in the open air, and without an invitation from the incumbent. He answered that, being excluded from the parish churches, if he preached nowhere else, he would be silenced.

If he had complied with current notions of regularity and etiquette, where would Methodism have been? And what would the Church of England have been, without the reactionary influence of that Reformation? So now, the demands of Christian catholicity may justly override the prescriptions of a punctilious etiquette; especially when these are acknowledged by only one of the parties concerned.

The Church of England, notwithstanding all its defects, is a great and noble institution. We wish it no evil. But it is now tasting the fruit of errors in the past. On three great occasions at least, golden opportunities for a larger comprehension were presented, and those opportunities were cast away. The first was at the accession of James I, when the millenary petition was offered, and when, at the Hampton Court Conference, to the unspeakable delight of a knot of partisan and sycophantic bishops, that "Solomon of the age" bullied the Puritans. The second was at the restoration of the throne, at the accession of Charles II, when his most solemn pledges were violated, and when the Savoy Conference was attended by another victory of a bigoted faction. The third was at the Revolution, when the same faction, aided by peculiar circumstances to which we have adverted, gained another triumph. At both of these last epochs, the noblest and wisest men of the clergy and laity were the advocates of a liberal policy. Now, nearly half of the English nation is arrayed in hostility to the National Church. If the Church of England should be disestablished, it would most probably be divided. It is hardly possible, that the party which cleaves to that judaizing type of religion, which is an heirloom from Pharisaism, and is an eternal foe of the Gospel—as truly so to-day as it was when Paul denounced it without stint, in the Epistle to the Galatians—should abide in the same communion with the adherents of the principles of the Reformation. The Ritualists, with their candles, "their flexions and genuflexions," their elevation of ceremonies above truth and godliness, will form a church by themselves, or go back to the Pope, where they belong. Under the present circumstances, the signs of the times being what they are, and when the Romanizing faction are active, it is not strange that enlightened men of the Low Church and Broad Church parties should be

inclined to draw closer to the other Protestant bodies, which hold the same faith, and should desire to see the Church of England abandon the habit of seclusion, which is not required by her constitution, but which was forced upon her in the servile days of the Stuarts, and resume her old position by the side of her sisters of the Reformation. Such men feel that the contests of the seventeenth century are over, and that the passions engendered by them should die out, and that the barriers that were erected by partisan feeling should be levelled. In each of the branches of the High Church party, there are good men. But with the principles of this party it is impossible for a genuine Protestantism to feel any sympathy. The astronomers tell us that any star, however diminutive it might be, on which we should place ourselves, would appear to be the centre of the Universe, and that the whole creation would seem to revolve around the particular spot where we stand. It must be through some similar delusion that this party of the Anglican Church, a party which constitutes but an insignificant fraction of the Christian world, while it turns its back on the Protestant churches, and, in turn, is spurned by the Church of Rome, yet imagines itself the centre and embodiment of Catholic Unity. Archbishop Whately was not a man of genius, but he was a man of remarkable good sense. In his work on the Kingdom of Christ, he shows that the Articles of the Church of England "rest the claims of ministers, not on some supposed sacramental virtue, transmitted from hand to hand in unbroken succession from the Apostles, in a chain, of which if any one link be ever doubtful, a distressing uncertainty is thrown over all Christian ordinances, sacraments, and Church-privileges forever; but, on the fact of those ministers being the regularly-appointed officers of a regular Christian community." Those, he says, who seek to take what they call higher ground, "are in fact subverting the principles both of our own Church in particular, and of every Christian Church that claims the inherent rights belonging to a community, and confirmed by the sanction of God's Word as contained in the Holy Scriptures." "It is curious," adds Whately, "how very common it is for any sect or party to assume a title indicative of the very excellence in which they are especially deficient, or strongly condemnatory of the very errors

with which they are especially chargeable The phrase 'Catholic' religion, (i. e. 'Universal,) is the most commonly in the mouths of those who are the most limited and *exclusive* in their views, and who seek to shut out the largest number of Christian communities from the Gospel covenant. 'Schism,' again, is by none more loudly reprobated than by those who are not only the immediate authors of schism, but the advocates of principles tending to generate and perpetuate schisms without end."* It would be well for the party, which Whately here delineates in language not more caustic than it is just, to learn, that to take a part for the whole is the very essence of a sect.

* *Kingdom of Christ* (Am. ed.), pp. 126, 127, 128.

ARTICLE VIII.—SOME SUGGESTIONS ON POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ART.

A FEW years ago Cardinal Wiseman delivered an address at the Royal Institution, London, on "Points of Contact between Science and Art," and in the course of his remarks furnished a number of illustrations which very definitely set forth the relations between Science and the Fine Arts. It has occurred to us, however, on again reading over the address, that the Cardinal did not seem to appreciate the fact that the methods of investigation pursued in art are almost identical with those of science. The main distinction lies in their aim; the one inquires for the sake of knowledge; the other, for the sake of production. Not only does art perpetually avail itself of the results of science, but it frequently anticipates science. Not only does it employ science in its methods and forms, but its aim and expression are often involved in considerations which demand the highest exercise of precise knowledge respecting both the sciences of nature and the science of man. "Science perfects genius," said Dryden, and no doubt he himself knew how much of that which is termed *genius*, on closer inspection turns out to be precise knowledge, knowingly applied.

The subject, however, which engaged the Cardinal's attention, seems to be much more fruitful of suggestion and illustration to-day, though but a single decade has passed since the address was delivered. Science has made great advances, and many of her results have found application in connection with art. The principles of art are, perhaps, being more definitely formulated, and the tendency of criticism is to show the scientific character of its products in relation to history, literature, and philosophy. Contact alone with works of art, without any acquaintance with the life and character of their authors, the methods of study they pursued, their indefatigable research in preparation, the difficulties encountered and overcome, not only with respect to methods of art, but concerning that of which art is merely an expression—we repeat, through mere contact with their

finished works, we may readily grant that art is indeed nothing more nor less than "an inspiration for the gratification of a divine instinct." But following the artist closely in his methods and manipulations; his choice of subject with respect to the capacities of art for its proper expression; the selection and arrangement of material contributing to this; we find him involved in considerations thoroughly scientific in all respects save as to their special aim and bearing.

The Cardinal, in his address, cited Leonardo da Vinci as "the representative man" to illustrate this contact of science with art; and there could be no better selection. Leonardo, in his investigations and discoveries, both in pure and applied science, is ranked high, and "has his place in the history and in the philosophy of the inductive sciences." Whewell ranks him among "the practical reformers of science." He left "thirteen volumes of scientific sketches, of diagrams and mechanism, chiefly connected with hydraulics." But this fact in itself serves as no illustration of the contact of science with art, for they consisted of investigations made purely in the interest of science. The points of real contact—if we can so term them—are where science prepares the ground for the action of art, and in connection with its objects.

But a slight analysis of any work of art will exhibit these points of contact very definitely. Consider, for instance, what requisites were in demand for the production of Raphael's "School of Athens." An analysis of this work naturally divides under two heads—the philosophy of ideas connected with the subject, and the science of their embodiment by means of art. The former involves a relative estimate of the philosophies and the sciences illustrated by their most prominent teachers. A central interest is accorded Plato and Aristotle, the one pointing to the heavens, the other, with outstretched palm spread toward the earth; each regards the other with an expression of intense conviction, while their arguments, together with their philosophies, are summed up in this significant and concentrated action. Nothing can exceed the accuracy of artistic statement in the rendering of this, together with the portrayal of their respective disciples, who, with no less significance, exhibit like distinctions in their sympathies of thought. Below

this central group the subordinate sciences find illustration, and with no less intellectual appreciation of their character and aim. The group which surrounds Archimides, who constructs a geometrical figure upon a tablet lying on the ground, evinces the nicest distinctions with respect to the opening of the minds of the spectators to the reception of the thought. On the steps, apart from all, reclines Diogenes the Cynic, attentively scanning a tablet; a youth, directed by an old man, turns from him to the teachers of a higher philosophy. Above, among others, we observe Socrates, addressing a group of listeners who have collected about him, to whom he explains in order (counting on his fingers) his principles and their conclusions. This is but a glance, sufficient, however, to show the nature of the thought pervading this work. Each individual thinking head in this remarkable picture has characteristic expression, and the knowledge requisite for this is the result of *scientific* insight, which alone enables the artist to use the human form to give accurate expression to ideas or emotions: to determine among the many muscular movements of the features the exact anatomical play that suits the character of thought moving in the mind. Here is a science of the fitness of the means to the end which admits of no deviation. Right expression depends strictly upon the accuracy of the artist's knowledge. Leonardo, having in mind his conception of the Christ for his picture of The Last Supper, searched for months to find a type that would give him a proper basis upon which to realize this idea in sensible form. In these higher walks of art the judgment is involved with questions quite distinct from the more marked effect passion produces upon the human countenance. A close sympathy with those placid, yet profounder movements of the mind, is in demand, and a knowledge of their corresponding physical expressions. This finds noble illustration in the *repose* of antique statuary. Thus anatomical science must be so thoroughly mastered that the artist may give right expression to actions wholly imaginary, and for which it would be impossible to find a living model capable of *assuming* the exact situation, morally or physically; the Laocoön is a remarkable instance of this.

As we descend in our dissection of this picture, numerous

points present themselves as having this connection with science; but, fearing to be too tedious, we will merely make reference to the architectural accessories which involve an elaborate perspective, a *strictly mathematical science*. Indeed, when the Cardinal cited his few points of contact between science and art, a closer inspection might perhaps have revealed the fact that there could be no art save as a superstructure based upon science. The arts have notoriously flourished best when science was making most rapid advances and achieving her highest triumphs.

If the subject selected for illustration be taken from ancient history, *ethnological* as well as *archæological* points arise which require accurate knowledge on the part of the artist. The character, manners, customs, and costumes pertaining to public and private life. The spirit of the epoch, gathered from literary and other sources. No art, of any time or people, can be properly interpreted but in connection with its literature. The Cardinal quoted Ruskin's observation, that "a painter should be a man of universal learning." This is what Cicero has said of the finished orator; and the most distinguished masters in art have, to some extent, evinced this breadth of cultivation. The higher and more varied the education the artist receives, the more extensive the learning which he acquires, the more it will assist him in his artistic pursuits.

"I see not what, without true genius, study,
Nor genius without study, can effect;
Each needs each; both, when hand in hand, will thrive."

—Horace.

Holman Hunt passed several years in the Holy Land searching out those hereditary types by means of which he realized that remarkable embodiment of his subject, "Christ in the Temple"—one of the most remarkable works of modern art. He made studies of the oldest types, and, comparing these, was gradually enabled to determine the peculiarity of feature common to the old race of Jews which dwelt at Jerusalem. In respect to the habits, dress, ceremonies, and symbols of the synagogue worship, he applied himself no less diligently. But a slight acquaintance with the requisite preparation such works demand will enable us to estimate the requirements of art, and

reveal those points of contact wherein the studies of the artist meet with those of the historian, the archæologist, the scientist, and the philosopher. We find Leonardo and Michael Angelo on the one side expressing their most subjective thought in the sonnet or in the picture, and on the other devising and executing stupendous works of architecture and mechanical engineering. The methods of study pursued in art are eminently fitted for a union of the theoretical with the practical, for while they are directed to the object, they aim to draw from it that which renders it subservient to artistic expression. Thus the object is studied not for its own sake alone, but as a means for the expression of ideas, sentiments, and the like. Art is no less practical than it is fanciful. The very essence of art is *invention*. The lists of inventors contain many names that have been associated with the fine arts. In this country, Morse and Fulton are noted examples. Albert Dürer was a skilled mathematician and the inventor of several mathematical instruments and machines. Camerarius assures us that he wrote no less than one hundred and fifty books and pamphlets (probably an exaggerated statement); among which were treatises on *Civil Architecture*, on *Fortifications*, on the *Anatomy and Proportions of the Horse*, and on the *Art of Fencing*. Pirkheimer also informs us that he wrote several works on Painting. In 1525 he brought out his "*Instruction in the Art of Mensuration*," consisting of four books treating of the "Construction and divisions of lines, of the measurements of plane surfaces and solid bodies, with practical hints in Optics and Perspective," based chiefly on Euclid. He also published a treatise on "*Human Proportions*."

We have alluded to the scientific works of Leonardo da Vinci. There are now in Paris twelve large volumes of his essays in Science; the balance of his works are in the Ambrosian Library at Milan. They consist of treatises on *Mathematics*, *Chemistry*, *Hydraulics*, and *Anatomy*. Gustave Uzielli claims for Leonardo "the credit of having first laid down the fundamental laws regulating the distribution of the leaves of plants," thus forestalling the English botanist Brown by more than two centuries. Leonardo also informs us at this early date "that the circles of wood in the section of a branch de-

note the age of the limb, . . . their density depends on the dryness of their natal seasons:" also "the heart of a tree will be found nearer to its southern bark than to its northern." Fossil shells and fish likewise engaged his attention, and indeed, so numerous were his studies in *Natural Science*, that it would be tedious to make mention of them further than as an illustration of the character of his investigations. The invention of the Planisphere is also claimed for him, drawings of which are among his MSS. at Windsor. That Leonardo anticipated Cordan in believing that the phenomena of the camera tended to explain the laws of vision, is obvious from his own words—"This spiracle made in a window . . . conveys within all similitudes of the bodies opposed to it. Thus may we see that the eye likewise acts." His remarks on Optics are full of suggestive insight, coupled with skillful investigations. He constructed an eye of glass by which to illustrate his conclusions; and then gave himself up to considerations and inventions "concerning the means for making the moon appear larger by the use of lenses."* He also wrote a treatise on "*Force as a cause of Fire*." We may gather from these suggestive items some idea of the character of his studies, carried on in the intervals of his artistic pursuits. In being brought face to face with nature and with science in those methods of study which form the right training of the artist, it is impossible that the mind should not feel some stimulus towards strictly scientific investigation. It must be a dull mind which excludes inquiry into subjects bordering upon its special pursuits; experience teaches that these very pursuits are the better mastered through this breadth of cultivation which we find illustrated in the best masters in science or art.

But to continue our subject. It was not until long after *Perspective* had been discovered and applied in art, by Paolo Uccello, and the brothers Van Eyck, that science formulated it. Science was forestalled by art in two distant countries at the

* It must be remembered that this anticipates Galileo by nearly a century. Vasari records of Leonardo that in his youth he first suggested the formation of a canal from Pisa to Florence, by means of certain changes to be effected in the river Arno. Bottari says in a note: "This magnificent work was executed about 200 years after, by Vincenzio Viviani, a disciple of Galileo."

same time, in Italy and in Belgium. Before the time of Giotto, through the long period of Byzantine art, it had remained unknown. But in Giotto and his followers we find evidence that not mere "personal observation and artistic cleverness enable them to seize this necessary ingredient of pictorial art," but that it was reduced to principles, formed into precepts, and taught to scholars. Pietro della Francesca deserves especial notice in this connection; he died in 1482. There is evidence in his works that he not only understood and practiced Perspective with great accuracy, as Vasari records of him, but he reduced its principles to writing in three books, which are still in existence. Before the literature of perspective commences, Raphael, in his "School of Athens," and Michael Angelo, in the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, had shown themselves consummate in the application of Perspective to art. Then "the anticipations of art were verified by science and reduced to unvarying rule." It was not till 1608 that the first satisfactory treatise on this subject was published by Guido Ubaldo. In 1642 the *Prospectiva Practica*, commonly known as the Jesuits' perspective, appeared—very generally in use among artists until quite recently. Finally the correct mathematical theory of perspective was propounded by Brook Taylor in 1731. Copies of these works are before us.

A *mathematical* basis, consisting of proportion, relation, and quantity, underlies all art, in line, color, form, and pictorial composition, no less than in musical harmonies. Michael Angelo claimed that the human figure is perfect in its proportions and these proportions have a definite law. The thought was not original with him, but was derived from the ancients. "The human form is bounded by lines, the angles of which are all harmonic, and the curves which circumscribe the subdivisions possess this quality in no less degree."

Before considering Architecture in relation to points of contact between science and art, a mere glance at the Sculptor's work will show us the scientific requirements of his art. The character and function of every muscle of the human form is to be mastered; of every bone which affects the outward appearance or gives support to the parts. He is to possess accurate knowledge of every action of which this form is capa-

ble, of the scope and function of every bone and muscle, and under all imaginable action, such as cannot be studied from the living subject; instance of which we have cited in the Lao-coön. But all this, in the most accurate form of *scientific* knowledge, will not effect for art those still higher requirements which are as yet beyond the reach of science, and in respect of which knowledge is extremely limited. The gulf between the genius of our being and what we know of its nature and scope is still vast and unfathomed by science.

In respect to these "points of contact," Architecture presents numerous illustrations; for Architecture naturally divides into two branches—the artistic and the constructive, or scientific. "On the one side it seems to descend toward the class of mechanical pursuits; on the other, it has in the past laid contribution on its two sister arts, and commanded their highest resources."

In its *artistic* phase, which is subservient to the expression of certain effects, line, form, space, and color are the elements with which these effects in Architecture are produced. It is perfectly tonic, in respect to its lines, angles, and curves. The Parthenon has been reduced to a strict *mathematical* proportion in its construction, and the harmony of the parts have been found to fulfill a certain mathematical ratio. Said Penrose, "Its calculated and measured dimensions do not vary, even within the fraction of an inch." The same treatment has been applied to Lincoln, and later to Salisbury Cathedral, and it has been ascertained that their proportions have this same character and are reducible to similar principles. Though the men who built those great edifices "may have had no idea of the *science* which they obeyed, they had it in the education of their feeling and judgment; when science came in and tested their work she merely verified and found it strictly according to its rules."

But in its *constructive* branch, Architecture is almost exclusively scientific; with respect to the nature and selection of materials; in all its constructive forms in carrying out the conception or design. "The early builders could not calculate the proportion requisite between superincumbent weight and its just support; and they erred on the right side, by providing superabundant strength to carry their intended burden." We

observe how, "by degrees, every architecture becomes slimmer and lighter, as experience has brought these proportions to test;" hence, after the Doric comes the Ionic, then we get the Corinthian, and at last the Composite. In like manner we pass from the Norman, through intermediate stages of pointed architecture, to the Flamboyant or Decorated. Remarkable evidence remains, that the heavier construction of remoter periods "was not based upon any accurate calculation of ratio between support and weight." The first went beyond the demands of the second. We find the architects of the sixteenth century, "fearlessly altering the old Norman arches into the pointed, and round massive piers into slender clustered columns; thus cutting out masses of sustaining material without apprehension of insecurity."

As in the departments of science there are multiplied subdivisions, and human labor in these fields is now directed into specialities, so are like subdivisions the characteristic of modern art, which is divided and subdivided, the artist applying himself exclusively to some one art, and again to some one branch of this, to portraiture, to landscape, to history, to genre. Architecture is subdivided into church architecture, public buildings, domestic architecture, exclusively of shops and dwellings. Bridge-building has been wholly turned over to the engineers. The architect, so-called, does little more now than get out the plans and elevations. But it is characteristic of a thorough mastery of any art not to submit to this narrowing specialism, not to neglect the *science* for the superficial attractions, but to treat the whole with that sympathy and thoughtful insight which a knowledge of the structure and functions of the human form demands, from the most evanescent expression that lingers upon the features, down to the very bones of the skeleton.

Before closing our remarks on this topic, let us glance at a few of the later results of applied science mechanically contributing to the interests of art. Stone columns, once laboriously shaped and polished by hand, are now turned and glossed by machinery, at much less cost. Stone is dressed by the same means. Stone itself is manufactured and molded into various forms and ornaments. The tendency of this is un-

artistic in its effect, because what is done by machinery lacks that *expression* which manual labor, directed by individual mind and feeling, gives to the material it shapes.

This could be remedied if, after the forms were shaped by mechanical means, the final execution were reserved for direct human contact, giving character and expression to the forms; very slight superficial labor would serve to give this final finish. The sculptor gives his clay model to his workman, who delivers to him the marble reproduction drawn from the block by pointing measurements; but the sculptor goes over it with the instinct associated with its earliest conception, giving the subtleties of expression, texture, accident, and grace of execution which, with very little additional labor, gives value and interest to the work. Why could not we, in the place of insipid, machine-made columns and ornaments now generally in use, have exact repetitions of such charming examples as may be found abroad in old buildings, churches, cloisters, etc., copied mechanically by means of plaster cast taken from the originals, and *finished by hand*, making the laborer's work more free, thoughtful, and stimulating to his own fancy.

Iron, in the uses to which it is applied in the architecture of the day, is altogether a recent result of applied science, but as now used it is an abomination so far as artistic expression is concerned. Plaster casts taken from Gothic or Renaissance ornament might be sent to the foundries to be used as patterns. Much wood-carving is now done by machinery. We have seen the head of a dog carved in wood by this means, which had the character of hand-work. Such carving as may be found in Belgium and Perugia might be reproduced by this means, *ad infinitum*.

Science, in its applications, has brought that chief of musical instruments, the Piano, within the reach of every household. Every separate feature of its construction, from its general form to the material which enters into the manufacture of its finest wires, has been subjected to scientific tests and investigations. The interpretation of the masters of musical composition may now be heard on the extreme borders of civilization, in the log-cabin as well as in the households of the wealthy. But *Musical-boxes*, such as are now imported from Switzerland, have

reached that perfection which may fairly claim for them the merit of affording pleasure even to the critical.

Through *Chromo-lithography*, effort was made to reproduce and multiply the works of the painter. Though it certainly has never reached any very refined expression, it has undoubtedly contributed somewhat in the interest of art, and met a want which eventually comes to be regarded as the stepping-stone to something better. The principles of *photo sculpture* have, as we have seen, been applied to wood-carving.

But *Photography*, through the various methods and forms which have sprung from it, will assuredly, if it has not already, effect a revolution in certain ideas pertaining to art. Cardinal Wiseman, in opening his remarks, made use of these words: "I am venturing to address, on the subject of science, an assembly of men whose reputation for its advancement, or for its cultivation, may be said to pervade the whole civilized world. And I have had the hardihood to announce that I would speak upon art, in the presence of those who, if their fame has not extended so far—*because their works are not so portable or communicable as books*,—stand at the very summit of this most honorable profession;" and, speaking of the old masters, at the close of his remarks he said, "Nor are we ever likely to see their marvelous and multiplied works *within the easy access of the people*."

Ten years later we find a French Jew traveling from city to city, throughout the length and breadth of the land, selling *fac-simile* reproductions of sketches of the old masters, termed "*Autotypes*." Thousands of these autotypes find their way into public institutions and private families, familiarizing us with the most famous works of the great masters of art. In like manner the "*Helio-type*" reproduces for us those etchings and engravings which have become so very costly and precious on account of their great scarcity. The works of the sculptor likewise, with the precious fruits of antiquity, are now, by means of photography, brought within the reach of every one. In all respects save color, we find the artist's productions multiplying and spreading, almost to the extent of the author's thought, through printing. Who can foretell the effort this is likely to produce upon generations to come, when art, through

such channels, seeks the audience, or rather the *eye* of the world, without waiting for the world to come to it. In a very subordinate field, that of caricature, we have seen what an effective engine of reform, through their influence on the public, the cartoons of Thomas Nast have proved. It was their wide-spread reproduction through the medium of a circulation that averaged, weekly, above one hundred and fifty thousand, which gave to them the character of a language, coarse and crude indeed,* but which all who run might read.

In closing our remarks, an extract from a letter addressed by Col. Gray to the Committee of Architects who had in charge the Houses of Parliament, may not be out of place. He says, "It is constantly to be regretted, that much of the good attending many of the institutions founded for the advancement of science and art *is lost by their isolation and want of connection with each other.*" This is but too true, and the remedy seems likely to be applied through those tendencies which are now directed towards the establishment of these schools in connection with the universities. By this means enlarged and comprehensive facilities are afforded the student of any branch of science or of art, and by the close proximity of institutions having either direct or indirect bearing upon each other, results must follow which may be considered mutually beneficial. Literature can no longer afford to exclude those arts, the relations of which are so closely interwoven with her own; the aim and character of which, if not strictly identical, certainly assist in affording us a better acquaintance with her own classic forms and spirit. It is a matter of some surprise that the arts have been so much neglected in this connection, when photography and the plaster cast have long furnished a cheap form of illustration.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

BARTOL'S *RIISING FAITH** is true to its title. It gives evidence that faith is rising above the point which it reached in "Radical Problems"—we should not dare affirm that it were fully risen—but there is abundant evidence in the book of so positive a tone in respect to many points concerning which there prevails extensively very little faith, that we are disposed to be thankful and take courage. There can be no doubt that the volume gives evidence of genius, although it is often of genius exalted to rhapsody. The pith, and pathos, and humor, of many single passages are simply wonderful. We are moved to laugh and mock on the one hand, and to weep and pray on the other.

So far as the subjective side of religion is concerned there is little that is defective. Even the objective truths that used to be called Calvinism, are set forth with no little energy and positiveness—albeit in phraseology that smacks very much of the Shorter Catechism.

The point to which the *Rising Faith* has not yet risen, is the affirmation of historical and supernatural fact. We do not know that we need say that in respect to matters of this sort the book cannot be treated as a guide—we imagine no one would think of such a thing. It is not very easy to take a solar observation through a kaleidoscope. We may turn it as often as we will; we may raise and depress it; but it will give us neither the real sun nor the real earth, but uniformly beauty, and blaze, and confusion—always some bits of color, and form, and symmetry—much truth in detail, but the total impression is bewilderment and confusion.

Mr. Bartol seems somewhat like the man of whom he speaks, who thought the West church in Boston was a paragon of architectural beauty. Could our author be removed from Boston, and forget everything about Boston and the Radical Club for five years, and be put upon a dry diet of hard facts and matter of fact people, he might write a better book than this on the *Rising Faith*.

* *The Rising Faith*. By C. A. BARTOL, author of *Radical Problems*. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1874.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.*—Professor LeConte's "Religion and Science" consists of a series of Sunday lectures, delivered to his pupils, first at Columbia, S. C., and subsequently in a form more fully developed at Oakland, Cal. The following topics are discussed: Personality of Deity; Contrivance for Use; Contrivance for Beauty; The Spiritual Nature of Deity; Essential Nature and Attributes of Deity; Attributes of Deity, viz: Truth, Justice, Love, Holiness, Freedom; Unity and Trinity of Deity; Incarnation of Deity; The General Relation of Theology to Science; Man: His place in Nature; Probation of Man; Predestination and Free-will; Prayer in relation to Invariable Law. The treatment of these topics is familiar and popular, but not for this reason less profound and thoroughly scientific. It is uniformly fresh and individual, and although occasionally admitting a suggestion, which is theologically crude and untenable, the book is the more, rather than the less, attractive. The author does not enter into the details either of science or religion, but gives his attention to the salient points which attract general attention when the two are supposed to come into conflict, and discusses them with eminent individuality and uniform tolerance. Of the many books written for the instruction of those who are pressed by difficulties from science, this seems to us one of the least exceptionable, while for freshness, force, and general ability, it deserves high praise.

COMMON-SENSE IN RELIGION.†—Rev. James Freeman Clarke's "Common-Sense in Religion" is a volume of Essays upon Common-Sense and Mystery; Common-Sense View of Human Nature; on the Doctrine Concerning God, the Bible, and Inspiration; the New Meaning of Evangelical Christianity; the Truth About Sin; Common Sense and Scripture Views of Heaven and Hell; Satan, according to Common-Sense and the Bible; Concerning the Future Life; the Nature of our Condition Hereafter; Common-Sense View of the Christian Church; Five Kinds of Piety; Jesus a Mediator; the Expectations and Disappointments of Jesus; Common-Sense View of Salvation by Faith; on not being afraid; Hope; the Patience of Hope; Love; the Brotherhood of Man.

* *Religion and Science.* A series of Sunday lectures on the relation of Natural and Revealed Religion, or the truths revealed in Nature and Scripture. By JOSEPH LECONTE, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874.

† *Common-Sense in Religion: a Series of Essays.* By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1874.

Mr. Clarke defines Common-Sense as "the mode of judgment derived from experience of this world; that is of God's method in nature and in human life." He does not advert to the fact that there is a common-sense which is superficial and one which is profound; that the superficial may be plausible and true, as far as it goes, and yet may fail to do justice to the less obvious but more important truths that are in question. With much, very much of what he says we agree most cordially. Where we fail to assent to his views we do not, as we think, abandon our common-sense, but only apply it more earnestly and comprehensively.

THE LITTLE SANCTUARY.*—We are not aware of any English preacher in our time making a more favorable impression on cultivated minds in this country than Dr. Raleigh, when he attended as a delegate the Congregational Council in Boston in 1865. Those who heard him then were prepared to welcome anything from his pen, and the book quaintly entitled "Quiet Resting Places" did not disappoint their expectations. Another, on "Jonah," not yet reprinted in this country, as we wish it might be, as a larger and more elaborate treatment of its subject, we think, would give a still better measure of his power. The work now before us contains sixteen "Meditations" (the first, founded on Ezekiel xi, 16, giving title to the volume), which are characteristic of the author. If we were to describe him we should have to begin by saying that it is his merit not to exemplify one good quality at the expense of others, but in an unusual degree to combine them in a happy symmetry. Freshness, vigor, and refinement of thought, chastened fervor of feeling, freedom and grace of style, felicity of allusion and description, and a pervasive Christian spirit, make him a most engaging and effective preacher, whether in the pulpit or on the printed page. If our readers will look into any two or three of these "Meditations," they will read them all.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE BOOK OF JOB UNFOLDED.†—While the whole Bible is expounded, perhaps more assiduously than ever,

* *The Little Sanctuary, and other meditations.* By ALEXANDER RALEIGH, D.D., author of "Quiet Resting Places," &c. New York: Dodd & Mead. 12mo. pp. 334.

† *The Argument of the Book of Job unfolded.* By WILLIAM HENRY GREEN, D.D., Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: Robert Carter & Bros. 1874. 12mo, pp. 367.

and in forms accessible to general readers as well as ministers, it is an advantage also that in so many instances particular books are handled separately by authors, who expend on them enthusiasm and research which could not be given alike to all the rest. In our own country, Stuart, Bush, Barnes, Alexander, Hackett, and Hodge, have thus rendered the more service to Biblical study. Prof. Green has thus added another to the specialties on Job. The ten chapters treat of the patriarch's "happy estate," of "Satan," of Job's "affliction," of his "three friends," his "conflict" and "triumph," his refutation of "his friends," of "Elihu," of "the Lord," and "the Place of the Book" in "the Scheme of Holy Scripture." An "explanatory note" is added on "the Doctrine of Immortality," and an "Analysis of the Book." As the preface tells us, the work "is not a continuous commentary," "nor is it concerned with the vexed questions of its age or authorship," in these respects differing from the works we have referred to. It is rather a series of discourses, that were probably first preached, in a clear and animated style, somewhat more diffuse than if composed only for the eye, setting forth, as the title page describes it, "the argument of the book," and hence is the better fitted for the use of most readers. At the same time it incorporates the results of study and reflection, and shows the scope of the poem and the relations of its parts, so as to favor the author's design of "promoting a better understanding of the book among both ministers and laymen."

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES.*—This essay is admirably adapted to the object for which it was written, that is, to give Germans a knowledge of the relations of Church and State in the United States. No one is more competent to give instruction on this subject than Dr. Thompson.

Had he written particularly for Americans, he would, undoubtedly, have discussed some of the topics more fully than he has in this work. But the principles are all here from which one can form an intelligent opinion on the true relations of Church and State. And much that has been said, recently, on the Bible in the schools shows that there is need of such knowledge at home as well as abroad. It would do ministers of the gospel in our own land good to read this essay.

* *Church and State in the United States*; with an Appendix on the German population. By JOSEPH P. THOMPSON. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. pp. 166. 1873.

MY CLERICAL FRIENDS.*—The author of this book seems to have been a member of the Church of England, who has become a Roman Catholic. He writes clearly and forcibly, and has evidently read extensively on the topics of which he treats. He denies the validity of ordination in the Anglican Church. Some of the facts are referred to which have been, recently, brought out in the discussions on Joint Communion; showing that for a long time after the Reformation the doctrine of apostolical succession, as it is now taught, was not held in the English Church, and that bishops regarded Presbyterian orders as good as any. This fact, he thinks, proves that ministerial orders in the English Church are lost—as they evidently are, if transmitted sacerdotal grace is essential to their validity.

The chapter on the "Clergy and Modern Thought" shows considerable knowledge of the scientific speculations of the present day, and is well written. But the idea, that the Roman Catholic Church is the barrier against the infidelity of the times, which this author maintains, finds no justification in the history of that Church in any land.

STRAUSS'S "THE OLD FAITH AND THE NEW."†—The "old faith," to which the title-page of this volume refers, is the Christian, which is caricatured on its pages. The "new faith" is made up mostly of negatives. One thing denied is the existence of a personal God. Another is the existence of the soul, as anything beyond a function of the nervous system. Another is the future life. Another is the freedom of the will. It need not be said that the miracles recorded in the New Testament are denied. The genuineness of the Gospel histories is denied. It is denied that we have the means of knowing much of Jesus, or of his life. But several things are affirmed. It is affirmed that men spring from monkeys; and monkeys, together with all living things, from inanimate existence, by "spontaneous generation." It is affirmed that the operations of nature are wise, although there is no wisdom in the cause. It is admitted that, in casting away the hopes and consolations of religion, much is lost. The study of German poets, and music, it is suggested, may serve as a solace and com-

* *My Clerical Friends and their relations to Modern Thought.* New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1873.

† *The Old Faith and the New.* A confession by David Frederic Strauss. Authorized translation. By MATHILDE BLIND. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1873.

fort to souls thus bereaved. This work is an abandonment of the author's previous doctrines. It inculcates Materialism, in the room of ideal Pantheism, his old creed. It is reckless in its statements respecting critical questions, declaring that various things are settled, which are simply groundless assertions of the infidel party. Not unfrequently Strauss descends to coarseness and blasphemy. Altogether, it is a melancholy fruit of the old age of its author.

PRESSENSÉ'S "THE EARLY YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY."*—This volume—"Heresy and Christian Doctrine,"—now introduced for the first time to the English public, is the third in a consecutive series, intended to present a complete picture, from the author's point of view, of the spiritual life and history of the Church during the first three centuries of the Christian era. The two previous volumes—"Early Years of Christianity" and "Martyrs and Apologists"—delineated chiefly the extensive growth of the Church and its conflicts with enemies without. The present volume treats rather of its intensive development and the history of its doctrines.

The concluding volume of the series will appear simultaneously in English and French. The recent pressure of political, in addition to pastoral duties, has prevented Dr. Pressensé, as yet, from arranging his accumulated materials for this work. He has, however, engaged to prepare it for publication with the least possible delay." This Preface, by the translator, explains the design of the little volume before us. It relates to the early theology and to the early heresies of the Church. It presents a lucid and interesting view of the subject. The learned author is now taking an active part in the political affairs of his country. We can hardly look, at least for the present, for much that is new from his pen; but he has done a good service by the works which he has already written.

THE SPEAKER'S COMMENTARY: KINGS II, CHRONICLES, EZRA, NEHEMIAH, ESTHER.—The third volume of "the Speaker's Commentary," republished by Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., is constructed on the plan which we have described in connection with notices of the preceding volumes of the series. The commentaries in the present volume are from the pen of Canon Rawlinson, who

* *The Early Years of Christianity.* By E. DE PRESSENSÉ, D.D. Translated by Annie Harwood. *Heresy and Christian Doctrine.* New York: Nelson & Phillips.

is well known through his works on ancient, especially Oriental, history, and who has some special qualifications for the treatment of the subjects embraced in this volume. We have examined, with interest, his introduction to the Chronicles. He writes with unusual candor on the difficult questions arising from the comparison of these with the other historical books of the Old Testament. The English reader has these questions presented to his attention; which is more than most of the commentaries undertake to do, at least with fairness.

THE CHARACTER OF ST. PAUL.*—It would seem as if the great work on the "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," by Conybeare & Howson, had left little room for another volume from either of these writers having the same apostle for its subject. It was possible, however, for the materials they had gathered to take on a new form, and the research and reflection they had expended to be employed for a more specific purpose, with some advantage also from later consideration. Thus the survivor of the two, Dean Howson, here gives us a delineation of the personal character of the apostle, while his biography, writings, and doctrines hold only a subsidiary place; and it need not be said that for this purpose the author was eminently qualified by his earlier and more extended labors. The volume contains five lectures, or sermons—as in fact they were—on these several features of the apostle's character; his tact and presence of mind; tenderness and sympathy; conscientiousness and integrity; thanksgiving and prayer; courage and perseverance. The opening of the first refers to "the endowment under which these sermons are preached," and a foot-note bids us "see the Preface," but in this edition the preface is wanting, nor is there any index or table of contents, as there should be. The discourses need no other *imprimatur* than the author's name. It is the lot of the great apostle, as of his Master, to be studied and admired anew in these last times, and Dean Howson's delineation will be welcomed as worthy of the theme.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL

WADDINGTON'S CONGREGATIONAL HISTORY.—The first volume of Dr. Waddington's very elaborate and exhaustive work on the

* *The Character of St. Paul.* By J. S. Howson, D.D., Dean of Chester. New work: Dodd & Mead. 12mo, pp. 314.

history of Congregationalism was published five years ago. As there has been no American edition of it, and as the English edition was got up in a style which made it too costly for extensive circulation in this country, it is much less known on our side of the Atlantic than it deserves to be. So highly is it esteemed in England, especially among Congregationalists, that the author has been encouraged and assisted to retire from his pastoral charge in order to devote himself exclusively to the prosecution of his work as a student and writer of ecclesiastical history. The second volume of his "*Congregational History*" will soon be published. While it is passing through the press we have had the privilege of reading that part of it (400 pages) which has already been printed—or had been printed a few weeks ago; and we wait impatiently for the completed volume.

So comprehensive is the author's plan that his first volume is little more than an introduction. Beginning with the thirteenth century, just when the Papacy had reached the zenith of its power, he gives in that volume (of 750 pages) the story of certain ideas and principles struggling towards light and liberty,—the ideas and principles which require for their development the spontaneous separation of believing souls from the unbelieving world around them, and their union with each other and with Christ in local churches freely gathered; and which, when once developed and applied, permit no priesthood save His who has passed into the heavens, and no interference of Cæsar in the things which are God's. That volume ends where the history of organized Congregationalism in England may be said to begin, namely at the earliest date as yet discovered of a voluntary and self-governing Church, formed by separation from the world, and deriving its rights neither from the State nor from the hierarchy. Such a Church seems to have been formed, in 1567, by a company of Christian people confined in the Bridewell of London for the offense of meeting to worship God otherwise than in the forms prescribed by the State. At that point the narrative is resumed in the second volume; and thenceforward it moves in an unbroken current to the end of the seventeenth century. The author's style as a writer of history improves by practice; and the story, in his telling of it, gives evidence that his long years of research in the State-Paper Office, and in other public or private repositories of inedited manuscripts, as well as in books long obsolete, have been amply rewarded. So far as we have had the privilege of becoming

acquainted with the new volume, we have been especially interested in its illustrations of our New England history. All the early history of New England is intimately connected with the history of Congregationalism; and we are confident that Dr. Waddington's forthcoming volume will find many readers—more than its predecessor has yet found—in our country.

There ought to be an American edition. This is just the book which the Congregational Publishing Society might issue with great advantage to the churches which it undertakes to serve, and with advantage also to itself as a manufacturing and trading institution.

JOHN STUART MILL'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY* will of course attract the attention of all students of philosophy. It is interesting as a careful record of the progress and development of his own mind under one of the most thorough processes of discipline to which any Englishman of the present century has been subjected, at least in his very earliest years. It gives a deeply interesting and a most instructive sketch of the school of thinkers and reformers, of which Bentham was in a sense the founder, and in which James Mill, the father, and John Stuart Mill were preëminent. It gives the autobiography of a confessed atheist, who from his earliest childhood never had any religion; who not only never had any religion, but was taught from his infancy to regard the Christianity of England as like the old idolatrous superstitions in unreasonableness, and as intensely demoralizing in its influence. Last and not least, it records the history of the transformations of opinion and of character through which Mr. Mill proceeded till the end. Incidental to all these historic records there are many personal notices of some of the most remarkable men of the last two generations, such as James Mill, the father, who must have been a man of extraordinary intellectual and personal force, and deserves the most conspicuous place as the organizer, if not the founder, of his party; Jeremy Bentham, the first mover of the same, whose seething brain, self-satisfied spirit, and kindly nature and ample fortune, were all brought into requisition; Thomas Carlyle, who had so many points of sympathy with and so many more in antagonism against Bentham and the utilitarian reformer; the leading Coleridgeians, as Charles Julius Hare, John Sterling,

* *Autobiography.* By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1873.

Frederic Denison Maurice, the Christian Liberals and Reformers, etc., etc.

From infancy to the age of fourteen Mill was subjected to a very severe intellectual training under the immediate supervision and with the constant companionship of his father. From fourteen to eighteen he was left more to himself and the influence of others, who were almost exclusively men of his father's ways of thinking. At about eighteen he began his public life as a writer and reformer of the Bentham and Malthus type, and had no other ambition than to devote his life to the reformation of man by means of a change in his circumstances, preëminently by the perfection of social and political institutions. When he was about the age of twenty, he passed through what he calls a crisis in his mental history, which carried him a stage onward, in respect to his practical principles and conceptions of life. It was preceded by several months of unaccountable depression of spirits, in which he was asking himself the question: What if all this perfection in humanity for which I am laboring should be achieved, should I be happy? This question he was forced to answer in the negative. This state of mind Mill supposes may be analogous to what the Methodists call their first conviction of sin. From this profound and long-continued depression Mill was delivered by a process as sudden as a Methodist conversion. He was reading a pathetic tale of disinterested self-sacrifice and he was moved to tears. This experience awakened him to a new theory of life, which was expressed in two leading principles, viz: not to aim at happiness as the consciously proposed end of each action, and to make culture, that is, the culture of the feelings, a definite object. Music and poetry began to be esteemed by him as important instruments of the culture of the sentiments and the inspiration. He abandoned his favorite fundamental theory that institutions could make over man, and substituted very largely the theory that institutions are the growths and products of what man is. The literary and personal sympathies of Mill were greatly enlarged by this conversion. The hard, uncompromising radical became the accommodating and appreciative critic and admirer of men whom he would previously have assailed and denounced. Another tone is plainly discerned in his writings. While he did not abandon his original party and principles, his intellect and sympathies were enlarged and liberalized.

At the age of twenty-five, Mr. Mill became acquainted with Mrs. Taylor, with whom he maintained the closest intimacy for

some twenty years, after which, subsequently to the death of her husband, they were married. After seven and a half years of married life as Mrs. Mill, she died suddenly, and the survivor records most movingly his feelings on his bereavement and the influence which her memory had on him. His friendship with her he calls the most valuable friendship of his life. His mind and character were stimulated and elevated by her intellect and heart. The best books which he wrote were as much or more her work than his own. What he gave to her in thought was more than given back to him after passing through her mind and being transfigured by her feelings.

The book, with all that there is in it to instruct and move, is still fearfully sad and depressing. There is neither hope nor cheerfulness in the impressions which it leaves. Mr. Mill tells us his own story and retraces his own development and analyzes his own character. With all the advantage which the story gains from this circumstance, it is only sad and depressing, and adds one more comment to the familiar phrase, "Without God and without hope."

LIFE OF EMANUEL SWEDENBORG.*—Emanuel Swedenborg was born in Stockholm, Sweden, Jan. 29, 1688. His father, at that time a chaplain in the army, was afterward professor of theology in the University of Upsal, and in 1719, was made bishop of Skara in West Gothland. The bishop says of himself: "I can scarcely believe that anybody in Sweden has written so much as I have done; since, I think, ten carts could scarcely carry away what I have written and printed at my own expense, and yet there is much, yea nearly as much, not printed."

It will appear that this *facilitas scribendi* was inherited by the son. There was little remarkable in the childhood and youth of Swedenborg, except a strong tendency to religious thought and conversation. He was graduated with honor at the University of

* *Life of Emanuel Swedenborg, with a brief Synopsis of his Writings, both philosophical and theological.* By WILLIAM WHITE. With an Introduction, by B. F. Barrett. First American Edition, 272 pp. 12mo. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, 1872.

The True Christian Religion; containing the Universal Theology of the New Church, foretold by the Lord in Daniel vii, 13, 14, and in Revelation xxi, 1, 2. By EMANUEL SWEDENBORG, Servant of the Lord Jesus Christ. A new Translation from the original Latin Edition, printed at Amsterdam in the year 1771. 613 pp. 8vo. J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1872.

Upsal, at the age of twenty-two, in 1710. The dissertation which he wrote for his degree, consisting of selections from certain Latin authors, with comments on the obscurities of the text, was published. The same year, he published a Latin version of the twelfth chapter of Ecclesiastes. He then spent four years in visiting other parts of Europe.

In 1715, he published an oration on the return of Charles XII. from Turkey; a small volume of Latin prose fables; and a little book of poems, which has been republished several times. In 1716, he was appointed by Charles XII, with whom he became considerably intimate, assessor of the mines in the kingdom. The same year, he sought to marry a young woman, but was rejected, and always remained single.

In 1717, he published "An Introduction to Algebra," and the same year, another work entitled "Attempts to find the Longitude of Places by Lunar Observations."

In 1719, the family were ennobled by the queen, and from that time he took his place with the nobles of the equestrian order in the triennial Assembly of the States. The same year, he published four works, namely, "A Proposal for a Decimal System of Money and Measures;" "A Treatise on the Motion and Position of the Earth and Planets;" "Proofs, derived from appearances in Sweden, of the Depth of the Sea, and the greater Force of the Tides in the ancient World;" and "On Docks, Sluices, and Salt-works." The work on money and measures was republished, after his death, in 1795.

In 1721, he visited Amsterdam, and there published the five following works, namely, "Some Specimens of a Work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy, comprising new Attempts to explain the Phenomena of Chemistry and Physics by Geometry;" "New Observations and Discoveries respecting Iron and Fire, and particularly respecting the elemental Nature of Fire, together with a new Construction of Stoves;" "A new Method of finding the Longitude of Places, on Land or at Sea, by Lunar Observations;" "A Mode of Discovering the Powers of Vessels by the application of Mechanical Principles."

In 1722, he published two works, one at Leipsic and Hamburg, and the other at Stockholm, namely, "Miscellaneous Observations connected with the Physical Sciences," in four parts; and "On the Depreciation and Rise of the Swedish Currency." The latter he republished by request in 1771. In 1724, he declined the profes-

sorship of mathematics in the University of Upsal. In 1729, he became a member of the Royal Academy of Science at Stockholm. In 1734, he published, at Leipsic and Dresden, "*Opera Philosophica et Mineralia*," in three folio volumes; and the same year, "A Philosophical Argument on the Infinite, and the final Cause of Creation; and on the Mechanism of the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body." In 1740-41, he published, at Amsterdam, "*The Economy of the Animal Kingdom*," Parts I. and II. at the Hague, and Part III. in London, which Ralph Waldo Emerson pronounces a work of wonderful merits. In 1745, he published, in Sweden, the last of his scientific works, which was entitled "*The Worship and Love of God*."

It thus appears that in thirty-five years, 1710-1745, he issued twenty-three works on literature, finance, the natural sciences, and metaphysics.

Until nearly the close of this period, he seems to have had nothing peculiar in his religious experience, and to have given no particular attention to theological studies. But in 1743, when he was fifty-five years old, and while he was in London, the Lord Jesus Christ, according to Swedenborg's most solemn belief and declaration, appeared in person to him, gave him a free pass for intercourse with the spiritual world, including heaven and hell, and commissioned him to make known to mankind the things which he should thus learn. This endowment continued with him substantially for the rest of his life—a period of twenty-nine years, was ordinarily available at his discretion, and determined the direction and character of his pursuits.

In 1743-47, he learned Hebrew and read the Bible through several times in the original languages, and while doing this made notes which he called "*Adversaria*," which were published after his death. In 1747, he resigned the office of assessor of the mines, which he had held thirty-one years, but his full salary was continued as long as he lived. In the same year, he discontinued his "*Adversaria*," and commenced his "*Spiritual Diary*," or journal of his intercourse with spirits, which he kept up for the next twenty years. This work, in Latin, was published after his death in ten closely printed octavo volumes, of which two volumes are now translated into English, and the others are expected to follow. In 1749-1756, he published, in London, in Latin and in English, his "*Arcana Coelestia*," being a commentary on Genesis and Exodus, in eight good-sized quarto volumes. Several editions of this

work have been issued in England and America, and it can now be obtained in English in fourteen octavo volumes, of which twelve are text and two are index.

In 1758, he published, in London, five works, namely, "An Account of the Last Judgment and the Destruction of Babylon; showing that all the Predictions in the Apocalypse are at this day fulfilled; being a Relation of Things seen and heard;" "Concerning Heaven and its Wonders, and concerning Hell, being a Relation of Things heard and seen;" "On the White Horse mentioned in the Apocalypse;" "On the Planets in our Solar System, and on those in the Heavens; with an Account of their Inhabitants, and of their Spirits and Angels;" and "On the New Jerusalem and its heavenly Doctrines, as revealed from Heaven."

In 1763, he issued, at Amsterdam, the six following publications: "The Doctrine of the New Jerusalem respecting the Lord;" "The Sacred Scriptures;" "Faith;" "Life;" "Continuation respecting the Last Judgment, and the Destruction of Babylon;" "Angelic Wisdom concerning the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom."

In 1764, he published, in Amsterdam, a work entitled "Angelic Wisdom concerning Divine Providence." In 1766, he published, at Amsterdam, the "Apocalypse Revealed," an abridgment. The original work, in Latin, was published after his death, in 1790, in four quarto volumes, and was issued in English in 1815, in six octavo volumes. In 1768, in Amsterdam, at the age of eighty, he published a work entitled "Conjugal Love and its Chaste Delights; also adulterous Love, and its insane Pleasures." In 1769, he issued, at Amsterdam, "A brief Exposition of the Doctrine of the New Church," and the same year, at London, "The Intercourse between the Soul and the Body." In 1771, he published "The True Christian Religion; containing the Universal Theology of the New Church, foretold by the Lord in Daniel vii, 13, 14, and in Revelation xxi, 1, 2." He was now eighty-three, and this was his last publication. He issued in twenty-two years, 1749-1771, eighteen religious and theological works. He issued in the course of sixty-one years, 1710-1771, forty-one publications, and left manuscripts from which at least seventeen volumes, all on religious subjects, have been published since his death. His writings, including those published by himself and those issued after his death, amounted to over sixty volumes, or an average of one a year for the long period of his public life.

He was very temperate in his habits, and almost exclusively a vegetarian in his diet. He used coffee freely, which he generally

prepared for himself. He "had no regard for times, and seasons, days or nights, only taking rest as he felt disposed." In addition to his knowledge of the learned tongues, he was well versed in six modern languages. He was not a fluent speaker in either public address or conversation; was gentle and affable in manners, and avoided discussion. He made little effort to gain adherents by personal influence; and initiated no organization for the spread of his doctrines, but preferred that his followers should remain in and leave their present religious connections. He lived and died in the Lutheran communion, but rarely attended public worship, because, as he said, he "had no peace in the church on account of spirits who contradicted what the preacher said." In his later years, he had no library except the Bible in various editions, and his own writings.

He died in London, March 29, 1772, in his eighty-fifth year, and was buried in the vault of the Swedish church, in that city. As a writer, he is very consecutive and requires close and patient attention. In his religious works, he abounds in references to, and citations from, the Scriptures, but uses words in such peculiar meanings that a dictionary of about 500 pages 12mo has been published explaining his terms.

His works have been translated into French, but their chief circulation has been in the English language. His views have had little acceptance in France, Germany, or Sweden. Notwithstanding his expressed opinions, his disciples felt constrained to organize, and the New Church was inaugurated in London, June 1, 1788. In 1810, "The Society for Printing and Publishing the Writings of the Hon. Emanuel Swedenborg" was formed in London, and now owns an office of publication in that city, and is supplied with funds for the circulation of his works in cheap editions.

As far back as in 1836, it was claimed that, in Great Britain, his enrolled followers amounted to from 2,500 to 3,000, and that there were not less than fifty clergymen of the Church of England, and several thousands of other ranks, who advocated or favored the doctrine. There are now sixty or seventy of these churches in England and Scotland. They use a liturgy and hymns, and observe the Christian ordinances. Their polity is congregational or independent. They meet in a yearly conference, whose organ is *The Intellectual Repository, or New Jerusalem Magazine*, issued monthly.

About 1836, the Swedenborgians of this country had a General Convention, meeting yearly in Baltimore, in connection with which were six ordaining and eight teaching ministers, with ten licentiates. They had then twenty-two regular societies, and, in all, seventy-nine places where their doctrines were received.

Prof. Bush edited for a time a monthly called *The New Church Repository*, and an "American Swedenborg Printing and Publishing Society" has recently been established in New York. The organ of the General Convention, *The New Jerusalem Magazine*, a monthly, has been issued at Boston. A weekly paper, *The New Jerusalem Messenger*, is published in New York, and a monthly, *The New Church Independent*, is to be issued at Chicago. It is stated that the circulation of publications has been larger here than in Great Britain, and that the New Church has made considerably greater progress in America than in England, especially in Massachusetts.

The chief peculiarities in the views of Swedenborg may be stated under the five following heads:

1. God. There is one God, but no trinity of persons in the Godhead, and of course no Son of God existing from eternity. Christ was God manifested in the flesh, and the Holy Spirit is no person, but only the influence which Christ exerts. So that God, Christ and the Holy Spirit are one God, in the sense in which the human soul, and the human body, and the operation of the soul in and through the body are one man. Christ did not make a vicarious offering for sinners; and his death had no such importance as is commonly attached to it, but was the last of his great temptations. His redeeming work consisted in combating and beating back the spirits of hell from their malign dominion and influence over men, and so clearing the field for a spiritual union between man and God.

2. The Scriptures. He rejects thirty-two of the sixty-six books of the Bible as no part of the inspired word, namely, in the Old Testament, these ten: Ruth, First and Second Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon; and twenty-two books of the New Testament, leaving only the four Gospels and Revelation.

The first eleven chapters of Genesis are an allegory, the truth being put in that form as an accommodation to mankind. The Scriptures are used in the world of spirits as well as on earth, and have three meanings, a natural, a spiritual, and a celestial, and these three are contained in and by all parts of the inspired word.

3. *Salvation.* Man is a free agent, has understanding and will, and so can know and choose evil or good. He inherits evil qualities from his parents, and can not be saved without repentance and regeneration. He is not justified by faith alone, but by charity and faith exercised in the Lord Jesus Christ. Man is active in regeneration—regenerates himself in the Lord—and regeneration is a gradual work progressing through life.

4. *The Last Judgment.* The last judgment and the destruction of Babylon are already past. Babylon is a general term including all the so-called Christian bodies, Papal and Protestant, which existed at the time Swedenborg arose; and this Babylon had its trial in the world of spirits in 1757, and was condemned and came to an end, in the same sense in which the Jewish Church was condemned and came to an end, at the introduction of Christianity; and the New Church, or Swedenborgianism, as a later and the last dispensation, supersedes Babylon or the so-called Christian Church, as that church superseded Judaism.

5. *The Future State.* The soul is never without a body. It has a spiritual body which in form resembles the natural body, and is male or female like the natural body. The soul with its spiritual body inhabits the natural body during life, and at death the soul with its spiritual body leaves the natural body and passes into the world of spirits. There is no resurrection of the natural body, no general resurrection, and no general judgment. As souls leave this world, they are judged and disposed of individually, and separately, in detail, according to character, which continues eternally in kind as it was at death. After death, there is no purgatory, no second probation, no change from wickedness to goodness. When the soul enters the world of spirits, it does not go at once to heaven nor to hell, but is detained for a period—not long—in a state and under a treatment preparatory to its final destination. In the spiritual world there are mountains, valleys, streams, trees, flowers, dwellings, public halls, libraries, and abundant means for employment adapted to the condition and character of the inhabitants. The sexes exist there, and marriages take place—but no propagation. All human souls leaving this world in infancy are received, as they enter that world, by good spirits, and trained up in goodness and saved. God has created no angels. All angels, good and bad, were once human souls. There is no leading evil angel, and there has never been a rebellion among the angels in heaven. This earth is not to be destroyed,

but is to continue to be as now the home of the human race, which race is to be continued as now in order to furnish material for angels.

Society in heaven and in hell is determined by aptitudes and mutual likings, as in this world. Those who are in hell are miserable in character, company, employment, and condition; and would be more miserable, if God did not measurably restrain them from doing violence to themselves and each other.

There are three heavens which are occupied by good spirits, graded according to excellence.

In regard to the system which embraces these peculiarities, we offer the following remarks:

1. It is hostile to Christianity as embodied in the evangelical denominations of our day. Its *animus* towards them is one of disparagement and unfriendliness. It attacks their views on the trinity and thus gives aid and comfort to Unitarianism—of which indeed it is a phase. It misrepresents their doctrine of justification by faith. It has little fellowship with them and pronounces them condemned of God and already, in the divine plan, superseded by the Swedenborgian dispensation.

2. It does violence to the word of God—by its fanciful mode of interpretation; by denying the divine personality of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost; by corrupting the doctrines of the atonement and of regeneration; and by denying the inspiration of 48 per cent. of the books which constitute the Bible.

3. It rests on the alleged seership of its author. Almost every chapter of his theology is confirmed by a statement of what he saw and heard on the subject in the world of spirits. He teaches as one having authority, and not as the scribes. While he reasons and quotes Scripture, he everywhere lays down his principles with an assurance as of infallibility. And why not? For, as he says, he had opportunities for learning the truth never before accorded to any mortal, and things were revealed to him which had never been made known before. He repeatedly left his natural body and entered the world of spirits; and for several years he was—to use his own words—"constantly and uninterruptedly in company with spirits and angels, hearing them converse with each other, and conversing with them;" and it was in his power, at his discretion, to converse with—to "interview"—any departed soul of whom he *could form any idea*. He was commissioned to introduce a new era in the kingdom of God on earth, and was qualified

accordingly, and was allowed, as it would seem, any amount of evidence he chose to require to corroborate in his own mind the things disclosed to him. In one instance, the whole corps of the twelve apostles were sent down to confirm to him the truth of what he was writing.

If we are satisfied with his claims as a seer, we must accept his system; but if his credentials for the seership are discarded, his system falls to the ground.

4. It will never have a wide sway. Some will be drawn to it by a respect for the varied learning of its author; some, by sympathy with it in its vigorous assaults upon orthodoxy; and some, by curiosity to be told ever so much about the spiritual world. But these classes, put together, are not likely ever to become a large aggregate. The system does not generate and perpetuate a succession and swarm of seers, like modern spiritism, but centers in the great seer who originated it. Its followers lack the enthusiasm and self-denial necessary for its wide extension. In this respect it is in marked contrast with Methodism, which arose about the same time. The mass of men will prefer the Bible as we have it to Swedenborg's expurgation of it; will pronounce many of his so-called disclosures absurd, and will reject his claims as an authoritative revealer of things in the unseen world.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS.*—Dr. Krauth's edition of Bishop Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* comes to hand just as we are going to press, but we cannot forego the pleasure of calling the attention of our readers to this completely illustrated edition of the most important work of the great and good philosopher. It constitutes the first volume of a series, which, if it is continued on the same scale as it begins, will be an honor to the country and a most important stimulus and director to philosophical study. The *Prolegomena* comprehend one hundred and fifty pages, devoted to Berkeley's life and writings; *The Precursors of Berkeley*;

* *Philosophical Classics*. A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. By GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. With *Prolegomena* and with Annotations, select, translated and original. By CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D.D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology and Church Polity in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia; Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, and Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1874.

Summaries of Berkeley's System; Berkeleyanism, its Friends, Affinities and Influence; Opponents and Objections; Estimates of Berkeley, his Character, Writings and Influence; Idealism Defined; Sceptical Idealism in the Development of Idealism from Berkeley to the present; Hume, Critical Idealism; Kant, Subjective Idealism; Fichte, Objective Idealism; Schelling, Jacobi, Absolute Idealism; Hegel, Theoretical Idealism; Schopenhauer; the Strength and Weakness of Idealism; Characteristics of the present edition, its objects and uses. Then follows Berkeley's Treatise, which is introduced by the Preface of Professor Fraser, the editor of Berkeley's complete works, and Berkeley's own Preface and Introduction. To this are given in the Appendixes Berkeley's rough draft of his Introduction, a Notice of Arthur Collier, and a Vindication of the Theory of Vision. To this is added the valuable critical notes of Prof. F. Ueberweg, comprehending, with additions, some eighty pages. A copious and accurate Index follows. The editor says very justly that he is not aware "that there is in our language, nor even in the German, incomparably rich as it is in literature of this class, any body of annotations of the same relative extent as this on a modern philosophical classic." To the learned writer and the liberal publisher the American public and the world of scholars are under special obligations for this valuable and handsome volume.

BELLES LETTRES.

SONGS OF THE SUN LANDS.*—The surprise and admiration awakened in a large circle of readers, and even more in England than in his own country, by the "Songs of the Sierras," made a second volume from the same new poet somewhat hazardous. The novelty of his themes and the originality of their treatment, his picturesque and sensuous descriptions, and the freedom and melody of his verse, had given a new sensation among surfeited readers, and suggested a new school of poetry from an unexpected quarter. It was feared by some of his eulogists that in "toning down" his exuberance under more critical influences he might sacrifice too much of his peculiar effectiveness. In the present work, however, the negligences and redundances that were pardoned in the other, if moderated, have not so far disappeared as to impair the author's

* *Songs of the Sun Lands.* By JOAQUIN MILLER. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1873. 16mo, pp. 212.

personality. He invests other themes with the same undeniable attractions. The principal poem, the "Isles of the Amazon," we suppose may fairly represent his merits and blemishes. The group of smaller pieces, entitled "Olive Leaves," on incidents of Scripture, adds pleasing tokens of the reverence of the poet if not of the piety of the man. We have not the assurance expressed by some foreign critics of his permanent popularity. And the worst to be feared from the impression already made by his unquestionable genius is the inevitable brood of imitators.

CROOKED PLACES.*—All who have read "Occupations of a Retired Life," from the same authoress—for Mrs. Mayo is no longer concealed under the assumed name—will need no other inducement to take up this work, which is marked by the same simplicity of style, fidelity to nature, sympathy with humanity in all conditions, felicity of delineation, and profound yet not obtrusive sense of spiritual truth. The charm of her descriptions is the more wonderful if it is true, as we have heard, that she is yet young, and her life has been confined to the city,—another instance of the truth of Sir Walter Scott's saying, in effect, that the knowledge of human nature is instinctive or intuitional, though the knowledge of manners may depend on intercourse with the world. The matter of the book answers to the title, portraying "struggles and hopes" in the hard lots or "crooked places" of common life, with discriminating recognitions of a divine Providence and of Christian truth. The lessons are not only moral but evangelical, yet in no wise forced or conventional. We cordially recommend the work both for interest and profit. It is fitly dedicated "to the memory of Thomas Guthrie, D.D., whose friendship was a treasure on earth, and is now laid up a treasure in heaven."

PICTURESQUE NORMANDY.†—This dainty little volume—which may be slipped with ease into one's coat-pocket—bears about the same relation to Mr. Freeman's elaborate description of Normandy in his *History of the Norman Conquest*, that an artist's sketch-book does to a gallery of paintings. But it will not be at all the

* *Crooked Places, a Story of Struggles and Hopes.* By EDWARD GARRETT. New York: Dodd & Mead, Publishers, 1873. 12mo, pp. 469.

† *Normandy Picturesque.* By HENRY BLACKBURN. First American, from second London edition. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1873. 16mo, pp. 291.

less interesting for this in the eyes of anyone who knows what a charm there is in turning over the full portfolio of an artist who is fresh from his summer work. But there is an additional charm about "Picturesque Normandy." It is not only the sketch-book of an artist, but of one who is as ready with his pen as with his pencil. Besides little "bits" from the exterior carvings of quaint old thirteenth century houses, and "studies" of Norman costumes, and more elaborate pictures of such churches as the cathedral at Bayeux, and of such places of historic interest as *La Rue de la Grosse Horloge* in Rouen, the volume contains sprightly descriptions of some of the most noted of the Norman towns and villages, and is full of suggestions respecting Art, and its relations to all that makes up our modern life, which are well deserving of a thoughtful reading.

ARTISTS AND ARABS.*—This is a second book by the author of "Picturesque Normandy," and is of somewhat the same character. It gives the results of a winter's sketching in Algiers, in the form of pictures of Mohammedan mosques, of Moorish houses, and of the rich semi-tropical vegetation of Northern Africa. The book is intended more particularly for the benefit of the author's professional brethren, whom he seeks to entice to spend the winter months in Algiers, sketching there under the bright sun in the open air; but the non-professional reader will be as likely to be carried away by the author's enthusiasm, and to long for the experience of a winter's life in the climate whose praises he sings.

MISCELLANEOUS.

HARVEY'S "CHRISTIAN RHETORIC."†—This work is claimed in the brief preface to be "a system" and "composed according to a new method and on a new basis," correcting "some errors that have been misleading authors and readers ever since the days of Cicero." The Introduction, in twenty-eight pages, is principally occupied with maintaining, as against several objections, that the true models of the Christian preacher are, not the classic or secular orators, but the Hebrew prophets, our Lord in his discourses,

**Artists and Arabs; or Sketching in Sunshine.* BY HENRY BLACKBURN. With numerous illustrations. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1873. 16mo, pp. 291.

† *A System of Christian Rhetoric*, for the use of Preachers and other speakers. By GEORGE WINFRED HARVEY, M.A., author of "Rhetoric of Conversation," &c. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1873. 8vo, pp. 632.

and the apostles in their spoken addresses as far as reported to us, in distinction from their epistolary compositions. The matter is distributed in four Books: I. Inspiration in preaching. II. Of Invention, including "the matter of sermons as determined by their objects," and their "Forms as determined by method." III. "Style;" and IV. Elocution; followed by an "Index of Figures, with definitions and examples," comprising fifty-two pages, which is really remarkable, and in its way interesting, if not obviously as useful, in attempting "to name and define all known rhetorical figures." This index, and indeed the book in general, shows a wide range of reading, and the many excellent citations from ancient and modern authors, on most of the particular topics, will repay the student's attention. The chief distinction of the treatise lies not so much in the prominence given to the rhetorical examples found in the Bible (as might be expected from the Introduction), as in the large place assigned to the topic of the first book (a hundred pages), the divine inspiration necessary and available for the preacher, of which it treats fully and emphatically, as to its effects on the will and on the intellect, and as affecting invention, style, and delivery, with its appropriate means and conditions, while taking pains to distinguish it from the "plenary" inspiration of the prophets and apostles. As a whole, the work cannot be expected to displace others already well known, nor radically to advance the science of sacred rhetoric as far as the author seems to imagine, and yet it deserves to be read by theological students, and ministers already at their work, particularly for the stress laid on divine help. The discussion of this and other topics is too discursive and diffuse, and the style, while generally clear and animated, might be improved in moderation and dignity. We take exception to some of his words, especially in a treatise on rhetoric, as either unauthorized, or now obsolete, and needless; such as "foundational" (why not *fundamental*?), and "condensated" (why not *condensed*?), and "pilgrimize," which is not warranted by Ben Johnson's phrase, "pilgrimize it," as given in Worcester,—these all occurring in the short preface. Then afterward we note "well-willed," "legitimably," "exertional," and "prophetry." To say of an objection that "if allowed to prevail it will advance to *fight up against*," etc., is at least uncouth or whimsical (p. 27). In several places we observe the Scotch rather than the English use of "will" and "would" for "shall" and "should." He speaks of "harmony" as well as "melody" in "the early music of the Hebrews and the Greeks" (p. 123), when

it is supposed to have had a later origin. What need is there of imputing a "Satanic inspiration" to some of the greatest poets, as on p. 90? As to Whately's example in the matter of extemporizing, (p. 539), we have the testimony of one of his pupils that he heard him preach in that way with earnestness and power.

"*SHE SPAKE OF HIM.*"*—This is a well written and every way interesting memoir of a remarkably gifted, devoted and useful woman, Geraldine Hooper, by marriage Mrs. Henry Deming, who died, only thirty-one years old, in August, 1872. Attractive and gay in her opening youth, she consecrated herself to Christ at the age of seventeen. Her pleasing person, vivacity, and wit fitted her to shine in society, but her distinction is that she employed the last twelve years of her short life most assiduously in the work of an evangelist, preaching to large assemblies with singular persuasiveness and success, whether in chapels or public halls or in the open air, chiefly in Bath, but in London also and other places, abounding too in all good works, and marked no less by modesty and tact than by activity and zeal. She seems to have attracted all classes by her eloquence, and to have been wonderfully successful in converting such as were insensible to ordinary influences, preaching "well nigh four thousand times," and often to assemblies of working people as early as five or six o'clock in the morning. It occurs to us, by the way, as a question we should like to have answered, why such multitudes can never be drawn together for such a purpose at so early an hour in *this* country, and indeed why here men of business can never be assembled to hear our most popular preachers at any hour in the day time except Sundays, as in Scotland they thronged at noon to hear Dr. Chalmers. Mrs. Deming won the testimony borne to her Master, that "the common people heard" her "gladly," while the more fastidious also paid tribute to her worth and power. Few ministers indeed have been so fruitful in the happiest results. There can be no question as to her extraordinary gifts fitting her for such service, and among them a voice of singular power and sweetness, both in speaking and singing. A devoted member of the Church of England, her conversion and riper experience were in connection with ministers of that body, who also appear to have countenanced and aided

* "*She Spake of Him.*:" being Recollections of the loving labors and early death of the late Mrs. Henry Deming. By her friend, Mrs. GRATTAN GUINNESS. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1874. 16mo, pp. 326.

her evangelistic work, while such sympathies and activities as hers could not be limited by any external pale. Indeed, she seems to have met with less opposition to "woman preaching," or to have disarmed it more easily, than some of her sisters in our less conservative country. In her last four years, which were all of her married life, she was associated in work as in affection with her husband, who was himself an evangelist. It is pleasant to know that she was a descendant of Bishop Hooper, as her husband also was of Cranmer. She was favored too with an intimate friend in the lady who has prepared this volume with so much loving and judicious care. An admirable Introduction is furnished by an English clergyman. We particularly commend to our readers the view taken in this Introduction, and still more fully in the last chapter, which is wholly devoted to that subject, of "Women's ministry in the gospel." The question of late re-opened in some quarters, how far women may go in publicly presenting the gospel and inviting the multitude to accept it, we have not seen anywhere argued with so much combined wisdom, candor, appreciation of woman and of this work, and intelligent deference to the Scriptures, as in this concluding chapter. Any thoughtful, earnest Christian, however scrupulous he may have been as to "female preaching," we think, must confess his sympathy with the English rector in the view taken of this instance in the Introduction. We cannot for a moment doubt that Geraldine Hooper Deming was signally endowed by our Lord for preaching his gospel, attested by his Spirit in the fruits of her work, and has a place among those who "turn many to righteousness" and "shall shine as the stars for ever and ever."

Much as we commend the compilation of this memoir, we wish it had a simpler and more succinct title, if only her now cherished name.

AGAINST THE STREAM.*—As "The Schönberg-Cotta Family" related to the times of the Reformation, the "Draytons and Davenants," with the sequel "Over the Sea," to the conflict of the Puritans with Charles I. and the times of the Commonwealth, and the "Diary of Kitty Trevelyan" to the religious revival under Whitefield and Wesley, so this work from the same pen has to do with the struggle in England, in the close of the last century and the open-

* *Against the Stream*. The story of a heroic age in England. New York: Dodd & Mead, Publishers. 1873. pp. 589.

ing of the present, for the suppression of the slave trade, and ultimately British emancipation in the West Indies. If the first must be allowed to have precedence for its marvelous fascination and the vivid portraiture of Luther and his doctrine of justification, the next two were not far behind it for interest and instructiveness. In all, though handling fictitious personages, the author is not merely a novelist, but a historical and biographical delineator, in the interest of philanthropy and spiritual religion. With the same general attractions of style and characterization, this work, as also the earlier "Victory of the Vanquished," which related to the first conflicts of Christianity, produces less vivid effect by not using the forms of contemporary journalizing so skillfully interwoven in the others, and we observe also some tendency to monotony in dwelling on the diverse aspects of the same event to different personages of the story. Nor does the subject itself furnish so many incidents of historic or personal interest. The story, however, is engaging, the characters are distinctly drawn, the reform commemorated is set forth by lights and shades drawn from ample information, and we find the same affluence of language, and striking, even picturesque, illustrations of truth, that have marked all the writer's deservedly popular narratives. The title is drawn from one aspect of the anti-slavery struggle—the general and stubborn opposition it encountered in its earlier stages from precedent, prejudice, and interest. As a motto it is meant to keep in mind the lesson that for a time reformers must needs go "against the stream."

SONGS OF THE SOUL.*—This very beautiful volume cannot fail to be a favorite among the choicest gift books of the season. The number and quality of the sacred lyrics now enriching our language, including recent translations, Dr Prime's well-known information and judgment, and the skill of the Cambridge press and of the best binders, combine to make it a treasure and ornament for the most fastidious study or parlor. The pieces, some four hundred and thirty-two in number, are arranged under the heads of *Matin and Vesper Songs*, *Songs of the Trinity*, of the *Holy Tides* (as *Advent*, *Christmas*, etc.), of the *Cross*, of *Sorrow*, out of the *Depths*, of *Aspiration*, *Faith*, *Hope*, *Courage*, *Love*, *Praise* and *Thanksgiving*, *Patience*, *Peace*, and *Triumph*. Indexes are added of subjects, authors, translators, and first lines. Besides

* *Songs of the Soul*. Gathered out of many lands and ages. By SAMUEL IRENEÆUS PRIME. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1874. 8vo, pp. 661.

many of the choicest hymns used in public worship, devout and thoughtful readers will find here fitly enshrined together poems that he has learned to love before in ephemeral or inaccessible forms, and others that he will welcome to the same desirable and permanent association. We need say no more.

STORIES OF INFINITY.*—There is a strange mingling of fact and fancy in this book; and unless readers are acquainted with some of the physical sciences, it will be quite difficult to tell where fact ends and fancy begins. The facts relating to light, upon which some of the Stories of Infinity are founded, are themselves more marvelous than any creations of the imagination. And, for ourselves, we much prefer Lumer as we see it in nature to the person with this name of whom we read in these stories. And yet many of his pranks, as painted in this book, are curious, and will be interesting and perhaps instructive to some minds. The speculations on religious subjects are worthless.

DR. EDWARD H. CLARKE'S "SEX IN EDUCATION"† is one of the most important of contributions to the discussion of the absorbing topics of Female Education, Co-education, etc. It has the very great merit of recognizing that there is such a reality as sex in the human species and that the reality is very significant. The author does ample justice to his theme, which he discusses with sufficient plainness of speech without needlessly offending the sensibilities. It will make a decided impression wherever and by whomsoever it is read, and it deserves to be read and pondered by every person who has any private opinions of his or her own which he or she may desire to propagate, in respect to any question which concerns female education, whether it be education in the family, in society, in the school, or in the university. We wish for this work the widest possible circulation.

PERRY'S ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.‡—It is a good sign that this treatise has reached its eleventh edition. This fact is one of various proofs that the science of which it treats is studied

* *Stories of Infinity*: Lumer—History of a Comet—in Infinity. By Camille Flammarion. Translated from the French by S. R. CROCKER. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1873. pp. 287.

† *Sex in Education*; or, a Fair Chance for the Girls. By EDWARD H. CLARKE, M.D. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1873.

‡ *Elements of Political Economy*. By ARTHUR LATHAM PERRY, Professor of History and Political Economy in Williams College. Eleventh edition. Scribner & Co., 1873.

in our schools and colleges. Prof. Perry has re-written portions of his meritorious work. In addition to its other excellences, it is furnished with a copious analysis of its contents, and with several indexes at the close. We trust that it will win a multitude of disciples to the sound doctrines respecting trade and finance, of which the author is a distinguished advocate.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Leaves from the Tree of Life. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D.D., author of "Bible Wonders." Robert Carter & Brothers, New York, 1874. 12mo, pp. 316.

Truffle Nephews; and How they Commenced a New Charity. By the Rev. P. B. Power, M.A. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York, 1874. 12mo, pp. 270.

Giles's Minority; or Scenes at the Red House. By Mrs. Robert O'Reilly, author of "Daisy's Companions." With Illustrations. Roberts Brothers, Boston, 1874. 12mo, pp. 275.

What can she do? By Rev. E. P. Roe, author of "Barriers burned away, "Play and Profit in my Garden." New York: Dodd & Mead. 12mo, pp. 509.

Kit Carson; the Pioneer of the West. By John S. C. Abbott. Illustrated. New York: Dodd & Mead. 12mo, pp. 342.

Morning Clouds; or Penelope. By Mrs. Stanley Leathes, author of "Soi-Même." Dodd & Mead, New York. 12mo, pp. 272.

The Mists of the Valley. By Agnes Giberne, author of "The Curate's Home." New York: Dodd & Mead. 12mo, pp. 294.

The Cumberstone Contest. By the Author of "The Best Cheer," "The Battle worth Fighting." Dodd & Mead, New York. 12mo, pp. 359.

Nancy. A Novel. By Rhoda Broughton. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874. 12mo, pp. 411.

Metrical Tune Book, designed to be used with any Hymn Book, for the congregation and choir. By Philip Phillips. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York. 12mo, pp. 156.

The Catholic Family Almanac, 1874. New York: Cath. Pub. Soc. 12mo, pp. 144.

The Hard Problem. Am. Tract Soc., 150 Nassau st, New York. 12mo, pp. 308.

The Better Land. By Rev. James Smith. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 16mo, pp. 128.

Thoughts on Intercessory Prayer. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 16mo, pp. 76.

Words of Comfort; or, Solace in Sorrow. By Rev. James Smith. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 16mo, pp. 64.

The Soul's Cry, and the Lord's Answer. Am. Tract Soc., N. Y. 16mo, pp. 47.

Our Heavenly Father; or, God a Refuge and Strength. By Rev. James Smith. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 16mo, pp. 64.

Publications of the American Tract Society, 150 Nassau st., New York City.—The Concert Programme; "Charity envieth not."—Horace Carleton's Essay; "Charity vaunteth not itself; is not puffed up."—Dora Felton's Visit; "Charity doth not behave itself unseemly."—Oakfield Lodge; "Charity seeketh not her own."—Frank Merton's Conquest; "Charity is not easily provoked."—Rachel White's Fault; "Charity thinketh no evil."—Ethel Seymour; "Charity hopeth all things."—A Week's Holiday; and other stories for children. By S. Annie Frost.—Wilson's Kindling-Dépôt. A story for boys. By Mrs. C. E. R. Parker.—Anchor of the Soul.

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No. CXXVII.

APRIL, 1874.

ARTICLE I.—PRIMITIVE CULTURE.

Primitive Culture. Researches into the development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom. By EDWARD B. TYLOR, author of "Researches into the Early History of Mankind," etc. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1871.

Researches into the Early History of Mankind, and the Development of Civilization. By EDWARD B. TYLOR, author of "Mexico and the Mexicans." London: John Murray, 1870.

It is difficult to compose history by induction. And yet the more slender the induction, the more fascinating the task. History that is based upon testimony, especially if it be abundant, and still more if it be contemporaneous, is of the nature of truth determined, treasure stored. It is always there. We can get at it at any time. We do not need to go every few days and see. A pyramid standing on its base is well enough. Why should it not? But a pyramid balanced on its apex is quite another affair. That is a "phenomenon." We must look into it. There is something about it which demands to be studied. And the finer the point on which so broad an induction

rests, the greater our admiration and the more intense our eagerness to solve a problem so enticingly impossible. It is not curiosity alone which impels us to "evolve out of consciousness" that knowledge which refuses to come at any other bidding. It is not curiosity alone that sets us to the task of determining what was from the indeterminate traces of what might have been. If from a single bone the paleontologist can sometimes restore an entire genus—if from a few well-triturated roots the linguist may be able to recover large portions of a primitive speech, and even tell where dwelt the prehistoric tribes who spoke it, how they lived, what their domestic animals, what their daily food, their religion, their tools, their homes—it is not curiosity alone that spurs the mind along a track which opens up such wonders. And even if we add to the ordinary usage of the term that genuine love of truth and that hunger for knowledge which may fairly belong to its definition, we have yet not wholly covered the case. There is an artistic admiration for truth, as well as a scientific love of it. And oftentimes when we are upon the most keen and eager quest, it is in obedience to the poetic sentiment within us quite as much as to the wise inquisitiveness: perhaps unconsciously, but none the less really. There is something delicious in the very use of a power which regains lost worlds of knowledge with such slender means. There is something startling in the vastness and the quaintness of that knowledge, something that appeals to the poetic imagination as well as to the judicial mind. And when we come to see more completely all the springs of intellectual aspiration, we shall very likely be astonished to find how we have been urged forward by our love of the beautiful as well as by our thirst for the knowable. Strolling along a beach, our careless feet dislodge some water-worn, barnacled fragment of timber. Was it a wreck? If so, who were the hapless voyagers that trusted themselves to its deceitful strength? What were their hopes, their plans, their sorrows and joys? Who were their beloved ones at home, who waited in vain for their return? To what port were they bound? By what catastrophe were they overturned into the watery death always lurking for them? Was it in distant seas, and did this weary waif drift on the currents half the world over

before it rested here? What tales could it tell us of the caprice of wind and wave, of the strange gambolling herds of the sea, of fleets and argosies that swept homeward from the gates of the morning, of other navies, as proud but less happy, that went gurgling down into depths unseen? These questions all have their poetical side no less than their practical. And in like manner, when we question a fragment we find cast up on the shores of the unknown—a fossil—a flint—a broken word—there is that in each answer it makes to us which appeals to the æsthetic sense as well as to the scientific. In most cases, doubtless, a part of the eager interest which lures the investigator onward in whatever track of science, is due to the highly poetical and spiritual light which shines from every fact he reaches. There is poetry even in mathematics; how much more in archæology.

We can readily see, as we wander through these volumes so densely crowded with fact, what a fascination Mr. Tylor must have found in his toil. In a dissertation like this upon the origin and growth of the principal elements of civilization, there are the separate interests which attach to each element by itself, its history, its development, and the philosophy of its growth; and superadded to all these, the great and inspiring satisfaction of adjusting them to each other and seeing them grow under his hand into one harmonious whole. It is under somewhat of the same spell that the reader follows in his footsteps through the mazes of this immense investigation. The study of civilization has a poetical side quite as luminous as its scientific.

We do not propose to "review" these comely volumes, in the technical sense of that term; still less to set over against each stage of the argument any theological endorsement or rejoinder. That task may be properly left to whoever may have taken in hand the business of settling principles and engineering hypotheses. Mr. Tylor is not only a representative, but in some sense an apostle and champion of the views presented in his work. He is at least a prime authority on that side of the great question; and as such he is entitled to a hearing. We propose to afford him a hearing with those whose knowledge of his investigations may necessarily be limited to some such medium as the present; and to that end shall endeavor to state

and explain his positions as briefly and as carefully as we may be able.

The path along which Mr. Tylor conducts us is altogether ethnographic, not at all metaphysical or theological. It is an inductive study of tribal life. So far as possible, all prejudgments are cleared away, and each point is reached by pure investigation. The pagan mind is studied not in the light of our beliefs and opinions, even those which we hold to be most indisputably true, and true for all latitudes and ages, but simply as it stands forth in its own manifestations, as it works itself out with its own barbaric machinery. We wish to know, for example, where the prehistoric savage got his ideas of God; whether they were in any way evolved out of his own processes of reasoning, or were communicated to him *ab extra*. So far as we get any answer to our question, we get it by studying *him*, not by studying our own ideas about him. We wish to know what were the original seeds of civilization, whence came those primal impulses which have expanded so wondrously and so diversely along different lines of the race—Aztec, Chinese, Egyptian, Semitic, European. The answer, if answer we get, is pure matter of fact; discoverable not by deduction from the latest modern postulates, but by induction from the earliest known facts. This method has its advantages, and it must be admitted also its disadvantages. On the one hand, it is practicable ground, and the conclusions ordinarily go no farther than the premises warrant. On the other hand, there is a subtle risk arising from this very fact; and we yield our confident belief to conclusions which seem to be pure inductions, and because they are inductions, while in reality they have been unconsciously and largely alloyed with our own opinions. If we keep our eyes open to this danger, the inductive method of investigation is by far the safest, and in some respects the only method of dealing with the different topics which enter into a study of civilization.

Accordingly, the reader of these volumes will follow the author over an almost unlimited field, from which he will find gathered an immense aggregation of facts, encyclopedic in their fullness, and very clear in the utterance of their testimony. They are what Ruskin calls "talkative facts." Mr. Tylor has

been eclectic, but apparently not exclusive; and the accumulations of ten years' toil have been cautiously sifted, that none but evidence of the clearest obtainable quality might enter into the case. This is so abundant, however, as to be at times almost confusing. The facts are so numberless, so diverse, and adducible in so many lines of proof, that one has to turn back occasionally to make sure that the exact point in hand shall not be buried out of sight under the overwhelming mass of details. The sources of evidence are almost indefinitely extended by the author's acceptance of modern savagery as properly and truly representative of the like stage among the earliest progenitors of the race. The first savages have left traces of a life so entirely similar to that of the modern pagan tribe, the same rude methods of taking their prey, preparing their food, building their homes, worshiping their gods, that for all purposes of evidence they may be considered as one and the same; and we can study our problem not only by looking back among the dim figures that groped on the horizon of the dawn, but by looking out upon precisely the same spectacle contemporaneous with ourselves. We have "prehistoric" barbarism moving on now side by side with the ripest civilizations. "The thesis which I venture to sustain," says Mr. Tylor, "within limits, is simply this, that the savage state in some measure represents an early condition of mankind, out of which the higher culture has gradually been developed or evolved, by processes still in regular operation as of old, the result showing that on the whole progress has far prevailed over relapse." (i, 28.)

This brings us to the direct question, What is the special problem upon which this work is engaged? What is its purpose, its theory? What is the axis of crystallization, so to speak, along which these countless facts arrange themselves? The question belongs to the larger one that yet remains, namely, What results does Mr. Tylor obtain? But we shall be better prepared for those results when we reach them, if we first answer this. The investigation was entered upon of course, and manifestly, to arrive at the truth in the case, whatever the truth might be. And having reached what he believes to be a sufficient induction, the author embodies it in the form of a proposition or theory, and in its support sets before us the laborious

processes of experimentation through which he had previously toiled himself. His theory shall be first stated in his own words. "By comparing the various stages of civilization among races known to history, with the aid of archæological inference from the remains of prehistoric tribes, it seems possible to judge in a rough way of an early general condition of man, which from our point of view is to be regarded as a primitive condition, whatever yet earlier state may in reality have lain behind it. This hypothetical primitive condition corresponds in a considerable degree to that of modern savage tribes, who, in spite of their difference and distance, have in common certain elements of civilization, which seem remains of an early state of the human race at large. If this hypothesis be true, then, notwithstanding the continual interference of degeneration, the main tendency of culture from primeval up to modern times has been from savagery towards civilization." (i, 19.) This growth of culture the author subsequently terms the progression-theory, and sharply contrasts it with the degeneration-theory. Neither, however, excludes the other. History plainly shows both processes in constant operation, sometimes side by side in different peoples, sometimes in the same people at different stages. The question only is, Which is the primal, and which the secondary process? Did the race start upon the higher level already divinely equipped with arts and ideas, which were preserved and expanded by the Egyptian, the Hebrew, the Greek, and their compeers—but by slow degradation were lost by the progenitors of the Tatar, the Australian, the Patagonian, the Hottentot? Or did the first generations begin at the foot of the ladder, and have all the civilizations which have risen in different countries since been the result of climbing from that lowest point? This latter supposition the author accepts as fairly sustained by the history of the race. The climbing has not been regular, but spasmodic and intermittent. It has not always been climbing, but often regression instead. "The progression-theory recognizes degradation, and the degradation-theory recognizes progression, as powerful influences in the course of culture. Under proper limitations the principles of both theories are conformable to historical knowledge, which shows us on the one hand that the state of

the higher nations was reached by progression from a lower state, and on the other hand that culture gained by progression may be lost by degradation. * * * History, taken as our guide in explaining the different stages of civilization, offers a theory based on actual experience. This is a development-theory, in which both advance and relapse have their acknowledged places. But so far as history is to be our criterion, progression is primary and degradation secondary." (i, 34.) Whatever degrees of civilization then have been reached by any people and at any epoch, may be regarded always as the result of advance from a lower stage to a higher. On the other hand, most cases of barbarism are to be considered as cases of arrested development, or of very slight advance on the primeval savagery, while a few can be shown to be the result of degeneration from a previous higher stage. "It will be seen again and again, by examining such topics as language, mythology, custom, religion, that savage opinion is in a more or less rudimentary state, while the civilized mind still bears vestiges, neither few nor slight, of a past condition from which savages represent the least and civilized men the greatest advance. Throughout the whole vast range of the history of human thought and habit, while civilization has to contend not only with survival from lower levels, but also with degeneration within its own borders, it yet proves capable of overcoming both and taking its own course. History within its proper field, and ethnography over a wider range, combine to show that the institutions which can best hold their own in the world gradually supersede the less fit ones, and that this incessant conflict determines the general resultant course of culture." (i, 62.)

Proceeding upon this development or progression-theory of the rise of civilization, Mr. Tylor sets forth at great length the evidences upon which so broad an induction is based. It is to be noted at the outset that he limits his task, and that of his reader as well, to a few well defined elements of the question. These may be taken as types or analogues of the remaining elements, a study of which would yield similar results. The argument "takes cognizance principally of knowledge, art, and custom, and indeed only very partial cognizance within this field, the vast range of physical, political, social, and ethical considera-

tions being left all but untouched. Its standard of reckoning progress and decline is not that of ideal good and evil, but of movement along a measured line from grade to grade of actual savagery, barbarism, and civilization." (i, 28.)

Within these limits the mass of evidence is distributed into five groups; Survival in Culture—Origin of Language—the Art of Counting—Mythology—and Animism. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the results obtained in each of these lines of investigation.

Among the countless trivialities of habit that go to make up our everyday thinking and living, there are some which, when we stop to notice them, appear so quaint, so grotesque, and even so absurd, that when we compare them with any standard furnished by either reason or culture, we are entirely at a loss to account for them. How came such curious elements to hold a place in the opinions or conduct of rational men? On what possible consideration does a full-grown man, living in the nineteenth century, and professing to be a man of sense, still insist on seeing the new moon over his right shoulder? What will account for the custom of ejaculatory prayer or salutation when one sneezes?—a custom common to the civilized and the savage, found among Zulus, Negroes, Polynesians, Greeks and Romans, Jews and Hindus, Persians, and the nations of modern Europe. Whence come those innumerable "signs" and "omens" and warnings," those presentiments, those notions of lucky and unlucky days, those countless fragmentary superstitions, which still make so large a part of the folk-lore under the highest civilization, and which still have some share in guiding the daily conduct of men who are sensible enough to blush while they obey? It is a question as instructive as it is curious. Mr. Tylor has traced large numbers of these enigmatical facts to their origin in primeval darkness. They spring from customs of savage life, customs which to the savage himself had a meaning, and expressed, for example, some rude sentiment of homage, some incantation of sorcery, some invocation of the gods, some emblem of friendship, some token of defiance, some proof of daring. By lapse of time these meanings have faded away, while the rite itself, the formula, the sign, persistently holds its place;

and thus, creatures of habit as we are, and simpletons beside, we hand on these traditionary absurdities to our children as our fathers did to us, growing every year with the increase of light a little more conscious of our silliness, and a little more ignorant, if possible, of any ground for perpetuating it. Even in enlightened countries, the belief in witchcraft, at least among the peasantry, is hardly yet a thing of the past. Apparitions, ghosts, vampires, divining rods, second sight, fortune telling, *et id omne*, are only slowly losing ground in the common mind. And some advanced doubters among the rank and file of the race have got as far as the amiable bishop who thought "there were *some* things in *Gulliver's Travels* that he could not and would not believe!"—and have attained to an estimable pitch of philosophical scepticism concerning things that are intrinsically impossible. But where these relics of common opinion and common practice still survive, they may often, perhaps generally, be traced back to a primeval source. They are "survivals" of ancient savage thought and custom in the midst of modern culture. The line of survival in many of these cases is so distinct that it is difficult to avoid the conviction that in these unreasoning habits of opinion and act we are cherishing fragments of custom which have drifted down to us over countless waste centuries of barbarism. "The German peasant, who says a flock of sheep is lucky but a herd of swine unlucky to meet, and the Cornish miner who turns away in horror when he meets an old woman or a rabbit on his way to the pit's mouth, are to this day keeping up relics of early savagery as genuine as any flint implement dug out of a tumulus." (i, 109.) Spirit rapping, spirit writing, spirit lifting, table moving, "mediums," and even "planchette," are shown to have had a similar remote ancestry, with recognizable progeny at every stage in the long slow advance. And the author closes his account of the phenomena of Spiritualism, so far as they relate to this branch of his subject, with the unexpected and not comfortable dilemma—"The issue raised by the comparison of savage, barbaric, and civilized Spiritualism, is this: Do the Red Indian medicine-man, the Tatar necromancer, the Highland ghost-seer, and the Boston medium, share the possession of belief and knowledge of the highest truth and import,

which nevertheless the great intellectual movement of the last two centuries has simply thrown aside as worthless? Is what we are habitually boasting of and calling new enlightenment, then, in fact a decay of knowledge? If so, this is a remarkable case of degeneration, and the savages whom some ethnographers look on as degenerate from a higher civilization, may turn on their accusers and charge them with having fallen from the high level of savage knowledge." (i. 141.)

The argument from the Origin of Language is of a nature similar to that from Survival in Culture. It covers but a single branch of the subject, and from that derives what might be called a minor probability. Without professing to account for sense-words, which constitute the vast majority of terms in any given language, it deals with sound-words alone. The comparison of savage dialects reveals in large numbers of them the same emotional and imitative sounds used to express the same notions. The comparison of cultivated languages with these reveals the same roots still in use for the same purposes. So much at least of the speech of civilized people is a survival of savage invention, and must have come down from prehistoric sources. Mr. Tylor carefully guards this induction, that it may not be taken to cover more ground than belongs to it: "I do not think that the evidence here adduced justifies the setting-up of what is called the interjectional and imitative theory as a complete solution of the problem of original language. Valid as this theory proves itself within limits, it would be incautious to accept a hypothesis which can perhaps satisfactorily account for a twentieth of the crude forms in any language, as a certain and absolute explanation of the nineteenth-twentieths whose origin remains doubtful. A key must unlock more doors than this, to be taken as the master-key." (i, 208.) The two chapters devoted to this part of the argument are very suggestive; but the details of the comparison are easily accessible elsewhere. The point of the reasoning is this. Large numbers of imitative words are found to be the common property of savage dialects which cannot be referred to the same family, and cannot be proved to have had any intercourse: such words cannot, therefore, have descended from one common origin, but must have sprung into use among

different tribes independently as occasion suggested or need required. If this is demonstrably true of certain classes of terms which are common to the lowest savage life and have "survived" in languages of the ripest culture, it is probably true of the other elements of speech: that is, all language has probably developed from the crude sounds and symbols which furnish the earliest means of intercourse in savage society, and not from some one parent dialect already completely prepared and divinely communicated. "Ethnography reasonably accounts at once for the immense power and the manifest weakness of language as a means of expressing modern educated thought, by treating it as an original product of low culture, gradually adapted by ages of evolution and selection, to answer more or less sufficiently the requirements of modern civilization." (i, 217.)

The brief chapter on the Art of Counting contains some curious facts gathered from the lowest stages of barbarism, and tends to the same general result, viz: that the various systems of computation in use among enlightened nations are direct growths from the first rude numerals of savage tribes. A single statement from the close of the chapter will suffice to present Mr. Tylor's view. "Among savage and civilized races alike, the general framework of numeration stands throughout the world as an abiding monument of primeval culture. This framework, the all but universal scheme of reckoning by fives, tens, and twenties, shows that the childish and savage practice of counting on fingers and toes lies at the foundation of our arithmetical science. Ten seems the most convenient arithmetical basis offered by systems founded on hand-counting, but twelve would have been better, and duo-decimal arithmetic is in fact a protest against the less convenient decimal arithmetic in ordinary use. The case is the not uncommon one of high civilization bearing evident traces of the rudeness of its origin in ancient barbaric life." (i, 246.)

The wonder-world of Mythology furnishes ample materials for the uses of the evolution-theory in culture. It has been fashionable indeed in almost all ages to "rationalize" these beautiful figments of the poetic brain and worshipful heart; so that even in ancient times old Atlas was half suspected to have

been nothing more than an uncommonly smart astronomer, and Zeus himself only a king of Crete. The scepticism of the eighteenth century was still more destructive, and everything fell, or was expected to, before its remorseless scythe. The golden shower of Danae dissolved into the prosaic specie that bribed her guards. The she-wolf that suckled Romulus and Remus tamed down into a buxom nurse by the name of Lupa. But this method of deodorizing these myths is far more barbarous than the myths themselves. It strips them not only of their poetic fragrance, but of their truth as well; and in these materialized forms they correspond neither to historic fact nor to prehistoric fancy; they represent nothing, "in the heavens above, nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth." In almost any given instance, when a primitive fable is interpreted by the realistic method, and all that is mythical in the story is macerated out of it, the residuum is so trivial and so grotesque as to refute itself by the *reductio ad absurdum*. Mr. Cox illustrates it by supposing Jack the Giant-Killer "rationalized" by leaving out the giants. Myth is something else than a tough dry kernel of fact enveloped in an atmosphere of imagination; and its meaning is not to be got by simply blazing off the atmosphere and retaining the kernel. It is rather the result of reasoning; reasoning in a very crude intellect to be sure, and upon premises which to modern illuminati would be meaningless and contemptible, but which to the primeval savage himself were full of truth and full of wonder. His mind was impressible like that of a child. The phenomena of nature, countless, rapid, mysterious, amazing, and utterly inexplicable, came trooping in upon him and scoring upon his plastic mind infinitely varied impressions, vivid enough and startling enough to make the brain of a savage whirl. Let us conceive an adult mind in an infantile state, without knowledge, without ideas, hopelessly involved in these perplexing confusions, yet attempting to disentangle and match them into some sort of explainable relation—and we have the conditions for generating myth. It is the first spark of savage reason trying to illumine the darkness. Things glimmer and float and fade before the eye, to re-appear in the strangest combinations like cloud-scenery in the sky. The more complicated

the problem, the more readily does reason, half baffled, turn over the task to the fancy, equally crude and equally childish with itself; and between the two the airy substance slowly personifies itself in poetic shape, and the myth becomes a reality in the savage consciousness, perhaps complete at once, perhaps destined to strange growths and transmutations by the additions and attritions of the ages to come after. How poetical and even pathetic are many of these fabulous personifications may be seen by citing a single one among hundreds—the myth of the Pest-maiden. “There sat a Russian under a larch-tree, and the sunshine glanced like fire. He saw something coming from afar; he looked again—it was the Pest-maiden, huge of stature, all shrouded in linen, striding towards him. He would have fled in terror, but the form grasped him with her long outstretched hand. ‘Knowest thou the Pest?’ she said; ‘I am she. Take me on thy shoulders and carry me through all Russia; miss no village, no town, for I must visit all. But fear not for thyself; thou shalt be safe amid the dying.’ Clinging with her long hands, she clambered on the peasant’s back; he stepped onward, saw the form above him as he went, but felt no burden. First he bore her to the towns; they found there joyous dance and song; but the form waved her linen shroud, and joy and mirth were gone. As the wretched man looked round, he saw mourning, he heard the tolling of the bells, there came funeral processions, the graves could not hold the dead. He passed on, and coming near each village heard the shriek of the dying, saw all faces white in the desolate houses. But high on the hill stands his own hamlet: his wife, his little children are there, and the aged parents, and his heart bleeds as he draws near. With strong gripe he holds the maiden fast and plunges with her beneath the waves. He sank: she rose again, but she quailed before a heart so fearless, and fled far away to the forest and the mountains.” (i, 268.)

Among the groups of myths which are examined in this work, and which are treated with great copiousness of information and analysis, are the personifications of sun, moon, and stars, myths which have sprung from the water-spout, the rainbow, the sand-pillar, sunset and eclipse, wind and tempest, thunder and earthquake, the doctrine of werewolves, giants,

dwarfs, men of the woods, tailed men, tribes of monsters, and a great variety of others. These researches are accompanied and supplemented by discussions upon philosophic myth rising among semi-civilized people, and even among the enlightened, to account for some remarkable event or phenomenon, the bearing of the miracles and legends of the middle ages upon mythology, eponymic legend, etymological myths, beast-fables, the effect of language in the formation of myth, and other minor topics which belong to the subject. All these contribute not only to the exhaustive treatment and the picturesque effect, but also to the final adjudication. The argument moves on with a broad sweep. "In its course there have been examined the processes of animating and personifying nature, the formation of legend by exaggeration and perversion of fact, the stiffening of metaphor by mistaken realization of words, the conversion of speculative theories and still less substantial fictions into pretended traditional events, the passage of myth into miracle-legend, the definition by name and place given to any floating imagination, the adaptation of mythic incident as moral example, and the incessant crystallization of story into history. The investigation of these intricate and devious operations has brought ever more and more broadly into view two principles of mythologic science. The first is that legend, when classified on a sufficient scale, displays a regularity of development which the notion of motiveless fancy quite fails to account for, and which must be attributed to laws of formation whereby every story, old and new, has arisen from its definite origin and sufficient cause. So uniform, indeed, is such development, that it becomes possible to treat myth as an organic product of mankind at large, in which individual, national, and even racial distinctions stand subordinate to universal qualities of the human mind. The second principle concerns the relation of myth to history. It is true that the search for mutilated and mystified traditions of real events, which formed so main a part of old mythological researches, seems to grow more hopeless the farther the study of legend extends. Even the fragments of real chronicle found imbedded in the mythic structure are mostly in so corrupt a state, that far from their elucidating history they need history to elucidate them. Yet unconsciously,

and as it were in spite of themselves, the shapers and transmitters of poetic legend have preserved for us masses of sound historical evidence. They moulded into mythic lives of gods and heroes their own ancestral heirlooms of thought and word, they displayed in the structure of their legends the operations of their own minds, they placed on record the arts and manners, the philosophy and religion of their own times, times of which formal history has often lost the very memory. Myth is the history of its authors, not of its subjects; it records the lives, not of superhuman heroes, but of poetic nations." (i, 375, 376.)

The remaining branch of Mr. Tylor's argument is the subject of Animism. This is the *summum opus*. It is of very great interest, and occupies the whole of the second volume, together with the closing chapter of the first.

The term is not a new one, but for the purposes of this argument is appropriated to the general notion of the spiritual side of human thought, man's beliefs and emotions with respect to the supernatural and his own relation to it. The lowest elementary definition of religion is taken to be "the belief in Spiritual Beings." We cannot positively affirm, as some have, that there are tribes which are utterly destitute of religious notions, and have no vestiges of even superstitious rites, and if we could it would make no material difference in our general conclusion: but it would be obviously unfair to set the criterion of religious belief higher than this. Different tribes may work out their own religious ideas into widely diverse creeds and observances, but what we want is to start with that and only that which is common to them all. "So far as I can judge," says Mr. Tylor, "from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races, with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance, whereas the assertion of absence of such belief must apply either to ancient tribes, or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones. The exact bearing of this state of things on the problem of the origin of religion may be thus briefly stated. Were it distinctly proved that non-religious savages exist or have existed, these might be at least plausibly claimed as representatives of the condition of man before he arrived at the religious stage of culture. It is not desirable, however, that this argument should

be put forward, for the asserted existence of the non-religious tribes in question rests, as we have seen, on evidence often mistaken and never conclusive. The argument for the natural evolution of religious ideas among mankind is not invalidated by the rejection of an ally too weak at present to give effectual help. Non-religious tribes may not exist in our day, but the fact bears no more decisively on the development of religion than the impossibility of finding a modern English village without scissors, or books, or lucifer-matches, bears on the fact that there was a time when no such things existed in the land." (i, 384.)

Here begins the long patient survey of the immense field. The main subject differentiates at once into two great branches, the doctrine of individual souls, and the doctrine of spirits in general, including all grades of deities. And the two issue together in one practical result, the production of some form of worship. The moral element in religion is not included in the survey, because it so rarely enters into or grows out of the savage notion of spiritual things; and the facts examined are treated from the standpoint of human origin, "as being developments of Natural Religion."

In the lowest form of savage culture, souls belong not only to men and animals, but also to things. To begin with the most important:—"The conception of a personal soul or spirit among the lower races may be defined as follows: It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapor, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind to flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men, waking or asleep, as a phantasm, separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things." (i, 387.)

These conceptions are readily formed in the savage mind by crude speculation upon what appears to be actual experience. The breath leaves the body when it dies; may not the breath then be its soul? The heart ceases to beat when the body dies;

may not the heart be the soul? Every man is accompanied by a shadow, and when he is dead and gone, that shadow is never seen again; may not that shadow be his soul, now departed to some other bourn? A person may have more than one soul. The Algonquins, for example, believe in two, the Chinese in three, the Dakotas even in four; and each of these notions may be matched in numbers of other tribes entirely distinct from each other in language and race. One or more of these souls may absent themselves from the body; if in sleep, that would account for the strange excursions made in dreams; if when the body is awake, that would account for its tendency to disease and the manifold risks of death. It is recorded that among the Fijians, in a case of fainting or even dying, the spirit can sometimes be called back, "and occasionally the ludicrous scene is witnessed of a stout man lying at full length and bawling out lustily for the return of his own soul." In dreams, the soul may not only go abroad on errands of its own, but may stay at home and receive visits from other souls. If so, it is not difficult for the savage to persuade himself that a "medicine-man" or sorcerer may acquire the power of sending his soul out into other regions while awake, and of summoning other souls into his presence: and this would open the gateway for the entire system of voluntary intercourse with the spirit-world—whether by way of trance, vision, wraiths, witchcraft, second sight, bargaining for the assistance of spirits, celestial or infernal, or whatever other machinery barbaric spiritualism might chance to develop.

Souls are as much alive after leaving the body as before. It follows that they must have wants in the spirit-world corresponding to their station here. Accordingly, food is carried to their graves, and they invisibly consume its invisible essence. Weapons are buried with them, their favorite animals are sacrificed, servants or captives are killed to wait upon them. Sometimes in after years other servants are dispatched to carry them messages. Even among so civilized a people as the Hindus, until lately, the widow must go after her lord by the fiery path of the *suttee*—a custom which many authors regard as a "survival" from ancient Aryan savagery. The existence of souls in animals and things makes it possible to equip the dead

for their career in the other life with the same furnishings they had in this. Anything buried with them, or burned for them, can be thus made a part of their celestial belongings. The spirit of the Indian hunter can still pursue the shades of buffalo and elk with the souls of the bow and arrows buried in his grave. Mr. Tylor gives the substance of an Ojibwa tradition or myth, which will illustrate many particulars in barbaric eschatology. "Gitchi Gauzini was a chief who lived on the shores of Lake Superior, and once, after a few days' illness, he seemed to die. He had been a skillful hunter, and had desired that a fine gun which he possessed should be buried with him when he died. But some of his friends not thinking him really dead, his body was not buried; his widow watched him for four days, he came back to life, and told his story. After death, he said, his ghost traveled on the broad road of the dead toward the happy land, passing over great plains of luxuriant herbage, seeing beautiful groves, and hearing the songs of innumerable birds, till at last, from the summit of a hill, he caught sight of the distant city of the dead, far across an intermediate space partly veiled in mist, and spangled with glittering lakes and streams. He came in view of herds of stately deer and moose, and other game, which with little fear walked near his path. But he had no gun, and remembering how he had requested his friends to put his gun in his grave, he turned back to go and fetch it. Then he met face to face the train of men, women, and children, who were traveling toward the city of the dead. They were heavily laden with guns, pipes, kettles, meats, and other articles; women were carrying basket-work and painted paddles, and little boys had their ornamented clubs and their bows and arrows, the presents of their friends. Refusing a gun which an overburdened traveler had offered him, the ghost of Gitchi Gauzini traveled back in quest of his own, and at last reached the place where he had died. There he could see only a great fire before and around him, and finding the flames barring his passage on every side, he made a desperate leap through and awoke from his trance. Having concluded his story, he gave his auditors this counsel, that they should no longer deposit so many burdensome things with the dead, delaying them on their journey to the place of repose, so

that almost every one he met complained bitterly. It would be wiser, he said, only to put such things in the grave as the deceased was particularly attached to, or made a formal request to have deposited with him." (i, 434, 435.)

The doctrine of the soul's existence after death is almost universally found in savage culture, and in all grades of it. It very naturally takes two distinct branches of growth as it develops into more specific forms of belief. One of these is the doctrine of transmigration through a series of bodies here; the other is the doctrine of a future spiritual existence in another world. The former is sufficiently familiar and need not be enlarged upon. The latter expands into "theories of lingering, wandering, and returning ghosts, and of souls dwelling on or below or above the earth in a spirit-world, where existence is modeled upon the earthly life, or raised to higher glory, or placed under reversed conditions; and lastly, the belief in a division between happiness and misery of departed souls, by a retribution for life, determined in a judgment after death." (ii, 21.)

The place of existence too is almost as definite in savage theology as the existence itself. Different tribes may have different locations for the souls of their departed friends, but they agree in having a location somewhere. With some it is an under world, entered through some cave, or by way of the sea. The literature of the subject abounds with traditions of visits to this under world by favored mortals who have returned to tell of their strange adventures; and these tales are not found in savage myth alone, but very abundantly in classic mythology, and even in mediæval Christianity. With other tribes the place of the dead is not under the earth, but on its surface, in impenetrable forests, among secluded ranges of mountains, or on distant islands. There is a curious Tongan legend, that a canoe driven out of its course once landed on the island of the gods, where the choicest of fruits and flowers and game, when taken for the use of the immortal inhabitants, were instantly renewed, but were too shadowy for the hungry sailors to get hold of; and they found too, to their amazement and terror, that the souls they met walked directly through their solid bodies, even as they themselves walked without

resistance through the shadowy houses and trunks of trees. Another location for the dead has been discovered by savage thought in the sun and moon; a theory not entirely unknown to speculators of higher pretensions. And still another has been found in or beyond the skies. The argument we are tracing gathers up all the details which are given in illustration of each of these points, in order to maintain that they cannot be referred to any single primeval form of religion, to any original revelation, since they bear internal evidence of having risen independently of each other, among separate tribes who worked them out according to the genius of their own character.

The manner of life attributed to the souls which have taken their journey into the spirit-world, is almost invariably made up of the employments which occupy them here. Their identity will be the same, their wants the same, their amusements the same. The influence of the conduct here upon the life there scarcely enters into their dream. Most tribes on the lower savage level have no notion whatever of anything retributory in the awards of the future state. That idea is a later growth; and even then produces its effect rather upon the hopes and aspirations of the barbaric mind than upon the character and the life.

The field of view here widens out from the study of souls and their destiny into the doctrine of spirits in general. In savage thought, not only is the transition easy, but the separation of the two would be unnatural. Souls are spirits. And indeed departed souls are spirits of such power and sometimes of such malignancy, that among some tribes they are driven away and hedged out from their former haunts by every device known to savage invention, among others they are appeased by presents and offerings, among others still they are worshiped. Hence ancestor-worship, as among the Chinese, and patron-saints, as among the Catholics. Hence come also savage notions of demoniacal possession, diseases inflicted by spirits, oracular responses given in a state of rhapsody or trance. The prodigious power exerted upon the pagan mind by what we call Fetichism, is due to the spirit which resides in the fetich, or is manifesting itself through that physical me-

dium. The transition from Fetichism to the actual worship of the objects containing the spirit, is easy. From this to regular and permanent idolatry is also easy; that is, to the worship of images, purposely made to be the residence of such beings, or to represent their functions, or to symbolize their presence.

In barbaric mythology there is a vast hierarchy of spiritual powers, from the lowest grades of elf, fairy, genii, imps, demons, up to the highest gods. All these are conceived as of like nature and character to man, and as busying themselves not only with man, to help or harm him, but also with the movements of nature. The doctrine of spirits therefore affords a ready solution to the otherwise inexplicable phenomena which the savage is daily experiencing or witnessing. All the universe swarms with spirits. His own dwelling is infested. By night come the incubi, the succubi, the vampires, the earth-men, the witches; and he kindles fires or strews ashes to keep them off. There are patron-spirits, there are familiars, there are guardian angels, there are good and evil demons contending for his soul. So in nature. Every fountain, river, forest, lake, or mountain has its resident deity. In every whirlpool dwells some demon ready to suck everything down its gorge. Every volcano has its fire-god. Every dangerous reef is haunted by its rapacious Scylla or Charybdis. Even the wild beasts around him are possibly inspired by some deity, and at any rate are animated by souls more strong and more ferocious than his own, and it behoves him to do them reverence. In large classes of these objects he observes the same effects constantly recurring; this sets him to thinking that instead of a fetich to each object there may be some one deity presiding over the whole class; and so by the savage and yet entirely scientific process of generalization he reaches the conception of a species-deity or class-deity; and thence, by easy grades, he rises to a sense of still higher and supream beings. These last are the lords of the spiritual hierarchy. They are the chieftains of the spirit-world. They rule over spirits, as spirits rule over things. The rain-god, the thunder-god, the wind-god, the heaven-god, the earth-god, the sea-god, the fire-god, the sun-god, the moon-god, and divers deities who preside over the events and experiences of life,

such as the gods of war, husbandry, marriage, child-birth, death, and the like—these are superior gods known almost universally throughout the range of savage culture. They are known by different names, and their functions are not always discriminated, but the general conception of them is much the same. But the generalization does not stop with these. The higher growths out of Polytheism often tend toward a distinct dualism, a supreme pair of deities, perhaps suggested by the coupling of antagonisms which are constantly seen in nature, as light and darkness, day and night, health and disease, joy and pain, life and death—the good deity being at the head of the hierarchy of all things good and prosperous, the evil deity heading the kingdom of darkness and pain. Perhaps the most finished example of this dualism is found in the Ormuzd and Ahriman of Zoroaster. Nor does pagan theology rest with a duality of gods. It caps the summit of the structure with Monotheism. Even in the barbaric mind the force of generalization, the hunger for explanation, the search for a cause, sometimes reach far enough to suggest a primacy among the gods. It may well be that different tribes shall have different reasons for assigning the One God his solitary place over all as the Supreme; with some he may be the First Cause, with some simply the Creator, with some the Great Spirit, with some the sovereign Ruler, with some the one Soul of the universe. But the conception is there, in whatever shape and under whatever name. The great problem is, how it came there? Mr. Tylor, from ethnographic induction, answers that it is there by evolution out of savage animism. If that is the last appeal, be it so. No heart of faith need tremble lest, if it were so, it might damage the ground of trust. Whatever is *proved*, the Christian may accept as confidently, as eagerly, as any one; it will not be found to be at real variance with the revealed Word. But so far as appears, the answer of that Word is, that in the beginning the Supreme made himself known to man, and wherever now we find traces of that monotheism among savage people, it is a "survival" from that primeval revelation.

The investigation of Animism is completed by a very interesting inquiry into some of the rites and ceremonies by which the nations express their religious sentiments. There is a busy

communication kept up with these invisible beings. Their favor is to be invoked. Their power to harm is to be averted. Their wrath is to be appeased. Their wants are to be supplied. Their aid is to be secured. Their might and majesty are to be acknowledged and adored. The methods of approaching the spirit-world for these purposes have settled into certain well-defined observances common to all nations. The principal of these Mr. Tylor selects for examination. They are prayer, sacrifice, fasting and other methods of artificial ecstasy, orientation or worshipping toward the east, and lustration. All these are shown not only to exist in various shapes in almost all barbaric creeds, but to have "survived" and pushed forward into the higher culture, in which indeed most of them have received a large expansion and refinement. For the purposes of the present paper it will be sufficient to outline a single one of the whole group. We will take the rite of sacrifice. Mr. Tylor begins with the most rudimentary and therefore most likely the primitive notion contained in an offering to the gods, namely, the notion of a gift. A child makes a gift without stopping to question whether it may be acceptable to the receiver, or in any way of use to him. So does the savage. If the offering he carries to his fetich satisfies his own idea of what may be proper and suitable in the premises, little need he reckon as to the sentiments of the fetich itself. This crude transaction may at first suffice. But each higher level of culture lifts him into a little higher region of philosophizing on the subject. What becomes of his gift? How does the fetich appropriate it? If it is a libation to the sun-god, he can see it diminish day by day, as the fiery god drinks it up. If it be an offering to the ocean, he can see the ocean engulf and devour it. If it be to the spirit which inhabits beast or fowl, he can see his gift borne away and consumed. But if his fetich is a stomachless stone, how can he feed that? By what means can his solid idol be made to partake of the heart or blood of a slain enemy? The doctrine of souls will doubtless bridge the difficulty in his logic. The spirit in the idol can take the soul of the thing offered, and leave the body. Let the body then go to the dogs and birds; all that is precious in it, its essence, has gone to the gods. But may not this process be

facilitated? If the offering be burned, will not the more volatile shape in which it ascends to the gods make the transfer of its spirit to them more easy and more certain? This would account for burnt-sacrifice and incense, both of which were perpetuated for centuries in the Hebrew ritual. "The view of commentators that sacrifice as a religious rite of remote antiquity and world-wide prevalence, was adopted, regulated, and sanctioned in the Jewish law, is in agreement with the general ethnography of the subject. Here sacrifice appears not with the lower conception of a gift acceptable and even beneficial to deity, but with the higher significance of devout homage or expiation for sin." (ii, 350.)

With the growth of culture the gift-theory rises into a higher motive on the part of the worshiper. If, as has been shown, the savage notion of spirit is modelled on the attributes of man himself, then the savage offers to his fetich just as he would offer to his neighbor, or to his chief. Sometimes the gift would mean simply a gift, sometimes an offering of good will, sometimes an act of homage, sometimes recompense for injury, sometimes pacification of wrath. The sacrifice begins to gather into itself a certain element of obligation on the part of him who offers, and on the other hand, becomes of more worth to the deity the more costly it is to the worshiper. Thus the history of the rite grows from the primitive gift-theory through the homage-theory into this last and highest form, which Mr. Tylor terms the abnegation-theory. But even this receives a singular modification in the practice of substitution which has grown out of it. Costly rites become too costly and too burdensome. Indolence and economy suggest that the load be lightened. Sometimes therefore a part is offered for the whole, sometimes the less instead of the greater, sometimes a single object as the symbol of many, sometimes a similar cheaper object instead of the more costly, sometimes simply an effigy of the offering which is really due. The residuum of these ideas is still to be found projected far into modern culture and unconsciously modifying the ideas and even the practices of large portions of the civilized world. The most notable instance of its survival is in the sacrifice of the Mass as observed even now throughout papal Christendom. And "the natural conclusion of an eth-

nographic survey of sacrifice, is to point to the controversy between Protestants and Catholics, for centuries past one of the keenest which have divided the Christian world, on this express question, whether sacrifice is or is not a Christian rite." (ii, 371.)

The enquiry into the history and primitive significance of Rite and Ceremony concludes the author's study of the great subject of Animism; and this completes the argument. The results are not harvested in a sum total at the close, but are supposed to have been gleaned by each reader in his own progress over the immense fields of fact spread before him. A single very brief chapter points out a few of the directions in which the ethnographic methods of investigation ought to be used, and some of the subjects to which it ought to be applied.

The beliefs which are held at our present stage of culture are not always founded on reasons. Some are growths from previous opinion, beginning perhaps at a period remote and unknown; but being in harmony with the nature of things are recognized as valid. Still others, coming down from perhaps more distant sources, have no foundation in reason or in nature, have drifted down to us across untold centuries of barbarism, are mere survivals from primeval savagery, and yet take their place in the common mind side by side with rational belief. What shall it profit us to discriminate these diverse portions of our mental furniture? Is the spell of fascination which these studies throw over the mind the only reward they afford? If researches into the history of an opinion should disclose the fact that that opinion had its source in savage myth, and has no other assignable ground, shall we only count it one of many curious facts, afford it a few moments of puzzled interest, and then relegate it to the limbo of forgetfulness? The tenure of opinions is a matter of far higher moment. If ethnography can show "what is received on its own direct evidence, what is ruder ancient doctrine re-shaped to answer modern ends, and what is but time-honored superstition in the garb of modern knowledge," its office is both honorable and necessary. The world of Christian culture cannot afford to run in the grooves first chiselled by the crude fancy of the pre-historic savage. Whether the test be applied to language or mythology, to mental philosophy or moral, to political science or legal, the student

will be surprised to find how far and in what way the great body of doctrines may have been modified by the persistent "survival" of traditionary ideas which should have no place in such company. This method would be of prime importance in such supreme questions as those of morality and religion. So many notions of rude primeval thought can be shown to have projected themselves into the mythologies of later culture and thence to have crystallized into dogmas of modern belief, so many aspects of doctrine seem to be not luminous with celestial light, but dim with the shadows of a savage dawn, that we do well to tread softly and warily over such hallowed ground. If a doctrine of ethics or of faith be true, by reason or by revelation, then, as King Henry said of the Bible, "in God's name let it go forth among the people:" but if it be only a "survival" from barbaric myth, the sooner religion is purged of it the better.

We are well aware that our task, now completed, may give to other minds a very imperfect and inadequate transcript of Mr. Tylor's views. It can be but an outline, and purposely abdicates any judicial office. Whether these views are in the main true, is a totally different question, and is for the present left undebated. No one can read history without admitting the correctness of both theories of culture, the progression-theory and the degeneration-theory. Which of the two is primary and which secondary, is a problem which the world even yet is hardly old enough and hardly wise enough to decide. Long in possession of an indubitable Revelation from God, the race has but just discovered the long-buried records of its own earliest life, and until these records are deciphered and compared, not only with each other and the Revelation, but also with all rational grounds of human belief, it may be premature to demand the hasty decision of a problem involving elements so many and so intricate, both of the natural and of the supernatural. We must wait for more light.

ARTICLE II.—IS SCHISM A NECESSITY?

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE RIGHT REVEREND A. C. COXE, D.D., BISHOP
IN WESTERN NEW YORK.

My dear Sir :

I cannot plead, in apology for addressing you thus publicly, that I am moved to it by the reading of your recent volume entitled *Apollos, or the Way of God*. It is my misfortune, and I feel it seriously, that I have not yet had the opportunity of reading the book, for I doubt not that it throws light on the subject on which I would speak to you, and answers in advance many of the questions which I wish to put. But as a matter of fact, I had already begun to put my thoughts and questions into the form of a letter to you, when I saw the announcement of your book. And my reason for this use of your name was that I knew you, through both public and private acquaintance, as the man who more than any other in the Episcopal Church in America cherishes an intelligent conviction of "High Church" principles, in conjunction with a warm love for all Christian believers, a "continual sorrow of heart" over the schisms by which they are divided from each other and miserably weakened in their work "for the whole estate of Christ's Church militant."

What is the subject upon my mind you have already conjectured. According to the direction from which it is viewed, it might be stated either as the restoration of the Episcopal Church to the communion of the Church Catholic; or, (in an aspect more obvious from your own point of view) as the facilitating of the communion of Christians generally with the Protestant Episcopal Church. But instead of attempting to define or discuss the subject in a general way, I beg your attention to it in the most practical form, as illustrated in a very needless and useless schism lately effected in the little community of American Christians residing at Geneva. There is nothing unprecedented or even unusual in the facts of this case. I mention them simply in order to bring the subject fairly into view.

There has long existed among the American Christians at Geneva the desire for a church where they could unite in common worship. Of late, this desire has taken the form of a practical resolution. The movers in the enterprise were of various denominations; but so cordial was the good-will that the majority deferred to the preferences of the Episcopalians among them, and an Episcopal minister was invited to organize the congregation according to the forms of that denomination. This invitation having been declined, they proceeded at a later period, with the same fraternal spirit, to organize a church independently of any question of sect. The preferences of the Episcopalian brethren were still consulted in the order of public worship adopted. A convenient place of worship was engaged; the services of a diligent, earnest, and able pastor were secured and his support pledged; regular services were begun; and plans were at once laid for building an American church-edifice.

These arrangements had been completed only a few weeks, when a zealous Episcopal minister, who was residing at the time in Italy as a missionary for the promotion of Christian union, hastened to Geneva, got out his posters announcing a separate series of services, organized a separate congregation, started his opposition building-subscription, and seems now in a fair way, unless some good influence should interfere, to accomplish a permanent schism in the little population of American Christians in Geneva.

The most mischievous results of this schism were not obvious when it was first effected. It was during the brief season of summer travel, when, for a few weeks, Geneva is full of Americans passing to and fro, or sojourning for a short time. Accordingly, both services were well attended and well supported for the time. To be sure, as a matter of taste, it was not pleasant to see the less honorable features of American church-life so distinctly protruded before the observation of people abroad;—the “running” of rival churches on the principle that “competition is the life of business;”—the rival show-bills displayed in public places side by side, the new one quite eclipsing the old in dimensions, with an air of “no-connection-with-the-shop-over-the-way;”—the business-like cards in circulation at

hotels and boarding houses;—the gentle bragging and “tout-ing” on the part of the friends of the respective enterprises, mingled with faint praises, almost fading into civil disparagements, of the rival undertaking—all this is sufficiently astonishing to the European mind, which is just now very earnestly intent in studying the American method of conducting religious institutions; and it is not gratifying to the pride or the conscience of all Americans.

But now that the summer torrent of travel has run by, the mischiefs of this schism become more apparent. The congregations are dwindled to a few meagre dozens a-piece, each comforting itself in its scantiness with the probability that the other is still smaller. Contributions and subscriptions decline—the zeal of some to give for strife's sake being balanced by the disgust of others at the wanton waste, and worse than waste, of money required for sustaining the schism. Of course, the temptation (however successfully it may have been, thus far, resisted) to the ill feelings commonly attendant upon schism, is increased. And if this is so now, what will it be when the tug of building begins?—when the monuments which are to perpetuate this scandal, and hold it continually in public view, begin to rise painfully from their foundations?—when each party begins to feel in its pocket the inconvenience of the existence of the other party?—when over every stranger of uncertain allegiance and large means there arises a contention as over the body of Moses, and the fancy-fairs and pious lotteries begin to flourish, to the glory of God and the edification of the Church?

It will be alleged that this state of things is compelled, in the circumstances, as the inexorable result of the conscientious principles of the dominant party in the Episcopal Church. If this is so, there is nothing more to be said in the hope of accommodation. We cannot ask for a sacrifice of principle. We must respect, how much soever we may lament it, a schism for conscience' sake, in which there is no schismatic spirit, and must make up our minds to the suspension of all religious intercourse and common worship between Protestant Episcopalians and the rest of the Church Catholic, imputing it to their principles and not to themselves, and viewing it as the reduction of those principles *ad absurdum*.

But is such non-intercourse necessarily a matter of principle? Is there no possible *modus vivendi* according to which the American Episcopalians in one of these transatlantic colonies may without sin join in common worship with their fellow-Christians of the same country and language? It seems to me that the inquiry has never been thoroughly and candidly made, unless, peradventure, it has been made in your recent volume entitled "Apollos." The attempts at solving it seem to me to have been made with no adequate understanding of the differences involved, or else with no respect for them. Permit me to say for myself, in apology for this new Eirenikon, that I have no disrespect even for the exclusivism of High Church Episcopalians. I regard it as the only effective practical protest extant against the prevailing "evangelical" heresy that the normal state of the Church universal is schism; that sects are a good thing, so that the more sects you can have (within reasonable limits) the better; and that the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, consists properly of a series of strenuously competing denominations, maintaining diplomatic relations and exchange of pulpits; "sinking their differences" in a Tract Society that agrees to be mum on all controverted points; and meeting occasionally in an "Alliance." So long as this continues to be the highest prevalent conception of Christian fellowship, we need the protest of High Churchism, in its most uncompromising form, in favor of the organic unity of the Christian Church. I would not have that protest made one whit less effective. I do not believe that a protest against schism is less effective for not being made in a schismatic spirit. I do not believe that the usefulness or the dignity of the Episcopal Church (as represented in its dominant party) would be in the least impaired by its asserting its principles courteously and affectionately towards other Christians, with some expression of regret when difference of principle seems to involve the necessity of separation; and by its doing its best to free itself from the reproach of being the most pushing, elbowing, scrambling, and unscrupulous of all the sects. I believe that its best mission, that of asserting the necessity of appointed *forms* of permanent Christian fellowship, can be fulfilled in such wise as not to offend the *spirit* of Christian fellowship. I have often

found much of the poetry and theory of Christian communion among Episcopalians, and often a great deal more of the practical spirit among non-Episcopalians. The former have so worthy a desire for fellowship with the Church of the Fourth Century that they are ready, for the sake of it, to live in practical isolation from the actual Church of the Nineteenth Century. They are so earnestly (though hitherto vainly) desirous to open some special relations of communion with Old Catholics, or Greeks, or Armenians, three or four thousand miles away, that they tear themselves asunder with alacrity from their own fellow-countrymen and fellow-Protestants.

The things which hinder Episcopalians from common worship with their fellow-Christians generally, may be summed up under three heads: 1. Conditions of Communion. 2. Ritual. 3. Authority of the Ministry.

1. In respect to the conditions of communion, the only thing of the nature of a principle that need be waived by Episcopalians is waived already, in their actual practice. I refer to that expressed in the rubric at the end of the Confirmation-service, to the effect that "there shall none be admitted to the holy Communion until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed." The effect of this rubric, if followed, would be to make the Episcopal Church a close-communion corporation, like the American Baptists. By a happy inconsistency, which shows how easy it is to find a way through a rule, if there is only a will, this rubric is commonly, not to say generally, set aside whenever it is found to work inconveniently. On the other hand, the pernicious use of formularies of dogma as a ritual for receiving candidates for the Lord's Supper, which has spread from the Congregationalists into so many of the Evangelical communions of America, is practically abandoned by them whenever occasion requires.

2. The subject of *ritual* might seem to be one of great difficulty. If Episcopalians can not agree about it among themselves, how can they hope to agree with the rest of the Church? But I believe that practically there is no serious difficulty about it. There was once a difference of *principle* between the parties. That was when it was held by all Puritan churches

that human compositions in divine worship were forbidden. The contest over this tenet was fought out for American Christendom a hundred years ago, on the question of using Watts' Hymns. It lingers among us to-day only in a dwindling sect of Scotchmen, and in a few feeble minds which are capable of believing that what is tolerable and even edifying in verse, becomes an offense in prose.

On the other hand, is there anything of the nature of *principle* to forbid Episcopalians from joining in worship otherwise than in their own forms? A canon (i, 20) indeed forbids Episcopal ministers ever to preach or to conduct worship except with the use of the Common Prayer without interpolation. But it does not appear that even the letter of this regulation, far less anything worthy to be called a principle, forbids the use of other acts of worship after the "Common Prayer" is ended. The only thing which excludes these, is the excessive length of the three services in one which are prescribed for every Lord's Day; and the ingenuity of Episcopalian ministers has not been employed in vain in discovering ways of keeping the law and shortening the service at the same time. Doubtless there are Episcopalians who without due reflection have adopted the notion that the Prayer-Book, as they have become accustomed to it, together with the pattern of a black and white gown, was showed to Moses in the mount. But happily, in the case of congregations of Americans abroad, it is not with minds of this class that one has chiefly to do. The traveled or traveling Christian is ordinarily of a more liberal mind than the average domestic parishioner. Christians of the non-liturgical denominations have shown a cordial disposition to use liturgical forms, not, as I think, from a mere willingness to humor the preferences of others, but in part from a hearty appreciation of the good that is to be found in such means of worship. It is not too much to hope that, in assemblies for common worship with other Christians, Episcopalians, although trained habitually to look too exclusively on their own things, and not on the things of others, might learn to appreciate what it is in other modes of worship which so holds the affection of the vast majority of American Christians, including multitudes of those honored for the highest culture, the deepest learning, the most

fervid and apostolic piety. I do not believe that any wider modifications of the Prayer-Book order of worship would be needed to unite the prayers and praises of the great multitude of American Christian travelers or sojourners in Europe, as they find themselves together for a longer or shorter time, than such modifications as are already allowed and practiced in Episcopalian congregations, together with such as you would yourself acknowledge to be desirable for their own sake, or in view of the peculiar circumstances and character of the congregations, to be provided for. What these might be I will indicate by-and-by.

3. We come now to the only real difficulty in the case. It is, of course, the claim, made in behalf of episcopally-ordained ministers, of exclusive authority to administer the word and sacraments of the New Testament. This difficulty is real and great. It is not to be evaded by pretending not to see it, or by treating it otherwise than as a serious and conscientious conviction in the minds of many by whom it is alleged. Not the slightest progress towards the solution of it is made by means of occasional departures from the ordinary Episcopalian usage on this point by persons who do not feel the difficulty in their own minds. But there is certainly no hope of solving it by the process of persuading American Christians generally to agree in putting any kind of slight or affront upon the great body of the most beloved and honored of American ministers of the gospel, and to enter into arrangements by which they are to be forbidden to minister in the congregations of their fellow-countrymen abroad. The successful reconciliation must guard from infraction the principles held by many Episcopalians, without excluding from a share in the services of these mingled congregations of sojourners the approved ministers of other denominations. Such a reconciliation, if only there is a will for it, is not impossible.

There are two suggestions, familiar already to thoughtful minds in the Episcopal Church, which bear upon the problem : (1) That the functions of teaching and leading the worship of Christian assemblies is not necessarily a *peculium* of the priesthood. (2) That it may be possible to confer the authority implied in Episcopal ordination upon ministers of other commu-

nions. I may add to these (3) that it might be possible for ministers of other communions, in some circumstances, to accept episcopal ordination, becoming loyally responsible to the bishop for all such acts as they should perform by virtue of it, if they were not thereby to be cut off from the general fellowship of the Christian ministry; and (4) that the importance, especially in these foreign congregations, of having some better guard against the intrusion of unfit persons into sacred functions than is afforded by the ordinary constitution of a "Union Church" would be cordially appreciated by wise men of all the uniting confessions, and most of all, I venture to say, by the foreign chaplains themselves.

To bring all this down to practical details, let us take the case of this little Community of American Christians in Geneva which it is proposed to split into two fragments, competing, striving, advertising, bragging, quarreling,—for it is not easy to have two churches, in a community which is barely large enough for one, without these results. Let me sketch the outline of a practicable union among them which would involve no sacrifice of principle.

1. Let there be no "organizing of a church," according to a practice very commonly followed. This useless procedure raises a great many questions which need not be raised at all—questions both dogmatic and ecclesiastical. All that is needful, practically, is a house of worship and a pastor for this group of travelers and sojourners. The effort to bring the various Christians together for common worship will be all the more fruitful if it is contented with this one object, and seeks for nothing beside, except what comes freely of itself. It is enough, to begin with, that the congregation of believers meet every Lord's day for the worship of God and the hearing of his gospel. If that is all that they can agree upon, let us be thankful for so much as that. It is not a small thing that they should look one another in the face as fellow-Christians, and join their voices in common praise and prayer. If for all the rest they must separate—if the old painful experience of the Church through all the ages of its captivity must be renewed, and that rite which should have expressed the general fellowship of the Church—its holy communion—must needs be used again as

the occasion and symbol of its dissensions—if when all the rest come with one accord into one place to eat the Lord's Supper, Episcopalians and Baptists must for conscience' sake refrain, and assemble for their separate rite,—then let us be thankful for so much of fellowship as we can attain unto, and greatly honor the conscientious fidelity which, having gladly conceded all it can to Christian love, pauses where it must in obedience to Christian duty.

If a way be found by which the fellow-worshippers can also, with a safe conscience, be fellow-communicants, there need be no provision or local rule for "admitting to the church" by public rite. If penitent believers be invited, any penitent believer may come to the Lord's table. And nothing need hinder any new communicant from seeking preparatory counsel from ministers of his own preference, or confirmation from a bishop when opportunity should offer.

All subordinate organization—for Sunday school, for charitable work, etc.; might be left to grow up of itself, providing perfect freedom and every facility for division whenever it was found difficult to work together. With such freedom, divisions would rarely occur, and when they did occur would not necessarily involve a general split of the whole community.

2. In the matter of Ritual, something would have to be conceded by Episcopalians, I do not say to the prejudice or preference, but to the *conscience* of Christians generally. As a matter of *conscience*, these would not ordinarily be contented with forms which, compiled in an age before the awakening of the missionary spirit among Protestants, make no adequate provision for prayer for the extension of the Church, and the conversion of the world to Christ; and which interdict the congregation from "praying the Lord of the harvest that he would send forth laborers into his harvest." I do not think that they would do right to be satisfied without the privilege of praying for the supreme civil authority of their own country. The mistake made by the American editors of the Common Prayer, of substituting for the prayer for the King a prayer for the President, as if that were equivalent, would have to be rectified in some way. For especially at those times of solemn election at which the power delegated for awhile to temporary functionaries re-

verts to the hands of the supreme People, and great issues, involving even the interests of the kingdom of Christ, may be hanging upon their imperial decision, the conscience of a Christian citizen craves the privilege of praying, according to the spirit of the apostle's injunction, for the People "as supreme, as well as for presidents and governors who are sent by" the People. I might cite another instance of the need of larger liberty of prayer,—I mean the case of times of financial anxiety and distress, which are to modern society what drought and famine were to the old world. But for all these and other like cases no other provision would perhaps be necessary than such a provision for *time*, as is already available even under the strictest letter of your law.

The principal change necessary in order to give full scope to all needful accommodation, is that already authorized by a multitude of precedents in the Episcopal Church, both American and English,—to have the Litany, or the Ante-communion service, or both, at a different hour from the Morning Prayer and Sermon.

Some changes would commend themselves, I am sure, to your own mind, as desirable in view either of the *fluctuating* character, or of the *mixed* character of such a congregation.

For instance, in a fluctuating congregation, the compensating advantages of a systematic lectionary, which gives to a stable company of regular church-goers the substance of the Bible in the course of a year's morning and evening lessons, entirely disappear, leaving only the serious inconveniences of it. Furthermore, in a community in which (as often in these American communities in Europe) more than one formal service on the Lord's day may seem inexpedient, it would be mere servitude to some people's usage to take half the psalms in the Psalter at hap-hazard, and read these to the exclusion of the others. It would be equally "decent and in order" and much more "to the edification" of all parties, in the circumstances, to leave the selection of lessons and of psalms to the discretion of the minister.

And so in view of the *mixed* character of the congregation, could the highest "churchmanship" imagine a reason why the Psalter should be read in the quaint old "Bishops' Bible" ver-

sion, familiar only to Episcopalians, instead of in the version which is both familiar and dear to all English-speaking Christians?—or why it should be read in alternate verses, instead of in responsive parallelisms? Or is there any divine authority in the new Hymnal of the Episcopal Church which would make it binding on a congregation made up in large part of members of other communions, in case that congregation, on the whole, should find it too great a departure from their customary hymnody?

These are some of the amendments which suggest themselves when the question is how to adapt the Anglo-American order of worship to the best edification of such a mixed and fluctuating congregation as that of an American colony in Europe. They are certainly nothing very startling. If assented to by the proper authority in the Episcopal Church, would they sacrifice one atom of principle held by Episcopalians, or let go any thing that intelligent Episcopalians hold dear? They would make barely difference enough to show that the congregation was not a parish of the Episcopal Church in the United States; and this is just the fact which it would be important to have distinctly understood, on all hands.

3. The difficulties growing out of the claim of exclusive authority for episcopally ordained ministers are of two sorts: they relate either (1) to the stated pastorate, or (2) to occasional services.

(1.) With a *naïveté* which always wins my affectionate admiration, some Episcopalian clergymen suggest that the difficulty touching the pastorate may be completely solved by always giving that office to an Episcopalian—"He is acceptable to every one, you know, and nobody else would be acceptable to our people." I need hardly explain to you why this solution does not strike all minds as completely satisfactory.

A more complete solution may be sought in the suggestion, made long ago in the Episcopal Church apropos of a certain "Memorial," and repeated almost importunately since, in behalf of the Episcopal Church, in the interest of Christian Union—that the element of apostolic authority derived from succession should be introduced into the ordination of ministers of other communions. In the form in which this was first suggested—the

grafting upon the stock of the American Episcopal Church of vast branches, bigger than the stock itself—it was doubtless open to practical objections from both sides. But to the plan of extending this offer of ordination to “godly and well learned men,” designated to the exceptional duty of foreign chaplaincy, in order that they might be enabled to minister orderly and to edification to Episcopalian travelers and sojourners, as well as to others, there could be few objections from your side which would not also be objections to every act of Christian comity.

And the difficulties from the other side, which were obvious in the case of the “Memorial” proposals, would not prevail in the present case supposed. It was an unlikely thing that a great religious body, like the Methodist Church, for instance, after negotiation, deliberation, discussion, and vote, should come bending to its little sister consenting to have its illegitimate ministry validated by an improved mode of ordination. But it is not in the least unlikely that individual clergymen, and those of the highest worth, might gladly receive a special ordination for a special work. There are some few, indeed, who hold to a theory of apostolical succession through the presbyterial line, and to these few the proposal of an Episcopal ordination would seem like a disparagement of their former commission. But for my part, to receive the benediction of one of the chief pastors of another communion, with his commission to care for members of his own flock scattered abroad, would seem to me no more sacrilegious than for Paul and Barnabas, after years of apostolic and prophetic ministry, to receive the laying on of hands of their brethren when sent to the Jews of the dispersion.

It has never been claimed that belief of the special validity of Episcopal ordination was necessary as a condition of receiving such ordination.

Will you not explain to me wherein consists the good faith of those urgent invitations and expostulations repeated by high representatives of the Episcopal Church, yourself among others, to their brethren of other ministries, to remove the one great hindrance to Christian Union by accepting the free gift of the laying on of apostolic hands, which would make it right in conscience to recognize them as belonging to the true ministry of

Christ's Church? I am persuaded that there was an honest meaning in it, as in everything that I hear or read from you. It is impossible to think that all that was intended in that affectionate appeal in behalf of Christian Union was simply an invitation to come out of Babylon, pass a year's quarantine, and then reappear as one of the "inferior clergy" in search of an Episcopal parish. I am bound to presume that it contemplated some way in which one could share the fellowship of the ministry of the Episcopal Church without renouncing that of the Church Catholic.

I would fall back on this for a solution of the difficulty. Let the person designated as pastor of a foreign American congregation, when he happens to be of some other ministry than that of the Episcopal Church, on giving satisfactory evidence of his fitness, and satisfactory evidence that his special commission will be exercised in a generous and loyal spirit, be ordained—be reordained, if you like (the word need not scare any one)—to his special mission to the Episcopalian part of his flock.

(2.) The difficulty which relates to the occasional services of ministers of various Christian confessions, who from time to time may be sojourners at the place of the chaplaincy, is one not less important than that which relates to the pastorate. To you it is not necessary to explain the importance of it. No man feels it more distinctly. But I have no doubt that there are those in your denomination who in all simplicity and sincerity fail to understand why any should refuse to be satisfied with an arrangement on this basis: that the Reverend Mr. Cream Cheese, stopping over upon the grand tour, should be recognized as a clergyman, and that the most illustrious saints and teachers of the American Church—a Stoddard or a Schauffler on his return from apostolic toils and triumphs in the mission-field, a Woolsey, or a Hodge, a Simpson or a John Hall, rich from the exploration of Christian truth, or glowing with the joy of successful preaching—should be required to sit dumb, as not being validly ordained. If there be such, they ought to be made to understand that, even if it were an easy and graceful thing for their Christian brethren to repudiate beloved and venerated preachers of the Gospel for others just as good, the actual question would be on repudiating them for others ad-

mitted to be inferior. For on this point, although I purposely refrain from pressing it invidiously, I suppose that there is really no doubt whatever. It was remarked on to me, not long ago, with great emphasis by each of two of the most eminent dignitaries of the Church of England. The importance of this question, then, is clear. Happily, the solution of it is not far to seek. It lies in recognizing these two points:

First: That ordination to office in one church does not make a man minister of another church. Our principles do not differ with regard to this. When you and I were neighbor pastors in New York and Brooklyn, if I had come into your church, I should have been a layman there; and if you had come into my church you would have been a layman with us,—only I should have been at liberty, in accordance with the general and graceful usage of American churches, to recognize your official position in another church with acts of courtesy which you would have been forbidden by rules to reciprocate.

The inference from this principle is that no person, however ordained, would have any right to officiate in such a congregation as we are supposing, without being duly invited.

Secondly: That the functions of preaching and leading in public worship are not regarded as exclusively priestly functions, even by those who hold most strenuously that there is such a thing as a "changeable priesthood" in the Christian Church. Among such, it is a matter of rule and usage and good order that, in ordinary circumstances, these functions be discharged by those whom they recognize as priests. But the question is how to provide, not for ordinary circumstances, but for extraordinary; and it is very certain that in the Episcopal Church, under the most scrupulous administration, persons having no claim to sacerdotal character are invited, when occasion requires, to address religious congregations and to offer prayers.

But I do not think that any would desire that in a congregation so peculiarly situated the pulpit-door should be carelessly left open to any person presenting himself in a white cravat or with a claim to apostolic succession. I think it would be found a general convenience, in the circumstances, if it were understood that the chaplain's *general* rule, on this point, to be departed

from only for good reason, was to invite into his place only persons furnished with recommendations from a Committee in America in which the government of the Episcopal Church would naturally be represented.

I trust that I have said enough to show that no *principle* stands in the way of the healing of such a poor, pitiable little schism as the Episcopal Church, through its representative and missionary, has effected in the American community at Geneva. And yet I have not written with sanguine hopes of a practical result. For I fear that the ready answer to all such suggestions will be—must be, perhaps—a *non possumus*; that the Episcopal Church, and each of its bishops and ministers, are so bound by rules to one narrow and invariable method of operation, that with the best will in the world it is impossible for them to depart from it. I am afraid this is so. I am afraid that the dominant party in the Church has bound itself as under a doom to hold its “high” pretensions in connection with a policy which impeaches them of holding those pretensions, I will not say with conscious insincerity, but with dubious conviction and palpable unfaithfulness. For “high” principles can not be held in righteousness, except in connection with a broad policy. The claim to be the one Catholic Church for America, to which the allegiance of every baptized American is due, implies the duty of putting no wanton or arbitrary hindrance in the way of such allegiance. The pretension to be trustees of a grand deposit of sacramental grace, on which the salvation of the souls of the whole people largely depends, carries with it an awful responsibility for making this grace freely accessible to all,—for opening conduits in all directions, that it may flow forth without hindrance to every soul that will receive it. The “Evangelical,” who holds that there is a legitimate way to heaven through the Presbyterian or Methodist Church, and that no one is bound to be an Episcopalian unless he prefers it, might innocently enough insist on rigid and narrow laws within his church concerning non-essential matters,—that there shall be one set of prayers, one hymn-book, one cut of gown, one code of dogma, one school of preachers—and that those who do not like these may seek some other fold. But the High-Churchman, who believes that there is no true fold but his pin-

fold, can not act thus without condemning himself of horrible sin, against God and against humanity. And yet it is thus that he does act—for it is he who controls the policy and makes the laws of his Church. He calls to all his fellow-countrymen to come into the ark of safety, but stands himself in the door-way to see to it that none get in except on condition of conforming to his own notions of etiquette. Of all the religious bodies that claim to be nothing but parts of the Church, do you know of any which pursues a policy so rigidly narrow with regard to mere circumstantial and non-essentials as that body which claims to be itself the Church Catholic for the United States?

It would be wrong to infer from this policy that the notions with which it is associated are held insincerely. But it can not be unjust to infer that they are not held, in general, with any great depth or thoroughness of conviction.

And after all, is the divisive, schismatic course so often pursued in the name of the Episcopal Church, really a matter of principle at all? Is it a sort of thing that is amenable to serious argument? Is there not reasonable ground to fear that the course of action in that Church has been controlled, to an extent of which its best men have been unconscious, by a very different class of people, whose influence tends to oppose any acts of accommodation or courtesy towards other Christians, however wise or right. These are people who have a keen relish for schism for its own sake. They like a select and exclusive church, and are willing to pay smartly for it, much in the same way in which they like a first-class car on a German railroad—not because it is any better or more respectable than the second class car, but because it keeps somebody else out, and so inspires in the person within a transient but pleasing sense of being a distinguished individual. It is from this class of our fellow-citizens (they abound in Europe) that we hear the frequent longing for established class distinctions in American society—a longing not unmixed with happy and assured convictions as to the grade to which, in that case, one would find one's self assigned. To such aspiring souls the distinctive privilege of being a fellow-communicant with my lord Tomnoddy, and of having a minute but indefeasible personal interest in the archbishop of Canterbury, brings tender feelings of gratitude for the

mercy that has so lifted them up, at least on Sundays, above the common lot of their fellow-republicans. Is there not reasonable ground to fear that there are enough of such people in the Episcopal Church to have insensibly affected its policy, and in some instances to have effected schisms for vanity's sake, or for schism's own sake, that never would have been begun for the sake of any serious principle. If there be a disproportionately large element of this sort in the Episcopal Church, I am well aware that the shame and blame of it must be borne in part by other denominations, from whose fold they have in many cases come forth. But I am unwilling to think that such feelings can be allowed to hold any lasting influence upon the policy of a considerable and respectable religious organization. I will not believe, except under the compulsion of facts, that the Episcopal Church is hopelessly committed to the policy of fomenting or maintaining such schisms as this which has occasioned the present letter.

If some solution of the question in hand could be reached, it would be a matter of great satisfaction and joy to the multitude of Christians of every name in America. It would confer vast additional power on the growing influence of American Christianity in Europe. But can there be a doubt that the chief gainer would be the Episcopal Church itself? In one view it would be a loser. These mingled congregations of American travelers and sojourners could not be added up into the statistics of sectarian growth. They could not be used as proselyting traps to catch wayfarers. They would afford no opportunity either to priest or to people of the Episcopalian sort for loftily making-believe that there are no other sorts of Christians in the world. There are minds doubtless to whom these will be fatal objections. But over against these might be set the blessings, both to the heart and to the intellect, which spring from "the communion of saints." It is impossible to read a "Church" newspaper, or frequent the conversation of "Church" circles in America, without feeling how hungrily that whole region of religious society needs to be liberalized by some actual fellowship with the Church universal. I do not doubt that you feel it more deeply than I do. The adjustment of terms of agreement for common worship among Christian travelers abroad

would be a safe and practicable beginning of such fellowship; and from this beginning what good things might possibly grow?

Do not think me insincere in arguing for the good of the Episcopal Church. Among its members and especially in its ministry are some of my most cherished friends. For my brethren and my companions' sakes, may peace be within its walls. Because of the house of the Lord our God, I will seek its good.

I do not speak as representing any party. For some years it has been my fixed purpose to belong to no sect, and not to be counted on either side in a schism. I come with my family to reside near this venerable city, and find that the congregation which should have been our spiritual home has been desolated by this wanton schism. There is nothing for me to do but to show, with every opportunity, that I count my brethren on both sides, and that my paramount love and allegiance is due to the whole and not to either fragment; to pray for the peace of Jerusalem; and at the same time to send forth this appeal to the quarter in which I am sure of a sympathetic hearing, and from which I do not despair of an influential response. Perhaps it will be deemed too late to heal this "hurt of Zion." Perhaps the mischief will have to go on aggravating itself with time, and be perpetuated and displayed in stone as a monumental scandal of American Christianity before the annual throng of European travelers. Perhaps there will have to be a race and scuffle of sects for the first foothold in the various frequented capitals of Europe, and a repetition of this edifying exhibition before the scorn of a wider audience. But I do not believe you will suffer it to be by your fault; and I know it will not be by mine. I have delivered my soul.

Faternally and truly yours,

LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON.

Petit Saconnex, Geneva, }
December 10, 1873. }

ARTICLE III.—THE EMOTIONS IN MUSIC.

WRITERS upon psychology have hitherto somewhat neglected the subject of emotion. The problem of knowledge has occupied their attention, almost to the exclusion of the problem of feeling. How we know, is a more important inquiry than how we feel; and hence far more has been written upon the human intellect than upon the sensibilities or even the will. Probably, too, far more has been written upon what might be called abstract psychology—upon the laws of thought, as these laws must rule the mental operations of all intelligent beings—than upon what we may call concrete psychology—or the science of mind as known to us, dwelling in and manifested by a bodily organism. The former might be a very good mental science for disembodied spirits, but the latter only could be of any practical use to us in the present stage of our existence. The science of the human mind, it is evident, must be intimately connected with the science of the human brain, and the human nervous system, by which mind finds expression and has the power of action. There is, indeed, a growing tendency, among thinkers and writers on these subjects, to study the mind and the body in connection, but they generally fall into one or the other of two opposite dangers. One class of thinkers, absorbed with the fact that the mind works through the brain and nerves, forget the part played by the corporeal organism, and ignore the fact that, as different tools do different work, and different instruments produce different music, though employed by the same hand, so the instrument of thought or of the expression of thought must necessarily modify, in some way, the operations of the mind inhabiting and using it. Some of them even go so far as to claim, explicitly or implicitly, that the most plainly corporeal desires and feelings, such as hunger and thirst, or the desire of sleep, or physical fear, or the shudder of disgust, pertain to the immortal spirit of man. On the other hand, another class go as far in the opposite direction, reducing all to materialism, making thought and feeling to be functions or secretions of the brain, and eliminating the immortal part altogether.

It is not the purpose of the present Article, however, to attempt to mediate between these two ways of viewing the phenomena of intelligence and feeling, or to try to decide precisely at what point matter ceases and mind begins, or *vice versa*. The former will accomplish itself. Materialism cannot continue to satisfy the human mind, for it ignores a most important class of phenomena, and hence is an incomplete philosophy, therefore no philosophy at all. And a psychology, which is applicable to disembodied spirits alone, which ignores the body and the brain, cannot thrive in this age, so full of material science, so noted for progress in physiology. "Psychology," says Pres. Porter, "is usually limited to the science of the human soul, in its connection with the human body." There can be no doubt that the two will be more and more studied in connection, and their mutual relations investigated. But to lay down the exact limits between the influence of each would seem to be a problem too difficult for human powers, and of little or no value in itself, but perhaps one that will be incidentally approached, and by successive approximations.

Perhaps the time will come when the philosophy of emotion will be revised, and more fully developed, and it will then probably be found that the physical system has far more to do with the emotions than with the intellectual powers. It is certainly far easier to conceive that a pure spirit, without the bodily machinery of expression, can think, reflect, and imagine, than that such a spirit could feel, without the corporeal means of impression. Perception may be an instantaneous act of the mind acting through the senses, and then the deductive powers may be busy in the matter for a long time, until some result is reached, whereupon the physical machinery must again be called upon to assist in its expression. It may be that light will be thrown upon this subject by the revival of the old distinction between the soul and the spirit.

According to this ancient and profound distinction, the soul (*ψυχή*), the necessary counterpart of the body and intimately if not inseparably connected with it, contains the principle of animal life, and is the seat of sense, feeling, and emotion; while the spirit (*πνεύμα*), independent in existence, lofty in its attributes, using the body as instrumental and subordinate, is the

seat of intellectual perception, reflection, intuition, and moral will or choice. Dr. Brown-Séquard has recently, in a course of lectures in Boston, defended the theory, "that there are two sets, or a double set, of mental powers in the human organism, or acting through the human organism, essentially different from each other. The one may be designated as ordinary conscious intelligence;" that is, he probably means, the power of sense—perception, emotion, etc.: "the other a superior power * * * which solves, sometimes suddenly, sometimes unexpectedly, nay even in sleep, our problems and perplexities * * * acting through us, without conscious action of our own." Prof. Agassiz, in quoting this theory, in the words given above, adds the suggestion, if we understand him rightly, that the former class of mental powers do not differ in kind from those of the lower animals. Doubtless these distinguished lecturers had in mind some such distinction as the ancient and scriptural one between soul and spirit. President Porter, in his work, *The Human Intellect*, says: "The term soul originally signified the principle of life or motion in a material organism. * * *

Traces of this signification may be distinctly discovered in the three-fold division of man into body, soul, and spirit, in which the soul occupies the place between the corporeal or material part, and the spiritual or noetic. * * * When the soul was limited to man, and signified the human soul, it came to designate by eminence those endowments by which man is distinguished from the animals, instead of denoting, as previously, those which he has in common with them." There is a debatable land between the soul and the body, by whatever name it may be called. And whether we call it the animal soul or the corporeal spirit, or if we divide it up between the mind and the brain, attributing some things to the activity of the one and some to that of the other, it will be found that it is to this debatable region that the emotions for the most part belong. And if the brain and the mind were each to claim its own, those emotions which are excited through the senses, by means of music for instance, would fall to the share of the physical organism.

It is universally admitted that the emotions, usually called by that name, such as love, anger, hatred, are complex, com-

prising much which is simply intellectual, and in no way emotional. Thus the perception of the loveliness or desirableness of the object loved, the selfish desire to enjoy or possess it, and the earnest purpose to satisfy this desire, all these are commonly joined together with what is properly called emotion, and the whole complex state of the mind is termed love. When the intellectual element has been eliminated, what remains may truly be called emotion, but in this emotion itself there must be distinguished two elements, one excited by the senses, by the sight or hearing of the object loved, a physical emotion, and the other aroused by the intellectual perception of excellence of character, or congeniality of tastes, or other lovable qualities. There is a valid distinction between sense-perception and intellectual perception, or thought. By the first I may see a man; by the other I may perceive some abstract relation in which he stands,—as, he is responsible for his actions, or, he is a member of the Church. In like manner, emotions may be divided into sense-emotions and intellectual emotions. A man who sees a stone falling down upon his head is filled with fear, perhaps utterly paralyzed by it. But this is entirely physical; the intellect, the spirit has nothing to do with it, as is shown by the fact that a brute is affected in the same way. One who hears of an act of injustice or cruelty is filled with indignation, but with this feeling the physical organism has nothing to do; it is purely intellectual. Using here the beautiful distinction between soul and spirit, we may say that each of the senses fills a double office; in one it is the servant of the spirit, in the other it is a direct avenue to the soul, a means by which the latter is subjected to emotional excitement. The spirit cannot come into direct contact with matter, but must have its royal messengers, its servants, whose reports are expressed in language, and being passed upon by the judgment, may be accepted or rejected. But the soul is open to direct impression, and has no choice but to be excited by that emotion whose appropriate cause is placed before the senses.

According to the ordinary usage of language, we speak of the emotions as excited by music, or, by the sight of beauty, or by sublimity. But if there is any truth in the above suggestions, it would be more in accordance with the true philosophy of

the subject to speak of the emotion of the ear, and that of the eye, or, of the auricular emotion and the ocular emotion. Music has a powerful influence upon the mind, so powerful that perhaps those who are susceptible to its power are incapable of analyzing it, just as an angry man is prevented by the heat of his passion from observing the phenomena of his anger, so as to describe them afterwards. But perhaps something may be found out by inquiring what experience any one susceptible to emotion of music passes through on being subjected to its influence. Its plaintive melodies and minor chords seem to fill his very soul with the deepest melancholy. Despair and despondency settle down upon his mind. A flood of sadness seems to enter at every avenue of his soul. His head droops, and the tears gather in his eyes, against his will, perhaps contrary to his efforts. But let the air or the harmonies change, let a quick movement begin, let rich chords and stirring combinations of instruments be introduced, and his sadness and despair vanish as quickly as they came, and a singular exaltation succeeds. The susceptible hearer seems to feel the music permeating every tissue of his brain. His eyes flash, his head rises and sways to and fro, keeping time with the music. It is not joy, not delight; it is ecstasy. Now these are evidently the two opposite poles of the same emotion. One is depression of the nerves, the other is exaltation; and the rapidity and certainty of the change from one to the other show, even if consciousness did not give the same verdict, that it is not the immortal spirit which is excited to joy, fear, sorrow, courage, or despair, but that these feelings are due to the depression or exaltation of the brain and nervous system through the ear, by means of music. Or, we may express the fact by saying, that it is the soul, the principle of animal life, which is affected by music, and not the spirit. It is also important to notice in this connection the fact that the partitions between these different forms of musical emotion are extremely thin; how thin, is best known by those who feel them most vividly. At the Boston Peace Jubilee, when the immense orchestra and vast chorus burst suddenly into the triumphant notes of Luther's grand choral hymn, a man seated in a prominent position in the gallery was observed to break into an uncontrollable agony of tears. Many

persons have experienced the same feeling, if they have not so yielded to it. An accomplished musician of our acquaintance was once challenged by a distinguished theological professor to make him weep, by the power of music. He soon brought tears to the professor's eyes by a performance upon the piano, which consisted, in reality, of Yankee Doodle in slow time. Beyond this mere impression upon the nerves, most of the power of music is derived from association, and not from the music itself. The liveliest national air is solemn enough to the exile. The plaintive wailing of the bag-pipes excites the Scot to a martial ardor and courage. Yankee Doodle, though a British burlesque, excites no anger, and, though an utterly trivial air, excites no contempt, in any American bosom; but long association has made it stirring and patriotic. "America," originally a Jacobite tune, excites our patriotic ardor now, quite as well as though it had not been composed to honor the exiled tyrant James. The Marseillaise hymn means nothing to us; to the Frenchman it is a frenzied excitement. These facts show that the principle of association must be carefully eliminated, if we would rightly understand musical emotion.

Another indication that there is but one emotion of music, is found in the fact that all who are susceptible to music at all are affected by it in the same way, allowance being made for whatever is the result of association. All are here on the same level; no difference exists, save in degree. The person of finely attuned and delicate ear and thorough musical culture is moved to tears or rapture, while the one of less subtle and delicate auricular mechanism, or less culture, is simply deeply moved. His spirits rise or fall as the character of the music changes; the same strange depression, the same divine-seeming exaltation, the same exquisite pleasure, are felt by both persons. If one feels music at all, it must be in the same way, with difference only in degree, according to nature or education. Moreover, those whose susceptibility has been improved by education, are conscious that their experiences in hearing music are the same in kind as when their perceptions were childish or uneducated. They have gained in the power, but more especially in the definiteness of the impressions which music makes upon them. If it be true that music excites in the mind different

emotions and different combinations of them, surely the infinite varieties of temperament and intellect ought to render the effects various beyond all computation or foresight. The same strains ought to excite one man to anger and another to grief, according to the nature of his mind, or his momentary previous feeling. But if there is only one emotion of music, it would exist in various degrees of force, delicacy, and cultivation, but the same in kind in all,—which we find in fact to be the case. And, if this is the true theory, we should expect to find some persons deprived altogether of this emotion, through some physical defect, or some missing link in the mysterious chain which binds body and soul together. And this too is actually the case. Many persons “have no ear for music.” It is hard to believe that such persons are created with all the emotions of their fellow men, but deprived of susceptibility to that mode of exciting them which is at once the most powerful, pleasureable, and beautiful. There may be some who never love, some who never hate, some who are not revengeful, but none are deprived of all passion or emotion; each one has some capability of being excited by external causes. Far simpler and more analogous with other phenomena is the supposition that the emotions which depend upon the senses form a class by themselves, and while each sense has its own peculiar emotion, one or more may be defective in its physical or psychical machinery, so that one man may listen unmoved to the most exquisite harmonies, and another may take in with his eye all the beauties and sublimities of earthly scenery with knowing it.

There are some interesting facts connected with the execution and composition of music which are in point here. The wonderful mechanical mastery displayed by some performers over their instruments, comes within the province of that curious principle of the coördination of motions, which is one of the most remarkable discoveries of modern physiology. For example, when a man walks, there come into play a large number of independent muscles. But the man does not will the alternate flexion and contraction of each of these muscles; he wills to walk, and this volition carries with it all the subordinate volitions of each separate muscle. This peculiar power,

called the coördination of motions, is said by physiologists to reside in a particular part of the brain, the cerebellum, and it lies at the basis of all improvement in mechanical skill of every kind. Of course, this same cerebellum presides over the mechanical part, the execution, in short the art of music. Without this no amount of practice would give skill, no brilliancy of talents could avail to produce anything more than the rudest music. The immortal part of man, then, seems to have nothing to do with the execution of music, as such.

The composition of music suggests a similar conclusion, though leading us into a higher region. For music as a science is strictly mathematical, that is, mechanical. Its precise division of time and its profound calculation of harmonies employ high mathematical talents. Precision in the performance and pleasure in the hearing, as well as facility and success in the composition of the higher class of music, depend upon the mathematical capacity of the mind. Great composers have often been men of the most splendid talents, nor can we doubt that in the composition of their sublimer works their vast talents have found the fullest scope.

The world is full of mysteries. The most common and simple operations of nature display forces beyond the ken of human science. Equally incomprehensible is the link which connects the soul with the body which it inhabits. It is impossible to explain how the will has power over the bodily organism, and in like manner we can never expect to understand how it is that certain sounds or sights fill the soul with emotion, without regard to association or expectation. In the case of spoken and written language we instinctively feel that its arbitrary signs are interpreted only by the intellect, the personal reason, and that whatever emotional or passionate excitement arises thence is a very different thing from the emotions excited through the senses, and results from, if indeed it does not consist in, a deep and absorbing perception of the relations, causes and consequences of the facts thus conveyed, aided, perhaps, by the imagination. Far otherwise is it in the case of music. No operations of the reasoning powers intervene, no arbitrary signs require interpretation, no volition and no imagination has anything to do with its effect. Through

the air and the physical system it reaches at once the seat of passion and feeling. No induction, no deduction, no reasoning, no conception, has anything to do with it. Music, subjectively considered, is purely sensuous.

Plato says that "harmony, melody, and rhythm, combined in music, flow from a corresponding state of the mind, and hence music tends to reproduce this state." This harmony of mind, this music of the spirit, is the end and ideal of Plato's philosophy,—as, indeed, is it not also of Christianity? And so, according to Plato, the perception of harmony and relation of sounds must fit the soul for perceiving the higher harmonies of the spiritual world, and excite its desire for them, thus elevating and purifying the mind. But Plato's soul-harmony has no resemblance to that ecstasy or intoxication which we call the excitement of the emotion of music. Yet it need not be demanded that in music, or in anything else, all pleasures of the senses should be despised and denied, and the highest speculative uses should be alone pursued. Pleasure is a good thing. The highest good is not stoical indifference. But let men understand that pleasure, even in the refined and elevated form of music, does not involve the exercise of the highest faculties, that emotion of this kind is not the noblest power with which we are endowed.

This pleasure of the senses should be considered as recreation, and is not worthy to be pursued as an end in life. For it is a fact conveying a useful lesson, and also confirmatory of our theory, that there are some who are consumed by what might be called the lust of the ear, corresponding to the lust of the eye which the Apostle Paul condemned. There are some who seem almost to live for no other end than to enjoy the delights of music. They know nothing of the spiritual uses found by Plato in music, for indeed Platonic souls are rare. They care nothing for the tender or lofty associations connected with the strains they worship,—they live for the titillation of the ear, as epicures for the pleasures of taste. They are music-mad. Music is to them both religion and culture, home, friends, and country. And while love and patriotism and duty and all higher sentiments are thus swallowed up in one absorbing pursuit and passion, they often contrive to be-

lieve that their course is the very one which raises them up to a spiritual elevation far above other men. Moreover, it is fashionable to imitate their raptures, and there is a cant in this worship, as in all others. One of these imitators, who had really but slight knowledge or taste in music, once said in our hearing, just after listening to a symphony of Beethoven: "Such music as that lifts me right up above this world; it burns away the human sin and weakness, and purifies and benefits me more than a thousand of your Calvinistic sermons about everlasting punishment." He was doubtless correct in supposing that his mind was not in a fit state to understand Calvinism or any other system of theology. And doubtless, too, he was guilty both of cant and bigotry.

Plato utters another important fact when he says that even a strong and vigorous mind becomes enervated, stupified, and weakened by exclusive cultivation in this direction. And how emphatically is this true now, when the new, modern art of music has been carried to so great perfection. The fact is, no one power of the human constitution can be exercised beyond measure without causing a deformity. Over indulgence of the imagination weakens the judgment. Perception being unduly cultivated, the exercise of the speculative reason becomes irksome and difficult. The astronomer's acuteness of eye is not likely to co-exist with the musician's accuracy of ear. The susceptibilities are not safe without the intellect. The man who lives in a world of feeling, of emotion, of sense-pleasure, cannot rise to any height of moral grandeur, will not meet boldly a great crisis in his fate, or resist nobly and successfully when assailed by temptation. While we admit that music has important intellectual and spiritual uses, we ought not to forget that its undue cultivation, as art, or science, or emotion, is unfavorable alike to intellect and to morals. But we need not on this account banish and condemn music, because others abuse or worship it. No! delightful music, companion of solitude, alleviation of sorrow, which gives expression to our joys, accompanies and assists our worship, shall be our recreation and a worthy attendant upon our festivities and religious services, but not itself worship, nor an object of worship.

The application of the above theory of the nature of music to its use in religious services is almost too obvious to be mentioned here. If music is entirely sensuous, its performance cannot be an act of worship. When we assemble in the house of God, the calming, solemnizing strains of music may serve to turn our minds away from every-day pursuits by soothing our weary brains with their sweetness. But let not the lascivious strains of the opera recall the most trivial pursuits at the most sacred hour, nor let the marvels of difficult execution and the display of perfect training excite astonishment and vulgar curiosity where only reverence or gratitude or contrition have any proper place. This is profanation of the house of God. Let music, too, enliven our social gatherings, but let it not be cultivated by those who care not for it, for mere purposes of display. This is profanation of a noble art, by vanity and foolish ambition.

ARTICLE IV.—BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

CHRISTIANITY is now involved in one of the sharpest conflicts with scepticism in which it has ever been engaged. The men who are making this latest attack on the claims of Christ are men of learning, if not of wisdom. Science and letters have been ransacked for the last thirty years to find material to advance against the religion which prevails over the civilized world, and which rules with marked force our New England thought. Among other branches of study, that which has for its object the comparison of the various religions of the globe has been called upon to bear witness. And notwithstanding the almost universal testimony of scholars to the unquestionable superiority of the Christian faith, it has been very much the fashion for a certain class of writers and speakers, such as those who have made Horticultural Hall in Boston their temple, to hold up in one hand Christianity to a rap and in the other hand Buddhism to praise. If they have not been in the habit of asserting the superiority of the latter over the former, they have been in the habit of dismissing their readers or their popular audiences with the impression that one was just about as good as the other. Out of this habit has come a vague scepticism which floats about in an intangible way, but which shows itself and cries aloud whenever some voice which is thought to be a voice of authority speaks words fitted to summon it from its invisible depths. We propose, therefore, as briefly as we can, to place before our readers the nature of the religion, the style of the morals, and the degree of the civilization, which Buddhism as the most conspicuous, and in some respects the highest, of all heathen religions, offers to mankind.

For this purpose we must begin with the life of its founder. It is a life of romantic interest, but for our purpose it has a deeper meaning than the romance which attends it. The dominating ideas of the religion grow out of the inner experience of its author. The pathos of a single life has cast a sombre hue over the lives

of millions. The struggle of one soul after truth, and its missing the truth, have plunged nations into error. Such consequences are involved in the errors of a single mind.

The author of Buddhism, according to that celebrated French writer, M. J. Barthelemy Saint Hilaire, who has given us a fascinating sketch of his life, was born toward the end of the seventh century before our era. Max Müller places his birth about seventy years later than St. Hilaire. His native city was Kapilavastu, the capital of a kingdom of like name, situated in Central India, at the foot of the mountains of Nepal, and north of the present Oude. This was his father's kingdom. The future Buddha was born a prince and heir to a throne. His mother, whose beauty won for her the name of Mayâ, or the Illusion, died seven days after his birth, that she might be spared, says the legend, "a heart broken at the sight of her son deserting his mother to wander as a religious devotee and a mendicant." The young prince bore in his boyhood the name of Siddhartha. But as he belonged to the family of the Cakyas, he became known later in life as the recluse of the Cakyas or Cakyamouni. The name Cramana Gautama, the ascetic of the Gotamas, comes in like manner from the name of the race from which he was descended. The name of the Buddha, or the Enlightened, is that which he himself assumed. We say the Christ. The Buddhist says the Buddha.

It may help us to realize the place of this remarkable man in history, if we call to mind that, at the date adopted for his birth by St. Hilaire, as well as by other high authorities, the foundations of Rome had only been laid about a hundred and thirty years—that in Buddha's time Daniel was a captive in Babylon, which was then in its glory under Nebuchadnezzar—and that the period of his activity falls more than two hundred and fifty years before that of Alexander the Great. As related to the other great founders of religious systems, he stands nearest in time to Confucius, who was perhaps born before an end was put to the career of the Indian sage. The age of Zoroaster is uncertain. Nothing more definite can be said than that, according as we follow different authorities, he precedes Buddha by a period of from six hundred to fourteen or fifteen hundred years. The founder of Buddhism, also, appears on the stage, speaking

in round numbers, about fourteen hundred years later than Abraham, and nine hundred or a thousand years later than Moses.

Such was the period of a life which was full of the mightiest influences over a large part of the human race. Buddha's early years were spent among princely luxuries; but his great soul was saddened by a sense of misery clinging to mortal existence. Disease, old age, and death, the pains of the body, the sufferings not only of this world but of all worlds, enveloped him in a cloud of melancholy. "In the bitterness and the heroism of his soul," says St. Hilaire, from whose work we translate a few lines, "he often said, 'The three worlds—the world of the gods, that of the Asoura, and that of men—are consumed with the griefs of old age and disease; they are devoured with the fire of death, and are destitute of every guide.'" In vain his father surrounded him with the magnificent attractions of royalty. In vain he tried to win him from his religious purposes by a happy marriage. In vain he besought him to sacrifice the life of an ascetic for a throne. In vain he built him palaces, one for his residence in the spring, another for summer, and a third for winter. In vain he placed the strictest guards to prevent his escape. To-day, as the young prince drives out of the eastern gate, he sees by the roadside an old man, broken down, infirm, bowing on his staff. Again, driving in his chariot from the south gate, he discovers a man smitten by disease, burning with fever, emaciated, dirty, alone, and without asylum. A third time, passing to his pleasure garden through the west gate, a dead man stretched upon his bier, meets his eyes. "Alas!" cries the saddened prince, "woe to that youth which old age destroys—woe to that health which so many maladies destroy—woe to human life which lasts but a few days. Alas! Were there no old age—no disease—no death! Would that age, sickness, death were forever bound!"

Overborne* by the pressure of that melancholy which had

* It is more probable, says Wassilief, in his *Buddhismus*, p. 12, that Sakya-muni was led to view existence as the cause of pain and sorrow, in consequence of a war in which the Sakya tribe was defeated, and which obliged him to wander about, . . . for there is a legend which says that the Sakya race was almost entirely exterminated during the life of the Buddha. Schluginweit, *Bud. in Tibet*, p. 6, note.

seized upon him, he determined to find the way of deliverance from evil. He escaped the guards. He turned his back on the luxuries of the palace and the court, and devoted himself to the pursuit of that knowledge which should deliver him from old age, disease, and death. Born in the ancient faith of Brahminism, he applied first to the sages of his religion, but found no peace. He then retired from the world and subjected himself to the severest penances until he was satisfied that no bodily mortification could open to him the way of deliverance. He renounced the life of an ascetic, and gave himself up to meditation, until he obtained that vision of truth which delivers men from all evil. From this time he claimed the name of Buddha, or the Enlightened, and devoted himself to the instruction of mankind.

Such is the history. It is partly legendary, but probably essentially true. It is the history of a sad but pure man oppressed with the shadows which rest on human life. It is a history of devotion to the salvation, however falsely conceived, of mankind. It is a history of sincerity and sacrifice, which challenges the admiration of the Christian world. And such is the beginning of a religion which has lived two thousand four hundred years; which after a long struggle with the older faith of India out of which it sprang, went forth to conquer the nations of the East—swept over Ceylon and the Burman empire; up among the mountains of Thibet and over the vast regions of China out to Japan, and is even supposed by some to have sent its missionaries around by the north of Asia through Russia as far as Norway; while the celebrated German author, Schlaginweit* quotes authority to show that it was known in Mexico as early as the fifth century of our era. At the present time it rules, by a careful estimate, three hundred and forty millions of souls, while the various forms of Christianity dominate over a total population of three hundred and thirty-five millions†—or five millions less than the followers of Buddha.

The spirit of Buddhism is a sigh. The melancholy which threw its black mantle around the youth of its founder has cast its shadow into all his teachings, and spread its gloom over the lives of untold millions through twenty-four centuries.

* Schlaginweit, *Bud. in Thibet*, p. 13. † Schlaginweit, *Bud. in Thibet*, p. 12.

The fundamental principle of the Buddhist religion, or the Buddhist philosophy, for as it was originally put forth it was a philosophy rather than a religion, asserts that all existence is necessarily evil. On every hand man beholds only sorrow. All things are subject to change. Pleasure only increases evil. Man is a helpless sufferer. Human life begins with pain, is continued in grief and disappointment; is subject to the torments of disease, rushes on to the burdens and regrets of old age, and finally falls into silence and corruption. But the grave gives no hope of release. This mournful existence renews itself from age to age under every conceivable form of misery, which can only be mitigated, never wholly rooted out. He who dies to-day revives in another grade of being, over which he has no choice, and which may be any of all possible existences from the vermin which swarm on the dunghills and crawl in the festering sores of human bodies to a supreme Buddha. All these forms of being have intelligence and powers of suffering as well as man, and are subject to the law of misery. The man who stands to-day over the dying-bed of his nearest friend, does not know what degree or form of sorrow awaits the departing life. The one he has cherished here and who has filled his years with the sweets of love, may to-morrow crawl in the slime at his feet, or glare at him from the thicket, and fasten the fangs of a beast in his hand. Whatever may be the destiny of himself or of others, he is sure only of this, that existence is an insufferable burden, subject to the grandest catastrophes and the most frightful ills.

And as man knows not what he is to be, so he knows not what he has been. Of the stages through which he may have gone in the past ages, he has no recollection. Out of this unknown past a cloud with dark deep fringes rises and settles down on human life. The evil man suffers here is the punishment of crimes committed in the past, but of which he knows not the when, or the how, or the where. He may have lived ten thousand ages, during which he may have been anything possible for man to conceive of. He may have been an inferior demon; he may have been a murderer, a thief, or an adulterer; of this he knows nothing. He only knows that whatever he has been, and whatever crimes he has committed, they

must be expiated by suffering, either here or in some future life. In the record book of Karma—which is little else than a fate—there is an account of guilt he knows not how large or how black. The law of retribution follows his heels, waiting its time to strike. The miseries of this life are the penalty of unknown crimes. The possibly worse miseries of his next life will be the penalty of other crimes equally unknown. No man can foresee when or where retribution is to fall. The forgotten murder of a thousand years ago may smite the murderer a thousand years hence. What a life!

And from this life of certain sorrow and gloomy foreboding, what escape? Nothing short of annihilation. Buddhism begins with asserting that all existence is evil, and ends with asserting that evil can only cease with the cessation of existence. Nirvana is the end of all desire, the end of all pain, the end of all sorrow, the end of hope and of fear, because it is the end of all consciousness, the return to that nothing out of which all things come. This is the final haven of rest, where no care nor grief, nor disease, nor poverty, nor old age, nor death can come. Behold the goal of all earthly hope! Behold the solution of this whole problem of life! Over that calm where all being has sunk away, no wave of trouble shall sweep, for there shall be no sea of souls through which its billows may roll. In those depths of emptiness the good and the bad alike shall bury their griefs, in burying themselves forever. Mr. R. Spence Hardy, whose *Manual of Buddhism* is authority the world over, says: "At his death, the *rahat*" (one who has attained a certain stage on his way to the final goal) "invariably enters Nirvana, or ceases to exist." "It is not possible for him to enter upon any other mode of existence." And again he quotes from the legends of Buddha, where the Enlightened is made to say, "So long as existence continues, the effects of Karma" (or that law which awards to men both good and evil) "must continue; and it is only by the cessation of existence that they can be entirely overcome." And lest it should be supposed that so unspeakably sad a view of the lot and destiny of man were impossible to any considerable portion of the human race, we translate again the words of a foreign writer, whose essays upon Buddhism are as celebrated among scholars for their deep

penetration of its meaning as for their touching eloquence. "If," says Saint Hilaire, "this phenomenon of a religion founded on nihilism seems too incredible, and if anybody is driven to call it in question, let him remember another fact not less singular, and the certainty of which may possibly give some faith in that other fact. The general sentiment of all these populations, not only of the Buddhists but of the Brahmins, is that of a horror of life under its present conditions, which nothing is able to appease. The idea of transmigration pursues them like a terrible phantom. At any price this hideous image must be put away."

The same writer, in his discussion of the meaning of Nirvana, appeals to the testimony of those who have sounded the views entertained by the professors themselves of the Buddhist faith at the present time. He cites Gogerly, who spent forty years in Ceylon catechizing the Buddhists of that island; Mr. Spence Hardy, whom we have also quoted; Mr. J. Armour; Mr. Grimblot, consul to Ceylon; Bigandet, who resided in Burmah; Wassilief, for ten years of the Russian Mission at Pekin; Joseph Williams, Missionary of the London Society to the south of India; as perfectly unanimous in affirming that in the Buddhist faith of to-day, Nirvana is annihilation. To these may be added Dr. Judson, who studied to some extent the ancient Pali, and made himself well acquainted with the people and religious literature of Burmah, and who held that Nirvana is "nothing less than a total extinction of soul and body." Mr. Malcolm also interprets the Burman Nigan to mean annihilation; while Sir James E. Tennent, in his work on Ceylon, says of Nirvana that it is "a condition between which and utter annihilation there exists but the dim distinction of a name."

St. Hilaire is supported by numerous other well informed writers. It would seem, then, that the authority of these men who have conversed with the Buddhists themselves, and studied their religion among Eastern surroundings, ought to be conclusive. But Mr. James Freeman Clarke, in his "*Ten Great Religions*," rejects this interpretation of Nirvana; although he has against him such an array of authorities as those here cited, and also the celebrated Burnouf, as well as Max Müller, Tournour, and Schmit, whom he mentions, and we would add Adolf

Wuttke, and if we are not deceived, Schlaginweit,—and he relies on Bunsen alone. But he remarks that Bunsen also believes that Buddha never denied or questioned the existence of God or immortality; whereas the fact is generally admitted that Buddha did not, it is true, question but absolutely ignored God, and allowed no such thing as a soul distinct from the body. In his more recent lecture on Buddhist nihilism, Max Müller so far adheres to his former opinions as to assert that “no person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the Nirvana contained in the Buddhist canon, can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf; namely: that Nirvana, the highest aim, the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, is the absolute nothing.” But he here also advances the theory that a distinction which Burnouf has pointed out between the third book of the canon and the two first books, may be used to clear Buddha himself of the doctrine of annihilation, though it has been adopted by his followers. But the truth seems to be that annihilation or its practical equivalent is a necessary part of Buddha’s system. It is cut into its very foundations. The four fundamental truths of Buddha are these:*

1. Pain cannot be separated from existence.
2. Existence is produced by passions and evil desires.
3. Existence is brought to an end by the cessation of evil desires.
4. Revelation of the path to this cessation.

Schlaginweit also gives the following formulation of the four truths found on ancient Buddhist images and recited as a confession of faith. “Of all things proceeding from cause, the cause of their procession hath the Tathagata† explained. The great Sramana† has likewise declared the cause of the extinction of all things.” Here seems to be the foundation of the doctrine of annihilation. Beginning with the assertion that all existence is necessarily subject to pain, how can pain cease except by the cessation of existence? The two doctrines of transmigration on the one hand, and on the other of annihilation as the only escape from existence, are the cemented

* Schlaginweit, *Bud. in Tibet*, p. 16.

† *Epithets of the Buddha.*

foundation stones of the Buddhist faith. "With the exception of those beings," says Mr. Spence Hardy, "who have entered into one of the four paths leading into Nirvana, there may be an interchange of condition between the highest and the lowest. He who is now the most degraded of the demons may one day rule the highest heavens; he who is at present seated upon the most honorable of the celestial thrones may one day writhe amidst the agonies of a place of torment; and the worm that we crush under our feet may, in the course of ages, become a supreme Buddha." It is this dreaded round of evil that forces the mind to accept a less dreaded release.

Such then is the Buddhist view of man and of man's destiny. He walks under a cloud of crimes, he knows not how many or how great, committed in past stages of existence of which he has no recollection. Misery and comfort have been allotted to him here and will be allotted to him in his next state by a law which knows no mercy. Happy to-day in the possession of good, what past crimes may be avenged to-morrow! In a lot of ease, of freedom from pain or of honor here, to what depths of infamy and torment may his former crimes hurl him in his next state of existence! Doomed so long as he has being to wander through the unending changes of sorrow, suffering, and death, what relief until he enters that path which leads to the eternal sleep! Besides this there is no ray of hope. There is in the heavens no pitying God, for God there is none. There is in man no immortal soul to reap the fruit of penitence in returning to a holy life, for soul there is none. Of what is it possible to conceive more degrading and more hopeless than this. One in nature with the brute which crawls at his feet; both alike subject to an unpitying law, with no God to temper it; both knowing no security and no rest and no hope but this—that existence may be at last blown out* like the flame of a candle which was but is not!

And this goal of Nirvana, this escape from the horrible phantom of transmigration, how is it to be reached? By an unaided effort of humanity to ignore every part of itself. If an impression has gone forth that the religion of Buddha is a glorifica-

* Max Müller says: "Every Sanskrit scholar knows that Nirvana means originally the blowing out, the extinction of light."

tion of intellect, in the sense in which such words would be understood among us, nothing could be further from the truth. It is true that Buddhism depends solely on the human mind for the deliverance of man from his lot of sorrow. As it knows no God, so it knows no revelation to human ignorance, and no divine aid to human struggle. In this sense it exalts human intellect. But to the Buddhist, intellect is itself an evil to be got rid of, as everything else. It is to be presumed the error which imagines that Buddhism exalts intellect, comes from the fact that Nirvana is to be reached by knowledge. But it is not knowledge, in our sense of the word ; not instruction in the truths of humanity, of creation, of God ; not by storing the mind with learning and developing its power ; but by teaching it to lose all desire, all aspiration, all hope, all fear, by teaching it that all we seem to know is an illusion, and by fixing it in the search not of knowledge but of the extinction of every sense — of all consciousness and of all being. It is by the knowledge of *Buddhist doctrine* that man reaches the end of his desires.

Moreover under the law of Karma, man has an account of merit and demerit. By a balance of merit he is lifted through the higher forms of existence toward his final end. By a balance of demerit he is doomed to wander through the lower forms of existence. Every man who would come speedily to Nirvana, must do his utmost to insure his good account in that book. And virtue helps to accomplish that. It is one of the chief means of speeding a man to his goal.

Here is the root of Buddhistic morality. It is false in its motive ; but on that false motive Buddha has put forth a moral code which has won the generous admiration even of the Christian world, for its completeness and its purity. In defining the duties of man to man, scholars agree that he has probably exceeded all systems of morality except the precepts of Christ. None will pretend that he has exceeded them ; few, that he has approached them. In this respect, Buddha stands nearer to Moses than to the overflowing fullness of Jesus of Nazareth. Sometimes, even in his morality, a kind of legalism offends us. In his definition of lying, or at least in that of the present Buddhism, for example, we are taught that in

order to make a lie, there must be the discovery by the person deceived that what has been told him is not true! That leaves a good chance for a liar. And the same fault may be found with his definition of murder. But notwithstanding such defects, the gentleness and the purity of his code excite at first wonder and then admiration. Forbidden things are, the taking of life, even of animals; theft, adultery, lying, slander, unprofitable conversation, scepticism, drunkenness, gambling, idleness, improper associates. Amusements of certain kinds, such as dancing, singing, and others, are looked upon as dangerous. The duties of children to parents are minutely and tenderly defined. "Were the child to place one parent upon one shoulder, and the other parent upon the other, and to carry them without ceasing for a hundred years, even this would be less than the assistance he has himself received." Murder is committed "not only when life is actually taken, but also when there is the indulgence of hatred or anger;" but on the other hand, if a command is given to take life at a particular time or in a particular place, it must be done at that time and in that place, otherwise it is not murder. The sceptic will be born in hell or as a beast. There are five great crimes, but scepticism is greater than any of them. Of the five crimes, taking of life, theft, adultery, lying, and drinking, the last is the worst. These examples will give a general idea of the drift of Buddhist moral teachings, as rendered by Mr. Spence Hardy. They are distinguished by gentleness and purity. They have the wise flavor of proverbs. They image still, after the lapse of twenty-four centuries, the tender soul of the young Siddhartha mourning over the evils of existence. And it is this which has carried a certain class of writers into a hasty comparison of Buddhism with Christianity, and has led them to paint in rosy tints a religion which as a whole presents us with ideas revolting to an enlightened humanity. But the value of a religion does not depend on a dozen or twenty moral precepts. It depends on its whole view of human life and human destiny. It depends on what it makes man out to be, and what hopes it puts before him, and what means it puts forth for the attainment of his hopes. And here is where Buddhism utterly fails. Its view of human life goes out from the deepest melancholy and

drapes it in weeds of perpetual mourning. It looks only at the dark side of existence. It runs over the words disease, sorrow, decay, death, and returns to them in perpetual repetition, till life is a tomb in which hope has been buried. Its proper symbol is found in the Buddhist ascetic wandering among graves wrapped in rags and in the cerements of the dead. It degrades man to the lowest of the brute creation. The swine is his brother, and the worm is his sister or friend. It tangles human destiny in a fatal web which drags it through ages of untold horrors,—for what?—that it may be purified?—that it may come forth from all this at last to rejoice in the new effulgence of a life of love which has left all pain behind? No, nothing of this;—only that it may cease to be! There is no great glowing future to which faith can lift its eye, no eternal progress to inspire human aspiration. No God, no soul, no Saviour from sin, no love, no heaven!

Here is the grand defect of Buddhism. There is no high aim for virtue to aspire to. It is not to be loved for its own sake—for it, alas, is to cease. It is not to be practiced because it enlarges a man's moral powers and teaches him how to love forever, for all mortal powers are an evil, and love itself is to die.

What then is the end of virtue? Simply this, that a man may get a balance of merit in his favor on that book of Karma, before whose account he trembles. Here is the motive force of this pure morality. And what is its practical result? A supreme selfishness, a supreme pride—and an utter failure to produce an every-day morality which will bear the least inspection.

We have had, from time to time, beautiful pictures of heathen life held up to us as worthy of our imitation. But it must not be forgotten, that the spirit which underlies human action determines its moral worth. And even the sweet pictures of hospitality which Burmah presents, and which are so pleasantly described by Mr. Malcolm, are marred by a principle of selfishness and pride which has not escaped the notice of travelers and is traced back to the very essence of the religion. The principle of merit and demerit makes the Buddhist eager to do acts of virtue and makes him selfish in doing them. Strange as it may seem to us, Mr. Malcolm asserts

that the necessity for doing such works of merit is so well understood among the native Burmans, that "if a man does another a favor, he supposes it to be in order to obtain merit, and seems to feel as though he conferred an obligation in giving the opportunity." And again: "Gratitude is a virtue of great rarity; they never, on receiving a present or any other favor, make any acknowledgment, nor is there any phrase in the language equivalent to 'I thank you.'" And again: "Buddhism necessarily tends to suppress gratitude by keeping up the constant sense of mercenariness." But where there is no sense of gratitude for favors received, in the same persons there will be no generous motive for giving favors. We might go on and show from the works before us, in which are some searching analyses of Buddhist morality, on how low a basis it stands. Adolphe Wuttke says: "The morality of the Buddhist is founded, not in love, but in pain." The highest motive which he ascribes for it is pity. All creation is a woe, and man, himself a sufferer, spares others from suffering. "The Buddhists," he says again, "are the mildest people of heathendom; but it is not the mildness of love; it is the mildness of pain, and of indifference. It is a negative virtue." But the perpetual need of merit vitiates even the motive of pity. The Buddhist founds hospitals for sick and lame animals, and in his greed for merit debases man to a level with the brute he ministers to. The poetic fiction of Buddha giving his own body to be torn by a hungry tiger, and his blood to quench his thirst, becomes among Buddhists something real—a man goes into the street and hires a poor wretch to enter a hospital for horses and cats and dogs and rats, and to lie down there while the vermin which infest human filth crawl over him and feed upon him. Now how utterly this principle of merit by pain fails to produce a real humanity, is shown by the Buddhist Jains of western India, who found hospitals for animals and then lend money to people in need, at from fifty to seventy per cent a year, and take the very bed from under the man who fails to pay! The dishonesty of government officers here is overmatched by the cruel extortions of government officers there. Mr. Malcolm speaks of their rapacity as carried to such an extent that no common man cares to im-

prove his land or his house, or make any show of wealth, because it exposes him to extortion, and perhaps to personal danger. In truth, if we analyze Buddhism, we shall find in it no correct views of human worth and human obligation, and no lofty motive for virtue. Hence it is, that, in whatever direction honest enquiry is made as to its moral results, the answer comes back, "It is a failure."

Sir J. Tennant, in his extensive work on Ceylon, says: "Both socially and in its effect upon individuals, the result of the system in Ceylon has been apathy almost approaching to infidelity. Even as regards the tenets of their creed, the mass of the population exhibit the profoundest ignorance, and manifest the most irreverent indifference. In their daily intercourse and acts, morality, and virtue, so far from being apparent as the rule, are barely discernible as the exception. Neither hopes nor apprehensions have proved a sufficient restraint on the habitual violation of all those precepts of charity and honesty, of purity and truth, which form the very essence of their doctrine."

And when we pass over to Burmah, we have a like picture. In their houses there are some things attractive. "Children," says Mr. Malcolm, "are almost as reverent to their parents as among the Chinese." But he who reads to the bottom of the page, will learn that thieving and pilfering are common, though chiefly among the lowest sort of people. Murder not unfrequently goes hand in hand with robbery. And while these are not national traits, the inhabitants of Burmah "may be said to be a nation of liars." They never place confidence in the word of each other. Even when detected in a lie, no shame is manifested. Temperance is universal. There is no open show of unchastity, but the trouble missionaries have with their converts points to secret vice. The better classes like to appear neat when seen abroad, but their skin, their hair, and their houses, are decidedly slovenly. "Divorces are shockingly common." The Burmans do not indulge in profanity, but "both sexes utter, in default of profane oaths, such obscene expressions as can scarcely be conceived." All this is from Mr. Malcolm. And this obscenity of speech is common everywhere through Eastern Asia. It prevails in China. A gentleman who has lived over twenty years in India told the

writer of this Article, that even Indian women on the street will turn away their heads from the foul blasts which come from heathen mouths. The same person assured us that the grossest immoralities have been proved in India upon the Buddhist high priests, in open court, and that these religious devotees are reputed to teach the girls of India doctrines so grossly licentious that the mention of them here would not be endured. And in accord with all this, Mr. Spence Hardy closes his chapter on the Ethics of Buddhism with the following words: "Our development of this great system is now complete. The present chapter contains the most rational of its phases. It discountenances all licentiousness. It inculcates an affection for all order of beings; and shrinks from the infliction of pain even as a punishment. Yet from no part of heathenism do we see more clearly the necessity of a divine revelation than from the teachings of Buddha. The moral code becomes comparatively powerless for good, as it is destitute of all real authority."

And if one does not tire of turning up the gross side of heathen life, let him visit China and go through the same process of inquiry there with the same result. Who that has read the best authorities with regard to that vast empire does not know that the evidence is overwhelming against any claim to a high morality? "The general condition of religion among the Chinese," says Williams, in his *Middle Kingdom*, "is effete, and the stately formalities of imperial worship, the doctrines of Confucius, the ceremonies of the Buddhists, alike fail to comfort and instruct." The crime of infanticide has perhaps been exaggerated. It is probably limited to certain sections, but in those sections it prevails. Gambling is a popular pastime. Opium takes the place of intoxicating drinks, and anger vents itself in gross obscenities of speech which prevail among the middle and lower classes as profanity does among like classes with us.

After mentioning some of the better traits of Chinese character, such as peaceableness, industry, and good order, Mr. Williams says: "With a general regard for outward decency, they are vile and polluted in a shocking degree, their conversation is full of impure expressions, and their lives of impure acts." "More noticeable than the sins of the flesh

is the falsity of the Chinese. They feel no shame at being detected in a lie. Thieving is exceedingly common, and the illegal exactions of the rulers are burdensome."

The corruptions which have sprung up in connection with the Chinese system of competitive examinations are too well known to need mention, and the fact that the sale of offices is a source of royal revenue does not speak highly for the style of governmental administration. Yet heathen life is not without its cheerful aspects. The bright side in Burmah is its kindliness. Its bright side in China is its peaceableness, its good order, its industry, and especially its reverence for ancestors, though that belongs to Confucianism and not to Buddhism. It is pleasanter to experience Chinese politeness than it would be to experience the same amount of rudeness, even if politeness is sometimes carried so far as to show its heartlessness. Ask a Chinaman, "Is your honorable wife living?" and he answers, "The mean person of the inner apartment is still alive." "Is your noble son doing well at school?" "The contemptible little dog has learned a few characters."

These facts are not brought up for the purpose of giving a gloomy picture of humanity. They are brought up to show, in opposition to certain writers, that all rose-colored pictures of heathen life are false, and to convince those who may have been misled by such pictures, that they are false, on the testimony of unquestionable witnesses who have seen and known what Buddhism is in its home. These facts are brought up to show—strange that it should have become necessary to have it shown—that the moral results of Buddhism as seen in Burmah, India, and China, are not to be compared with those of Christianity. Undoubtedly we in New England have our vices—but no intelligent observer could draw such a picture of life here as intelligent men draw of life there. Take any one of the great vices of humanity, and how many here are licentious, how many are profane, how many are drunkards; how many are cheats, how many homes, from the humblest to the highest, as compared with the whole, are impure. These vices among us assume an individual and not a national character. In fact, if we take only a bird's-eye view of the general civilization of the most civilized heathen land, and of the at least moderately

civilized New England, our difficulty will not be in answering the question which is the more advanced in morality and virtue, but in understanding the audacity which would raise the question !

The civilization of the nations of the earth is not to be estimated by the magnitude of the works which they undertake. Immense piles of masonry, vast palaces and pyramids, Chinese or Roman walls, are signs not so much of a true civilization as of a tyrannical power which calls at will an unlimited supply of forced labor out of an over-populated country to do its bidding. The walls of Babylon, the palaces of Nineveh and Persepolis, the pyramids of Egypt, rose with the groans of down-trodden humanity. The true test of a civilization is in its elevation of the masses, its exaltation of the average man in comfort, in culture, in morals; in all that makes a man. It is not necessary here to bring forward facts to show that tested by this sign—what is to be found in the average home, the average appliances of art and science, as well as the elements of manly virtue—China, which has been cited as the most advanced of civilized heathen, is behind the average of Christendom. China is not without her wonders of history. She is not without her honorable service of mankind. She has made contributions, as have other heathen nations, to the arts. It has been perhaps correctly asserted that a thousand years ago China was the most civilized nation of the globe. But that period marks the transition from the downfall of the heathen civilizations to the establishment of a Christian civilization. And in the march of that Christian civilization, China has fallen in the rear. She has not even known how to utilize some of her most noted discoveries as they have been utilized by Christian nations. Narrow in her religion, she has been narrow in her national policy, narrow in her ideas of learning, and contracted in her civilization. The tremendous awakening of human intellect and unfolding of human energy which Christian nations now exhibit, the developments of industry and the investigations of science, the subjugation of the forces of nature to the service of man, as in steam and electricity, are due in large measure to the force of that Christian doctrine which is always holding up a glorious future for humanity, only to be possessed

along with the possession of virtue and godliness. And that glorious future Buddhism knows nothing of.

And now, let us go back a moment and compare Buddhism with Christianity. On the one hand is a view of life which makes it a tomb, on the other a view of life which fills it with hope. On the one hand is man, brother to the brute and child of a law as relentless as fate; on the other hand is man the child of God. On the one hand is the destiny of annihilation, on the other the offer of a glowing immortality. On the one hand is a virtue born of the idea of merit, on the other a virtue born of love. On the one hand is a heathen civilization, on the other a Christian civilization. Have we to learn of Eastern Asia, or do we hold in Jesus Christ a power for human elevation and for human salvation from sin and sorrow, which, as Christian men and women, we are bound to send forth till all men are blessed in the possession of it?

Two hundred and fifty-three years ago, our fathers set foot on Plymouth Rock. December, with its cold, gray sky, and bleak shores, gave them a very cheerless welcome. One after one, men, women, and children climbed down the sides of the Mayflower, and seated themselves in the little boat that bore them ashore. The cold spray sprinkled them, the cold sea benumbed them, and chilled them as it washed the rock with its waves. The cold frost pinched them as they crowded together on the beach. And the cold blast over their heads warned them of a winter of suffering, of peril, of sickness, and death. But off from the cold sea on to the colder land they came and planted a Christian civilization. They founded a colony in the love of liberty, in the worship of God, and the practice of Christian virtue.

From that time to this, New England has developed rapidly in all that constitutes material prosperity and moral power. She has welcomed to her institutions and her influence men of all climes and all nations—the refined and the wealthy, the poor, the oppressed, the Christian, and the heathen. Wave after wave of foreign population has rolled in upon her, and while those waves have brought much that was virtuous, they have brought much of ignorance and vice.

It has been the work of Christian New England to elevate and purify this stream as well as to maintain its own standard of religion and virtue. If she sometimes staggers under the magnitude of her work, let it not be ours to point the finger at her; let us rather not forget that what we enjoy *here*, we owe to the faith of that little company which landed on the strand under the cold sky of that bleak December day.

ARTICLE V.—FRIEDRICH ADOLF TRENDELENBURG.

1. *Logische Untersuchungen*, von A. TRENDELENBURG, Zweite ergänzte Auflage. Leipzig, 1862.
2. *Historische Beiträge zur Philosophie*, von A. TRENDELENBURG, 3 Bände. Berlin, 1846–1867.
3. *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik*, von ADOLF TRENDELENBURG, Zweite ausgeführte Auflage. Leipzig, 1868.
4. *Kleine Schriften*, von ADOLF TRENDELENBURG, 2 Theile. Leipzig, 1871.
5. *Elementa Logices Aristotelicæ*. 6^{te} Ausgabe. Berlin, 1868.
6. *Erläuterungen, etc.* 2^{te} Ausgabe. Berlin, 1861.
7. *Zur Erinnerung an FRIEDRICH ADOLF TRENDELENBURG*, Vortrag gehalten am Leibniztage, 1872, in der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften von H. Bonitz. Berlin, 1872.
8. *Adolf Trendelenburg*, von Dr. ERNST BRATUSCHEK. Berlin, 1873.

"THE kind of philosophy which one chooses," says Fichte, "depends on the kind of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a lifeless piece of household furniture; on the contrary, it is animated by the soul of the man who has it." "Philosophy is the history of philosophy." Doubtless every man, even the lowest, has his philosophy. He has a distinct set of beliefs, positive or negative, respecting the nature and origin of things, the government of the world, and his own destiny. They are his, even though derived from "the tradition of the elders," his forefathers; they are his, in a still more eminent sense if they are the outcome of his own thinking or of his moral preferences. Philosophy, in this wider sense, is the most perfect indication of character, and the ideal of a noble man is of one whose philosophy, intelligently thought out, rounded off, and adopted, is but the conscious, theoretical

accompaniment and reflex of a noble life and character. A most striking illustration of this interpenetration of life and theory is furnished by the biography of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, for whom also, philosophy, in a special, but not in the narrowest sense, was identical with the history of philosophy.

It were easy, by reference to the history of philosophy and the biographies of its representatives, to show how, universally, the personalities of the leading philosophers have found expression in their systems. The aristocratic Plato has a more than wholesome horror of the so-called pollutions of matter, and identifies true reality with the ideal. And, for the rest, modern philosophy has not found it easy, as yet, to determine what reality, if any, belongs in fact to the material as such—that is, what matter truly is. Aristotle, more involved in the practical problems of life, plants his theory more cautiously on the palpable earth. In modern times, the calm and consequent spirit of Spinoza gives birth to the all-comprehensive system known by his name, in which God is all, and tranquil, unfretful submission to the necessary laws of the universe (of God) is deduced as the corollary, and is exemplified in the philosopher's life. The pietistic training of Kant's youth leaves its traces in the well-known, life-long conscientiousness of this founder of modern critical philosophy, and re-appears still more conspicuously in the notion of duty, on which his moral philosophy is founded, and in the categorical imperative, in which its fundamental requirement is formulated. From facts like these, what is to be inferred? That philosophy is simply a system of beliefs, the expression of personal traits, and that it moves, hence, eternally round in the vicious circle of the ever-varying but substantially unchanging opinions and characters of mankind? This was not the view of Trendelenburg, who sought in the systems of the past for the elements of permanent value, and sought to add to these and to build upon them, as upon a basis of historically demonstrated solidity.

Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg was born in Eutin, in the principality of Lübeck, Nov. 30th, 1802. His father, who had studied law, was in the employ of the Danish government as postal agent at Eutin. He lived in simple but comfortable circumstances, caring intelligently for the education of his children

and being the "model of a German father and citizen." Trendelenburg's mother, the daughter of a country clergyman, was a woman of gentle, simple tastes, abounding in charity, and inspiring the affection of her children. The influence of both parents in determining the loyal, genuine, earnest character of the son was great, and the latter rewarded their love and devotion fully and in kind. Of Trendelenburg's four uncles, on the father's side, one was a physician and another a lawyer in Eutin, while the other two were teachers of the classics in the gymnasia at Dantzic and Lübeck. These, and other, older family associations seconded the natural desire of the father and the inclination of the son in the matter of the acquisition of a thorough, liberal education for the latter. Happily, although Eutin was and is still but a small town, of less than 4,000 inhabitants, the school advantages there were good. Trendelenburg was early placed in the gymnasium, which was under the direction of one König, and there he remained until the completion of his studies preparatory for the University. He learned not without difficulty; but his conscientious, eager industry enabled him nevertheless to prosecute his studies in mathematics and other German branches, and in the classics with marked success, so that on leaving the school at the end of a course, the last year of which was partly spent in teaching lower classes, he received a specially commendatory, documentary statement of his character and acquirements, at the hands of his teacher. "One," Trendelenburg used subsequently to say, "can do anything which he is earnestly resolved upon," and in the spirit of this maxim he had successfully, but laboriously, gone through the first, long stage in his student life. The germs of much that was characteristic in the life, character, and teaching of Trendelenburg, were laid or partly developed in this early period of schooling. In an address delivered in 1857, on entering upon the rectorship of the University of Berlin, Trendelenburg says: "The ancient languages and the mathematics are the way to the heights of humanity and into the innermost nature of things." The foundations of this opinion were laid under König, under whose direction the reading of the classics was to him (as he himself says) "a stimulus, leading him to seek for the spirit of the ancients in their writ-

ings, to strive to learn how to think after the model of the great thinkers, and to clothe his thoughts in similar, beautiful form." Under the same teacher, also, Trendelenburg enjoyed the advantage of private instruction in logic and philosophy, Kant's works being made especially the subject of sympathetic and careful study, while the sentiment towards Fichte was cooler, and Hegel was declared by the instructor to be to him incomprehensible, and his "pure thought" the *πρῶτον φεῦδος* of modern philosophy.

It is impossible to represent in too strong a light the benefit to the future philosopher of this early period of ten years of training in the gymnasium. What earnest American scholar will not look with envy upon one who had the advantage in his youth of reading through "nearly all the Greek and Latin authors that are ever read in schools," some of their works being read "several times," and all this under a teacher of broad philological and literary training and of independent philosophical intelligence? And we say nothing of the thorough course in mathematics, rhetoric, and other German branches, nor of other languages, as Hebrew, English, French, learned either in the gymnasium or under private teachers. All this careful and extensive study and training, which do not stop short with the elementary, but actually take the student into the inner sanctuary of learning, give the German student a preparation for future study and labor, at the University and in subsequent life, which we Americans must also secure for ourselves, would we ever become alike competent and independent in our philosophical and literary judgment, and respected in the world of scholars.

At the same early period in his life, also, Trendelenburg became specially penetrated with a sense of the importance and sacred character of the teacher's vocation, to which he resolved completely to devote himself.

The four years from Easter, 1822, till Easter, 1826, were spent by Trendelenburg in University studies. Until the autumn of 1823, he studied at Kiel, devoting his attention to philosophy, history, theology, and philology. His instructors in the first of these branches were Reinhold, who in Jena, thirty years previously, had with such brilliant tokens of success expounded the

philosophy of Kant, and von Berger, a philosopher of Danish origin, familiar with the then current phases of German philosophy and seeking to unite the teachings of Fichte and Schelling. These men, by their moral and scientific enthusiasm, and the latter by some of his fundamental teachings, left a deep impression in the mind and opinions of Trendelenburg, an impression which subsequent years did but confirm. From the fall of 1823, till the corresponding period in the following year, Trendelenburg studied at Leipzig, attracted thither, especially by the unusual advantages then, as now, offered by the University in that city, for the prosecution of philological studies. There, among others, Gottfried Hermann, "the first Greek of his times," lectured. Here Trendelenburg devoted his attention principally to philology, Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. But his relations to his teachers were less genial than they had been in Kiel, and after some hesitation between Bonn and Berlin, Trendelenburg repaired, with his father's consent, to Berlin, where he finished his studies and graduated, after hearing one course of lectures by Hegel, who failed to inspire conviction in him, and others by Schleiermacher (on *Æsthetics*), Neander (on Church History), Ritter (on Geography), Hagen (on German and Northern Mythology), Bopp (on Science of Language), and Steffens (on Physical Philosophy), and studying Gothic with Zeune, Sanscrit with Rosen, and learning fencing and gymnastics with Eiselen. In his whole course of University studies Trendelenburg proved himself an earnest student and independent thinker. Conscientiously did he devote himself to the study of the great thinkers of ancient Greece and modern Germany, with a view to the determination of his own philosophical beliefs. The necessity of a definite and intelligently adopted and well grounded system of such beliefs was ever present to his mind. "One must have a philosophical system, just as one must have a house," he wrote, while at Berlin, "and this house each must build for himself; it must be almost moveable, like a tent, and susceptible of enlargement;" accordingly he labored diligently in his years of preparatory study to bring together the materials for the final structure of his system. His attention was nearly equally divided between philology and philosophy, but his interest lay

chiefly in the direction of the latter, the studies in philology being prosecuted largely with a view to their bearing on the investigation of the doctrines of the ancient philosophers. He took his degree after having sustained the usual disputations on theses selected by himself and preparing and publishing a Latin dissertation on "Plato's doctrine of Ideas and Number, in the Light of Aristotle's Criticisms." The theses defended by him are characteristic of the direction of his mind and of his philosophical convictions at that time; and these convictions remained with him subsequently unaltered. The theses were the following: "The study of Etymology discloses a popular philosophy of conceptions;" "In philosophy, as elsewhere, belief precedes knowledge;" "As negation without presupposed affirmation is impossible, so also is pure skepticism;" "Kant's incognoscible 'things-in-themselves' do not follow even from his demonstrations concerning the nature of space and time;" "As space and time are pure and primitive forms of intuition, so also is motion such a form."

The first and the two last of these theses mark in particular the tone and direction of much that was of prime significance in the later philosophical investigations and doctrines of Trendelenburg. The dissertation showed how Platonism was to be corrected by Aristotelianism; the bond of connection between the immaterial ideas and the concrete things whose reality is derived from their participation in the ideas, was to be supplied by the addition of the Aristotelian principle of motion, and the (Aristotelian) principle of finality, obscured or inadequately apprehended by Plato, in his identification of the Good with Absolute Being, was also to be distinctly introduced.

For seven years after his departure from the University, Trendelenburg—in this following the example of other, more eminent German philosophers before him, Kant, Fichte, Hegel—was occupied with the duties of a private tutor. Brilliant openings had indeed not been wanting to him; the professorship of philology at Kiel and a position in the gymnasium at Lübeck were offered him. His reasons for declining these positions were characteristic of the man. The professorship at Kiel, great as were its attractions for him, would have demanded of him the preparation and giving of lectures in a wider field

than that which his philological studies had fairly covered. "I have freely told you," he writes to Twesten, theological professor at Kiel, "how in the last years I have occupied myself very particularly with Plato and Aristotle and the history of ancient philosophy. I have indeed sought to keep myself in near and living relation to all the other parts of philological science. But I would now first accomplish something worth the while in the one direction mentioned. Were I now to undertake to teach in the whole field of philology, I should be unable to carry out the golden maxim: *to concentrate in the smallest point the greatest force*. I should perhaps render myself and others superficial; myself, for the whole field of philology appears to me as too extensive; and others, because in numerous branches I am too scantily prepared to teach. Were my acquisitions more solid in that department in which I desire at some time to accomplish something creditable, . . . I should perhaps ask you whether I might not be useful to the University of Kiel in a position in which philology and philosophy should be united. But I am unwilling to appear as unripe fruit, and the evidence of ripeness I can acquire only as I feel it within myself. To the eye the apple often appears red before it is ripe within." And so Trendelenburg deliberately chose the more modest position of private tutor for the son of Postmaster-General von Nagler at Berlin, having rightly apprehended the lesson of laboring and waiting. The acceptance of this place afforded him the leisure and freedom from responsibility necessary for the continuance and relative completion of the work of "gathering the materials" for his philosophical house, although the demands which it involved upon his time and energies were not slight. The position had the further advantage of bringing him into desired relation to a circle of refinement and culture, and of increasing his knowledge of the world by occasional journeys with his ward.

One principal work occupied him during his life in the family of von Nagler. This was the preparation and annotation of an edition of Aristotle's *De Anima*, the publication of which marked an epoch in the careful study and correct interpretation of the Greek author. "The study and investigation of Aristotle's doctrines," says Bratuschek, "appeared to him [in

his earlier period] ever more and more as his life's work." Fittingly and brilliantly did he continue this work—begun in the study of Plato with Aristotle's eyes—in the publication just mentioned.

The remainder of Trendelenburg's biography may be briefly summarized. Thus much of it has been given relatively in detail, since it throws such instructive light on the conscientiousness and thoroughness which not only marked the scientific career of this particular philosopher, but must be illustrated in the life of every true student.

In 1838, while at Paris, Trendelenburg received from Minister von Altenstein his appointment to an "extraordinary" professorship of philosophy at Berlin. The salary was to be moderate, but was to be supplemented by work performed in the commission for the examination of candidates for positions in the public schools of Prussia. Trendelenburg accepted the position gladly, and entered upon the performance of his duties as professor with courage and hope. In 1837, on the occasion of his receiving a call to the place left vacant by H. Ritter at Kiel, his professorship was changed to a full or "ordinary" one, and in this position the remainder of his life was passed. In 1846, he was elected a regular member of the Berlin Academy, and in the following year was made secretary of the section for the history of philosophy, an office which also he continued to hold until about the time of his death.

Trendelenburg's lectures extended over psychology, logic, history of philosophy, ethics, and the philosophy of law. His lecture room was usually crowded. His genial manners and the simple fitness and felicity of his style and delivery rendered him unusually attractive. As an examiner in the above-mentioned commission he acquired great influence among the higher class of teachers in Prussia and throughout Germany. His devotion to labor was unflagging, his health always perfectly good until very near the end of his life, his family, social, religious, and political relations agreeable, and his death (Jan. 24, 1872) very widely regretted.* His principal works, are

* Of Trendelenburg's dogmatic views in theology, the writer of this Article has no information which descends to details. Rationalism had entered his father's family before his birth, but it evidently coexisted with warmly devout feeling. This feeling, wholly separated from fanaticism or mysticism, continued to permeate

in addition to the edition of Aristotle's *De Anima*, his *Logical Investigations* (1840, 2d ed., 1862, 3d ed., 1870), his *Natural Right* (1860, 2d ed., 1868), and his *Historical Contributions to Philosophy* (vol. i, 1846, on the History of the Doctrine of Categories; vol. ii, 1855, vol. iii, 1867, mostly critical articles on ancient and modern philosophers and philosophical systems). Numerous addresses, chiefly delivered in the Academy and relating to questions philosophical, historico-political, and æsthetic, are published in his *Minor Writings* (2 vols., 1870). He also published *Elements of the Aristotelian Logic* (a compilation of select passages from the Organon, with Latin notes), which went through four editions at least, also a volume in German of elucidations of the same, which reached the second edition, and both especially designed for use in the higher schools.

While the life and philosophical career of Trendelenburg furnish an extremely attractive object of study and attention, on account of the harmonious, happy flow of the former and the discreet method and practical fruitfulness of the latter, the special importance of the man and of his doctrines are founded on their relation to the historical development of philosophical thought in Germany.

The philosophy of Germany had ever been and still is pre-vaillingly idealistic. Its founder, Leibnitz, an Aristotle by his encyclopædic knowledge and his thoughtful union of the theoretical and the practical, had identified matter with active force and had conceived the latter after the analogy of spiritual, conscious existence. The life of the monads was ideal; it consisted

Trendelenburg's character through life. It is strikingly and most orthodoxly expressed in a poem composed by Trendelenburg in his school-days, and given by Bratuschek in his monograph on Trendelenburg. Later it appeared in such expressions as "It is a great and glorious thing to call up the simple gospel into intimate life within one's self," in the tendency to repel all "construction" of Christianity from the stand-point of philosophical systems, in the profound belief in Divine Providence and apparently reverent and loving acceptance of the authority of Christ (cf. *Kleine Schriften*, i, p. 73). But with Trendelenburg, as with German philosophers, generally, who are not professed theologians, philosophy was an independent science, which was, if any thing, to confirm, and not to be confirmed by, religion, so that it is only virtually (but none the less truly), and not by reason of any distinct utterances or claims in his writings, that Trendelenburg could be termed (by his friend Mayer, see Bratuschek, p. 222) a "Christian philosopher."

in the possession of more or less distinct perceptions. With Kant the cardinal point in philosophy became, under the influence of the English philosophers, Locke and Hume, anthropological and, if it may be thus termed, cognitional, rather than ontological or cosmological; the question of first importance was, what can man know? and not, as it had been before, what is the nature of things? The skeptical conclusion, by which theoretical knowledge was confined within the limits of the subjectively phenomenal and relative, and the moral conclusion, resting in the postulates of God's existence, of human freedom, and of the immortality of the soul, led, as is known, in the system of Fichte to the doctrine of complete subjective idealism: since, of the two factors, by the coöperation of which Kant accounted for the facts of human knowledge, namely, the mind with its innate forms and functions, and the unknown and unknowable "things-in-themselves," the latter had inconsequently had ascribed to them by Kant a causative agency in the production of impressions and ideas in the human mind (inconsequently, for Kant had elsewhere sought to demonstrate that the range of causality was confined absolutely to the sphere of phenomena, in distinction from "things-in-themselves"). Fichte, with characteristic logical boldness and recklessness, resolved to derive the whole universe from the subject alone, i. e. from the *Me*, and hence was obliged also to identify God, the Absolute, with the absolute subject. Philosophy, thus fairly launched on the sea of pure speculation, with no acknowledged guidance but that of a purely *a priori* or dialectic method, did not delay, with the aid of Schelling and Hegel, to run to the very end of the idealistic tether, landing in the system of absolute idealism. In this system the absolute, apprehended in pure thought as identity of thought and being, figured as the source whence the dialectic method was to trace the development of the whole universe of reality. The real was to be construed—ideally constructed—*a priori*. Rich in grand conceptions and suggestive thoughts, this philosophy, nevertheless, did such insolent—had it not been ludicrous—violence to established facts of positive science and of history, that, while the crowd of men aspiring to be accounted the possessors of philosophical opinions, but too indolent or impotent to form them for themselves, were sunning

themselves in the light of the new intellectual luminary, others, more suspicious of appearances, could not but inquire whether the original source of all this glow were not perhaps, after all, but the phosphorescence of unsound materials, or, in other words, whether the authority by which the new philosophy adjudicated *a priori* upon the facts of the universe was really well founded or not. This philosophy wrenched by its demands and claims too violently the fibres of average human belief, not to be followed by reaction and resistance. Criticism would naturally seek to detect flaws in the principle and method of the new philosophy, and when these had been discovered and set forth with sufficient evidence to shake the convictions of unprejudiced believers, the query would naturally arise: what philosophy shall we fall back upon?—or, what does the history of philosophy teach us to rest upon as solid ground of theory? The exponent, *par éminence*, of this criticism and this inquiry was Professor Trendelenburg, and it is because he is thus the representative of a new tide in the historic progress of German thought, that his life and philosophy are specially worthy of our study.

What Trendelenburg accomplished may profitably be considered under the successive heads of,—1. Criticism of recent methods; 2. Historical and critical investigation and rehabilitations of the true results of earlier, especially ancient philosophy; 3. Positive development of doctrine on the basis of historically assured results.

I. Trendelenburg's positive aim was the establishment of a philosophical theory which could stand the test of comparison with the results of modern science, nay, more, which should be confirmed by and, so far as practicable, founded on those results. Recognizing fully the necessity of experience for all concrete knowledge, respecting the various positive sciences as sovereign within their respective spheres, he sought in philosophy the common band which should unite these sciences, and not a speculative principle which should produce them *a priori*. Philosophy was to be, in some sense, the one eye overseeing them all, the one mind comprehending them in their mutual relations and as parts of one ideal whole; it was to recognize in the case of each science, whether concrete or abstract, its

place and use in the whole *organism* of knowledge; it was to be consummated in an "organic conception of the universe" of thought and being.

But philosophy was not to dictate to positive science what its methods or its results should be; it should not attempt to control scientific fact. In this spirit, it differed from past-Kantian philosophy. (Hegel, for example, concluded, on speculative grounds, in favor of Goethe's luckless theory of color, and could speak, in that connection, of the "insipidity" and "disingenuousness, even" of Newton!) On the other hand, it agreed with the spirit of Kant's and of the English philosophy, and indeed with the tendency of modern philosophy as a whole, in regarding the problem of knowledge—its possibility and veracity—as the fundamental or initial one. Now, as a philosophy, fundamentally speaking, must err, if at all, either in its assumptions or in its methods, and as the current results of philosophy convicted the latter of error, Trendelenburg's first search was for the false methods or assumptions from which speculation had been proceeding. He found them, naturally, both conjoined and, as it were, intertwined, and his first work was to show their weakness or falsity.

As to method (logic), German philosophy had partly developed, partly adopted two views of logic. Kant, substantially the founder of the one view, had regarded logic as a purely formal science, having to do simply with the forms of thought, —notion, judgment, inference—without reference to its content. And in this view he had been and is still followed by numerous and influential imitators. (Sir William Hamilton's *Logic* is the notable embodiment of this view in English literature.) The other view, founded proximately in the method of Fichte and Schelling, came to perfection in the celebrated *Logic* of Hegel and is known by the name of the dialectic method. Against both views Trendelenburg directs his criticism. (It will be borne in mind that the German conception and consequent treatment of logic differ measurably from the English, in uniting this science closely either with the discussion of the problem of the possibility and nature of knowledge, or with metaphysics proper. Only the adherents of the formal view of logic treat it as exclusively conversant with the laws of thought as

thought, without reference to their metaphysical meaning or objective validity. Trendelenburg, true to his organic conception of the world, regards thought as, "so to speak, the highest organ of the world, so that, if understood in its forms, it points to the nature of the things which it is destined mentally to apprehend and to comprehend.")

To the formal view of logic, then, Trendelenburg objects that it regards thought without due reference to the organic end and use of thought, and that its pretended consideration of the forms of thought apart from all relation to what is thought, is impracticable (*Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. i, chap. 2). From the truth of formal logic would follow the impossibility of a philosophical development.

But it is Trendelenburg's criticism of the Hegelian, dialectic method, which did the most, not only for the celebrity of the critic, but also in the way of clearing up the speculative fog in the midst of which German speculation was floundering. Eduard Zeller, whose competency as a judge none can deny—himself originally a Hegelian—terms Trendelenburg's criticism of the dialectic method "sharp and successful" (*Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie*, Munich, 1878, p. 908). In fact, it was annihilating; and the breaking up of the Hegelian school simultaneously with the publication of the "*Logical Investigations*" and with the public discussion which they stimulated, was by no means accidental. The objections of Trendelenburg are directed against the primal assumption of the method, "pure thought," and against the alleged process of immanent, dialectic development. The former is shown to be impossible and the latter to be not what it claims to be, viz: a purely *a priori* process, independent of experience.

Empiricism and dogmatic idealism, in attempting to answer the fundamental questions of philosophy, become involved in contradictions or else demand of the unprejudiced inquirer the admission of what he is unwilling to admit without better reason than any alleged. Absolute idealism requires its adepts at the outset *simply to think* (*rein denken zu wollen*, Hegel, *Encyclopädie*, § 78, *Logik*, Book I, *init.*). The assurance is then held out that through an inner necessity pure thought shall move forward, developing, according to a necessary law

peculiar to itself, the whole scientific system of the universe. What must otherwise appear simply as an inexplicable riddle, will be seen in its true nature; God, the universe, and humanity, with their laws, will be seen, as it were, in their growth, and the how and the why of all things shall be revealed to the satisfied gaze of men. Out of the Absolute the finite, the real, shall be construed, or, rather, developed. The beginning, then, is pure thought, without definite, concrete content, other than pure being, which, after abstracting from all concrete objects, must remain as the necessary (at least formally objective) correlative to thought. But then pure thought and pure being will be identical, and it may, therefore, also be said, and is said, that the beginning is pure being. This "pure being," the product of "pure abstraction," is, however, obviously enough "purely nothing;" or pure being and pure nothing are the same. Thus far, apparently, little has been won; how shall further progress be made from a beginning which seems so unpromising? Answer: The identity, thus established, of pure being and nothing is contradictory; thought cannot endure a contradiction; hence it determines itself, and Being along with it, to a higher notion, to which notion a corresponding higher reality corresponds, namely, to the notion of Becoming, in which, as in a higher unity, the contradictory terms are both contained and their contradiction resolved. This first stage in the dialectic process illustrates, then, the whole method. First, thesis; second, antithesis; third, synthesis. The synthesis serves, however, at once as the starting-point for a new progress, the moving impulse being the new contradiction which itself is found to involve and which urges on (in the form of a new antithesis) to the determination of a new synthesis; and so on, *in indef.* In the above exposition is seen, also, in its primal manifestation in Hegel's system, the celebrated law of the identity of contradictories, as also, in its first operation, the propelling principle which lies at the basis of the speculative development. (We do not here inquire whether the antithetic terms are true contradictories, nor whether, supposing them to be such, the strange perception of their identity would not be sufficient to satisfy the curiosity and the interest of thought and so to arrest the progress of the development by

taking away all motive for pursuing it further. The former point, at least, Trendelenburg, as we shall see, has considered for us.)

The first requirement of the dialectic method being that we shall simply think, the question arises as to the possibility and import of this pure thought. Admitting its possibility for the moment, we remark preliminarily that it will be of no value or concern to us, unless it shall possess some important content and advance in some definite direction. This much is by universal recognition essential to all thought worthy of the name.

The expression "pure thought" is an inconveniently indefinite one, since it may be made to stand for an important truth or to conceal an impossibility. It may denote and would perhaps most naturally suggest "the Ideal," which in the human mind depends upon a previous knowledge of the Real; or it may express the characteristic quality of rationally conscious, as distinguished from non-conscious, being; or, finally, it may be employed, as it is at the beginning of Hegel's *Logic*, as a name for thought engaged with no *definite*, concrete object and independent of sensibility. Has pure thought, in this last sense, an important content and can it move forward in a definite direction? If what Hegel claims were true, the question, in both its clauses, would have to be answered with a decided affirmative. This we have already seen. But let us look a little more closely, seeking to be guided only by the old-fashioned and scarcely yet antiquated principle of the identity of things identical and of the contradictory and hence mutually exclusive nature of things contradictory. We are required by Hegel to abstract from all that which sensation offers or imagination constructs. Complying, we find our thought occupied with nothing in particular and with everything in general, i. e., with the simple notion of being, for "everything," in its "general" aspect, is simply being. Now, could we arrive even at this indefinite result, if sensation and imagination had furnished us nothing from which to abstract? He would be rash who should assert the affirmative. Nor has this general notion of Being any significance or value for us, except in its relation to that from which it is abstracted or to those possibilities of being, unknown in reality, which we represent to ourselves

only with the direct or indirect aid of the imagination. If, now, this notion be viewed in the light of that from which it is abstracted, it has a certain value, but is not an independent possession of pure thought; if not thus viewed, if thought, seeking to regard it, repels all reference to the sources through which the notion was derived, it becomes nothing and the thought of it impossible. The thought of it is possible for Hegel, only because he combines in his conception of pure thought two notions, which exclude each other, and with the one of which he practically works, while the other is falsely imagined to be the true working conception. These notions have been both indicated in the above definition of the "third sense" in which pure thought may be understood. They are: absence of any definite, concrete object (but not of negative reference to sensible intuition), and independence of the forms and at least ideal activities of sensible intuition. The former is the working notion in Hegel's system; the latter is a mere figure-head, contradictory and impossible *in re*, but put forward as the all-effecting agent. In the latter sense, purely to think is purely to do nothing, and hence, evidently enough, progress is out of the question. And it is because the beginning is made by Hegel, not in the "element of pure thought" taken in this really unthinkable sense, the sense required and professed by the system, but in the former sense, i. e., it is because the beginning is made by him in a realm thickly surrounded by the shadowy forms of banished objects, which imagination is constantly ready and urgent to re-introduce upon the scene, that any kind of progress is possible for him. Without the felt presence and influence of these forms, not thought, which is life, but the absence of thought, or mental death, would ensue. For thought is suffocated and withers without the air and light of the sensible cognition of the world of real things and the creative aid of the imagination, which works with materials derived from such cognition. Pure thought, in the sense required by the Hegelian dialectic, is impossible. What is thus shown by reflection and analysis, is confirmed by Trendelenburg in the demonstration which he gives in the "*Logical Investigations*" (chap. iii, *init.*), of the fact that the first stadium, through which pure thought is alleged to pass, is not traversed

without the aids now pointed out, and hence, by analogy, that the whole assumed progress of pure thought depends on the same aids. But before accompanying our author in his analysis, let us call attention to another fundamental assumption of the Hegelian system.

While the beginning, as above stated, is, in its subjective aspect, pure thought, it is, objectively speaking, pure being; and these, says Hegel, are one. Identity of thought and being, or, rather, their inseparable union as different but accordant aspects of the same thing (the Absolute), this is the assumption common to all systems of absolute idealism. The assumption in German idealism had its origin with Kant, who concluded that the whole sphere of known Being was phenomenal and hence subjective, and that true being (in "things in themselves"), though real, was unknowable. Fichte, detecting (with others) the formal inconsistency with which Kant had concluded to the existence of things in themselves, denied their existence, deriving the whole universe from the activity of the "me," the subject of thought, and so founding the system of subjective idealism. In this system obviously enough, being could not but be identical with thought. But the basis of the system was untenable, the fancied demonstration of it (through Kant) having (now, at least) been shown, on the one hand, to be unsound, and, on the other, not to warrant, in so far as it may be sound, any such conclusion as that drawn by Kant and his successors. The theorem of the identity of thought and being became therefore, instead of a demonstrated principle, really a postulate of the whole school of absolute idealists from Fichte onwards.

What it means with Hegel is, doubtless, in the main (as with Spinoza), that the content and connection of necessary thought corresponds with the content and connection of being, and further (in advance upon Spinoza) that thought is the "truth of being," as its genius and its end. In the Absolute, according to Hegel, thought and being are one, and since, according to the same authority, the Absolute can be comprehended in pure thought—can be seen in dialectical development—it follows that the dialectic development of thought is at once an expression of the necessary development or being of things. If, in

what follows, the demonstration shall be completed that pure thought is impossible for man (or, at least, that Hegel's attempt at it was unsuccessful,) the above conclusion will also fall, with the assumption on which it rests. (For the rest, Hegel himself found insuperable obstacles in nature to the realization of all which he had proudly claimed for pure thought. "The development of the particular," he admits, in his *Philosophy of Nature*, "is exposed to external and foreign influences; in this is seen an impotence (?) of nature, which sets limits to philosophy; that which is most particular in nature cannot be ideally exhausted [expressed in adequate conceptions]." See Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, New York, 1874, vol. i, p. 581.) We call attention here simply to the circumstance that Hegel seems to envisage the postulate of thought and being as identical. in different manners, in different parts of the *Logic*. At the beginning we are told that the commencement is made with "pure being, which is also pure thought." Here the identity is evidently purely psychological; pure being is a "pure abstraction," and an abstraction has no being except in thought. It is evident that from this identity there does not follow the real identity of definite physical being with the thought which apprehends it or even with the thought which (in man) is assumed "dialectically" to develop it. Nor is either of these forms of identity synonymous with that other, which Hegel affirms in his *Philosophy of Law*, when he says that "whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real." It is this latter conception of identity which determines Hegel's practical developments, and in the affirmation of its truth, but not in its application, few metaphysicians, we fancy, will disagree with him.

That, now, the progress from thesis, though antithesis, to synthesis, in the successive stadia of the dialectical development, is not a progress of pure thought, is shown by Trendelenburg in an examination of the first stadium. "The beginning," says Hegel, "is pure being, which is, at the same time, pure thought." "This pure being," he continues, "is pure abstraction, hence the absolutely negative, which is nothing." "Nothing" (in this view) "is the same as being. The truth of being, as also of nothing [*das Nichts*, taken, it should be observed, with the article, hence substantively, hence treated as though it were

after all something more than bare, absolute negation] is therefore the unity [identity] of the two ; this unity is [ideally, and hence also really] Becoming." Pure Being, the beginning, is Nothing, and Nothing is pure Being ; both are identical, and yet they are contradictory ; the contradiction is resolved, for thought, in the notion of Becoming, and for the corresponding world of reality, in the corresponding real process. That becoming contains a positive and a negative element—being and non-being—is obvious enough, as Trendelenburg now says, when we consider the notion in the light of sensible intuition or observation. "While, for example, it is becoming light [while day is dawning], it is both light and also not yet light." But pure being, says Trendelenburg, is repose : and pure nothing is repose. Becoming (development) is motion ; where, in the elements which Becoming involves and whence it issues, is found the element of motion which appears in the resulting higher idea ? It is not contained in them ; and pure thought being unable to draw from them what they cannot yield, nor to add this to them from its own resources, is really compelled, tacitly, but surreptitiously, to call in the required idea of motion from the sphere of sensible intuition.* "Thus Motion, without a word of explanation, is assumed by the dialectic method which pretends to assume nothing." "The beginning of the dialectic is subsequently represented as being like the beginning of the geometry of Euclid. The postulate of logic, it is said, is Think, just as the postulate of geometry is 'Draw a straight line.' In and through these actions both of these sciences then proceed systematically and naturally forwards. That which is involved in the requirement to 'think,' is presupposed, and nothing else. But the difference between the two cases is easy to be perceived. Geometry requires something simple : something equally simple was to be required by the dialectic method ; hence its requirement was termed *pure* thought. But, behold what happens : this pure thought, presupposing only itself, can, notwithstanding its simplicity, not advance without aid, and it shows itself in its very first step indissolubly joined to [making use of] an idea, in which space and time are perceived to be

* We use the expression "sensible intuition," in this Article, as the equivalent of the German term *Anschauung*.

involved ; it is therefore not pure thought, completely unfettered from external or concrete being." Trendelenburg points out, with less of detail, how motion, with space and time, is in like manner tacitly assumed in subsequent stadia of the alleged progress of pure thought, and in particular, in the section relating to Quantity, where such notions as continuous and discrete magnitude, the " Extensive," the " Intensive," and Number are considered. He calls attention to the fact that the terms of language confirm the assertion of the natural and necessary involution of motion, time, and space in the notions in question. (The reader will recall the " Thesis" above cited, in which Trendelenburg asserts the philosophical significance of etymology. Trendelenburg constantly looked to the forms of language for the confirmation or correction of his views.) " External motion is thus, in the first place, the postulate of this non-postulating logic. It is impossible to tell how much is thus secretly introduced—the whole wealth of constructive mathematical intuition, the clearness of an accompanying sensuous image. This postulate is immeasurable in its consequences. For motion, when present in the slightest measure, gives an image and so conducts directly into the realm of sensible intuition. Thus thought has at its disposal an image, which it uses whenever it needs it, but which, agreeably to its principle, it repels from itself, whenever it withdraws into the realm of proud abstraction." So, then, the " pure thought" with which the dialectic method claims to begin, is impossible, for it cannot exist without content, nor, if it could thus exist, can it live without progressing, and both content and progress depend on the presence and aid of elements derived from or indirectly related to the sphere of the sensuous imagination.

The dialectic method proposes to construct the universe of thought and being by speculative development from the datum of pure thought. Its procedure is professedly *a priori*. It would show the genesis and necessary connection of things, as they might lie in the consciousness of a divine mind. *A posteriori*, i. e., empirical, aid, the aid of sensation and imagination, is to be excluded. By what means, then, is the construction to be effected? It has been above indicated that the

notions of contradiction (negation) and identity are the prominent means used for the end proposed. Trendelenburg proceeds to show the defects and the inefficacy of these means. Negation, he points out, may be either logical or real; the one is formal, contradictory opposition (A and non- A); the other is real (material) opposition—the opposition of contraries (white, black). The former is purely mental, the work of reflection, and requires no positive image of the second term; the latter alone exists in nature, whence both its terms are derived through sensuous intuition. By an examination of various stadia at which the principle of negation is seen at work in Hegel's system, Trendelenburg shows that it is not logical, but real opposition which is in play, and that consequently its employment requires and has led to the constant use of sensible intuition and its products, which are foreign to pure thought, and concludes his consideration of the first one of these "means" as follows: "There results from all this, for the dialectic of pure thought, an inevitable dilemma. Either the negation, by the aid of which it leads to antithesis and synthesis, is pure, logical negation (A , non- A)—in which case it can bring forth no *definite* product in the antithesis and can not combine thesis and antithesis in the synthesis; or it is real (contrary) opposition—which, however, can not be arrived at by the way of logic alone, so that the dialectic is not a dialectic of pure thought" The other means employed, identity, establishes the reconciliation of what was before opposed, as, above, Becoming was termed the identity or unity of Being and Nothing, and "their truth." But this identity, as Trendelenburg shows, is an identity of reflection or comparison—an identity, that is to say, at the perception of which the dialectic philosopher arrives only by the way of comparison with what, *ex hypothesi*, his pure thought does not contain, namely, with the world of real, sensuously apprehended forms; hence the employment of this means involves again the abandonment of the ground of pure thought. While it is claimed to have concrete significance, it is purely abstract, and is ludicrously inadequate to the accomplishment of the results claimed for it. This is shown by Trendelenburg in numerous examples taken from Hegel's *Logic*, among others, in the development of

the notion of Freedom. Here the thesis is causal substance, causality; the antithesis is the effect; the synthesis is reciprocity of action (action and reaction). The effect reacts, is itself therefore causal. Cause becomes effect, and effect, cause. In this identity of cause and effect, the underlying substance remains "at home" ("with itself," "*bei sich*," a phrase denoting a moment subsequent to that expressed by "in itself" and "for itself;" the indefiniteness of the expression, as applied by Hegel, is fitly pointed out by Trendelenburg.) This being "at home" (having come home) on the part of substance is, therefore [], the truth of necessity, or freedom! Trendelenburg very justly and mildly remarks, that the dialectician thinks he has more in this train of development than he really has.

The remainder of Trendelenburg's criticism—which we cannot be expected further to reproduce here—is directed to showing that the argument from a *regressus, in infinitum* is frequently and incorrectly employed by Hegel as positive proof of a contrary; that the terms "immediate and immediacy," present in every page of the Hegelian *Logic*, conduct unseen from the assumed realm of pure thought into the realm of sensuous representation; that in place of the asserted immanent connection of the Hegelian system, there is, rather, a constant solution of continuity; that the dialectic process, contrary to its claims, is the reverse of the genetic. Particularly entertaining is the manner in which Trendelenburg convicts of logical error those steps in the dialectic process in which, by virtue of the ostensible Principle of Identity, thesis and antithesis are united in synthesis. In these steps we discover "the second syllogistic figure of Aristotle, but—what logic interdicts—with an affirmative conclusion. E. g., Pure being is 'immediate;' Nothing is 'immediate': hence nothing is pure being; or, the premises being interchanged, pure being is nothing. Logic warns us against such syllogisms From the nature of the case, syllogisms of the second figure with affirmative conclusions are fallacies or sophisms. Since Aristotle's time it has remained a demonstrated law that in the second figure none but negative conclusions are possible. Hegel counts the second figure as the third—which does not alter the case; but he treats with contempt the rules to which it is subject, since he adds in a

note (*Encyklopädie*, § 187): 'The inquiry, for the rest, as to the conditions necessary to correct conclusions in the various figures—whether these may be universal, etc., or negative—is a *mechanical* one, which, on account of its senseless mechanism and essential insignificance, has justly fallen into oblivion.' That which is termed mechanical in this passage, is really, the rather, an instance of mathematical exactness and necessity, which no one has ever yet disregarded with impunity. He who considers the observance of an elementary principle to be beneath his dignity, will surely be tripped up by it." In like manner, errors in conversion and instances of a fallacious *quaternio terminorum* are pointed out.

Such, then, are the principal points in the criticism by Trendelenburg of Hegel's dialectic method—and he who will may read the whole expressed in the author's meaty German, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2d ed., ch. iii.* In this examination of the dialectic method and in this exposure of its defects, Trendelenburg claimed that he had placed the life of the system of absolute idealism at stake, since the latter lived only through the former. He recognized, with all others competent to express a judgment in the matter, the grandeur of Hegel's aim. But this aim of Hegel's was and is substantially identical with that of all philosophy, to comprehend, namely, all things in their necessity, to make it evident to thought how and why things are and must be as they are, and to discover the principle of life on which the procession of events in the universe depends. But were the means chosen by Hegel sufficient for the end proposed, "was the earth, on which he stood, firm enough to support such a heaven-storming construction?" This is what was to be decided, and Trendelenburg's dissections and demonstrations

* In the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, ed. by W. T. Harris, St. Louis, No. 20, 1871, Nos. 21, 22, 24, 1872, may be read a translation of articles written by Trendelenburg in defence of his criticism, after the publication of various attacks upon it. While these articles, well translated, furnish an admirable specimen of the reposeful, pregnant, almost antique style of the author, it is surprising that the translator did not instead give the readers of the journal the original criticism as published in the *Logical Investigations*; for the "articles" deal only by way of brief recapitulation with the criticism itself, and are largely taken up with personal or local discussions of relatively transient interest.

were "epoch-making" in leading to that negative answer, which has already become so nearly the judgment of history. If we have dwelt so long upon it, this has been because of the importance of the achievement in itself, and also because the interest among American students of philosophy in Hegel, and the disposition among many of our best philosophical minds to study the scientific merits of his method, are so marked, as to make the exposition given both welcome and, possibly, useful.

But not only did our philosopher thus seek negatively to determine his own ground by showing the untrustworthiness of others among his immediate contemporaries; in the further development of his own doctrines he has constant reference to the theories of others, seeking to prove all things, to hold fast that which is good. Thus, to take one example and that a most important one, in connection with his own derivation of the notions of time and space, Trendelenburg seeks to justify his disagreement with various philosophers, whose theories on the subject were most worthy of attention. It is in this connection that he first developed, in a manner to attract attention, his criticism—now become notorious, if not also famous—of the Kantian doctrine of time and space; the doctrine on which the whole *Kritik of Pure Reason* essentially rests, and which affirms the exclusively subjective and *a priori* character of these intuitions, as forms of perception and imagination, valid *for us*, but unrelated to things-in-themselves—necessarily applied by man, but only within the sphere of experience, which sphere covers only phenomena and does not extend to the true things as they are or may be in themselves. Trendelenburg maintained that Kant's arguments for the subjective and *a priori* nature of the intuitions ("forms of intuition") in question did not exclude the hypothesis that space and time have also objective reality; Kant, according to Trendelenburg, seemed to have fancied that space and time must be either exclusively subjective or exclusively objective, and not to have considered the third alternative, viz: that of their being at once both subjective and objective. It is pretty nearly literally true to say that the *cudgel* was taken up by Kuno Fischer, the historian of Modern Philosophy, in Kant's defense, in the second edition of

his *History*. The dispute became in the end extended over a wider ground than that of the doctrine in question, in consequence of the intimation made and supported by proofs, on the part of Trendelenburg, that Kuno Fischer's exposition of Kant was not authentic; and it must be admitted that it also became personal and criminatory to a degree not creditable to the influence of divine philosophy on the passions of its votaries. Numerous parties have expressed their views on the main subject of the dispute, in pamphlets and review-articles, and the matter will still be held by many to be *in judice*. The present writer, after a tolerably careful review of the arguments and proofs on both sides, can not but express his agreement with many whom he believes to be among the most impartial of philosophical judges in Germany, that Trendelenburg was triumphantly in the right, as he was far superior to his opponent in point of temper. We should be glad, did the limits and proportions of this Article permit it, to develop the grounds for agreement with Trendelenburg in this matter. It will be evident, at all events, to all familiar with the philosophy of Kant and of his successors, how this demonstration of the incompleteness of Kant's proof of the exclusive ideality of time and space, cuts away the ground from beneath the feet of the whole subsequent development of German idealism.

II. The degree to which, during the past three or four decades, historical studies in philosophy have taken the place, among the Germans, of original system-making, has been often enough remarked. The causes of this lie near at hand. Modern philosophy had grown up without due reference to the investigations of earlier thinkers. Bacon, Descartes, Kant, had treated ancient philosophy with neglect, when not with contempt. The same inattention to ancient thinking had prevailed, relatively, with the immediate successors of Kant. Hegel with his comprehensive, all-embracing desire for knowledge, had indeed studied the history of past philosophical systems and lectured on the same. But his study and his exposition had been prejudiced by the desire to find exemplified, in the succession of philosophical stand-points, the all-compelling sway of the dialectic process of development. It was not history as such,

but history as testifying to the truth of the Hegelian system, that was sought. The tension of the general philosophical mind after the publication and wide-spread adoption of the Hegelian philosophy was extreme, and could not but generate in the end a reaction of fatigue. When finally, after the death of Hegel, history began to make up a verdict unfavorable to the truth of the Hegelian method and teaching, it is not strange that a general distrust of system-makers followed, and that those who did not abandon philosophy entirely, sought rest for their minds and a sure footing for their remaining philosophical convictions in the calm study of the past. And especially was it the grand, reposeful forms of the Greek masters towards which many eyes turned. It was as if the resolve had been made to institute a new investigation, which, covering the whole ground of the past, should determine what results, valid by the fiat of history, and consistent with the results of modern science, had been arrived at by all preceding philosophers. And this impulse towards historical investigation was and is but a part of the wider movement in the direction of historical study in general. "Seldom is sufficient emphasis laid upon the fact, that our century, by the historical direction given to its investigations, has brought about a second Renaissance—a Renaissance extending to all that is great in the past, but yet restricted to that alone which is ascertained to be truly great—a Renaissance on the basis of an all-inclusive criticism, and not, like that of the 16th century, borne on the inspiration of an one-sided, naive enthusiasm." (Alfred Dove, in *In neuen Reich*, 1872, No. 7, p. 242.) In this study and restoration of the past Trendelenburg took a conspicuous and earnest part. His philological studies had specially prepared him for the critical study of Greek texts. (The union in him of philological and philosophical attainments led to his being termed, revilingly, "the philologist among the philosophers, and the philosopher among the philologists.") The fruits of such study appeared in the historical works above named. The first part of the *History of the Doctrine of Categories* is especially devoted to Aristotle's doctrine. The result of the investigation is that Aristotle arrived at the statement and definition of the categories in his table, through the study of the logical elements of grammatical

discourse. While this result was not received, in the case of weighty contemporary authorities, without protest, it could not but be especially interesting to Trendelenburg, as furnishing a new exemplification of his favorite thesis of the intimate connection between philology and philosophy. The other volumes of the *Historical Contributions* contain articles and addresses relating especially to the history of modern philosophy, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, and Herbart receiving most attention. The numerous addresses reprinted in the *Minor Writings*, relate in large proportion to Prussian history, and are to a considerable extent an historical commentary to Trendelenburg's work on Natural Law.

The characteristic of all of Trendelenburg's historical investigations is the scientific objectiveness with which he apprehends and sets forth the historic facts and their substantial import. Not that he regards the various philosophical systems and doctrines of the past with the dry light of the understanding alone, as a botanist dissects a plant or an anatomist a corpse. From the time of his graduating from the gymnasium, he sought to combine with intellectual light the warmth of feeling; indeed, according to him, feeling and not thought, was the fundamental and characteristic mark of humanity. So, then, the artistic in form and the ideal in inspiration and content, in Plato's works, excited his special and enthusiastic approbation, as did also the sober exactitude and much in the method and specific teachings of Aristotle; while doctrines, such as some of Spinoza's, Kant's, Hegel's, and Herbart's being, in his opinion, demonstrably false and in some cases pernicious, he treats them with all the severity of logical rigor and, sometimes, of a just moral indignation. Never, however, does he confound an intellectual opinion with the personality of its defender, when measuring out his blame; his decided reprobation, on scientific and logical grounds, of the pantheism of Spinoza and Hegel, for example, never blinds him to their personal, moral worth nor to the magnitude of their substantial contributions to the development of philosophic thought and knowledge.

But while Trendelenburg's historical investigations were thus carried on in a truly scientific spirit, they all had, as above mentioned, a direct and intended bearing on the construction

of his own philosophical system and the discussion of living questions. "We desire," he says, in his *History of the Doctrine of Categories*, p. 197, "to contribute to the result, that historic investigations, from their broad basis in the past, shall raise their summits into the present. It is where history ceases to be simply past, that it furnishes the most active impulses for the present." While philosophy must ever seek expression in a system, it could not disconnect itself from its past. The past contained for it results and warnings, from which the philosophy of the present could and must derive profit. "Philosophy will not recover its former power, until it acquires permanence, and it will not become permanent until it shall grow in the same way in which the other sciences grow—until it presents a continuous development, not taking a new start, and then abruptly breaking off with every successive thinker, but taking up the problems of thought as given in history and carrying their development further on."

"The Germans must give up their erroneous idea, that a new principle must be found for the philosophy of the future. The principle *has been* found; it is found in the organic conception of the world, founded in Plato and Aristotle, continued by subsequent philosophers who followed in their steps, and which must be developed and gradually perfected in a profounder investigation of the fundamental conceptions, as also of the special minor sides of the problem, and in mutual *rapport* with the concrete sciences.

"Had a powerful mind, like Schelling, begun with Plato and Aristotle the philosophical studies which, in the succession of his works, he went through with 'before the public,' instead of proceeding in inverted order backwards from Fichte and Kant to Herder's analogies, then to Spinoza, then to Plato and Giordano Bruno, then to Jacob Böhme, and only taking up Aristotle at the last and at a time when, in spite of his most earnest attempts to penetrate Aristotle, he could only use him—as he does in his rational philosophy—as a kind of elastic spring-board, whence and by the aid of which to hasten himself and the reader into the monstrous 'Potenz'-doctrine, which is wholly unrelated to Aristotle's principles—had, I say, Schelling not pursued this, but followed the contrary, course, one portion of

German philosophy would have turned out otherwise than it did—greater, more enduring, more fruitful. So important is it to keep company with history and to follow the historical development of great thoughts in humanity.”

It was, above all, Aristotle without the knowledge of whom “the true source of modern philosophy would remain unknown.” During every semester, accordingly, it was Trendelenburg’s custom to spend two hours in each week in the public explanation of some portion of Aristotle’s writings to a voluntary class of students. His method in these lessons was not doctrinal or magisterial; on the contrary, he sought to make his pupils investigate for themselves, and his method was adapted to draw them out and assist and stimulate them. The result of the impulses thus communicated became subsequently apparent in the lives and works of more than one of his pupils, who have made substantial contributions to the study and interpretation of ancient—especially the Aristotelian—philosophy.

As to the sources, in ancient philosophy, of Trendelenburg’s own system, they are to be sought in Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrines. The spirit of Plato’s dialogues, in which thought—the “Ideas”—are made so decidedly, not simply the *prius*, but the only and true reality of things, elicited from Trendelenburg a hearty and sympathetic response. But he was not blind to the indefinite and the fantastic in Plato’s philosophy, in whose theory of ideas and of the cognition of ideas he discerned the ancient prototype or beginning of the modern notion of pure, unimagined thought. The Platonic Idea was true and real, but not such, nor cognizable, apart from “things”—the reality and scientific cognoscibility of which latter were, according to Trendelenburg, not to be contested. In Aristotle he found a more discreet, because more realistic theory of cognition, a conception of nature and spirit which so commended itself to Trendelenburg that he made it the ground-work of his own theory, and, what was of no less consequence, an organon of method—the Aristotelian logic—confirmed in the experience of centuries, and not superseded by the dialectic method of the new philosophy. In Aristotle, too, he found the idea by which the formal ethics of a Kant was to be corrected and supplemented, and on which Trendelenburg’s own ethical theory was founded.

On the basis of his careful study of the past, and with constant reference to the results of modern positive science—which he studied with unwearied application in the midst of most engrossing labors—Trendelenburg founded his own system of philosophy.

III. Trendelenburg was, evidently, not one of those who, disheartened by the disastrous end of the labors of the Titans in speculative philosophy, passed to the conclusion that no philosophy was possible. We have already seen that his own experience taught him, what it requires of course but little reflection to perceive, that a system is as necessary for a thinker as a house. Plato, or Aristotle, or Kant, or Hegel, as a system-maker, may fail, but every one will still require that the connection of his own thought shall correspond in some manner or other with the connection of things.

Trendelenburg not only perceived the folly of shutting one's eyes to the verifiable results of earlier thought; he also recognized the inseparable connection of philosophy with the other more concrete or specialized sciences. "Properly speaking, there is as yet no philosophy there, where as yet there exist no special sciences; for it is only in relation with these that philosophy receives its problems and its significance." The special sciences are restricted to limited portions of the realm of reality; their results are but fragments of the whole sum of real or conceivable knowledge; all that we learn is fragmentary, and every philosophical theory is an attempt to reconstruct from the torso the image of the god, or with artistic divination to reunite the scattered limbs in one beautiful body." Philosophy, as Trendelenburg loves to repeat after Plato, is the sentinel on the boundaries of the other sciences, fixing and preserving limits, uniting, demonstrating, and in all this morally purifying. "Philosophy is the religion of science." The special sciences point to the universal; philosophy seeks to realize this universal. She "furnishes principles for the beginnings of the special sciences, establishes harmony among their results, and maintains a living *rapprochement* among them; she is thus at once *a priori* and *a posteriori*; the latter, because it is in the other sciences that she finds her material, and the former, since she must go beyond and above the material thus furnished in order to seize and exhibit the

living band that unites the whole." Philosophy must then bear a due relation to the real and to the ideal; she can be neither purely empirical nor purely *a priori*. Ideal-realism will be her proper name.

The universe exists for thought; the one thing desirable and essential is, that our thought about it shall be true.

Knowledge is something we all imagine ourselves in greater or less measure to possess. The sciences claim to arrive not merely at knowledge, but at necessary knowledge—knowledge of necessity. They prove, in a manner, the legitimacy of this claim by their verification in the application. So, in particular, pure and applied mathematics. The former proceeds by axioms, principles, and constructions, resting on a basis of *a priori* intuition; these axioms, etc., furnish points of view—categories, in a secondary sense—which are verified or concretely illustrated in applied mathematics. The fact of the existence of the sciences is the starting-point for the first philosophical problem, for in this fact is involved the conception of scientific knowledge.

It will be objected (and has been, for example, by Dr. Ulrici, of Halle), that the acceptance of scientific knowledge as a fact, implies what the sceptic may deny, the existence of an objective realm present directly or representatively to the mind. But the question of the reality of an objective world of external things is one upon which practically there is no disagreement among men. The discussion of the grounds of our belief in this reality is essentially one belonging to physics and psychology, and to logic. The explanation of the necessity of this belief is, however, "tacitly contained in logic, which seeks to open the way for an insight into the nature of necessity and into the process by which our knowledge of it arises."

The theory of vision assumes provisionally the reality of the thing to be explained, viz: sight. The nature and significance of the phenomena of sight are to result from the ascertainment and scientific elaboration of the facts. So, in the case of the theory of cognition, the difficulties of the subject can not be expected to disappear before the correct

doctrine—statement and comprehension of facts—shall have been developed.

The axioms, principles, and constructions of pure mathematics are not forms or notions found unaccountably in the mind *a priori*, but are seen and known in their mental genesis; our trust in them reposes on our genetic comprehension of them. In so far as our knowledge—thought—in general contains necessary or universal elements, it can be comprehended only when we comprehend, in like manner, its derivation.

At the outset, therefore, nothing is to be declared inexplicable or unknowable. Any limitation of the field of knowledge, which may eventually be shown necessary, will result from our genetic insight into the nature and possibilities of thought.

Other ways of beginning a system of philosophy, which will occur to the reader of some English systems, are, to write first, for example, a section labelled "The Unknowable," wherein, on the basis of concurrent testimony and alleged "inconceivabilities," the most difficult problems are from the first brushed aside, the subsequent development, running through volumes, being devoted to questions in physics, empirical psychology, or social science (worthy and extremely important subjects, but not questions relating to the essential problems of thought and being); or, on a similar basis, to prove to a probability that certain notions can not but be held, without showing the source of this necessity. If thought and its objects were petrified, and not living, there can be no doubt that the English method of reflective analysis, carried out with sufficient patience, would suffice. But since the contrary supposition is the true one, nothing remains but to find a primal germ and follow it in its development. Philosophy is explanation; but explanation gives the how and the why, and the former can be stated only in terms of motion—terms which describe a genesis.

All the sciences—such is Trendelenburg's development—have to do with somewhat that *is*, and they treat of this "somewhat" through the organ of thought; or, each science has its special subject, a portion of the realm of being, and makes use of thought in the treatment of it in a definite way, or, in other words, has its peculiar method. As, then, the part points

always to the whole, so each science points to the science which treats of the whole of being, or of being as such (Metaphysics), and to the science of thought as thought (Logic). "If the sciences will become completed, they need precisely that to which—though it lies beyond their separate, special spheres—they point. Logic and metaphysics are in so far the proper implication, the consequence, of the essential life of the sciences." The theory of science will hence include a reference both to metaphysics and to logic, and it is this theory which the "*Logical Investigations*" would establish.

In every act of knowing is involved the antithesis of being and thought. The former is taken up into the latter; the latter penetrates the former. How is this possible?

It was a saying of the ancients that like is known by like. Knowledge, as the union of thought and being, can be possible only in virtue of something which belongs equally to these two factors, something in which each resembles the other. And since thought is essentially active, this element common to thought and being must be some form of activity. The first mark, then, of that active principle which shall mediate between thought and being, must be that it shall be common to both. It must, secondly, be primitive and therefore need and admit no explanation, and hence, thirdly, simple, for the complex is not, logically, primitive.

For the discovery of the principle in question, says Trendelenburg, two ways may be pursued. Either the activities manifested in thought and in being may be analyzed, with a view to ascertaining that ultimate one in which both agree, or, some activity known to sensible intuition may be assumed hypothetically, with a view to seeing whether it meets the required conditions. The latter course is adopted.

The activity thus hypothetically selected is motion. Aristotle declared that "he who knows not motion, knows not nature." Modern science is demonstrating with ever increasing completeness the universality of motion in nature. Our perceptions of nature, sight, sound, etc., are found to depend on external motion. Even for the explanation of matter, the image of motion is found necessary: matter is comprehensible for us only in terms of balanced or specific positive forces, and

the conception of force, if realizable at all, is not so without the aid of the conception of motion.

On the other side, thought depends in all its phases on the ideal counterpart of motion. In vision we describe the outline of the object in thought, though with lightning-like rapidity—a form of ideal motion; in sound we “follow” the succession or prolongation of sounds—again a form of ideal motion. The terms and processes of the abstract or logical understanding, such as distinguishing, combining, classifying, inferring, its ideas, such as causality, finality, all imply ideal or *constructive* motion, the counterpart of external motion.

Motion, then, would seem to satisfy the first of the requirements for the desired principle mediating in knowledge between thought and being, the requirement, namely, that it be common to both thought and being.

Motion is, further, both in the sphere of being and in the sphere of thought, primitive, as being underivable, indecomposable, indefinable. No definition of motion can be given which does not presuppose the thing defined.

Thirdly, motion must, in order to meet all the requirements of the principle sought, be simple. It is claimed by some that motion is the product of space and time as its factors. But the ideas, factor, space, time, all involve, in order to their realization in thought, the idea of motion. Or is it claimed that activity is more universal than motion? But no specific difference, by which motion may be distinguished from activity, can be stated, which does not itself imply the conception of motion. Nor is the idea of change more general, though more abstract. Motion is simple, and not compounded (Since activity and change are more abstract than motion, they cannot serve as principles in a theory of cognition. For a principle is needed which shall conduct thought into the realm of the concretely real.)

Motion is a fact of nature, and “the fundamental phenomenon of all nature.” It is claimed and shown to be, in its ideal form, also a fact of mind, and that, not as a mere representative image derived from without, but as original, spontaneous, the counterpart of motion in space, and taking place in the ideal space of thought. Since motion is thus common and funda-

mental to thought and being, it is possible to conceive how that which is necessarily involved in external motion may be comprehended—may find its necessary counterpart—in thought, which is ideal motion. And *per contra*, that which follows from motion as an ideal possession, those ideas which are seen in thought to result from motion as implied in it, we may expect to find realized in the world of outward, real things. How much, then, and what, is involved ideally in the fact of motion?

First, Trendelenburg examines Kant's arguments for the exclusively subjective nature and validity of the notions of space and time, and finds, as above stated, that they are not conclusive; that, while they prove that space and time are subjective intuitions, they do not exclude the possibility that space and time may have also objective validity. As directly following from the idea of motion, these ideas are observed by Trendelenburg to be at once subjectively and objectively necessary and valid. They are hence not empirical, their number (which, on the Kantian theory that they are *a priori*, purely subjective forms, remained unaccounted for) is explained by the fact that no other similar ideas actually flow from the idea of motion, and their peculiarity as belonging to the sphere of sensible intuition, in distinction from the sphere of abstract conception, is comprehended (for motion, from which they result by implication, is an idea of sensible intuition), as is also, for an analogous reason, their infinitude. The harmony of the subjective and the objective, the union of thought and being in knowledge, is, in so far, made intelligible. Space may then be termed "the external product of motion, and time the idea of the inward measure of motion." Trendelenburg examines various other theories of space and time, arriving at results which confirm indirectly his own conclusion.*

From what has now been set forth, it will be evident how, in the view of Trendelenburg, motion, as a physical and ideal (theoretical) activity, is to be regarded as the *prius* of experience, "the *a priori* before experience," and how it is the medium of experience. In an examination of the fundamental notions of mathematics and physics (point, line, figure, num-

* On the objections to this theory of space and time as related to motion, see Dr. Porter's *The Human Intellect*, New York, 1867, pp. 560, 561.

ber, matter), he shows how, with the aid of space and time, products of motion, through the constructive (intuitive, not abstract) motion of the mind, these notions (intuitions of the sensibility) are, with the exception of matter, evolved *a priori* by genetic necessity and are necessarily outwardly manifested and confirmed in the physical world, the radicle of which is also motion. Not as though these notions were developed *a priori*, in such sense as to be anterior to experience and an independent possession of pure mind ; (pure mind, mind unrelated to empirical objects, we do not know ;) on the contrary, "the *a priori* is only what it is, in so far as it confirms and reveals itself externally." As to matter, although all our attempts to analyse or comprehend it result and end in the apprehension or idea of some form of motion, yet it is admitted that there remains in it something as yet inexplicable.

- From Aristotle's time until now, philosophers have been more or less accustomed to distinguish a certain number of fundamental notions, of more general application than others, which have been termed categories. These notions represent mental points of view, from which we apprehend and judge of objects or relations ; or, they are fundamental notions, on which all our thinking rests. The ten categories of Aristotle are well known in the history of philosophy, and the twelve categories, in three classes, of Kant, will be familiar to every student of modern philosophy. With Hegel, every new stage in the dialectic development of thought furnishes new categories. In Trendelenburg's *History of the Doctrine of Categories*, he had examined the various forms which this doctrine had assumed in the history of philosophic thought, and had pointed out that, wherein each successive form seemed to be defective. In the last chapter of vol. i. of the "*Logical Investigations*" he names and explains the derivation of eight categories or ideas which follow from the idea of motion and are therefore valid wherever motion is found. These, in distinction from the subsequently investigated "modal" categories, are termed "real categories, following from motion." "Thought, since it is self-consciousness, can regard itself in its motion ; it knows what it does and sees what it has done." As, now, it observes motion, and its products and relations and distinguishes the latter, there arise for it the categories.

Of these the first and most important is causality. Motion, it has been shown, produces. The apprehension of the product takes place in forms of motion; the product is comprehended only in terms of motion. When, now, we follow backwards the motion of production, we see whence the product came. This derivation of the product is termed causality, which accordingly denotes simply the "direction whence." "The law of causality expresses nothing but this continuity of development." Since motion is in all thought and in all things; the notion of causality is universal and necessary in thought and things.

Motion and counter-motion limit and determine each other and the result is a product relatively at rest. This is termed thing or Substance—the second category. Quantity, the third category, needs little explanation. The fourth, Quality, is causality in substances. A substance, product of motion, is not absolutely at rest. From it motions go forth, producing specific effects. Thus a substance is "through its surface" the occasion of etherial vibrations, which are perceived by us as color. The other "real" categories (termed also "mathematical") are Measure, Unity in plurality, Inherence, and Reciprocity of action (including force). The significance of all these categories, when the principle of the system is admitted, is absolute, and not merely relative. If motion is the "first energy" of thought and of being, the categories which follow from it express relations at once ideal and real, subjective and objective. "In this view the chasm does not exist, which in other theories separates the categories of thought and the principles of things, as though they belonged to two worlds, which it is impossible to bring into relation; for in their origin all are one." The reader will easily see the coherence between the general theory here propounded and the further view of Trendelenburg, that in cognition, judgment (which corresponds to activity, motion) precedes conception (whose products represent the products of motion).

Thus far we have remained in the physical realm, the realm of the working cause, the sphere of mathematics. Is this the only realm?

The organic world stands before us apparently an imposing monument of the power of thought over the elements of things. In it the part has significance only in relation to the whole—the

root only in relation to the tree it nourishes, the human hand only in relation to the person whom it serves. So intricate are the combinations by which the ends of the organism are reached, so inexplicable, at the first glance, except upon the theory that the end has determined the means, that a modern "Positive" philosopher, while refusing to affirm the reality of final causes, has somewhere said that in the investigation of nature we must often proceed as if such causes really existed and acted. In the organic realm, what before was effect (in the sphere of efficient causation) seems now to become the cause, or, in other words, the preconceived idea of the end appears to have determined and directed the means. The phenomenon is at least extremely striking, and the idealistic theory by which it is accounted for is so plausible and so superior in point of evidentness and facility to any other, that it should certainly not be set aside without sufficient reason. The ancients, Plato, Aristotle, accepted the fact and the explanation, the one seeing in the fact the imperfectly realized power of the Idea, and the other not only following out the notion of purpose, end, in the whole sphere of physically organized existence, but also founding on it his conception of the ethical life of man as organically developing itself in the individual, the family, and the state. The notion of purpose, inherent end, as manifested in organic existence, is for Trendelenburg the second fundamental notion in philosophy. Motion—the efficient cause—forms the basis and becomes in the organic sphere the material of purpose—the final cause—and thus philosophy and nature are carried up above the purely mathematical and physical realm into the organic and ethical. There is differentiation, but not opposition. The real categories receive a new and profounder significance, but do not disappear, when permeated by and in the realm of the organic.

The adoption of this second principle required a more explicit and detailed justification than that of motion. The latter was furnished to hand, so to speak, by the sciences, which are but constantly completing the demonstration of its universal presence in nature. The former is very widely ignored or denied by the representatives of the positive sciences. Trendelenburg seeks to show that finality is a natural conception, one furnished by the facts of natural science. For this purpose he

examines the structure of various organs and the adaptations of organs to the circumstances in which they are to be used and for the specific uses to which they are put. In these examples the philosopher finds it impossible to exhaust the whole truth of the case with the application of the physical or mathematical categories, and is hence obliged to recognize a new principle, that of intelligence or finality. The difficulties of the case are not ignored. In the organism the efficient cause produces the whole from the parts, while the final cause determines the parts from the whole. "The circle is distinctly revealed. The organ in its activity falls under the sphere of the efficient [physical] cause; but by its structure, which reveals design, it falls under the law of its own effect. The eye sees, but it is sight itself which constructed the eye. . . . The organs of the mouth speak, but it is speech itself, the necessity of expressing thought, which beforehand framed them pliant to their designed use. This circle is the magic circle of the simple fact; and the pre-established harmony seems to point to a power superior to and including both efficient and final cause, and in which thought is the Alpha and the Omega."

The final cause, controlling the efficient cause, the force, identifies itself with the same. Its results are always a form of activity, not of rest; and thus motion which was at the beginning, reappears in the later and higher results to which thought contributes. Thought, finality, takes motion up into its service; "the idea persuades necessity," as Plato says, to become its servant. The efficient cause becomes a means.

Trendelenburg examines the theories of Bacon and Spinoza, who denied or limited the employment of the principle of finality, as also Kant's and Hegel's derivations of the notion, and finds in all no valid objection to the reception of the principle. The principle is assumed, because physical, mechanical causation is as yet insufficient for the facts. "True," says Trendelenburg, "the possibility still remains that a more complete knowledge of the efficient cause would dissolve the theory of finality into mere show. Such an attempt must be expected. But until the attempt shall succeed, the impotence of the efficient cause is the indirect proof of the necessity of design. Light cannot be comprehended as the product of darkness and

consequently we assume it to be a distinct form of activity. But light is self-revealing, and this is its proper evidence. So also is it with finality."

The possibility of finality, as an objective form of cognition, is grounded, for Trendelenburg, in the fundamental theory of motion as common to thought and being, and as being hence the agent or *tertium quid* through which thought and being can come together. Being acts upon thought and becomes thus the *ratio cognoscendi* through the medium of motion.* In like manner is given the possibility that thought shall act upon being, controlling its motion—its efficient causes—for ends conceived by thought. "As we know external motion only through the mind's own motion, so we perceive the external ends, which nature has realized, only because the mind itself proposes ends and can therefore reproduce in thought the processes of finality in nature." It is true that design—thought—cannot be observed like an outward phenomenon. But no more can physical cause,—for example, the cause of the phenomena of color. One thing only remains indemonstrable. "We observe nowhere in nature the point at which thought seizes hold of force and directs it to ideal ends, and speculation is unable to indicate the point. The philosophy which seeks the inner ends or purpose, founds the ideal in the real; but it as yet knows not how the ideal comes, enters, into the real. Just as the ancients represented the sun-god standing boldly erect in his chariot, and guiding his steeds with his hand, but placed in his hands no reins, instruments of human driving: so thought, as finality, rules the efficient mechanical forces of nature with invisible reins. Human intelligence has under its control an executant hand which provides for the bringing into realization of the means required by intelligence for its ends. But in nature the equivalent for the hand fails in our knowledge, and it is especially through this gap that the doubt enters in which regards finality with incredulity. It is not impossible that one day this defect of knowledge may be made good. For the present, let it suffice to be aware what we do and what we do

* The reader may recall here Spinoza's definition, in his *Ethics*, of the condition of causality: "If two things have nothing in common, one of them cannot be the cause of the other."

not know." It remains true, however, that "finality is a fact in the world, and the question is simply, whether it is a universal one or not. If not, then its existence in the world is an inconsequence."

As the physical realm is broader and higher than the mathematical, which latter it takes up into its service, and as the organic, in which the new principle of finality plainly appears, stands in a similar relation of superiority to the two preceding, so finally the ethical sphere rises out of and above the organic. In the ethical realm the end is an idea, the idea of the perfection of human nature—an idea given, it is true, in man's existence, but freely accepted and realized by him. The intellectual recognition of this ideal end of existence, and the free consecration of one's powers to its realization, are the characteristic conditions of the ethical. "The will is desire, permeated by thought." "The will is then first will in the full sense of the term, when it is able to act in response to the motion of thought [more especially, in response to the conscious idea of the end to be realized in human existence]. When it thus acts, when therefore it is moved by the idea of the nature of man, it is the good will." "This ability, in opposition to the desires and independently of sensuous motives, to have for one's motive only the Good as conceived in thought, we term Freedom of the Will." Truly free acts are necessary acts, because determined by the immutable idea of the nature and design of man, and by what necessarily flows therefrom.

The "real categories" are raised to a higher and more significant form in the light of the principle of finality. Efficient Causality becomes Means, Substance becomes Organism, Inherence—the relation of parts to a whole—becomes the relation of members to the organism, Quality becomes Organic Activity, and so on.

Of the modal categories, which are peculiarly categories of logic or of thought, Necessity, the most important, rests on the mutual permeation of thought and being. The impossibility of the contrary, by which phrase it is often defined, is measured only by comparison with fixed points in knowledge, which are won only by the mutual interpenetration of thought and being,

or by the comprehension of being in thought, on the ultimate basis of the element—motion—common to both.

The method of philosophy is at once analytic and synthetic. A model of all such cognition may be seen in the process by which an obscure passage in the writings of any author is studied and interpreted. The words are analyzed in their etymological forms and syntactical relations, and the sense thereby obtained is confirmed or corrected by comparison with the whole thought, of which the passage is but a partial expression.

"Only in the idea of the whole does the restless movement of the mind find repose." The part points to the whole, the relation to the unconditioned, the finite to the infinite and absolute. In the infinite as its end and cause rests the thought of the finite. But unmistakably as finite science points to the infinite, yet the endeavor to apprehend the infinite must necessarily fail, and the proof of its reality must be indirect; for all direct proof is genetic; but of the infinite there is no genesis. Yet the indirect proof becomes more and more convincing, in proportion as the points of view, the necessities of thought and fact, on which it rests, are made in the progress of science more evident. "God alone can comprehend God." No one is angry with the eye, when it acts with the unexpressed consciousness that the realm of its activity is not that of unchanging, pure light, but of light that is modified, reflected or refracted in the various play of color, that it lives not in the brightness of the sun in the heavens, but in the sphere of terrestrial light. But human thought is reproached with incredulity or indolence, when, like the eye, it knows that the circle of the finite and conditioned, which is surely broad enough, is the limit of its free and joyous activity. When the eye is ravished by the harmony of colors, it does not deny the sun; on the contrary, it knows, so to speak, that the colors are born from the light. When thought exercises itself successfully in finite things, it does not deny God, but sees Him in the reason that is in the world and knows that this reason comes from Him. But by the sight of the sun the eye is dazzled, and it sees then only phantasms of its own production; and so by the intuition of God finite thought is swallowed up

and in this fancied intuition it produces only a reflection of the finite. "All proofs of God's existence resemble the attempt to find out the pure light by reasoning from color, in which light is as it were clouded—as though man could remove the cloud."

"Or, the world may be compared to one among the poems of a master mind, a partial expression of his thought. We read the poem and infer what must have been the whole, the general thought of the poet." "The knowledge which the finite spirit has, however, extended is yet, for each individual, bare patch-work, fragmentary; and whether one's knowledge extend only to a particle or to a part of the world, yet the thought of God is ever the completion of this patch-work." "Science completes itself only in the hypothesis that there exists a spirit, whose thought is the origin of all being. The principle of cognition and the principle of being are one. And because this idea of God underlies the world, the same unity is sought in things and, as in an image, found again. 'The act of the divine knowledge is the substance of being for all things.'"

If in this last division of our Article we have presented so extended an abstract of the contents of the "*Logical Investigations*," an excuse may be found in the importance of the subject-matter, both in itself and as something which might well be incorporated into the current of English and American philosophic thought. The public mind in England and America is or is not now particularly adverse to philosophic exposition and inquiry, according as the latter is conceived as purely *a priori* speculation or as dealing with palpable questions of fact. In this the public mind is partly right; for, if anything has been demonstrated by the history of philosophy, it is the utter sterility of purely speculative inquiries, unrelated to demonstrated fact. But concrete questions in philosophy, no matter how specialized and empirical, cannot be successfully treated when isolated from a more general metaphysical theory. Philosophy is an organism, because all truth is organic. Each special truth is related organically to the whole sum of truth. Truth is one, and a partial truth is never rightly and fully understood except as related to the one whole of which it is a part. A metaphysical theory is therefore necessary, but not one manufactured at pleasure out of the philosopher's *a priori*

consciousness. On the contrary, it must be born of the widest knowledge of the actual methods of the sciences and of the facts of existence as scientifically established. And it is because English and American philosophy has been so often fragmentary and superficial (has the influence of the so-called eclectic school in France, together, alas! with the tradition of English philosophy, had nothing to do with this?) that, though writing, fundamentally speaking, rather in the spirit of an historian than of a propagandist, and acknowledging the influence in the right direction which is exerted by illustrious exceptions among our philosophical writers, we have been influenced by the thought that the further infusion, into our current thought, of something like the grave, comprehensive, universal doctrine of Trendelenburg would, if it could be accomplished, be in the least degree beneficial.

English philosophy is now separated into two camps, in the one of which the fundamental assertion is a negation—the denial of necessity in knowledge or thought—while in the other the opposite is affirmed. And how do the followers in the opposed camps go about to convict each other of error? By firmly based and comprehensive inquiries, resting on a correct appreciation of the whole breadth and depth of the problem? Not, certainly, in all cases. In the first place, the necessity in question is quite commonly conceived as psychological compulsion and philosophers have gone bravely to work to disprove the necessity (for example) that a child of two years should assume a cause for every effect or insist on the identity of A and A! As though any amount of anthropological knowledge or psychological history or analysis were going to show how and why we know (in so far as our *scientific* knowledge extends) that any things are necessarily as they are! For the necessity in question is not the necessity of psychological experience, alone or in any eminent degree, but the scientific necessity of things, and the determination of the basis and rationale of *this* necessity depends on a broad theory of the conditions and foundations of thought and existence, or of scientific knowledge. And if then certain ideas—so-called “forms of intuition,” or categories of the understanding—reveal themselves alike to the unsophisticated and to the

philosophically educated as necessary to thought, their necessity will neither be demonstrated as the result of any number of ages of habitual experience, nor will the temper of the times nor the true spirit of philosophy admit of their being explained (?) as existing in the mind by a divine creative fiat, but they will have to be comprehended as involved in the simple basis of all thought and of all our conceptions of existence. It should be borne in mind that thought, ideas, are nothing except as belonging to an organism of knowledge. Ideas are not necessary in themselves, but only as elements in knowledge. "The *a priori* is what it is, only as it reveals and confirms itself in the knowledge of reality." The question of the origin and nature of necessary ideas is not, therefore, one of empirical psychology. It can be treated only in a separate science, the Science of Cognition, or the Theory of Science, which must rest at once on a physical and a metaphysico-logical basis—the latter in so far as it relates to the fundamental quality and implication of thought, and the former inasmuch as it requires the widest knowledge which the physical sciences, and they alone, can furnish of the nature of being.

A philosophy like Trendelenburg's claims no greater completeness than that which the positive sciences have themselves attained, for it depends on those sciences for its data and its confirmation. It is frankly avowed to be an hypothesis which must be tested by the results of its application. The requirement that a philosophy should be stated as absolute truth is absurd, when we reflect that the philosopher is mortal and fallible, and that what is to be explained is much more difficult to seize than are, for example, in physics the causes of light, heat, and the like, of whose nature, however, our knowledge, though hypothetical, is none the less for that reason respected.

It is not our business nor our purpose to undertake here an absolute defence or criticism of the philosophy of Trendelenburg, yet a few words of cautionary explanation may be allowed.

First, then, let the error be guarded against, of decrying the theory of Trendelenburg as materialistic or in the bad sense empirical, because it rests on the hypothetical identity in nature

of the basis of thought and of physical existence. Once for all—and this is a late day at which to be repeating the statement of a thing so obvious—man is not a pure spirit, and as conscious existence in general depends, at least in this our earthly condition, on physical organization, so thought itself, even in its freest activities, depends on the presence of an image, which image may be received from without or construed from within. Even the most immaterial conceptions, as God, truth, are realized, if at all, only in direct (positive or negative) relation to sensible intuition and imagination and their products. The rule of the physical universe is the rule of the human mind. In each there is gradation, and in each higher grade the preceding is involved as a means. The artist's thought is revealed in a physical material chosen for the purpose; thought, finality, in nature finds no expression except in and on the basis of physical or efficient causation. And so the higher operations of human thought rest upon and involve the lower; conception implies previous perception and imagination and, as an instrument, the ideal, constructive motion which runs through both. The theory, then, instead of being monistic and materialistic at its commencement, is the rather dualistic, since it postulates, starting from the realm of first appearance and from a positive fact implied in all the sciences, the distinction of thought and being. It is not stated, be it observed, that motion exhausts the conception of thought and being, but the hypothesis—in developing which the tendency is to proceed from the known to the unknown—is simply propounded, that motion is universally common to both. What each may have or be in addition to motion is, for the time, set aside. If the analysis of thought and the results of the scientific investigation of nature go to confirm the hypothesis, this is enough to suggest the further supposition that it is through this common element that thought and being can come together in the act of knowledge. However immaterial thought and its substrate may be, neither can come into relation to material, physical existence without some middle term of relation; thus, at least, judged so great a philosopher as Descartes, who accordingly, since he recognized the existence of no such middle or common term, accounted for the interaction of soul and body

(which is but a specification of the problem of the interrelation of thought and being) by the assumed and essentially miraculous concourse of God. If the beginning, then, though in the better sense empirical (as starting from a given fact to be accounted for), is yet dualistic and hence not materialistic, much more, as has been seen, is the end adverse to materialism, since it recognizes the presence and power of thought in nature, ascribing to the former the supremacy and to both a dependence on the Unconditioned.

But, again, it may be said that motion presupposes something that is moved and a moving force, and that the former is in the theory not specified. This may be true; but the theory is not *ab initio* a metaphysics; it is a theory of cognition. It seeks primarily not the essence of existence, but the conditions and implication of thought. It runs incidentally—or, if one will, necessarily—upon the irrational conception of matter, which it frankly confesses its inability wholly to unriddle, although showing that all we can say about it must be said in terms of motion.

The fundamental emphasis which is laid upon finality in nature, is calculated to shock the prejudices of positive philosophers and of some scientists. But the legitimacy of their seeking only for the efficient cause or the mechanics of the phenomena which they investigate, is fully admitted. Since intelligence, if it rule at all in nature, can rule only through the agency of physical causes and on the basis of physical laws, every organism presents a problem in mechanics, which science has to solve. If by usage or courtesy the realm of efficient causation, and that alone, is set apart for science, yet philosophy, whose glance is more comprehensive, must regard phenomena in all their aspects, and if an aspect of them is found which, though not contradictory to the scientific aspect, is yet decidedly different and seemingly higher, the truly scientific spirit will be the last to object to anything being inferred from that aspect, which the facts may warrant or the analogies of thought may necessitate. In the face of opposition, however, philosophy must here stand upon her right and deny the right of the part to dictate to the whole, or of the basis (science, efficient causation) to dictate what superstructure (not in contradiction therewith) shall be raised upon it.

Trendelenburg's *Philosophy of Natural Law* (*Naturrecht*) is founded on ethics, and the ethical, as has been above intimated, is with him but a higher stage or potency of the organic—it is “the organic become free.” Space does not remain for an examination of his doctrine of natural law, agreeable and full of instruction as the examination might prove itself. Yet the founding of the ethical in the organic may strike some strict constructionists among our intuitional moralists as bringing the theory of morals too near to the realm of empirical philosophy, and theologians may reproach it with naturalism. The former objection will tend to disappear when it is recalled that for Trendelenburg the organic is the expression of thought, the illustration of an Idea; not, however, of an idea known apart from experience, but of an *a priori* revealed and confirmed in experience. Nor is the theologian's objection more substantial, for the theory expressly admits and claims that the Idea and its requirements (e. g., the idea, end, of man, and the duties following from it) are the revelation in human nature of the will of the infinite, unconditioned God.

It is a peculiarity of truth, resulting from its organic nature, that, just as, for example, in the human organism, no member can be understood out of relation to the whole organism, and the complete comprehension of any member involves a general comprehension of the whole, so the complete consideration of any part of truth leads, when correctly carried out, to the consideration and knowledge of the whole. And since truth is multifarious and many-sided, the approaches to it are correspondingly numerous. The philosophy of Trendelenburg is an approach to truth and an attempt to comprehend it, from one direction. Equally possible were it, however, conceivably to make the approach, as others have done, from other directions and to arrive at substantially the same results. A philosophical system conceived in this way does not admit of partisans, since a system thus conceived does not and can not claim to be the only true avenue to truth. Only a system, which pretends to take its stand *a priori* at the centre of absolute knowledge and thence to derive by necessary deduction all truth of fact, must have one-sided partisans for its disciples. But it is hoped that all who shall have read the first division

of this Article, will be disposed to allow that such a system is impossible for man. Nothing hinders, then, our conceding the general truth of Trendelenburg's doctrine, without, however, granting that his theory is the only one which a true philosophy may adopt. Now in accepting conditionally his doctrine is it necessary to accept all the minor statements, although we believe that remarkably few just grounds of criticism will be found in them, when all are considered with reference to the whole doctrine of which each statement is a part. Thus what is said (and above expounded) in regard to causality may well strike one as furnishing a strikingly inadequate account of the motion, unless it be borne in mind that it is only causality in the mechanical realm which is being considered. In the higher, organic sphere, the idea becomes deepened and spiritualized. This only must we say by way of criticism, namely, that the reduction of force, as a physical category, to motion, does not seem to us to have been properly supplemented by Trendelenburg in the part devoted to the treatment of the organic sphere. Here force appears as that which we know it in consciousness—not separate from motion, it is true, but with a significance which includes much more than motion. To find this pointed out we have sought in vain in Trendelenburg's works.

We may add, supplementarily, that Karl Rosenkranz, the gifted veteran in the ranks of the Hegelians, who has lectured and voluminously written to the delight of so many thousands—thanks to the charm of his style and the wealth of his erudition and intelligence—in an Article on Trendelenburg and Hegel, in *Die Gegenwart*, August 3, 1872, repeats, against the fundamentally important principle that thought without image (*Anschauung*) is impossible, the charge that such logical conceptions as "causality, necessity, universality, identity, difference, and the like," can absolutely not be imaged. In reply: it is not claimed that motion, and sensation, as dependent in cognition on ideal motion, exhaust the nature of thought. But it is claimed and shown that the universal and abstract conceptions above named come to consciousness and are realized only through the aid of constructive motion. This has been pointed out in particular, as regards the first named of them, in the third division of our Article. As to necessity, the most familiar

manner in which we clothe the conception to our thought is by regarding it as identical with a repellent force which forbids—wards off—the contrary. In like manner, universality, identity, difference, while, like necessity, they are conceptions peculiar to thought in distinction from being (they are not “given” in sensuous intuition, in the same sense in which, for example, color or sound is), have yet no sense and no application, and hence no existence in consciousness except as they reveal themselves and are confirmed in motion (real or ideal) and its products. Rosenkranz’s comparison of Trendelenburg to Cousin is infinitely more complimentary to the latter than to the former. There can be only a superficial resemblance between the German philosopher, who from youth to old age was self-consistent in his thought and ever self-possessed and indefatigable in his judgment of the results of the philosophic thought of the past and in his endeavor to confirm his theory by comparison with the scientific results of the present and by testing it in the application, and the French “orateur-philosophe,” a philosopher, in some sense, by commission, changeable in his fundamental views, and deterred by no philosophic bent from turning his attention, when his philosophic “business” was accomplished, to the study of female characters of the reign of Louis XIV.

ARTICLE VI.—SECTARISM, ALLIANCE, AND THE BASIS OF FELLOWSHIP.*

BASIS OF FULL CHURCH MEMBERSHIP.

A. A particular local church is an organized company of persons, engaged together in honoring Christ and advancing His cause.

B. All persons are to be received and retained in it who will honor Christ and His cause in that particular church.

C. The evidences of thus honoring Christ and His cause are (1) *belief* exhibited as "fruit," (2) *conduct* exhibited as "fruit," (3) a *regenerate state* of the persons "them"-selves, as professed or exhibited. (Matt. vii, 16.)

D. The third evidence, a regenerate state, may be absent notwithstanding the existence of the other two; and this should prevent reception, but need not produce exclusion of a member.

E. This third evidence, professed and more or less verified to charity, may exist without the other two satisfactorily present; and this alone should not produce reception, and need not prevent exclusion of a member.

BASIS OF FELLOWSHIP AND COMMUNION.

F. Members approved in any recognized Evangelical church should not (except by special extreme discipline) be excluded from *fellowship* and communion with any other church, even though (for reasons above) not accepted into full church membership.

G. For, all Evangelical churches (of whatever denominations) constitute as a whole the visible Church Universal, or "kingdom of heaven" on earth; which is one in Christ by "the communion of saints," though in diverse companies or churches, each administered according to its own judgment.

H. Each church by its power of "the keys" (Matt. xvi, 19, and xviii, 18) opens and shuts the doors of the "kingdom of heaven" on earth, or visible Church Universal, binding or loos-

* Supplementary to an Article in the *New Englander* for October, 1872, p. 726; which see. [The Editors of the *New Englander* give place, by request, to the following Article, although it presents views respecting the "Basis of Fellowship," as will be seen, which are different in some respects from those which have been advocated by this journal.]

ing as to general fellowship (except as above); and at the same time it may open to the individual full membership or government within itself, but not within any other church. Hence, there is a clear distinction between *local membership* and *general fellowship*; which, though not the same, is somewhat like the distinction made by our Baptist brethren, between "church fellowship" and "christian fellowship." Communion goes with general christian fellowship, and must not be confined to particular church membership as claimed by Baptists. Dr. Olmstead has just illustrated this in a practical way; and thus "close communion" is relinquished.

CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND ALLIANCE.

I. Each local church has to be based upon charity of judgment, and toleration of individual differences. Hardly any two members agree exactly in religious ideas or methods pursued; and these variations must be cheerfully put up with, so long as they do not necessarily prevent coöperation and successful work together in the Church. On no other principle can active intelligent people be combined into any church organization. Trifling divergences must be allowed, while in larger matters there must be submission to the majority. Thus in one church should every small community be united upon a simply Evangelical basis.

J. When difference of views or methods becomes such as to make a submission of them to the majority impracticable, on the part of a *large number*, a number so large as to be able to sustain suitably a church work by themselves,—then it is proper for them to separate in charity, and labor for Christ in their own way. But this must not mar their mutual toleration, and fellowship, and communion, and coöperation, in recognition of one another as churches, or branches of the one Church Universal.

K. This coöperation of churches in recognition of one another is an Evangelical Alliance, or union and communion of the General Church visible in its one common work; which in any town and city ought to have its stated gatherings and labors together, and thence should extend to the State, national, and international alliance of the Church Universal. This, in the fulness of its loving harmony, is the true unity of Christ's Church, for which we are to labor and to long.

ORGANIC UNITY.

L. Right Christian union, therefore, is indeed an organic unity, by way of alliance and fellowship, but not necessarily by way of universally interchangeable full church membership or government. That would require the forced uniformity of Rome, which is not the real Christian unity in liberty. As every single church requires charity, in order to receive as brethren those who differ and are imperfect in many little things; so the alliance or unity of churches requires charity, in order to recognize each other as real churches of Christ, and to work together as such, notwithstanding the differences and imperfections discerned in one another.

M. Each individual deems his own views and procedures to be *the very way* of truth and right; and so each church or class of churches deems itself *the true model* of church operation. But as individuals we have to tolerate, and accept, and love other Christians who are imperfect in our view, in order to have a church; and so as churches we have to tolerate, and accept, and love other churches that are imperfect in our view, in order to have an alliance or unity of Christ's fold. We are obliged to own some very imperfect brethren; we must in like manner consent to own some very imperfect churches and denominations, or there never can be any sort of union.

N. It is a harmful error, that when in charity we recognize and tolerate a weak brother, we thereby endorse all his ways; or that when we recognize, and work, and commune with another church, we thereby endorse all its doings. No! the great law of charity requires us to harmonize in general with those, some particulars of whose course we disapprove. Even those whom we debar from governmental membership, we need not debar from neighborly communion. Let close communion and all high church brethren think of this. Not until this principle of charity towards the imperfect, with "limitation of responsibility" for their errors, is duly recognized (see Wayland) will the glorious day of gospel unity come.

SCHISM AND SECTARISM.

O. He, therefore, is alone the schismatic, who encourages separation into distinct churches where they are not needed; where there are not numbers enough to warrant the outlay.

And he alone is sectarian who encourages separate churches to disown, or disfellowship, or stand aloof from each other, or refuses to encourage another church when the law of charity requires. It is not sectarian to have diverse churches of different denominations, where there is room for them, nor is it sectarian for each person to prefer his own church method; if only this be kept subservient to charity and the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom, the fellowship and alliance of the one universal Church of Christ. Great error is abroad in regard to this point, and a careful consideration of it is demanded.

We now apply the foregoing principles.

A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR.

Modern mistake begins with a view fundamentally erroneous concerning the basis of local church membership. Instead of the true doctrine we have presented (at C), many leave out (1) and (2), retaining only (3) *a regenerate state* as the test. Whomsoever Christ receives, we must receive, they say; any one that is good enough for Christ is good enough for us. Evidence of piety, in any, even the smallest degree, is thus made the sole qualification for earthly membership and fellowship. There is an attempt to apply the final exact decisions of the judge concerning heaven itself, in the last great day, to man's present imperfect administration of the temporal Zion.

This is the doctrine advanced in an Article of the *New Englander* for October last, p. 670;* and it is now being extensively urged in some of the highest quarters. "We must accept boldly the principle," says that writer, p. 685, "that the Church is the home of all Christians, that every regenerate believer has an essential right to its communion, and that we cannot be right until we open the door to all who confess and call themselves Christians;" and this both as regards membership and "the invitation to the Lord's Supper." This same view was pressed by President Sturtevant, the essayist of the last Illinois State Association at Elgin,—it having long been his favorite theory.

* "Doctrinal Creeds as Tests of Church Membership," by Rev. K. Twining, Providence.

But now, on the contrary, the true principle as here set forth makes *belief* and *conduct*, as well as a *regenerate state*, the basis of church membership. As to belief, not all important doctrine should be insisted on for fellowship, but only the simply Evangelical doctrine in which all gospel churches are agreed, and which is essential to distinguish them from spurious churches. As to conduct, not only morality and a life of piety must be insisted on, but also a course of true brotherhood and coöperation with the Church in its modes of procedure,—a covenant fidelity, a submission to the majority or authority of the body, a *consent* to the fuller faith upheld by it, a life *doing honor to Christ and His cause in this particular church*. "Submitting yourselves one to another in the fear of God." (Eph. v, 21.) Doctrine *adopted* as personal *belief* is one thing, and doctrine *consented to* for the *conduct* of the Church is quite another thing.

Many go so far as to concede the propriety of requiring as a church qualification the amount of *belief* we have specified, namely, the doctrines simply Evangelical; but they would seem to make this only the needful evidence of a regenerate state, and with great inconsistency they object to any other evidence required. Thus they can make no demands upon *conduct*, as including consent to the Church's system of faith and polity, and submission to its methods and its watch-care.

THE FATAL RESULT.

This system must do away with all church discipline, all law and order in the household of God,—and must introduce complete license and anarchy. If a church has no right to have (like other societies) any rules or by-laws to be enforced, any prescribed method of worship, or procedure, or moral action, to which, as the Church's administration of Christ's law, a minority of its members must submit,—then, no harmonious services can be held, no successful steps of labor can be prosecuted, no moral reform can ever be maintained. There can be used no covenant against man-stealing or intemperance, or even in favor of prayer meetings or family worship; and the church has no longer any power or any self-government to wield. The recent Brooklyn development looks strongly in this direction of no-discipline. And one who has long been a

chief influential champion of this "liberal" theory of church membership, in the last October number of the *Congregational Quarterly*, p. 508,* boldly takes the ground of no church government; thus at length carrying out the view to its only legitimate and logical results. He says, p. 529:

"How grave an assumption this is, upon which the whole superstructure of church government has rested for fifteen centuries. It is none other than this: That our Lord has imposed on a society [His Church] the duty of guarding the two rites, so that no unworthy persons shall gain admission to them; and to that end, made it the duty of that society, in perpetual succession, to judge of the fitness of all applicants, to admit those found to possess the requisite qualifications, and exclude those found, or afterwards proving themselves to be, destitute of them. When we call for the proof that he did confer such an indefinite power on the Church or on the apostles, it is entirely lacking. It rests on nothing but assumption. (p. 530.) . . . When our Lord said, My kingdom is not of this world, He meant all which He seemed to mean, that His kingdom in no way whatever had any administration visible to human eyes and vested in human hands. (p. 531.) Let brethren cease from the unnatural practice of governing one another." (p. 532.)

Such is the no-government, we may say no-church, dénouement, of the new theory. And to this issue must all come who start with claiming a regenerate state as the only qualification for church membership. No wonder the mind shrinks back from such adjudications as presumptuous, when it has assumed that what the Church decides is men's inward fitness for heaven. For thus, *no* definite doctrine, even the simply Evangelical, can be required,—no definite line of conduct, even the moral and reformatory, can be insisted on. Because even without these one may profess piety, and even may inspire in us a hope that he is sincere and regenerate.

A Universalist denying the judgment day, a Unitarian denying the Saviour's Godhead, a liquor-dealer indulging in strong drink, a slave-dealer using profane words,—may give *some* evidence of regeneration, such that in charity we have no right

* Article on "Church and State," by Pres. Sturtevant.

to judge his heart, and be sure that he has no piety, assigning him of a certainty to hell. Yet we are not, therefore, required to receive him to the church; because more than mere evidence of regeneration is requisite, namely, such belief and conduct as will do honor to Christ and His cause in this particular church. If nothing but some evidence of regeneration can be demanded, what right has a church to insist on even Evangelical doctrine, to the exclusion of a pious Unitarian or Universalist? Surely their doctrines are not Evangelical; yet on your theory you must let them in.

And on the same principle, what right has a church to insist on any particular line of behavior, to the exclusion of some pious person of irregular habits? No right, says the October number of the *New Englander* before referred to. The author frankly avows this as the necessary and needed result of the theory. He says, p. 682: "It is said that temperance, and even abstinence, are Christian duties, that Christ called his disciples from the pomps and vanities of the world. Very well, say so; preach these things. This is a voice for the pulpit, and not for the creed [or requirements]. Do not put this into the terms of admission," or the causes for discipline. But when watch-care and accountability are thus ignored, where will be the purity of the Church? What will the mere "say so" of the pulpit amount to with many, when no bond binds to the practice of the right? And how long will a body of men unpledged to duties employ a man on purpose to "preach" to them those duties? Upon this plan, we shall soon have chaos come again.

THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL.

We must here note carefully the true distinction between the visible Church Universal and a particular church, as indicated above, at F, G, H, etc. Some stray into confusion from an error here. Thus the Article in the last October's *New Englander*, p. 678, says: "There may be a membership in the covenant Church of Christ, which brings with it no political right of government or action in a [any] local church. For example, in early times the eunuch baptized by Philip seems to have been a member of this kind. . . . The baptism did admit him to the covenant privileges of the Church of

Christ." And therefore, he argues, every local church is under obligation to receive any such person to its fellowship and communion, though not an accepted member of any local church. Hence the loose invitation to the Lord's table now getting into vogue, and the equally loose terms of admission to our churches. But this view takes from the brotherhood all control of its members, putting the keys of the church into the hands of the ministry alone. For they alone baptize, and like Peter with the eunuch, can baptize a professed convert anywhere and at any time, without reference to any church. To attempt to deprive them of this prerogative, would be to subvert their whole commission. But the result of such baptism, and indeed of any baptism in itself, is not to introduce the person into any local church, nor into the visible Church Universal which each local church is bound to fellowship, but only to make the person an *initiated candidate* for membership in some local church, whereby he will become a member of the Church Universal. Nothing but membership in some one Evangelical church entitles one to communion in other churches. Any other principle would make every stray baptizer, or every individual claimant, to override Christ's brotherhood, the divinely appointed guardians of His fold. And surely no son of the Puritans can thus gainsay the rights of the brethren; although those October Articles boldly look that way.

From the above presentation, we come to see and enforce also the true distinction, between "the greater excommunication" and the "lesser" excision, or "withdrawal,"—the former a casting out from recognition as not being in the Church Universal at all,—the latter a mere abandonment from our particular church. This distinction we have fully vindicated and enforced, in the *Congregational Review* for July, 1869, p. 363. He that is not serviceable and submissive to a particular church, must be removed from it; and though, if guilty of actual "trespass," he will be to us "as a heathen man and a publican" (Mat. xviii, 17), yet, if a less offender and only "disorderly," we shall "count him not as an enemy" (2 Thea. iii, 6-15), but allow him still our general fellowship, when working in faithful brotherhood with any other true church.

UNCHARITABLE JUDGMENT.

While the error we are deprecating on the one hand overthrows all government and discipline, on the other hand it annihilates the great law of charity. We have seen that this law requires us to recognize and fellowship *imperfect* Christians and imperfect churches. We now add, that this law requires us not to judge harshly the hearts of those whom we decline to have in our membership. We have a right to reject unmanageable persons; but we have no right to pronounce them unregenerate in the sight of God, or to refuse a general fellowship to them, if (without special scandal) they find and maintain a worthy standing in some different church, more congenial to them.

There are those who are such crooked sticks, that no church can get along with them without being completely disordered, or broken up. There are others who in one church will entirely defeat all its usefulness, but in another church more after their mind will answer a very good purpose. Such persons have no right to membership in the church they will ruin; and yet, it is not necessary to judge them as of course unregenerate and lost. As there are tares among the wheat, so there is wheat among the chaff. "Let both grow together until the harvest," says Christ. The kingdom *in* heaven will have some in it who are not fitted for the kingdom *of* heaven on earth; and some are fitted for one branch of the earthly work who are not fitted for another. The present administration by men is not a test for the final administration by Christ himself; and we are responsible not as to who will be saved, but only as to who are helping the cause.

To proceed otherwise must either destroy all discipline, all government, all church organization and existence; or else it must erect fallible men into censorious judges of the hearts and destinies of others. Unless we decide their church fitness largely by their open belief and conduct, we must decide merely that they are regenerate or not, and so destined to heaven or hell; which is to make the outward church into an insurance office for the future life, sitting in judgment on souls and their doom, and encouraging a reliance on membership for salvation. Upon that basis, no person can be kept back or excluded from

the church, except by pronouncing him unregenerate and doomed to perdition,—a most uncharitable and unauthorized decision for any human tribunal.

So prevalent is this error, that some time ago, when a very schismatic member was about to be excluded from a New England church, for obstinate and persistent contumacy, a distinguished divine interfered in remonstrance, innocently asking, "Why cut him off? Have you no idea that he may nevertheless be a regenerate man?" Just as though the church had anything to pass upon, save conduct as affecting the honor of Christ's cause. It was even claimed at Elgin by the worthy essayist, that our Puritan fathers established this system of judging human hearts and destinies, making a regenerate state the only test of membership; and that when they insisted on assent to a creed, it was only because they judged every body unregenerate who did not assent to their creed. What an uncharitable spirit to ascribe to them!

This whole hypothesis is a most monstrous assumption, without a particle of authority. When we admit or exclude a member, we decide nothing whatever concerning his inward state. In his admission, we judge of fitness primarily from *belief* and *conduct*, the fact of a regenerate state being already a matter of charitable inference from his own professions or aspirations. His exclusion is only a testimony that he is not of service to the cause of Christ in this particular church. If any other church can make use of him, they will do so; and (unless under our extreme discipline) he will through their endorsement have access to our general fellowship still. Now that this true meaning of exclusion is lost sight of, the churches are growing altogether too timid and negligent in discipline, and in the removal of the unfaithful.

TRUE CHRISTIAN BASIS.

Let then this whole delusion be dissipated, that a church ever votes or decides concerning the regenerate state of individuals. It is visible character, not inward condition, that we determine. Salvation belongs alone to Christ; creditable discipleship is all that we can judge. When this view is again fully seen and acted on, as once it was, we shall be rid of many current mistakes and follies of our times. "Who art thou that judgest

another man's servant? To his own master he standeth or falleth."

The proper basis of *fellowship* and communion, for purposes of alliance and common labor in the Church Universal, is an agreement upon the great doctrines of the Christian faith which are held in common by the Evangelical churches of different denominations. The same is the true basis within a simply Evangelical church; which ought to be organized in every small or divided community, where there is not sufficient strength for denominational churches, and ought to be recognized and fostered by all the denominations around.

But the basis of full *membership* and control within a particular church, or between the churches of an association, *may* properly include whatever of faith, polity, or action, is judged by the whole united body to be essential for the best interests of the kingdom of Christ. The notion, that no church has a right to require, of a full official member, anything of faith or practice but evidence of piety (of any sort or measure), is a heresy of these times, which is corrupting our churches and threatening the most disastrous consequences.

WHAT IS A SECT?

Another modern fallacy is, that to have any standard of faith is to be *sectarian*; or at least, that there can be no unsectarianism along with any use of a standard more than *simply* Evangelical. To see the error here, let us note the three meanings of the word *sect*, as developed from Webster.

1. "Sect: a number of persons united in tenets, chiefly in philosophy or religion, different from those of other men." Thus the Sadduces among the Jews, the Platonists among the Greeks. In this sense, the early Christians were a sect, as named in Acts xxviii, 22; and Christians in an unchristian land are now a sect, i. e., a set of persons agreeing in views disowned by the rest of the people. In a christian community, or even in a single christian church, there may be different ways of viewing Christianity in some of its features; and those persons holding each particular view constitute a sect within that community or church, viz: those who agree mainly with the sentiments of Calvin, or of Luther, or of Arminius, or of Wesley. Such differences of opinion cannot be helped; and in this sim-

ple inorganic form, sects or sorts of believers are unavoidable and harmless.

2. "Sect: a *body* of persons [or churches] united in tenets, constituting a *distinct party* by holding sentiments different from those of other men." Such parties or sets of believers, if duly restricted and kept subservient to the common welfare of all, may be proper in churches, as in States. But great caution is needed, that a mere party spirit be not engendered; which was the fault reprov'd in the followers of Apollos and Cephas at Corinth. When the interests of the party are thus exalted unduly, and made to eclipse or mar the interests of the one whole Church (or State), then we have—

3. Sect, in a bad sense (like faction): "a body of persons united in tenets," upon which they organize themselves so distinctly, as to interfere with the fellowship and co-operation of all churches and church members, for the higher interests of the one Church Universal, or Kingdom of Christ.

It will be perceived that sects or parties, in a good sense, may exist in a single church, being called old-school or new-school, high-church or low-church, or the like. And they may exist as whole distinct churches; for all of one sentiment may come together by elective affinity into the same church. Only, they will be careful not on this account to disfellowship or repel the church of different sentiment. And different churches of the same sentiment may go so far as to meet and work together as one *denomination*, for advancing their common views; provided, they do not allow this their own fellowship to interfere with the higher fellowship they owe to the whole christian family. If they fail in this latter respect, they become sects (or factions) in the bad sense of the word.

As churches of like *faith* may thus rightly work together, much more may churches of like *polity* work together, as a distinct denomination, or sect in a good sense. They *must* do this, so far as their diverse polities involve the relations of churches to each other. In this light, Episcopalians and Presbyterians are separate denominations or sects, even if they entirely agree in faith. And Congregationalists are as truly a denomination or sect as any other, even though they should give up all their distinctive belief. So that no reduction of our faith to a sim-

ply Evangelical basis, or even to no basis or test at all, will save us from being a sect among sects,—until we give up the Puritan polity for a Romish uniformity,—or persuade all other polities to surrender to ours. Till then, we have a right to exist as a distinct denomination, or sect in the good sense of the term.

WHAT IS SECTARIANISM ?

The terms *sectarian* and *sectarism* are now generally used in the bad sense, as denoting an uncharitable exclusiveness. He is a sectarian, who treats with contempt all christian sentiments or procedures different from his own,—who when deprived of his own church, will not unite or meet with another of different sort,—who thus treats his own peculiarities as of more consequence than Christianity or the worship of God itself. That church or denomination is sectarian which trains its members to such a spirit, which will not coöperate in fellowship with any but those of its own denomination, which treats the whole brotherhood of churches as of less consequence than its own particular sect.

In a word, sectarianism is opposed to the recognition of an Evangelical Alliance or brotherhood of churches embracing different denominations ; while the true catholic spirit of Christian unity recognizes such a brotherhood of the various orders. A sectarian denomination is one that refuses to act in alliance with churches of other orders, not acknowledging any Evangelical basis of church union. An unsectarian denomination is one whose churches are willing to act along with other churches on a common basis of mutual recognition, as all being true Evangelical churches in brotherhood. Individuals may be unsectarian, while the denomination to which they belong is sectarian in its course, and *vice versa* ; but sectarism as such is the work of whole churches or orders of churches.

It is not sectarian, or a mark of sectarism, merely to maintain or allow christian denominations, or sects in the good sense of the word,—that is, differences of Christian faith and method, organized into separate churches and combinations of churches, on a charitable basis of mutual fellowship. These denominations, rightly conducted, need no more break up the requisite unity of Christ's kingdom, than the different regi-

ments of an army, with their diverse colors, and equipments, and evolutions, need to mar the loyal enthusiasm with which they fight together for the common cause. As christians in their present imperfection *must* think differently, they may separately combine their several ways of thinking, if only they will keep uppermost their unity in the grand christian system itself. We repeat what we said in the *New Englander* for October, 1872, "*Sects* (or denominations) are not so bad a thing, if only *sectarianism* can be cast out."

It is not a being without any particular doctrines or methods of our own that makes us (or any body) unsectarian. It is simply our fellowship and brotherhood with others, who have doctrines and procedures somewhat different from our own. We should not be a particle more unsectarian than we are, if we should throw away all doctrine and all polity, and allow each member to think and do as he listed; nay, we might be less unsectarian,—if we insisted that we would fellowship only with churches as loose as we. It needs to be urgently enforced, that sectarianism or unsectarianism does not depend on the much or the little that a church holds to *for its own guidance and direction*; but upon its willingness or unwillingness to recognize and work with *other Evangelical churches* of different organizations.

One of the chief marks of sectarianism in any body of men is the claim of being itself the only church or body of churches, while all other combinations are only sects. Thus, a national establishment calls itself *the church*, denying the title to everything else, and using the word *sect* to designate all dissenters (as seen in Webster's 2d definition). And thus all high church Episcopalians and Baptists are wont to unchurch their neighbors, as nothing but sects. Such exclusive claims are the very height of sectarianism. So that, to boast of ourselves as the only ones constituting a church without any sect or denomination about us, is the very way to show ourselves the most sectarian of all. As "he that saves his life (in one sense) shall lose it" (in another), so he that denies all connection with *sect* thereby proves his thorough *sectarianism*.

WRONG VIEWS OF SECTARIANISM.

There are those who take a different view of this matter. They talk as if sectarianism had relation, not to our treatment of other churches and denominations, but to a church's procedure in regard to its own membership. They say it is sectarian for a church to have and maintain any faith or principle which is not accepted by every other Evangelical church. In other words, we have no right to have any other churches but such as are *simply* Evangelical, maintaining nothing but what is agreed to by all Christians everywhere. We are told that "the way to form a church is, for the professing Christians in any locality to unite upon the doctrines *to which no one objects*," i. e., upon the creed of the one who believes the least. And this is said to be the only unsectarian church that can exist. So that Congregationalism, in order to be unsectarian, must reduce itself to this "new departure."

According to these authorities, the liberty of an individual church to regulate its own faith and polity, in catholic fellowship with all other Evangelical churches, is denied. It must either reduce its principles to the minimum, not daring to assert one single item which any Christian church denies; or else it must bear the stigma of a *sectarian* organization, and possibly be put out of the synagogue as not truly Congregational, according to the simon-pure "new departure" stamp.

Hence also, upon this plan, all other denominations, because they adhere to their respective methods and beliefs, are condemned as sectarian bodies, however willing they may be to fraternize in Evangelical movements; and a great and ostentatious cry is raised concerning ours as the only possible unsectarian system. In short, the real sectarianism, or want of charity towards other churches, is thus magnified as a virtue; while the virtuous freedom of a church determining its own faith, is stigmatized as the only sectarianism! The attempt is not to unite the separated sections of Christendom in a happy Alliance of Evangelical recognition, but to swallow up all other denominations of more specific faith in OUR OWN grand reservoir of diluted doctrine. Is the attempt a wise and profitable one?

POSITION OF CONGREGATIONALISM.

Our position is this: CONGREGATIONALISM is purely unsectarian; not because it has no distinctive faith or polity; but because it proclaims that there is an Evangelical basis of Alliance, embracing other churches and denominations in common with our own,—along with which we are willing to coöperate, advising our membership to unite temporarily with them, rather than to have unnecessary divisions in small communities. We are a *denomination*, and yet we are *not sectarian*; although the two ideas are sadly confounded by some even of our shrewdest leaders. For example: In our previous Article (*New Englander*, Oct., 1872), we suggested this view of things, recommending simply Evangelical churches for small and mixed communities,—but urging that elsewhere orthodox Congregationalism as such is a distinct *denomination* (or sect in the good sense), though not *sectarian* or exclusive, since it opens its doors to the widest church fellowship. In what he appended, Dr. Bacon called the Article “an attempt to institute a sectarian Congregationalism;” and thereupon he proceeded to give us his disquisition on “Sectarian Symbols.” How inaptly such a rejoinder was made, we need not stop to remark.

We only ask: Does not Congregationalism exist, not only as a system of polity, but as a brotherhood of churches? And what can we call it but a *denomination*, or class of churches denominated in a certain way? Does not Dr. Bacon himself, in that very effort, treat us as a “confederacy of churches,” “walking in the same order” (p. 755), and having “communion one with another” (p. 760)? We must either assert, that the Congregational churches are the only true churches there are, while all other combinations are nothing but sects,—which will prove us the greatest sectarians of all; or else we must concede, that we constitute only one denomination, or sect, or section, of the mutually acknowledged churches of Christ,—and so show ourselves to be an *unsectarian sect*. Which is the more hopeful way of charity and union? Which promises best, to follow this our way, of ranking ourselves on a common level with other denominations, only trying to outreach them in unsectarian fellowship,—or, like some, to go crying out against

all churches *save our own* as nothing but sects? Let the candid judge.

Dr. Bacon's position is given thus:

"The legitimate definition of a Congregational church is, that it is a church of Christ and nothing else. . . . Such churches accept a doctrine . . . only because it is Evangelical. In like manner their polity is simply what they find in the New Testament, the Evangelical polity and nothing else. . . . What was attempted by . . . the Pilgrim Fathers of New England, was simply to fall back upon the Gospel and nothing else. Their ideal was Evangelical truth and Evangelical order. . . . What they proposed to themselves, what they attempted as an example to Christendom, was 'union on a simply Evangelical basis of polity as well as doctrine.'" (p. 759.)

That is, in the *opinion* of our Congregational forefathers, their whole doctrine and polity was "the Gospel and nothing else;" it was *truly* Evangelical, and *simply* Evangelical. Of course that was *their* opinion, or they would not have been what they were. But it was not the opinion of other people, or other people would have joined them. The other denominations had the same opinion of their own doctrine and polity, as being truly and simply Evangelical, or according to the Gospel; and they, as well as we, have the same opinion still. Nobody will own that he has in his religion anything contrary to, or even anything additional to, the Gospel. Every sect claims that it is only Evangelical, and has "a church and nothing else,"—just as loudly as Dr. Bacon claims this for himself and for us.

But the whole question is one, not of the separate opinion of our own, or of any denomination concerning itself, but of the *united opinion of the whole*. What sentiments have they in common? What is the opinion which they can all entertain concerning each other? What part of the system of each is uniform to the whole? and is it sufficient for a *basis of union* and fellowship, as mutually acknowledged Churches of Christ? What is the least allowable amount of mutually accepted truth that can be owned by Christians in general as containing the *substance of the Gospel*? That LEAST ALLOWABLE AMOUNT OF THE GOSPEL conceded by all to be Evangelical (or in accordance with the Gospel), when separated from everything else considered also Evangelical by this or that denomination, is called the *simply* Evangelical doctrine, or basis of Alliance between all Evangelical denominations and christians.

That is not the simply Evangelical basis which we or any particular people hold to, as being truly and purely Evangelical *to us* or to them; but rather, that which all Christians and churches are willing to accept, as truly and purely Evangelical to them all, as far as it goes. So that, if there is any common basis on which different denominations can thus agree to fellowship each other; *unsectarianism* consists in being willing cheerfully to coöperate thus together. And if any person or any church, on the contrary, declines to recognize any such simply Evangelical basis of the denominations in common, and insists on calling his or its own system *the* simply Evangelical system, *the* "Church of Christ and nothing else," disparaging the rest as sects, is not such High-Churchism *sectarian* in the superlative degree?

And just this is the tone of the disquisition referred to. Mixed in with the above citation of comforting claims for our own faith and order, as *par excellence* THE simply Evangelical system "and nothing else," we have such *un-comforting* expressions as these concerning others: "the organized sects," acting through "sectarian organizations," "churches which, having added sectarianism to the Gospel, hold forth the compound in their sectarian symbols," attempting "to be a sect among the sects, and to rejoice in sectarian symbols." All this emphasis against others in a single-page paragraph! and put forth as a wise antidote against alleged sectarianism in *us*, not as the veriest sectarianism itself, such as *we* should be unwilling to indulge.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

Some argue against any creed or standard of faith, as being sectarian. Others urge a simply Evangelical standard for all our churches, as the only unsectarianism. And many even insist, that this latter system has already been inaugurated for us Congregationalists in a "new departure" at Oberlin. It remains to be seen whether this is indeed the case. What we contend for is, that the simply Evangelical basis is for general *fellowship* and alliance between churches of different sorts; while full *membership* in Congregational churches may have a different basis. If the national organization were meant for a

mere Alliance, it might properly be made simply Evangelical, either in faith, or in polity, or both. Only in that case, the basis should be distinctly announced as for the Alliance alone, and not claimed as a "new departure," or basis of the Congregational churches.

The fault of the Oberlin Constitution is,—(1.) That its meaning is not sufficiently distinct (as Dr. Bacon sharply shows, in the Article referred to, p. 757); so that, while attempting to express the faith of the churches as *truly* Evangelical, it is claimed by many as putting the churches upon a *simply* Evangelical basis. (2.) That it undertakes to *speak for the churches* at all; when its business is only to organize the national body itself, as a voluntary Congregational Union (not a Council of churches).

There might be no objection to putting our national organization on a simply Evangelical basis, distinctly and unmistakably so expressed, provided it be as distinctly announced that this national basis has nothing to do with the individual churches. And why may not such a compromise reconcile all parties, making the national body simply an Alliance of all Evangelical christians of all sorts, who are in sympathy with our free and open polity? A change like the following is therefore suggested.

Constitution as it now reads.

"The Congregational Churches of the United States, by elders and messengers assembled, do now associate themselves in national council, to express and foster their substantial unity, in doctrine, polity, and work, etc. They agree in belief that the Holy Scriptures are the sufficient and only infallible rule of religious faith and practice, their interpretation thereof being in substantial accordance with the great doctrines of Christian faith commonly called Evangelical, held in our own churches from the early times, and sufficiently set forth by former councils."

Constitution modified as proposed.

"The delegated elders and messengers from conferences and associations of Congregational Churches in the United States, duly assembled for the purpose, do now associate themselves in [this American Congregational Union?] to express and foster their substantial unity, in doctrine, polity, and work, etc. And since this national organization has no authority concerning the individual churches or their basis of doctrine, therefore the only doctrinal requirement of this body shall be, that the churches recognized by it maintain all those great doctrines of the Christian faith which are held in common by the Evangelical churches of different denominations."

**ARTICLE VII.—WHAT IS THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF
CHRIST'S SECOND COMING?**

No correct opinion is the sole product of an individual intellect. The parentage, temperament, surroundings, all the elements which go to make up the history of the man as well as to a certain extent the history of the entire race, are involved in each opinion. Preëminently weighty are the historic elements in the formation of a right opinion upon the question now under discussion. Almost all its trustworthy data are historic; only by the progress of history will its details be in the future successively cleared up.

The true doctrine of Messiah's first advent was never understood until history brought Messiah before men. The prophecies of the Old Testament did not avail to teach them the complete knowledge of that coming. Indeed they scarcely served to put most men into the right point of view. Even the prophets themselves did not in any case thoroughly comprehend, and in many instances doubtless misunderstood, the future events of which they prophesied. And after the first advent was realized in history, still more of historic teaching with regard to it was needed in order to clear away the remnants of erroneous opinion. The apostles required and received this teaching through history. We, after eighteen centuries of historic training, do not fully understand the doctrine of the first advent. History still unfolds its doctrine.

Thus does the case stand with the doctrine of the second advent. It will be progressively better comprehended as the various second comings are brought forward in history. Only when the last of those events, the final coming, has been reached, will a completed true doctrine be made possible. •

The truth just stated justifies, as a fitting introduction to this discussion, these two remarks which follow, and which set forth the only trustworthy method of procedure.

Let then, first of all, the truth be acknowledged and ad-

hered to unswervingly, that no one need hope even to approach this question from the right point of view whose *method* is not *historic* and *critical*.

The only right method of procedure is historic. The violations, however, in spirit and in fact, which this method meets at many hands are indeed numerous. One entire class of writers, the so-called premillennialists, show almost an utter lack of the historic sense. Anything in the Bible from Genesis to Revelation is without discrimination welcomed, if only it can be made to fit their theory. The historic conditions under which the different authors of the Bible wrote, and under which its different books are to be valued and interpreted, are by them quite neglected. With restless eagerness they roam over the whole divine pasture-field, and seem not to care what they crop or how they select among the herbage. Much confusing of historic conditions was pardonable in the early Church—may even have been, in some respects, beneficial to them. To return, however, to the unhistoric way of dealing with Scripture and with opinion is not progress, but retro-gradation.

Nor can the question be satisfactorily discussed without the free though reverent use of criticism. Lack of acquaintance with the principles of hermeneutics is not the best preparation for dealing with any biblical topic. Prophecy is by no means in this regard essentially different from historic or didactic writing. That boldness which leads a man to feel most confidence in his interpretation of language, such as ordinary critical readers find most obscure, may help towards the formation of an hypothesis of a prophetic passage. But for its final interpretation we need another quality of mind. We need the quality which holds the student to the cautious, the conscientious use of grammars and lexicons. There is a sort of confidence in the interpreter which begets distrust in the reader of his interpretation.

The author of a little book entitled, "*Subjects for the Household of Faith*," sees in Christ's parable of the mustard-seed the teaching that nominal Christianity will become a "monstrous worldly system"—"a cage of every unclean and hateful bird." The vulture, the night-owl, and the bat, are sitting in the branches of the tree of the kingdom of heaven. To accord

with this interpretation, we are then told that, when this kingdom is compared to leaven, the point of comparison rests in the growing power of *evil*, which will finally take an entire control of Christendom. With a mind which works in such a fashion, we can simply refuse to hold intellectual commerce. In this refusal we are justified, because the man has renounced, not the formal canons of criticism merely, but the conscientious use of the critical faculty.

Second—Our method should be that of procedure from what is clearer to what is more obscure. . The two main parties in the discussion of this question of Christ's second coming take their departure from different points of view. With one class of disputants it is assumed that we have, in the prophetic utterances of inspired men, clear and somewhat detailed information as to the still future development of Christianity. The other class appeal rather to those principles which underlie all its past and present development. The one are prone to look upon the strata of the kingdom of heaven from the catastrophist's point of view: the theory of the other class is uniformitarian. The error of the former is this; that, starting with doubtful interpretation of obscure prophecy, they lay history, reason, and the Gospel under bans not to overthrow their ground of standing. The error of the latter class is apt to consist in a failure clearly to define the estimate which they put upon scriptural prophecy, and the principles which they adopt in its interpretation. Surely there should be found some way of fusing into one these two points of view. At any rate, we must abide by that which is plain, even at the risk of seeming to discredit that which is more obscure. If prediction and the divine order, as revealed in history and in the Gospel, are placed in conflict with each other, we cannot doubt which of the two will have to yield. Our hope as Christians is not founded upon prophecy, but upon facts. We cannot then by prophecy nourish any hope which is contradicted by the fundamental facts. Prophecy, rightly understood, we do well to take heed unto. But we take heed unto it only as unto a lamp "until the day dawn and the day star arise in our hearts." This truth is verbally recognized even by those who in fact disregard it.

We wonder, then, when we read the opinions of men who make the seventh chapter of Daniel their centre of mental solitude over this question of Christ's second coming. We are surprised to find how much they know of Gog and Magog, of the beasts and the stone of the Old Testament prophet, of the beasts, horns, and trumpets of the Revelator. We are also surprised to observe how little these same men seem to know of God's broad, gentle, but forceful love, as it flows through all discovered and all hidden channels for the saving of the race.

We shall begin and continue the discussion of this question with the determination to make prominent that which is plain in its meaning, rather than that which is obscure. This determination releases us from the necessity of following out in their details many bald errors of interpretation; whether they are the special extravagancies of less judicious writers, such as the statement of Josiah Litch in his "*Prophetic Expositions*," that the king of the perfected kingdom is "possessed of flesh and bones, but not of blood, because that he shed for the race of Adam;" or the more plausible but erroneous assumption, in which all the millennarian writers seem to concur, that the fourth beast of Daniel's vision stands for the present governments of Christendom, looked upon as remnants of the Roman rule. This prophecy of Daniel is usually made the key-stone of the premillennialist's arch. It is placed in its position by misinterpretation. But we claim that, without the necessity of proving this, the true method of procedure requires that we should begin from an entirely different point of view. Principles clearly proven, facts undoubted, must take precedence of doubtful interpretations of prophecy.

This preference for what is plain rather than obscure will also limit our discussion in another direction. We shall try to stop where white light fails us. If others with more incisive vision can see their way clearly beyond the point where we are compelled to stop, their liberty is not restricted. We prefer to go safely rather than far. Let the reader then constantly bear in mind that the present essay makes no pretence to an exhaustive treatment of its subject. Its fundamental thought is, that the treatment of such a theme as this must always be, at least in its details, relative to the progress which the Church has

already made. History is now interpreting the predictions of Christ's future advents.

The essay is rather a contribution towards the formation, upon historic and critical grounds, of a doctrine of the second advent, which is acknowledged to be incomplete, but which is true as far as it goes.

Having defined our method of procedure, we are now ready to examine evidence. In this work of examination the pressure of dogmatic considerations is usually very strong. We also have our dogmatic point of view. This is given us by a thorough confidence—not growing out of any inquiry into the present topic of discussion, though strengthened by such inquiry—in the

I. Infallibility and sinless purity of Jesus. This confidence gives us the only indispensable doctrinal preparation. We need thus much conceded at the very least. We do not necessarily require that concession should go further than this. There is, however, one class of passages from the Gospels which seem, as they are usually interpreted, to shake even this assumed basis of discussion. When prophesying of certain future comings, Christ uses language which is ordinarily referred to the description of his *final* advent. In connection with this prophecy, and in so close connection that a fair separation of the two seems impossible, occurs the statement that men then living should see the fulfillment of the prophecy. These passages even Meyer does not hesitate to interpret according to their face. Jesus himself expected his own second advent within the generation of men then living. That is, as Meyer holds, Jesus shared in the mistake upon this point of his disciples, and confirmed them by his teaching in their subsequent mistaken view. Upon this opinion one cannot hesitate to pronounce. It is, as Alford has said, contradictory of Meyer's own doctrinal estimate of the person of Christ. Better modify our views of the nature of prophetic language and of the amount of security from mistake, which is guaranteed by inspiration to apostles and evangelists, than accept such a conclusion. The opinion that the teachers and writers of early Christianity misunderstood, with respect to the one point of time, Christ's doctrine of his second coming, does not concede

anything which is necessary to Christianity. But to admit with Meyer a mistake upon the part of Christ himself does, we are sure, amount to an entire abandonment of its central doctrine. Considerations which will further on occupy us more in detail are required for the right understanding of these prophetic words of Christ. Let it suffice in this place to quote the words of Neander (*Life of Christ*, § 254): "In Christ we can recognize no blending of error with truth, no alloy of the truth as it appeared to his own mind." "But it is easy to explain how points of time which he kept apart, although he presented them as counterparts of each other without assigning any express duration to either, were blended together in the apprehension of his hearers, or in their subsequent repetition of his language." This view is certainly preferable, even upon dogmatic grounds alone, to that of many writers, who, through their anxiety to save intact the doctrine of an infallible inspiration for the apostles and evangelists, seem ready to lower their doctrine of the person of Christ.

Less outspoken than Meyer but scarcely less damaging in its concessions is the view of others, and among them Van Osterzee. "It cannot be denied," says Van Osterzee in his *Theology of the New Testament* (sec. xvi, 10), that the Lord throughout his teaching, as well as in his last eschatological discourses, represents his coming as very near at hand." "There are not wanting, however, clear indications that for Jesus himself the destruction of Jerusalem and the final judgment of the world were by no means identical." Jesus, we must then assume, taught that his second coming would be speedy, by a sort of accommodation, intending thus to secure the right moral results from the wrong impressions of his hearers. But to such a view the answer is near at hand. *If these utterances of Jesus refer to his final coming and have been correctly reported*, it is an understatement of the difficulty to say that he taught by accommodation, as though this final coming would be speedy. These things granted—*He taught, we must rather hold, by explicit statement that his final coming would be within his own generation.* To foster a wrong impression by accommodation would be doubtful morality, doubtful expediency as well. To teach

explicitly what turned out untrue can scarcely be called accommodation. Surely it is not justifiable accommodation.

But our proof that Jesus did not teach the doctrine of his speedy final coming is not derived from the doctrine of his person alone. A fuller examination of his teachings shows, from their form and variety, that he did not share the erroneous expectation of his disciples. For, as Prof. Jowett has said, "the words of our Lord are not more in apparent contradiction with the course of experience than they are with other words which are equally attributed to him by the evangelists."

Upon examining those words we find that Jesus did not regard that form of the kingdom of heaven which he was instituting as soon to undergo a final catastrophe. He saw and testified to its slow course of development. At times he glanced down this entire course with such confidence in its result that he could declare: "*Now* is the judgment of this world." The world is already *de facto* judged. He saw Satan descending from the zenith of his power as the lightning flashes across the eastern sky. At the same time he did not forget that the growth of this kingdom would be first blade, then ear, then full corn in the ear. His connected narratives, which tell us unto what things the kingdom of heaven is like, teach its slow unfolding. He provides means for this slow unfolding. The Church is left to do the work. The seed *automatically* springs up and brings forth fruit, as in obedience to his command the sowers of his Word go forth. The laborers in the vineyard increase hour by hour until the end of the age, and after "*much*" time the Lord of the servants comes to reckon with them. The whole tenor of Christ's teaching leads to the same conclusion which is necessitated by our view of his person, that he was freed from the narrow estimate of the world's destiny which was held by the men about him, and that he was accustomed to have "facts, which it requires the course of ages to make clear, lie open in his eye."

We may, on the other hand, safely take his own statement, whether we interpret the words of his coming to destroy Jerusalem, or of his final coming, that he was ignorant of the hour when the event would take place. This ignorance doubtless led him to avoid sharp distinctions in time, such as would have

been given had it been his design to leave for our information a connected scheme of the world's future history. Ignorance may have led to erroneous expectation in others. Not so in the case of Christ.

We conclude, then, that our doctrinal estimate of Christ's person, as well as his own plainer teachings, compel us to interpret his more obscure teachings in prophecy so as to save his infallibility and truthfulness. And we cannot afford, upon dogmatic grounds which touch the doctrine of inspiration, to deny or jeopard truths which are more important and more sacred than any dogma as to the formal working of inspiration can possibly be.

This point established, we have next to admit, in order to a successful treatment of our question, that,

II. The early Church at large, and with them also the apostles and evangelists, expected the *speedy* final coming of Christ.

We are unable to see how any consistent interpretation of the New Testament, or any compacted and satisfactory doctrine of the second advent, is possible without this admission. If it appear to some to be dangerous, we can only reply, the truth is not dangerous, nor does experience confirm the fears which are felt that evil results will follow this admission. It is not the work of the critical investigator into the teachings of the New Testament, nor of the devout learner from inspired men, to tremble about results—from truth. If the admission seem to others damaging to the Christian standing of him who makes it, we can reply, numbers of true and devout men have held and do now hold this same opinion. The evangelical German commentators in general do not hesitate over this admission. Their outspoken way is creditable to their scholarship and to their confidence in Christianity. Dr. Arnold says, "Paul expected that the world would come to an end in the generation then existing." (*Sermons on the Christian Life*, p. 400.) "The apostles themselves," says Conybeare, "expected their Lord to come again in that very generation." "St. Paul himself shared in the expectation." (*Life of Paul*, p. 401.) Even Mr. Barnes, commenting upon 1 Cor. xv, 51, says, "I do not know that the proper doctrine of inspiration suffers, if we

admit that the apostles were ignorant of the exact time when the world would close, or even that in regard to the precise period when that would take place, they might be in error." Surely the admission that they *did* expect Christ's speedy second coming, and *were* therefore upon this point in error, is of itself less objectionable than the theory of Dr. Watta, that the apostles, though not themselves mistaken, permitted the Church to remain in this error from design, that they might find encouragement and support in their trials. Of the opinion which Olshausen maintains, viz: that Christ himself framed his representations so as to keep before the mind the constant possibility of his final coming, we have already spoken. We are loth also to admit that the apostles resorted to this sort of accommodation. Indeed, if they could teach the early Church by accommodation things which they knew were not strictly true, why may we not suppose them to be now teaching us the same things in the same way?

The apostles certainly did not contradict the general and intense expectation of the early Church. 2 Thea. ii, 1-12, is sometimes cited to show that Paul did attempt to correct the false expectation. But the passage proves rather, when rightly understood, the reverse of what is sometimes claimed for it. Now the fact that the apostles made no effort to correct the error of the early Church is *prima facie* proof that they shared the expectation of the early Church. And further, that they did believe upon this point with the churches under their care, there is, it would seem, abundant additional evidence.

Certainly Paul, as Van Osterzee phrases the statement, cherished the living hope of the speedy advent of the Lord. This hope is more prominently brought to view in his earlier epistles: it became chastened but not extinguished as his life drew towards its close. Of the intensity and pervasive power of the expectation it is hard to give a correct impression by special citations. You find it warp and woof in many of his letters, especially in those to the Thessalonian Church. Christians are spoken of in 2 Tim. iv, 8, as "those that have loved his appearing." God's discipline, Titus is told (ii, 13), has for its final purpose that we shall live "expecting the appearing of the glory of the great God and of our Saviour Jesus Christ."

It is a Christian charism which Paul desires for the Corinthian Church, that they shall remain "expecting the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ." The Thessalonians are his hope, joy, crown of boasting, "before our Lord Jesus in his appearing." These more general expressions have their meaning definitely fixed by the passages in which Paul most expressly asserts his expectation. Such assertions are found especially, 1 Cor. xv, 51, and 1 Thes. iv, 15. "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed," he asserts in the passage first cited. Who are the sleepers, and who are to be changed, not having slept, he then plainly gives us to understand. Among the second class he distinctly places himself, when in the next verse he says, "the dead shall be raised," but "*we*," making an emphatic contrast by use of the word *ἡμεῖς*—"we shall be changed." To suppose that "we" who shall be changed are men of at least two thousand years later, among whom the apostle could not be one, takes all pith out of the sentence. Of that change which he so much desired and so confidently expected, he speaks more at length, 2 Cor. v, 1 ff. In 1 Thes. iv, 15, he assures the troubled Church that "we"—and defining the pronoun further, viz: "those who are living"—and defining still further, "those who are remaining unto the coming of the Lord," "shall not get the start of them that have fallen asleep." The Greek language could scarcely be used with more definiteness to form the class, and mark out the class characteristics of those who should be alive at Christ's second advent, of whom the apostle expressly asserts his expectation that he himself should be one. The method of interpreting these passages, to which they are forced who are unwilling to admit an erroneous expectation in the writings of inspired men, is very unfortunate. It is characteristic also of an entire class of commentators. The question asked should be, What does a fair interpretation of all the passages show to have been the *fact*? The question really asked is often this one: Can we possibly interpret each one of these passages so that it shall not necessarily contradict our opinion of what the *fact safely could be*? In the present case all the passages, at least with only one apparent exception, look one way. Why not admit that the truth lies that way?

The only attempt ordinarily made to disprove this view upon critical grounds is by a wrong interpretation of 2 Thes. ii, 1 f.

Paul, it is argued, could not have expected the second coming of Christ during his own life, because he warns the Thessalonians "not to be soon shaken in mind," "as that the day of Christ is at hand." But the verb *ἐνίστημι* occurs six times besides in the New Testament, and always with the meaning, "to be present." "*Proxime instans*" is a Latin equivalent. With the grammarians *ὁ ἐνεστώς* (*χρόνος*) was the present tense. In two of the six other places of its occurrence the word is expressly contrasted with *τά μέλλοντα*—the things which are yet in the future. In the supposition that the day of the Lord was already upon them, these Thessalonian Christians had fallen also into practical errors. Paul corrects their irregularities by assuring them that the day which they and he both expected was not just upon them. A further development of the power of evil, and a concentration of that power in the person of one man, Antichrist, should precede the coming of the day. He, however, expected to see all this accomplished. In this very epistle he prays, "the Lord direct your hearts into the patient waiting for Christ."

In this expectation of Paul shared Peter, James, and John, as the writings of them all abundantly testify. "The end of all things draweth nigh" (1 Pet. iv, 7); "patiently and bravely persevere until the coming of the Lord" (Jas. v, 7); "little children, it is the last hour" (1 John ii, 18); such are the declarations, such the exhortations of the early teachers of Christianity. There is scarcely another fact of early Christian life better established than that of this attitude of constant expectation, in which the early Church and the early teachers of the Church stood towards the coming of Christ.

The fact is usually brought into prominence by premillennarian writers. One of them, however, does not scruple to escape from its legitimate inference by the remark—Paul is still waiting; he has only changed his place of waiting. This is no better than quibbling. By all these writers it is maintained that our attitude should be like that of the early Church. But to admit that men eighteen centuries since were in the constant and intense expectation of seeing, during their lives, the Lord come in bodily presence, and then also to admit, as we are forced to do, that the expectation was disappointed, makes the continuance of a similar attitude on our part psychologically impossible.

Many opponents of the premillennialists lose, however, the very gist of their objection to premillennialism by refusing to confess both the error of early times and the coloring given by that error to the teaching of those times.

A few words as to the dogmatic consequences which are often attributed to the view here maintained. As has been already said, many in fact hold this view who study and love the New Testament as devoutly as those who will not consent to the view. We have no right to let the facts be overborne in their testimony by preconceived notions of what the formal results of inspiration must be. It is our work to learn what inspiration *has accomplished*. We need not fear to do this work. The only safe theory as to the products of inspiration is that given by the inductive method applied to those products themselves.

But, *second*, it is frankly admitted by all that these same apostles, at least in their early discipleship, held mistaken notions as to the nature of Christ's second coming. The so-called eschatological discourse of our Lord was called out, according to Matthew, by the double question from his disciples—"When shall these things be, and what the sign of thy coming and of the end of the age." These two events, the destruction of Jerusalem and the final advent of Messiah, were, as Elliott has remarked (*Life of Christ*, p. 289, note), by the disciples "instinctively connected." This opinion was due to a share in the views of the nation to which they belonged as to Messiah's advent. Their mistake upon the point of time is obvious. With the near catastrophe which Christ expressly limited to that generation, they were expecting the formal establishment of Messiah's triumphant rule. Their mistake as to the mode of his coming is equally obvious. For what view must these questioners of our Lord have held as to the nature of that coming, for the sign of which they inquired so eagerly? He was with them. They did not at any time previous to his death believe that Christ would go away before he came to them; for we know by their subsequent conduct that his death was unexpected by them. Plainly, they were then looking for the setting up of Messiah's kingdom, according to their views of it, in the life-time of Christ, and in connection with calamities to

Jerusalem. The half of truth was enough for them. The half of their opinion was untrue. The descent of the Spirit led them, according to Christ's promise, into all truth—but progressively and according to the needs of the Church.

And, *third*, the error of the New Testament prophets with regard to the time and mode of complete fulfillment for their own prophecies is like that of the Old Testament prophets. Both spoke things which they did not themselves fully understand, larger than themselves knew. Both lived with their eye upon the future, but as well upon their own times. They caught and applied to all ages the principles which they saw exemplified in occurrences at their side. To the vision of Isaiah, the deliverance under Messiah and the return from the Assyrian captivity are one event. In like manner Hosea, Amos, and Micah connect with the Messianic advent the deliverance of the Jews from Babylon. Thus in the minds of New Testament prophets things remote were brought near, and seen under forms furnished by those nearer times. They too, when they prophesied, saw future events projected in space rather than trustworthily arranged as to the time of their occurrence. There is an obvious and, it seems to us, valid distinction between an erroneous expectation, found within and coloring the teaching of inspired men, and an explicit error in their teaching. But whether the distinction can be maintained or not, the presence of such expectation both as to the precise time and mode in which their prophecies should be fulfilled, is to be detected in many prophetic passages of both Old and New Testaments.

But, *fourth*,—every one who deals critically with the New Testament is forced into admissions which virtually contain as much as is asked for here. What is meant when an exegete like Ellicott compares, upon the questions contained in this very discourse, "the narrative of the second and third Evangelists with the more *grouped* records of St. Matthew?" There are few who will venture to hold that, according to the view of the apostles, the second coming of Christ was not even liable to occur in their day. But an erroneous expectation would have been involved in the opinion that Christ *might* come as well as in the more decided conviction that he *would* come. For his-

tory has taught us that according to the plan of God the final advent of Christ *might not* have come so soon after his first advent.

This fact, that the early Church, including the apostles and evangelists, expected the speedy final coming of Christ, has been treated at some length because it is of great importance for the formation of a correct, and especially of a *consistent* opinion upon the whole question of the second advent. By it we are led to compare the doctrine of Christ's first advent as given in the Old Testament with the doctrine of his second advent as taught by the New Testament writers. The teaching of both classes of writers required to be progressively cleared up by the history of the Church. In both instances the truths taught were too large for the full comprehension of the men who taught them. They are mixed with mistake at least as to the time and in some respects as to the nature of their fulfillment. When the Church stands with reference to the second coming where we now stand with reference to the first advent, the true completed doctrine will be possible, but not till then. If, basing our convictions upon a wrong view of the prophetic utterances of even inspired men, we run in opinion counter to or beyond that which Christ has plainly taught, we shall scarcely be able, like those apostolic men, to avoid dangerous practical errors growing out of a wrong expectation.

We are now prepared to inquire,

III. What is the sum-total of Christ's teaching with regard to his second coming? We reply: Only so much as is contained in certain great principles; only so much as countenances the most sober, rational, and cautious views of the future of the Church.

1. The conception which lies back of Christ's teaching regarding the fate in the future of his kingdom is that of development. It is certainly not the conception of a godless and aimless development. It is that of an expanding of forces and powers already planted by God within the world as seeds, and destined by growth under the constant rule and presence of Christ, under the constant working of the Holy Spirit, ultimately to result in the conversion and sanctifying of the world. This development does not exclude marked epochs, even start-

ling catastrophes. The law of all growth is two-fold. Growth is for the most part uniform : but all growth has also its epochs. Thus it is and shall be with the kingdom of heaven.

The proof that Christ taught the general spreading of his kingdom through the preaching of the Gospel has been in part given. The parables of Christ, in which his coming to the work of separation and judgment is made prominent, are by no means averse to this truth. In them, as for instance those of the ten virgins, the talents, the workers in the vineyard, the tares and wheat, the kingdom of heaven is given in a picture which represents simultaneously its characteristics for all time and under all circumstances. To draw from them the relative steps of advance, with the distinctions in time and in details of method which a completed eschatological doctrine requires, is to misuse them. Nor are they without touches which set in relief the views of a general and finally universal spread, *under the power of the Gospel*, of Christ's kingdom : the parables of the leaven and the mustard-seed teach precisely this truth. It is also implied beyond doubt in Christ's command to his followers, "to make disciples of all the Gentiles," and in the accompanying promise, "Lo I am with you alway, even unto the end of the age." The Gospel of the kingdom he distinctly asserts shall be preached in all the *orbis terrarum* for a witness to all the nations, and not till then shall the end be. To assert that the prediction has been fulfilled, or that it is so small as not to lack thus far much of fulfillment, is to belittle the words themselves.

2. But more specifically of his teaching regarding his second advent, it is of first importance to observe that he himself attaches a varied and shifting meaning to the phrases which he employs. The one lesson which accompanies constantly his shifting use of terms is this: the day will come unexpected, a day of separation and purifying ; therefore, watch.

In one place he speaks of himself as coming to answer prayer and bring desired deliverance, and adds the question, "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith in the earth?" He teaches the doctrine of repeated and continuous comings, when he declares to Caiaphas, "From now on ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power and coming upon the clouds of heaven." Notice carefully the language with which

this progressive advent is described. It is a picture of the Son of Man borne upon the clouds of heaven. He has ever since the prediction been thus majestically coming to his Church and to the world. A similar though modified meaning seems best to suit the words of Jesus spoken to his disciples, John xiv, 3. This too is a progressive advent; consisting not so much, however, in majestic approaches of Christ to the world in history as of more quiet approaches to his disciples in spiritual gifts, and especially perhaps in the favor of a removal by death from earthly trials, to be with himself and with the Father.

Preëminently in the Gospel of John does Christ teach the doctrine of a spiritual second coming. "I will not leave you orphans, I come to you." And when he comes the Father also comes, according to his own statement: "We will come unto him and make our abode with him." Nor was this coming to be long delayed: "Yet a little while and the world no longer seeth me, but ye see me." With Christ's perpetual coming is connected a perpetual judgment. "Then," says the Psalmist, (xcvi, 12) "shall all the trees of the wood rejoice before the Lord, for he cometh, he cometh to judge the earth." In similar conception is brought to us the glad news of a perpetual judgment of our Lord. "For judgment I came into the world:" "Now is the judgment of this world:" "He that believeth not hath been already judged;" these are declarations of Jesus. A perpetual resurrection is also connected with this perpetual coming: "The hour cometh and now is when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God." These words last quoted certainly do not warrant us in denying the doctrines of a general simultaneous judgment or of a similar resurrection, but leave their claims to be decided upon other grounds. Nor do the previously quoted words of Christ to Caiaphus and to his disciples warrant us in denying that the several comings of the Son of Man will culminate in one final coming, most majestic and most noteworthy among them all. But passages like these selected from the sayings of Jesus *do* warrant us in agreeing with the declaration of Schmidt, when he writes, Christ's coming is "near at hand and far away; it is definite and indefinite at the same time."

Christ then speaks of himself as ever with his people, and

yet in some sort—say rather *in several sorts*—as still to come. He has come and come again. He will keep coming.

3. Christ gave his disciples more special information respecting his coming in the first great epoch of his kingdom. That epoch, which was the break of his kingdom with the Jewish nation, was for them the all-important coming. To it many passages often interpreted of his final coming primarily refer. We say primarily, for they have by parity of principle an indefinite application until the end of time. This epoch is, as the comings of Christ in history always are, a time of liberation and a time also of judgment. To this great epoch-making advent of Jesus reference is made in the following passages. “Whenever they persecute you in this city flee into the other, for verily I say unto you, ye shall not have finished the cities of Israel until the Son of Man shall have come.” (Matt. x, 23.) After making the prediction, “the Son of Man is going to come in the glory of his Father with his angels, and then shall he reward each according to his doing,” he adds, “Verily I say unto you, there are some standing here who shall not taste of death until they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom.” (Matt. xvi, 27 f.) It is of interest and importance to notice that Christ describes this advent with all possible majesty of draping; though by limiting it to that generation for fulfillment he compels us to interpret it of his break with the Jewish nation. To this event many other passages (Luke ix, 26 f.; xxi, 8-32: vid. also John iv, 21) refer. And to it the attention is primarily directed throughout the entire eschatological discourse of Matthew in the twenty-fourth and following chapters. No satisfactory division of these chapters can possibly be made. We know that certain portions of them refer primarily to the destruction of Jerusalem. The only consistent and safe interpretation is to refer them primarily as a whole to this and the accompanying events. To say with Ellicott, that what precedes the twenty-ninth verse of Matthew’s twenty-fourth chapter refers “mainly but not exclusively to the destruction of Jerusalem,” and that what follows refers “mainly but not exclusively to our Lord’s second advent and the final judgment,” and then to stretch the meaning of the Greek word *ἐνθάως* so as to make it cover centuries of time, seem to us like the abandonment of all attempt

at a critical interpretation. Nor is the point where the discourse is supposed to change at all agreed upon. Robinson would place it as the forty-second verse. Ellicott and others at the twenty-ninth.

Let it not be objected that some of the language here used by Christ is too significant and awful to describe his coming in judgment to the Jewish nation. To this objection the reply is ready. Language as significant and awful as any in the entire passage is to be found in those portions of it which confessedly refer to the destruction of Jerusalem. What event, even the total destruction of the world, could be more awful than was to those concerned in it the downfall of the Jewish nation? We are also to remember that it is the custom of the Bible to use language of this sublimity in connection with even local and temporary calamities. Christ, as we have seen, represents all his comings in history as advents "upon the clouds of the heavens." The angels accompany him in his continuous dealings with the earth. The sun was turned into darkness and the moon into blood when the Holy Spirit came down at Pentecost. In this same discourse, Christ describes a certain catastrophe in these words: "The stars shall fall from heaven and the powers of the heavens be shaken" * * * "all the tribes of the earth shall mourn and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." This catastrophe is the destruction of the Jewish nation, as is shown by the following statement that the fulfillment of the prophecy should fall within that generation. All attempts to alter the meaning of the word "generation" in this passage are negatived by its meaning elsewhere and by the fact that Christ makes similar predictions with the use of similar language in other passages.

In the epoch of the Church to which this entire discourse has *primary* reference lies the type of all the epochs. This fact gives us our warrant for applying the truths of the first epoch to times still future. That which those who bring us the report of Christ's saying supposed would occur once for all within their own life-time, occurs substantially the same again and again in the history of the Church. "All critical and creative epochs," says Neander, "correspond to each other and collect-

ively prefigure the last judgment and last creation—the consummation of the kingdom of God.”

We glean then these truths from Christ's teaching upon the question of his own second advent. The gospel, carried by his disciples into the whole world, is to convert the world. By a varied use of language, for which we have the warrant of Christ himself, we may speak of his continuous coming, spiritually to his people, progressively in the history of the race. These comings are all majestic, consolatory to his Church, condemnatory of the unbelieving world. One of these great historic advents he describes more particularly to his disciples as being that one in which they and the fate of the early Church were most concerned. Its two characteristics are liberation and judgment. It is the type of all Christ's comings in history. Its general features will hold true to the end of time. Jesus as the agitator of human society and of the Christian Church will not suffer his winnowing-fan to pause in its ceaseless swing, until he has thoroughly purged his floor. He is judge and king, not to be merely, but now in fact operating in the world.

4. The principles which Jesus lays down in all his teaching upon the doctrine of his second coming, as well as more especially that closer view of God's method which we obtain from looking upon the first epoch-making advent as the type of all other advents, warrant us in certain general conceptions of the future of Christ's kingdom. Those conceptions accord with the profoundest, truest views of the nature of sin and of righteousness, with the correct philosophy of human progress, and with the fundamentals in the teaching of the apostle Paul. The day of upturnings, of catastrophes has not ended. The general impression pervades many, at least of the more progressive minds, that there will be no more historic commotion over religious concerns. The sword which Christ came to send upon the earth seems ready to be sheathed. If once sheathed, the assumption is made, it will never again be taken from its scabbard. Would that this pleasant view of the future might be made plausible by the unconditional surrender of those forces which are opposed to Christ's kingdom. As the matter now stands, we can see how the intensifying and culmination of evil forces may coexist with the growth, both extensive and

intensive, of the forces which make for righteousness and for the success of Christ's kingdom. We may then still have to feel such blasts from the purifying winnowing-fan of Jesus as shall make the whole earth shake—and that not once only, but again and again until the final coming.

Of that final coming we know essentially the same truths that are revealed to us concerning all of Christ's advents. It will be a time of both liberation and judgment; it will be majestic, consoling the righteous, condemning the unjust.

5. Further, as to the details of the future of his kingdom Christ gives us no information. Nor, so far as we can conjecture, is it best that he should. His bidding is, ceaselessly "*watch*." Not that we are to turn our bodily eyes upward expecting to see his bodily presence at any hour. The truth is grander than that. The words of Paul when he declares, "the trumpet shall sound," are scarcely satisfied when we interpret them a trumpet of brass or silver will be blown by a visible angel in the air above our heads. Some will perhaps think it strange to find in this discussion no pronouncement upon the question, will Christ at the last come bodily and reign in person upon the earth? It is certainly not the design of the essay to answer this twofold question with a decided negative. There are many considerations, however, which are opposed to the affirmative answer. We, at least, seem warranted in saying it were better for us that such a coming should not occur. If Christ's final advent be in the body to reign here upon the earth, he will come of course under *all the conditions which necessarily belong to a bodily manifestation*. The questions, just where will he come?—how many (how few) can see him come?—what benefit will it be to us here to know that he is in Palestine, where we could not possibly all of us in bodies surround him?—what chaos, rather than order, will not be introduced into the Christian life under such circumstances?—are all questions relevant to the view? They who maintain it are rather than their questioners responsible for the putting of such questions. We do not wish to make our conceptions of what would be best the sole measure of what will be fact. Only we can find no teaching of Christ which leads us to adopt views such as seem themselves to lead, when legitimately car-

ried out, to so many difficulties. Does not clear thinking show many difficulties as inevitable conclusions from the opinion that the final coming will be in body and for a personal reign upon the earth? Nothing better refutes this view than to ask the one who advocates it—precisely what do you mean?

We are reminded, however, that in Acts i, 11, the disciples are assured, "this same Jesus" . . . "shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." The words *ὁν τρόπον* appear to be added to *ὁυτως* for the express purpose of insisting upon the comparison. As he had ascended so he should descend from heaven in a cloud. But we are thrown into much doubt as to how far we shall press this comparison when we remember that Jesus himself said that he should be seen coming in a cloud (vid. Luke xxi, 27, and compare Matt. xxiv, 30) within his own generation, and that he declared to Caiaphas (Matt. xxvi, 64): "From now on shall ye see the son of man coming upon the clouds of heaven."

We cannot find, then, that those whose knowledge of the future is much more detailed than has here been indicated have the authority of Jesus.

6. Nor have we, it should be further noted, in the views of the New Testament writers a firm basis for eschatological teaching which goes beyond that of Christ. The truth of a triumph for Christ's kingdom through the preaching of the Gospel was heartily accepted by them. No fact of their history is more firmly established. Their view of the time and method of this triumph may have been somewhat obscured by false impressions which still lingered from their old habits of thought. We may also be unable to tell how theoretically Paul reconciled his view of salvation for the race through the preaching of the Gospel with his expectation of Christ's speedy advent. We do know that he guarded that expectation most carefully against the wrong practices which some were ready to derive from it. He strenuously combatted the same practical tendencies which are at work in the present day. They unnerved the Christian workman. They took the joy and assurance from his *work*. As we have already seen, among the disciples John dwells most upon the spiritual second coming of Christ. In his view the second coming is preceded by a course of

development, in which the spirit of Antichrist must be overcome. The perfection of the individual believer is connected with Christ's second advent: "Beloved, now are we children of God;" "when he shall appear we shall be like him." (1 John iii, 2.) In Peter's view the development of the kingdom was perfected in the coming of Christ, though according to his expectation also that coming was near at hand.

We are not to wonder that a logical adjustment of these forms of belief had not taken place in the minds of the apostles. Such adjustment is still with many minds a thing of the future. No one is ready for presenting its perfected product.

We shall make no attempt in this essay either to combat false views of the prophecies of Daniel or the Revelation, or to throw light upon the doctrine of the second advent by presenting the true views. Those prophecies seem to us the carrying out, with reference to events which have already occurred, of those principles which lie at the base of all correct views of God's kingdom. To form from them a connected scheme of the world's future is to misuse them. Whenever such a scheme, however confidently derived, contradicts truths upon which is founded the whole historic course of God's rule, we have no need to give it a detailed examination. If our method of treatment seems to cramp too much the information given in divine utterances, we reply, it is, as far as it goes, safe. Let him who can *safely* go beyond, lead on and we will follow. But we will follow no man's teaching, even when based upon an assumedly correct interpretation of inspired prophecy, if that interpretation proves itself false by contradicting plain truths.

A more detailed doctrine than we have ventured to give, if possible for any one, is at least permissible only when that doctrine shall abide certain tests.

IV. We close our discussion with a brief statement of those tests. They seem to us entirely decisive against the vagaries of premillennialists.

1. No doctrine can be accepted, which, being ostensibly based upon prophecy, builds itself up by ignorance of first principles for the sound interpretation of prophecy. This is habitually done by premillennarian writers. They are repeating to-day

many of the errors of opinion found among the Jews of Christ's time. As those Jews misunderstood the true meaning of Old Testament prophecy, so they that of the New Testament. They misuse prophetic imagery. In this particular they are oftentimes even more inconsiderate than those whom they resemble; and for their misuse they cannot be driven by any man's logical onset to make any consistent defence. Their stronghold is the seventh chapter of Daniel, but they largely misinterpret this prophecy. They call constantly for a literal interpretation, but in attempting their literal interpretation of prophecy one runs great risk of stultifying the writers of prophecy. They themselves are led to expect Christ sitting bodily on Mount Olivet, the Jews his chief instrument for the conversion of the nations, violence his chief method, a world made up of men, some with ordinary physical bodies, and some with resurrection bodies, all literally worshiping together at Christ's feet—these things and other like things which are too many now to mention. This is a sort of literalism which is illiterate and leads to the grossest absurdities.

They refuse also the help of history in the interpretation of prophecy. This refusal is expressly made by Mr. Darby. "I do not admit history," says this writer, "to be in any sense necessary to the understanding of prophecy." "I believe that the attempt to interpret prophecy by history has been most injurious to the ascertaining of its real meaning." We confidently assert that no view of prophecy could be more opposite to the true view. To say that prophecy is never interpreted *except by history* would be much nearer the truth. We, therefore, feel much more confidence in the interpretation which is *historically* derived than in that which is given us by Mr. Darby. History always and grandly keeps the word of promise to the heart, though it sometimes, perhaps usually, breaks it to the ear. The premillennialists try to keep it to the ear, but sadly do they break it to the hearts of men. Without history we do not know the meaning of prophecy, either to the mind of the prophet himself, or as correctly interpreted by the course of the ages.

Their mode of interpreting prophecy also concentrates unduly the attention upon comparatively unimportant details.

In many of their discussions we feel no great interest. With Prof. Cowles—we do not care to debate “the question in celestial geography whether this earth, purified at the last day, is to be the location of the future eternal heaven.”

2. No theory of the second coming can be true which contradicts the facts of human progress, and of the vast contributions to this progress which have been made by the gospel. To deny these facts emasculates the gospel of its power to engender life in the world. We by no means relish much of the inane boasting about progress which is now so common. It is hard, however, to see how any thorough and healthy research into history can be undertaken without establishing the fact of progress. It is the growing power of God's forces. It is the Logos shining more and more in the world. This we call human progress: call it rather God's forward movement through the ages. Nor can it reasonably be doubted that to this progress Christianity has largely contributed. If this be not so, Christianity has small valid claim upon us for acceptance or even for respect. If it has been working for eighteen centuries upon the race only to show itself a failure, what confidence can we have in proclaiming it God's power for the salvation and lifting of the race? The following, according to the view maintained by the writer of a book, entitled, “*Hopes of the Church*,” is the sum-total of the Gospel's showing. “All is in disorder.” . . . “As to the present, that is the time during which Christ is sitting at the right hand of God, everything is in a state of misery.” . . . “Christendom is in a state worse than that of Jews or Pagans.” . . . “Instead of permitting ourselves to hope for a continued progress of good, we must expect a progress of evil.” But what, may we not ask, is the inevitable conclusion from statements such as these? If the Gospel can do nothing for the race, the race does not want the Gospel. Observe then,

3. No view can be true which *degrades the Gospel as a present and prospective power* in the world for the salvation and bettering of the race. It is against this degradation of the Gospel in its connection and work with the entire race, that we utter our most earnest protest. Strong feelings arise in the heart, and strong language is apt to flow from the pen, when we see such

a comparatively paltry influence assigned to the preaching of Christ's cross in the general movement of the kingdom of heaven. We gratefully recognize the amiable Christian character of many of those whose views upon this subject we must strenuously oppose. The worst effect—as it seems to us after a candid reading—of the dreary and disjointed literature with which they have flooded the country is this, that it tends to shake the confidence of men in the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ as a present and prospective power in the world. It is in vain for the advocates of the view to disclaim the tendency. It is only too widely and too obviously apparent. They who take such a doleful view of the Gospel's past have of course no cheer as to its future. Dr. Duffield puts the issue squarely. "The great question," he says, which forms the nucleus of the whole discussion is one and very simple—"is the kingdom of heaven a new dispensation to be introduced on earth by the visible personal coming of Christ?" Let the issue be thus stated. If Jesus teaches anything clearly, he clearly teaches us that the kingdom of heaven is now, and has been since his first advent, among men. His first cry was, "The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand." "The kingdom of God is preached and every man presseth into it:" the kingdom of God is in the midst of you; to this teaching the entire lives of Christ and his apostles are pledged. The whole Church in the past has been built upon the teaching. The error which denies this truth is fundamental. It degrades, as to a matter of prime importance, the Gospel of our Lord.

This premillennarian view degrades the Gospel as to its product also. That product is the Church, the community of believers formed by the work of the Gospel. But the Church, according to the premillennarian theory, is no saving power in the world; it is tolerated only until the time for sweeping it away shall come.

This theory also degrades the Gospel in the person of its author. The view of the Saviour which the theory presents is, though certainly not thus intended by its advocates, a degrading view. It is a return to the old-time erroneous notions of Messiah's rule. The blood of Messiah is unavenged, and to avenge it we must go back to the literal interpretation of the

passages which represent him as threshing the heathen in anger, and ruling the nations with a rod of iron. What precisely do these writers intend? The New Testament emphasizes the power of Christ's humiliation and death. The Cross and the preaching of it are the power of God for winning men. If we debase the power of spiritual forces, how shall we expect results from the miraculous working of forces which touch only the physical man? How can Christ—we ask the question reverently—except through moral and spiritual forces convert the world? how indeed can he *convert* it at all if it will have successfully resisted conversion through those same forces? Will he thresh sin out of men and beat salvation into them by displays of physical force? We are to believe his word, that it is far better for us and for his cause that he be bodily from us in order to be spiritually with us in all the ages. The victorious Messiah, trampling out his enemies by visiting physical disaster upon them, then reigning in bodily presence upon the hills that surround the capital of little Palestine, would have small attractive or compelling power for us, compared with the crucified, self-forgetful, humble Jesus. Surely this is a gross and false conception of Messiah, returned to fill again the imagination of men. To exalt that which is sensuous in its form and which works by producing sudden and great convulsions, above the slower, more secret movement of spiritual forces is a fundamental mistake in the interpretation of the past of Christ's kingdom, as well as a fundamental error in the conception of its future development. We recognize the influence of epoch-making catastrophes; but after all, great catastrophes generally do very little spiritually for those who are in the midst of them, and the men of the next generation at once forget their lessons. What reason have we to suppose that the bodily descent of our Lord would of itself do more to change men's souls than did his presence with them in the first advent? Are we not agreed that the elements of real power in that first advent, now multiplied, are working successfully in thousands of places where the golden throne of king Messiah could not be set up?

Finally—no theory can be true whose legitimate tendency is towards the letting down of tone in the whole Christian life.

We have no wish to use the *argumentum ad invidiam*. We deplore that we are forced to speak in this manner of a view which many Christian brethren hold. We are moving, however, under the profound injunction of Coleridge, to be tolerant of men and motives, but to be intolerant of false opinions.

Upon the peg of constant expectation of Christ's bodily presence the premillennialists propose to hang the whole Church. They propose what is *psychologically impossible*. The Church cannot live for centuries in intense expectation of an immediate realization of Christ's bodily coming. For his coming they are always to watch. But if they watch according to the expectation of the premillennialist, the hope breaks down. And breaking, it carries somewhat down the Christian character of most men who hold the hope. Yet it is this precise, well-defined expectation which these theorists insist is necessary for keeping in tone the Christian life. Not so: the constant spiritual coming of Christ does this. We can watch for Christ's spiritual comings, for his comings in history, and for the sweetly awful coming to the soul in death, and be benefitted by the watching. To try to expect that which we have no warrant to expect, and which is constantly disappointing us, is injurious. The definite statement is made by one of these writers that new converts should be especially fed upon the doctrine of Christ's speedy bodily advent. We have little doubt what would be the effect upon them of such pabulum. In the case of men of long standing in the Christian life, its obvious tendency appears in the nourishing of a condition which seems to us a sort of refined spiritual selfishness.

Some of these writers are very hard upon their brethren who do not hold their views. The Church at large seems to them a nest of unclean birds. They especially distrust missionary enterprises. The missionaries and their supporters, according to Dr. Lord, "are acting on mistaken notions of God's purposes and of their instrumentality, and will be disappointed." Their error, he thinks, is in many instances one of the heart also. Imagine Paul's fierce denunciation of a view like this—the man who had gone from Jerusalem in a circuit to Illyricum, and late in life purposed to reach also Spain, preaching the Gospel. Let it be distinctly understood, this attitude of waiting and

wailing is, in our opinion, unmanly and well calculated to realize the teaching of the men who take the attitude, viz: that Christ's Gospel is, for the regeneration and saving of the race, a proven failure. How any earnest soul can be satisfied with such a selfish theory of salvation, it is hard for us to imagine. We believe that the men are far better than their theory; but as to the tendencies of the theory we have no doubt. It tends to unnerve the workman. It takes the heart out of the preacher of the Gospel, who especially needs to feel that, when Christ stands by him, he is working for the ages. No manly, thoughtful workman is willing to measure the value of his work by its immediate results alone. He wants to work with Christ for the race. He is satisfied only if he can have a place in the great scheme of saving, through the Gospel, the fallen race. That theologian's teaching is vitiated, and that workman is palsied, who leaves out of his estimate of the Gospel the great conditions, aspirations, and hopes, which concern the race as a race. In viewing these things we have no right unnecessarily to load down our Christian doctrine with opposition to the right use of reason. The outlook is hopeful, though the course be long. *The outlook is hopeful because the course is long.* God—mysterious as the thought is, awful as it is in some of its applications, God never hurries. In his sight Christianity is not old. She is now in her infancy, and she will never outlive, but rather continually increase the vigor of her youth. There is room for many, many comings, in blended majesty and love, to judge and to liberate, before the final advent of him whose right it is to rule.

ARTICLE VII.—ADDRESS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE OLD-CATHOLICS FOR NORTH GERMANY TO THE CATHOLICS OF GERMANY.

Translated from the Supplement to the *Cologne Gazette* of Jan. 28th, 1874, by
Prof. OTTO FEDER, Darmstadt.

Catholic Fellow Citizens!

THE Central Committee of the Catholic movement in North Germany have hitherto refrained, on principle, from making the Church questions of the day the subject of a public address to all their fellow citizens to whom they are united by the bond of a common faith, however favorable the opportunities may have appeared, and however frequently they may have felt called upon to make an appeal. The state of affairs *now* compels us to depart from this principle. But it is not with a view to take advantage of an inviting opportunity to agitate for party purposes; but rather, impelled by *the vivid realization of the great bond* which we believe unites us all, in an ecclesiastical, as well as in a national point of view, by *the clear perception of the great interests* that spring from this bond, as well as of the *dangers to which we are equally exposed*, we undertake to lay before you the state of affairs, the origin of our difficulties, the intensity of the contrasts making a crisis imminent, and to call for a serious consideration of the duties which this state of things imposes upon you as men of honor and conscience, as Christians, as men, as citizens, and Germans.

The Church-question has, within a brief space of time, entirely changed its character and aspect. Instead of "*the scholastic dogmatic inflammation*," as it was called in the first stage of its development, instead of the purely internal concern of the "Roman Catholic Church," there appears now in the centre and foreground of irrepressible conflict, a most fundamental *opposition of those two powers, on whose intimate and organic connection the whole edifice of social order heretofore rested*; a conflict between "State and Church," raging with an inten-

sity and bitterness till now unknown. The execution of laws which have been enacted in Prussia to regulate the difficulties produced by ecclesiastical events, is everywhere impeded and arrested by the systematic opposition of the bishops of the land, who, listening to the injunctions of the "man outside of Germany," have met in an episcopal conference, and passed the word not to obey these laws, to treat them as not binding on themselves, and—the word was followed by the deed! This deed, however, or rather this studious omission of what the law required to be done, has then been followed by a whole series of enactments for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the law and the government: the judicial condemnation of the refractory parties to pecuniary fines, up to the highest measure as provided by law, to imprisonment for several years, to the withholding of the temporalities, the closing of internates, and clerical seminaries, the prohibition of official functions on the part of illegally appointed curates, the inhibition of divine service in different places, the preparations for the deposition of a bishop! This now is, on the other side, called a "*persecution of the Church*," a "persecution of Christians after the manner of *Diocletian*,"—the Polish primate calls the official enumeration of his many and heavy misdemeanors against his lawful king and sovereign, even a "*testimony of his faithfulness to God*," and of the conscientious discharge of his episcopal duties, and Pius IX. speaks in his latest *Encyclica* of the spectacle which the *manly* "*confessors*" in Prussia are giving to the angels and to men. And the Catholic people? The Catholic people having all the time become more and more excited by the prayers commanded from above for the "persecuted church," and for the "holy prisoner in the Vatican," the Catholic people return, instead of 82 as formerly, 93 deputies of the Centre party, whose leaders open the present parliamentary campaign with the motion for a resolution and a law declaring peace only attainable by a return to the approved principles of the time before 1871, and by which the May laws are to be abolished; and our neighbor, France, panting for revenge, watches with eagerness and satisfaction the progress of internecine strife among her conquerors. Consequently a vista of difficulties of the most serious kind, and of ever increasing pro-

portions is open before us, which, considering the nature of the principles in opposition, as well as the standpoint and the potential means of the adversaries, must appear endless, or admit of a termination only by a resort to the alternative of "*bending or breaking*," a result, the incalculable consequences of which will fall precisely upon the most innocent party, namely the Catholic people. It is impossible that the leading State of Germany should waver, or hesitate even for a moment, on the path it has entered, without incurring the verdict that it is "going to Canossa;" on the other hand, the inevitably increasing rigor of its just executive measures, must, for its Catholic subjects, produce a state of things which will amount in fact to an Interdict, a weapon which, in times gone by, used to be the *ultima ratio* of the Roman pontiff when he wished to break the opposition of worldly princes by the prospect of a rebellion, if their subjects should be prevented in the exercise of their religion. This state of things admits of no indifference on the part of any man that takes a lively interest of any kind in the weal or woe of the people; he will have to ask himself: What is the cause of all this, where is the help and the remedy, and of what avail can be the efforts of individuals?

I.

The first cause, the source of this strife and apparently hopeless confusion, is known well enough, but hardly a suspicion seems to be entertained that this first cause would have remained entirely inefficient without the intervention of a second coöperative cause. And this second cause is the attitude of the people themselves; it lies in the fact, that the evil is not traced to its origin, but is looked for in its pathological symptoms, in the *effects* of the first cause, which alone are combatted and sought to be removed. Everywhere the cry is raised: "Up to battle against Ultramontanism! Its aim is the ruin of civilization, its means, the uprooting of moral order, its system, the world of painted sepulchres!" And the number of combatants against this system is not small, their armor is splendid, their intentions are said to be excellent. But all efforts to put a stop to the spreading of the Ultramontane spirit

prove unavailing; its realm, though fair to view from without, is inwardly full of uncleanness and dead men's bones, yet grows from day to day; whole States have already succumbed to its power; France has declared herself its vassal, and we live to see that its heralds make bold to challenge the most powerful State in the heart of Europe: Darest thou cross me? Then war thou shalt have, unless thou don the garb of repentance and walk in the way to Canossa.

It is now time, instead of forever enumerating the many individual delinquencies and sins of Ultramontanism, to ask for once the question seriously: whence does Ultramontanism, in spite of its internal nullity and corruption, derive its undeniable external power? The answer will be found in the following positions:

1. It has succeeded—and not without the aid of many of its adversaries—in concealing its real principle and essence, in diverting attention from the fundamental and corner-stone of its whole organization, its only vulnerable point, and in confronting its opponents with the consequences of its principle, the emanations of its essence, as though these were the objects of attack.

2. Deceived, and deceiving themselves as to the *true nature of the Ultramontane danger*, people place their entire confidence in a power which from its nature is not a match for its adversary; they set a multitude of means in operation which positively cannot heal or remove, but only increase and spread the evil, and one most simple, powerfully operating remedy is left unused, untried. Concerning the *first point*, we must limit ourselves to a few observations. What are first of all the tactics of Ultramontanism? It divides the world into halves, into the internal (superior) world, and the external (inferior); it claims the former as its own domain, and thus securely conceals its principle and the basis of its operations from view. Why does it leave the thousands and tens of thousands who are not inwardly convinced of the truth of its lately defined dogma, who positively do not believe it, who even scoff at it in private, but think it superfluous, inconvenient, and unwise to declare their disbelief openly, why does it leave these "faithful children" of its "church" in full possession of all their Church

rights, honors and dignities, and empty all the vials of its wrath and curses upon the heads of those who, impelled by a love of truth, make this dogma the subject of a serious public criticism and protest? It acts thus, because it has *nothing* to fear from the nullity *itself* of its principle, but *everything* from the knowledge of this nullity on the part of the world. Whence comes the affected "surprise," the "murmurs," the "commotion," the anger of the Centre party, whenever in the course of the debates on questions of Church policy, a speaker chances to mention the 18th July? Is not then the discussion on the point of touching upon the doctrine of the source of infallible knowledge in matters of faith and morals, upon the doctrine which has been defined as enhancing both the glory of God, the authority of the Catholic Church, and the welfare of nations; hence upon a doctrine from which, as from the source of all knowledge, according to the views of its believers, the brightest light is shed on all questions of politics, law, and social order, and from which infallible consequences should flow? With what joy ought not the advocates of Ultramontanism to welcome debate on the glorious event, with what zeal should not that truth be set forth and unfolded in all its consequences, which to them is the principle of everything? But no, their answer is a demonstration of surprise, murmurs, etc. The Universal Dogma, the rock of the Church, all at once, has clearly nothing to do with political or national questions, aye, not even with questions of Church policy; it is merely an internal concern of the Church! One would think these Ultramontane tactics were palpable indeed. But though incredible, it is nevertheless true, that people laugh and make the keenest jokes on the source of the Infallibility of the 18th July; but to draw practical consequences from the absolute nullity of the dogma, to neutralize its theoretical and practical consequences by a logical inference from the nullity of the principle, such a course is never thought of, or, if thought of, is not pursued; it is considered impolitic. Thus Ultramontanism has secured its treasure, while its opponents are just where it wishes to have them, entangled in the *conflict with the consequences of a principle* which itself remains unchanged. Then come, in endless array, the doctrines of papal utterances, ancient and modern, from the

bull "*unam sanctam*," and the syllabus; the dominion—the dominion over every creature, the superiority of the Kingdom of God (the inner world) over the kingdoms of this world, of the laws of God over those of men; the State that refuses to lend its strong arm to the Church, or does not receive the power from God *via* Rome, is outside of the ethic order of the world, and if it sets any bounds to the influence of the blindly obedient organs of the Infallible one, then it is denounced as persecuting the Church; oaths sworn to the State are only conditionally binding, etc. All this is now to pass merely for Ultramontane excrescences of the Catholic Church, as mere *clerical assumption, arrogance, whims, and sophisms*. But to believe this would be as unreasonable as if we were to consider the thorns that tear our clothes and lacerate our hands only as accidental excrescences of the thorn-bush, which has been suffered to grow in our garden instead of the fig-tree, and that both were intrinsically of the same worth. Not a single one of these doctrines is accidental or spontaneous, so that without them Ultramontanism would still remain what it is; but each one is essential to it, and after the Ultramontane system had been allowed to constitute itself as the Church, every negation of those dogmas became a negation of this "Church" itself. If the organization which now calls itself the Catholic Church, and which is officially and unofficially called so, is the real legitimate successor of the old Church, which was essentially and intimately connected with the State and civilization, if between to-day and the time before the 18th July, 1870, nothing has occurred by which this internal bond and the legal continuity of the Church itself has been secured, and by which a new church system has been substituted for the old, then indeed is Germany, is the State, the disturber of the peace, and what the latter calls its self-defense, is only the opening of hostilities against the old Church, and then the demand of a return to the approved principles of former times appears perfectly justified. Let people scoff as they please at this strange: Kingdom of God, at these laws of God; let them be horrified at the frivolity of such an Anthropomorphism; but if they lack the requisite qualifications, or the ethic power, to recognize and to *treat* the infallible teacher of the identification

of the Human with the Divine as a usurper, then they will butt in vain at the solid syllogism which rests on the fundamental doctrine of papal Infallibility. It is therefore extremely silly to say that the 18th July has only given the form of law to ancient practice. Just here the stupendous change has been wrought; this very dogma is the foundation of the whole system, and with it, it is to be, or not to be. We justly regard the above syllogism as absurd and monstrous, and reject and condemn the claims of Ultramontaniam, one and all. But to do this with practical effect, we must attack the fundamental doctrine itself upon which these claims are based, and not the deductions merely; we must cut down the tree that bears only thorns instead of figs, and not turn our hands merely against its fruits.

II.

This brings us to the second question, and we have now to ask: What is the *real character of the Ultramontane danger*? In reply, we would first put a counter-question: Where and in what manner does Ultramontaniam attack the State, or civilization in general, and Germany in particular? Does an army of crusaders threaten our borders, or is the "Pope-king" about to usurp the sovereignty of the land and delegate the powers of the State to his holy offices? Have the contents of "*Const. cum et apostolatus*," or other pulpit doctrines been practically realized, and has the normal operation of our State institutions been interrupted in consequence; or is there anything of the kind to be apprehended? All such fears are absurd, will be the truthful answer; and all that is commonly thought of in connection with "Ultramontane danger" is hardly less unsubstantial; nothing of *that sort* need excite the vigilance of a statesman of the 19th century. If there were no other way in which the Ultramontane Church could endanger the State as the bearer of civilization, could not only theoretically oppose but efficiently attack, embarrass, and weaken it, then indeed it would be easy for the party of the Centre to rebut the charge, that the fundamental dogma is a danger to the State. But there is, in sooth, a different way.

The two halves of the moral world have their mutual line of demarcation traced in the outer life of man; but their lines of

contact enter into his consciousness, into the spiritual heart of individuals and entire nations. It is here alone that the relation of man to Him who is above all (we call it religion, i. e., feeling, inner perception of our dependence on an eternal fundamental cause of all life, and of the moral world) connects itself with his self-consciousness and his relations to others and to nature. And all well-being, all peace, all inward serenity and outward efforts of individuals, as well as nations, are dependent on the health and strength of this spiritual heart. To the Church, this point is easily and directly accessible; its very existence, its forms of worship, its doctrines, have for their immediate object the human heart, which yearns to be ever re-invigorated, lifted up and ennobled by fellowship in holiness; but it is hardly, and only very indirectly, and, at all events, very imperfectly within the power of the State, to arrive at a point whence it can influence the spiritual heart. Wherein does the "Ultramontane danger" consist then? *Essentially in the weakening, corrupting, debasing, of the spiritual heart, of Christian religious faith.* And how vast is the progress that has already been made in this direction? The heart into which God has written his eternal covenant with the human race, is—so implies the system of the Vatican dogma—an "*inanime quoddam*," a soulless thing, an empty tablet, only destined to be written over with scholastic "definitions" and commandments coming from without; the living Mediator, who promised to be always with us, is replaced by a substitute; instead of listening to the *Spirit* that, spread abroad in our hearts through love, speaks to *our* spirit of the hidden things of God, that reminds us of all the words of eternal life, and whose speech becomes intelligible and plain to us in that which has been believed in everywhere, at all times, and by all—instead of this, we are to believe in an oracle severed from the conscious mind of humanity, from reason and history, poised upon its own naked egoism; instead of the renewing power of the spirit, we are to walk in antiquated literalness and soulless formality; instead of coöperating from our conviction with the power of God, we are to sacrifice our intelligence, our reason, in cadaverous obedience to spiritual impotence and selfishness. Instead of the honor of being children of God, and fellow heirs

with Christ, we are to feel elated by being clothed upon with fealty to the pope, and forget in this slavery that we are of royal lineage; instead of worshipping God in spirit and in truth, we are to pervert through pope, and image-worship, the honor of God into the likeness of the creature, etc. It is commonly objected that this horrible perversion of conscience is just merely an internal concern of the Church, that it does not attack the State, nor endanger it! No doubt the State has neither the means nor the authority to meddle with the cure of this disease of the heart; but it is precisely the State, the civil, national, and social life, that has to bear the consequences. The corruption of the basis of life adulterates and decomposes at once all the conscious relations of individuals with one another and with the world at large. Above all for a church, which is essentially a "community" and which is called *Catholic, general*, or, still more properly, *entire*, because it necessarily pre-supposes individual nations and national churches as independent members and representatives of the human family gathered in Christ, for such a church, that spirit of perversion substitutes priestly dominion which, just as the heathenish Roman empire formerly was founded on the ruins of national existences, has a *dominus et deus noster* at its head and none but slavishly subjected atoms of humanity for its subjects. Such a church is the very ideal of governmental absolutism, and matures also in the political field this highest and last deformity; it withdraws furthermore the heart from the natural connections of family and nationality, from active participation in the lawful interests of the fatherland and of the popular development of civilization; but it stimulates, upon occasion, from Jesuitical policy, the national feeling, until it culminates in the fixed idea of a "chosen people," and avails itself of this madness as a means of reestablishing the temporal kingdom of the "Representative of God." It has been objected that all this is but an old story and dates from distant times; the 18th July has wrought no danger in this! We have already exposed the absurdity of this objection. The stupendous change effected by the 18th July is revealed by the fact that now the disease is dogmatically declared to be health, the deformity to be the normal shape, corruption to be the primitive state, while the

whole system of perversion and Romanization has now received the seal of sacred authority—so that, to the people, it looks as if this were a “revelation from God,” as if “commandments and laws of God” were promulgated which had to be obeyed above and before all human laws on pain of the loss of eternal hopes. Thus the “*animus hostilis*,” a disposition hostile to civil and national interests, has found entrance and scope, and from this disposition to active rebellion in favor of the “persecuted church,” is, we will not say but a step, yet certainly no farther than need be, to grasp a favorable chance offered from without. A portion of the people turn with horror from the Ultramontane “nonsense,” communion with the other portion is rejected on the only ground where a real union of individuals can exist. In its place, a feeling of estrangement, envy, hatred, pervades the people and makes them look to the ranks of the most overbearing order of all for its leaders and fathers. The national unity is destroyed and the people are divided into two strata separated by an impassable gulf. Religion on the one side becomes Paganism, on the other Scepticism and Infidelity. In view of *this* cause of our troubles and of this character of the Ultramontane peril, the expedients contemplated to redress the evil and avert the danger must excite astonishment and wonder. A path is pursued by which the real enemy cannot be attacked and reached; confidence is placed in a power which from *its very nature* is not able to cope with the adversary; and *that* only power which by nature is both qualified and called to uproot the evil, is left unnoticed, pushed aside, may possibly mistaken for the real enemy, and impeded in its operations; all strength is wasted in a useless struggle with the shadow of the giant, while a most simple, ready, and decisive agency, both for the present and the future, is left unused, untried.

It is natural that, on looking around for a *helping hand*, our *first* expectation should turn towards the *State*, even that State which guides the destinies of Germany. Our second glance, however must tell us at once that the State cannot be that power from which a real suppression of the Ultramontane peril, or even a real solution of the momentary difficulty, may be expected. The State, by means of its legislation, establishes a

new external order in place of the external confusion so thoroughly effected by the 18th July; this new order can be enforced through the organs of its government, and any uprising against this external order can be crushed by judicial power; but all this cannot avail to remove the venom which has penetrated into the vitals of the people; the "*animus hostilis*" of the clergy is not suppressed, the illusion of the people, concerning the persecution of their Church, is not dispelled, the Ultramontane danger to the State is not removed. The seat of the evil cannot be reached by the State, whose sphere of action lies elsewhere. The State itself stands in need of help.

The power which by *nature* is opposed to Ultramontaniam, and, because naturally a match for it, is qualified and called to uproot it, is *Old-Catholicism*. In saying this we do not boast. For what is Old-Catholicism? Surely not, as it is commonly defined, the "ecclesiastical or religious association of those Catholics that have protested against the dogma of Infallibility?" If this were all, its power would be small indeed, nor could it be explained why it has been able to attract so much general attention as it undeniably has. No, not on the power of majorities and masses could we rely in face of an adversary numbering one hundred and eighty millions, as alleged, when we, not one hundred laymen, at the meeting at Königswinter, on the 14th August, 1870, and fourteen of the most conspicuous representatives of science and of the clergy at the Nürnberg conference, of the 25th-27th August of the same year, first ventured to give to the Old-Catholic movement a formal expression; we had to trust in something very different from *power of knowledge, acquaintance with the cause, and individual power of mind*, when we saw that scientific attainments were not able to preserve even the most intelligent and best from folly and the fall; something very different from the *popularity of our movement among the "educated" and the liberals* was needed, to animate and sustain us undismayed, when this popularity, as we had soon enough occasion to learn, brought us nothing but an increase of unpopularity and hatred from the other side.

What then was and is this other reliance? It is the Old-Catholic cause itself, the positive side of faith, which our leaders

have, by a withering scientific criticism of the system of Infallibility, rescued from its obscuratation by Romanism, the faith which they have placed upon the candlestick and sought to render once more effective; it is even the pure heart, the holy aspiration of the entire human race, and Old-Catholicism must be defined as Catholicism *in its ever unchanging essence*, and in the *form and shape demanded by the times*. The act of the 18th July, 1870, by which Romanism proclaimed its absolute egoism and seceded from the communion of Christian heart fellowship, consequently excommunicated itself, gave thus again a concrete being to Catholicism as freed from the yoke of Romanism; the same act, by which the mere form and a particular development of the Church were substituted for the whole, for the Catholic Church itself, restored to the deeply hidden essence of the Church once more a form and fashion suitable to the times. A German thinker of the first order, and faithful Catholic withal, once uttered the characteristic words: Catholicism is the *strength of Papism*; Papism, however, is the *weakness of Catholicism*. All the disfigurements with which Romanism and the selfishness of men generally have, in the course of centuries, covered up the ideal and pure essence of the Church, have not been able to abolish the legitimacy, the authority, and the honor which the "*Roman Catholic*" Church possessed and enjoyed in its Catholicity, universality, and historical continuity; the Roman realism of the Church was forgiven in view of the grandeur of Catholic idealism. On the other hand, however, its Roman character was in the eyes of many the very stumbling block that forbade them to recognize in it *the* Church, and the obstacle to their return into the paternal mansion. The act of the 18th July has irrevocably severed the two parties. Catholicism has been delivered from the element that weakened it and made it subject to criticism: it can henceforth set its ideal force in motion.

All this would but amount to empty words and phrases—as empty and objectionable as the imposition practiced on the opposite side by their appeals to the "*Word of God, the laws of God,*" etc.—if we were to lift to the seat of holiness which belongs to the Supreme Being our mere personal conceptions and opinions concerning what has been believed everywhere,

always, and by all, or if we pretended to have the true heart of humanity, in the shrine of our egoism, of our selfish thoughts and interests, severed from history and mankind, if we were to identify our particularism with the just claims of the whole human race. But, protesting against the Infallibility of the pope, we have protested at the same time against any substitution of man in the place of God, no matter by whom and in what form. A movement, however, which turns against the principle of selfishness cannot itself arise from selfishness, but can only live in and proceed from the pure essence of humanity, from its very heart, sullied and weakened by no selfishness, participated in by all, and restored by Christ to its pristine quality. This, however, the divine power in man, not man himself, but above man, and the living faith and firm trust in that power, is truly not a phrase, or a conceit, but the sum of all powers, and especially the cure for all the heart diseases of the times, and for Ultramontaniam. Whoever believes in this power, trusts in it and employs its agency to wipe out the shame and disgrace with which Romanism has covered religion and Christianity at large, is—Old-Catholic, whatever else he may call himself.

But in the Old-Catholic movement there dwells something of this universal power. Ultramontaniam, and Rome herself, feel it, though indistinctly yet unmistakably, and of this feeling we have the clearest testimony. For, let us ask, what motive accounts for the gathering of an assembly like that of the Vatican Council? Doubtless the dogmatization of papal Infallibility! But why this definition? What occasion was there for it? There is but one answer. The object was to break down a power which was an *obstacle* to the formal crowning of papal and hierarchical absolutism, the substitution in the place of God. Of this obstacle hardly a perceptible trace was left in Romanic countries; the doctrine of the "Infallible Vicar of God" needed no preacher there among one-half of the population, and found no audience in the other; the definition was therefore partly superfluous, partly aimless. The Germanic spirit alone, which had not yet accepted the idea of a dualism of divine authority and human liberty, revelation and science, the German religious heart, or, according to the style of the Roman See, Germany

reeking with heresy, was felt at Rome to be the centre of obstacles to the substitution in the place of God. The depth of feeling, the inwardness of the German, his attentive hearkening to the voice of God in nature and history, his conscientiousness and seriousness—all this raised a stumbling block in the way of the *imperium urbis et orbis*. Therefore the Vatican definition came as a real declaration of war to Germany, to disrupt and crush it intellectually and religiously. But to whom was it more particularly addressed? Certainly not to Protestant Christianity in Germany. From this "Old heresy" Rome had nothing more to fear; only the Catholics of Germany could be meant, especially those who, together with the subscribers of the well-known lay address of Coblenz, in the summer of 1869, found themselves deeply grieved by the rumored tendency of the approaching Council, and who received from the German episcopate, in its memorable pastoral letter of the 6th September of the same year, the testimony of unfeigned piety and fidelity to the Church.

Would you have yet another weighty testimony that Ultramontaniam feels very well what power stands behind Old-Catholicism, then read that latest Encyclica, the ecclesiastical aspect of which has been so clearly reviewed by the pastoral letter of the first Old-Catholic bishop. Why, if Old-Catholicism is nothing but the power of a few thousands who want to have nothing to do with the Roman source of life and knowledge; why, if it is nothing but the work of men concocted by means of the sophistries of a few arrogant professors, a movement soon lost in the sands of time—why, then, this outpouring of all the vials of pontifical wrath upon Old-Catholicism; for that these philippics are launched vigorously also against the secular governments of Switzerland and Germany, can surely be attributed to nothing but the fact that these have stretched out their strong hands to preserve for their Old-Catholic subjects their freedom of conscience and religion, and that by this means they prevented the Old-Catholic movement from being ground to powder by the power of the infallible church machinery. On any other supposition it could not be explained why the government of Italy, the "usurpers of St Peter's patrimony," should have been let off so easily; but Italy has

no Old-Catholics in possession of liberty of conscience to manage, and all other sins are but venial when compared with even an indirect protection of Old-Catholicism.

But the little brook which, springing from the well of conscience, issued at the meetings of Königswinter and Nürnberg into the light of day, has in the course of only three years been deepened and enlarged into a stream, that cannot from any standpoint be left unnoticed, so that this movement reacts upon all the tendencies of the times and manifests thus its universal significance.

We refer, before all, to the three congresses at Munich, Cologne, and Constance, where the importance of the aims of the movement was set forth and developed before thousands of hearers, in speeches both deeply felt and well considered, which perfectly responded in equal measure to the claims of piety for the sacred and inviolable inheritance of history, as to those of time and progress. And yet in another direction they vindicated their character as truly Catholic meetings.

These congresses, not hermetically sealed and placed under the isolating apparatus of a papal oath, and the power of a spiritual and worldly police, like the so-called general Council in the Vatican—to which history will deny the character of ecumenicity, among other reasons, on account of the complete isolation of its members, both from each other and the world,—but opened wide to the inspection of the outside world, accessible to all that were called there by a lively interest, regulated in its proceedings by the spirit of order and mutual confidence, proved to be meetings in the spirit of the great Gatherer and Mediator. And who were those that from all parts of the Christian world, from far-off Russia, Greece, from beyond the Atlantic, from England, France, Switzerland, invited by us as guests, appeared either in person or sent us greetings and assurances of spiritual sympathy? Not the heathen of our day, “godless and christless Liberals,” were they; not scandal-makers, and founders of sects; but representatives of all the branches on the great Tree of Life, which has sprung from the grain of mustard seed, men in the most prominent positions of Church life, distinguished both for the purity of their lives and their scientific culture; full of zeal for the cause of Christianity,

deeply grieved at the distortions and injuries which the One faith had sustained from human additions, and consequent discord. In our invitations, they heard something like the echo of a voice speaking within them, as a voice of one calling in the wilderness: Prepare the way of Him that cometh—cast down the mountains of self-uplifting—fill the chasms which human passions and wranglings have made! And the contact between the great fragments of the Church, brought about by our meetings, has not remained without fruit. The community of the last and dearest ideals and interests, long and *deeply felt* on all sides, the necessity of standing up jointly for the sanctity of the Christian conscience of the people, threatened everywhere alike, as well as the fact that many causes of difference had already disappeared, and that others were not irremediable—all this has now been mutually *confessed*, and the ground has thus been prepared on which we may hope for further success in the attempt at drawing nearer to each other. And what, finally, of our movement in regard to our ecclesiastical affairs? We *were*—betrayed by those that had been given us for leaders, —shepherdless,—through the force of external circumstances, in the turning of a hand, thrust out of the rich inheritance, to the joint possession and enjoyment of which only the old unchanged faith could give us a sufficient legal claim; stripped even to nakedness of all exterior means requisite to meet our ecclesiastical needs,—exposed without protection to insult, to the most shameless calumnies, and even to manifold injuries to our material interests, in spite of all theoretical recognitions of the legitimacy of our movement; treated practically as outlaws, and confounded with Dissenters and Free-religionists, so that it is intelligible if thousands of sympathizers were deterred from public expression of their opinion by the helplessness of our situation and the hopelessness of our movement. And now, after scarcely three years, the scattered members are gathered in numerous societies and communities spread over Germany and Switzerland, and externally and organically re-united by a constitution in which ecclesiastical order and authority are wedded to individual liberty, under the guidance of a bishop, chosen by the clergy and the people, legitimately consecrated, and recognized by the German governments as a Catholic bishop.

It is therefore easy to understand why the Vatican has chosen Switzerland and Germany, i. e., Old-Catholicism, now ecclesiastically organized in these countries, as the objects of his *ultima ratio*, and the outpouring of *all* his anger. The only reason can be, that he has recognized in Old-Catholicism the only power which does not waste its strength against the outworks of the Ultramontane edifice, which does not only combat consequences the premises of which have been conceded, but which is qualified, called, and determined to attack the foundation itself; it can only have been prompted by the feeling that in this movement, though it compare with the external power of the multitudinous church, embracing 180 millions, as a little stone to a colossus, there might yet dwell something of the power and the nature of *that* "Little Stone" that was by an unseen hand detached from the mountain's side to upset the Colossus with feet of clay, and fill the valley with its fragments.

III.

And now, to conclude, we come to the *question to all Old-Catholics who have not already surrendered to Ultramontanism*. Why, Catholic fellow citizens, do you still hesitate publicly and decisively to declare what is long ago settled in your minds, and what you have often said indecisively though unreservedly, namely, that you want to remain Catholics and not to be believers in the Infallible Pope. Your reserve was intelligible so long as Old-Catholicism lacked a church organization, and it did not appear how the ecclesiastical needs of its confessors could be provided for. But after your principal objections have been removed by official recognition of the Old-Catholic episcopate, and since the remainder must disappear in the same measure in which the number of declared Old-Catholics increases, how will you answer it to yourselves, to God and the world, that you withdraw from this contest of world-wide consequences, the contest with an adversary who threatens equally the foundation of the Catholic Church and civil order, Christianity and Humanity, Catholicism and the civilizing mission of Germany? You have many and various motives for your reserve; most of them are of a purely private nature,

and, as such, are exempt from public criticism ; only motives of the nature of principles can here be considered.

Many of you distrust our cause, not in regard to its power and prospect ; but in regard to its legitimacy and Catholicity. You apprehend that our movement might serve to break through the last dyke that has been erected against the waves of the irreligious and revolutionary currents of the time ; you fear we are *going too far* ! Exactly the opposite are the motives of the other part of our Catholic fellow citizens. They do not question the legitimacy of our movement, but they charge us with not having yet cast out the old leaven and put a new one, decided antagonism to the Church, in its place ; at any rate, say they, *we do not go far enough* !

We lack space to criticize the apprehensions of the one, and the objections of the other party, as they deserve, and to expose their entire untenableness. Nor do we need it. For the ecclesiastical legitimacy and the conservative character of our whole movement, we need simply refer to the testimony of all intelligent Christian men, and to the act of our State government, which has granted us its recognition only on being satisfied that the aim of our movement is legitimate, and its action considerate, and guided by the spirit of order. That, on the other hand, Old-Catholicism will not stand still, but is indeed and truly a progressive movement, is shown, not only by the results of our congresses, but especially by the *restoration of the original character of the episcopal election and the organization of the community*, by the choice of our bishop through the clergy and the people, and the organization of synods and parishes, acts of such eminent significance for the development of church life, that even the Titans of the party of progress have never produced anything similar in their own field, nor ever will.

There remains then but one single objection to our friendly appeal to be answered, in doing which we can at the same time more clearly and palpably set forth the *practical object of our address*.

Though we have—such might be your last excuse—after what has been said, *no reason to conceal* our Old-Catholic predilections, or not to declare publicly and decisively our rejection of the Vatican dogma, yet neither have we a sufficient induce-

ment to make such a declaration publicly. *For what purpose should this be required?*

For what purpose! Why, because the *passiveness* of Catholic citizens in the church questions of the day, their *non-resistance* to the greatest perversion which the religion of Jesus Christ has ever suffered, is the foundation of the Ultramontane edifice, or, to speak more correctly, it is the second cause spoken of in the commencement of this Article, to which Ultramontanism owes its origin among us, its progressive power, and the pretext for asserting that the Romanized Church is really the Catholic Church, as though all the thousands who have not protested were believers in the dogma; owing to this passiveness, the State, deceived as to the scope of the Church question, has been led to make concessions to Ultramontanism for the consequences of which all its means afford no remedy—because this non-resistance of the Catholics is the rock on which the Ultramontane hierarchy rears its fortress of defiance, from the lowest degree of chaplains and priests, up to the bishops and the universal bishop; and because *inversely*, the *activity* of the Catholics, i. e., the mere positive declaration that they do not want to become New Catholics, but remain Catholics, and therefore be Old-Catholics, is the most simple, infallible, and powerfully efficacious means of tearing up by the roots the Ultramontane thorn-bush in the garden of German culture, of putting an end at once to the Ultramontane danger, the attempt of Rome to disrupt and enfeeble Germany anew, in order to lay bare its flank to the hereditary foe, of reestablishing or, at least, preparing the inner reconciliation of Germany; and because it is, at all events the simplest means of delivering our State governments from the ever-increasing dilemma, either to produce a state of Interdict for its Catholic citizens, or to return to the approved principles of former times. The passiveness of the Catholics is the reason why the Catholic Church has been discredited, dishonored, perverted, and oppressed by Ultramontanism: the *activity* of the Catholics would accelerate and complete the triumph of the Old-Catholic movement, and thus effect the downfall of Ultramontanism.

And this simple remedy, Catholic fellow citizens, lies in your own hands. Not only your *religious* duty commands you

to apply it, but also your sense of honor, straight-forwardness, and integrity; not only your often expressed detestation of the Jesuitical system—to seem what one is not—all this is not to be urged here; but the duty which you owe to the State, the nation, or whatever else you may in this direction esteem highest, commands it, just because the remedy, though only indirect, is yet infallibly efficacious to accomplish the national purpose. But if you continue to neglect it, you may cast your political votes ever so actively and correctly, you may add to the addresses of State Catholics thousands of signatures, thunder at meetings against Ultramontaniam, criticise in pamphlets its essence, cover the land with societies for popular education and enlightenment,—with all this you do not touch a hair of its head, you do not add the smallest stone to the barrier against the stream of Ultramontaniam; you only excite its scorn and prepare its ways. For in all this you proceed just according to its directions; you divide the inner from the outer world; you make outwardly a most noisy demonstration, and hush the voice of the heart; you give to the State an inefficient support, and leave that which is potential within you to the adversary as material to work upon: for, be it pointed out once more, it is not against our national existence, not immediately against our State institutions, but against the inner and ideal basis and factors of the same that the attacks and interferences of Romanism are directed; the hearts of the people are to be Romanized, their intellects confounded; it is a *Dogma* with which Rome enters the field against Germany. To use mere *political* expedients against this danger, is simply beating the air.

You will now say: “We are using strong words, and prognosticate effects which in proportion to the simplicity of the means must appear like a chimera!” We will not think it strange that you cannot without more ado ascribe to the power of Old-Catholicism, to faith, and to the trustful coöperation of the Divine power of a common Christian consciousness, such an influence on the concrete questions of the day; you are justified in demanding a *practical* proof of the asserted efficacy of our remedy. It is easily given!

Let us look, in the first place, at the *consequences* which *passiveness in church matters* has had in politics. In the elections to the House of Deputies, and to the Colleges of Town Councils, the Ultramontane candidates have, with the exception of certain Roman strongholds, been defeated in all the cities, even those with a predominant Catholic population, precisely on account of the church difficulties. The case is much more unfavorable with the direct elections for Parliament, but even there the result obtained is perfectly sufficient for our conclusions. The next sequence is: at the elections of the former category stood the majority of the voters, and at the elections for Parliament a *number little short of the majority*, on the side of Anti-Romanism, precisely on account of the church question; the Catholics among these voters were, therefore, without contradiction, briefly Old-Catholics in sentiment. Let us now see the effect of their politically correct action! It is nowhere to be found, it is lost, swallowed up in the general result of the election! What sort of a figure do now these educated, sensible, intelligent, independent men present, when compared with the "people," the mighty cities, rich in means of every kind, compared with these country parishes, ruled by priests? Surely a very sad one! Complete the picture, and imagine that our whole State were as Catholic as Rhineland, Westphalia! What would be the necessary consequence? In spite of the enthusiastically applauded "we do not go to Canossa," Prussia would then go to Canossa too, of course, in the manner in which such pilgrimages are performed in the 19th century, or there would be a "bending or breaking" of some wheel or other of the constitutional State machinery, but none at all in the domain of the Church. But let us not, from the circumstance that we are secured against this sad eventuality by the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Prussia are Protestants, draw the conclusion that therefore Protestantism contains the antidote to Ultramontanism, for Protestantism has its Ultramontane aspect as well as Catholicism, though the Protestant Ultramontania has a different situation and constitution from ours. Least of all, however, should we entertain the thought that pure irreligiousness is after all the true remedy; that would only be falling from Scylla into Charybdis! There is no such avenue of escape.

If now for ecclesiastical passiveness we substitute activity, i. e. as we have said, nothing but the formal declaration that you are Old-Catholic, what would be the consequence, the indirect consequence, with regard to the *pending political questions*? An immense revulsion, a total change of the situation, a removal of the delusion that the Roman is the Catholic Church. Let us illustrate the process by the concrete example of the city of Cologne. According to the result of the elections to the Legislature, the Catholic majority is Old-Catholic, and even the figure reached at the parliamentary elections, "6,400 against 9,100" is still sufficient for our purpose. If only one-half, or one-third of these Catholic sympathizers with Old-Catholicism, instead of casting their liberal vote, had, at the proper time, entered their names on the registers of the Old-Catholics, or if they were to do so now, it would be all over with the dominion of the involuntarily Vaticanized clergy over churches, church property, and schools. At the same time, the Ultramontane phalanx of the clergy would be broken, and a number of Old-Catholic benefices would be established, the educated classes would again take the lead of the lower classes, dependant on them in so many ways, and no longer allow them to be ruled and kept in ignorance by Ultramontane demagogues and disciples of Jesuitism. As here, so elsewhere. In the same proportion that this action of the educated would affect the uneducated, that the higher classes would influence the lower, would the example of cities re-act upon the country; here also, the system kept up by the Starvation-dogma would be decomposed, dissolved: the foundation upon which the resistance of the bishops rest, the unanimity and devotion of the clergy, would be destroyed, a prospect of ending the conflict between State and Church would be opened from within, which would relieve the State from the necessity of calling upon the legislative organs again to sharpen and multiply its legitimate weapons for warfare. The dilemma of going to Canossa or Interdict, would be solved, and the House of Deputies might devote itself solely to its political and ordinary legislative work.

Therefore, Catholic fellow citizens, give to the State, and you can surely do it with a good conscience, this indirect aid,

which no legislature, no applause of the press, no address of State Catholics can give it directly. You give it, by declaring decisively before the nearest Old-Catholic society, or parish, your Old-Catholic standpoint. Truly a little mite on the altar of the Fatherland! And yet a single entry on the registers of an Old-Catholic community is more efficacious than a hundred votes for the liberal candidate to Legislature or Parliament. Arise from your passiveness to action, show that the Divine power of a truly Christian community of feeling lives within you, that your heart is not Romanized. We conclude with the cry: Up to battle against Romanism, through the power of de-Romanized Catholicism.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

DR. JOHNSON OF STRATFORD.*—The "History of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut," by Dr. E. E. Beardsley of New Haven, is now supplemented with a volume of memoirs by the same author. In reviewing the history, we had occasion to express our estimation of the man who is now made the subject of a copious and admiring biography. (See *New Englander*, Vol. xxv (1866), 293-329.) Samuel Johnson, great-grandson of one of the New Haven planters, born at Guilford in 1696, educated at the Collegiate School in Saybrook, which afterwards became Yale College, a graduate in the class of 1714, tutor from 1716 to 1719, and one of the two who were the only resident teachers when the institution began to have a settled habitation in New Haven, pastor of the church in West Haven from 1720 to 1722, Church of England Missionary at Stratford from 1723 to 1754, President of King's (now Columbia) College in New York from 1754 to 1763, and dying in his old charge at Stratford in 1772, could not but be an interesting theme for a clerical and Episcopalian biographer. The author has made good use of materials equally abundant and authentic, and he has filled out this volume with as little repetition of what he had already narrated in the history as could be expected.

The one great longing of Dr. Johnson's life, from the moment when he renounced his ordination to the pastoral office in West Haven, was to see—we will not say, to be—a bishop of the Church of England in America. But just because Episcopalianism in the colonies was the Church of England, that great longing of his, with all the begging and importunity which came of it, was in vain. The British government, through all administrations, had no conception of any bishop other than a lord-bishop; and they thought it much better that every American who desired a valid ordination should cross the Atlantic and be ordained in England, than that there should be a lord-bishop in the American colonies.

* *Life and Correspondence of Samuel Johnson, D.D., Missionary of the Church of England in Connecticut, and first President of King's College, New York.* By E. EDWARDS BEARDSLEY, D.D., Rector of St. Thomas's Church, New Haven. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 8vo, pp. 380.

A lord-bishop would need a lordly income, which the colonial legislatures would surely refuse to grant and which might become burthensome to the imperial government. Had the perverseness of successive administrations been overcome—had there been an act of parliament establishing dioceses in America, and making due provision to support the dignity of the mitre—the first American bishop ought to have been Dr. Johnson. But any expectation which he or his friends may have entertained in that direction would have been disappointed. None but an Englishman would have been deemed by the British government of those days fit to be a lord-bishop even in a colonial diocese. Even Irish prelates—such as Trench, Whately, and the rest—are not always Irishmen. Canadian bishops—how many of them were ever born in Canada? The Archbishop of Calcutta and his suffragans,—the Governor-General is not more sure to be “sent out” from England. If there is now at last a black Anglican bishop at Sierra Leone, it is because the place has been found impracticable for Englishmen, inasmuch as there were always, in Sydney Smith’s phrase, two bishops of that see, “a live one going out, and a dead one coming home.”

The subject of this biography was something better than a mitred stipendiary appointed by the king’s ministers, with the title of lord-bishop. By virtue of his abilities and his zealous diligence, he was the apostle of Episcopalianism in Connecticut.

We observe that Dr. Beardsley, describing the Puritan ancestry and training of his hero, and having told us that his father and grandfather were successively deacons in the Guilford church, gives the farther information that by the grandfather he was “taught to read and commit to memory not only passages of Scripture, but the Lord’s Prayer and the Creed.” It may be worth the while to say that the old “New England Primer,” the very horn-book out of which all New England children were taught to read, always contained the Lord’s Prayer (itself a “passage of Scripture”) and the Apostle’s Creed; and that every child in a family making any pretension to religion was taught to commit the Lord’s Prayer to memory, next after the infantile prayer, “Now I lay me down to sleep,” and even before learning to read. It is possible that many children may have failed to commit the creed to memory, for it was not used as a form in worship, but there it was in the same Primer with the “Shorter Catechism,” and the only formula which New England children knew as “the Creed” was the Apostle’s Creed.

MR. GEORGE LEWES'S PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND* will attract the attention of the readers of his earlier philosophical works, because he seems to have turned his back upon his previous teachings. He is well known in philosophical circles as the author of an elaborate History of Philosophy, which has gone through four editions, each of which is distinguished from every other by some important difference, but all are alike in seeking to demonstrate, by the failure of every effort, the utter impossibility of attaining to any metaphysical system. But he suddenly has changed his front, as he expresses himself, and whereas he had previously assailed every previous system of metaphysics as impossible in its aim and execution, he now asserts that what he assailed was the attempt to solve the problem by any of the older methods, and what he accepts is the possibility of solving the old problems by a scientific process. Previously there were no words too contemptuous for him to use in respect to metaphysics and metaphysicians. Now he contends that the problems proposed by the older metaphysicians were legitimate and necessary. They failed of being solved because they were not subjected to the process of a scientific verification.

In order to mark the distinction between what he rejects and what he accepts, he calls the first *metaphysics* and the second *metempirics*.

The new departure of this active thinker will of course attract the attention of many, if from no other motive than curiosity, to see how he clears the one conception from the other. But the curiosity of even a practised reader will not be easily answered. Mr. Lewes may be a clear and progressive thinker, but he falls very far short of being a clear and progressive writer. As an expounder of physiology he is open, so far as we know, to no exception. As a literary critic and biographer he is no mean artist. But in the exposition of his new found metempirics he is anything but lucid. We find the solution of this phenomenon in the incoherent character of the attempt to prove that the foundation of a house can be at once foundation and superstructure; that the ultimate conceptions of both matter and spirit can be subjected to the experimentations of sense; that a question which is to be proved can be begged, and an argument can prove any conclusion which runs in a circle.

* *Problems of Life and Mind*. By GEORGE HENRY LEWES. First Series. The Foundations of a Creed. Vol. I. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1874.

The treatise, although laboriously rather than elaborately written, is the result of much close and earnest thinking and will reward attentive study. It may be regarded as a concession by an ardent devotee of *Comte's* Positive Philosophy that the dicta of his master require to be recast and restated if they are to be successfully defended. It is with great interest that we follow the efforts of two thinkers like Spencer and Lewes to look the questions of theology and philosophy squarely in the face, and to solve them each by his own system of metempirics, which each in a certain sense has been forced to accept against all the traditions of his early training.

W. R. GREG'S *ENIGMAS OF LIFE** is one of the many volumes which indicate that the greatest liberty of speculation prevails among many whom we should expect would be the soberest thinkers. In his Creed of Christendom the author has given plump and positive reasons for discarding the distinctive doctrines of Christianity as he chooses to misconceive them. In the *Enigmas of Life* almost every page gives evidence of the strength of his theistic and moral convictions and of the intense unrest and longing of his soul for the very truths for the rejection of which on every page he seeks, and thinks he finds some decisive reason. At the age of sixty he cleaves to the belief in God and a future life, and in moral distinctions, with a fervent faith for which he can give no good account to himself, except that perhaps these are the ineradicable remnants of an early Christian training—but to these faiths, whether they are rational convictions or ineradicable prejudices, he chooses to cling. In the Essays that follow upon Realizable Ideals; Malthus notwithstanding; Non-survival of the Fittest; Limits and Directions of Human Development; The Significance of Life; De Profundis; Elsewhere; he is continually mingling the profoundest ethical and spiritual conceptions of Christian philosophy with contemptuous and superficial flings at the Christian facts and Christian truths. The final chapter, entitled Elsewhere, abounds in startling and glowingly eloquent delineations of the spiritual joy or wretchedness which are provided for in the capacities of supremely virtuous and wicked spirits under the conditions of an unveiled spiritual existence. Altogether this book, with its weaknesses and defects, is to those who know how to use it a most instructive and spirit-stirring book, more useful to such perhaps than are many volumes called more edifying.

* *Enigmas of Life*. By W. R. GREG. James R. Osgood & Co., Boston. 1874.

GREG'S LITERARY AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS.—The publishers of Mr. Greg's "Enigmas of Life" have gathered in a volume which bears the above title a selection from his various essays and reviews; eleven in number, viz:—Madame de Staël; British and Foreign Characteristics; False Morality and Lady Novelists; Kingsley and Carlyle; French Fiction, The Lowest Deep; Chateaubriand; M. de Tocqueville; Why are Women Redundant? Truth *versus* Edification; Time; Good People.

AN OUTLINE STUDY OF MAN.*—Dr. Hopkins is too eminent as a philosophical thinker and teacher, not only among his pupils through oral instruction, but more widely through his published "Lectures on Moral Science" and on "The Law of Love," to leave occasion for indicating his merits in this later work on kindred themes. Yet we cannot but advert anew to his singular clearness of statement and simplicity and perspicuity of style, and his aptness of illustration. And it is to be observed how much power these qualities give him, not only in the class-room and in writing on topics generally considered abstruse, but on the platform, addressing miscellaneous assemblages, in behalf of missions and other philanthropic enterprises. All who have occasion to reach the public mind, whether in speech or writing, may well study him for his art of adapting himself on any subject at once to the more thoughtful few and to the respectable multitude. This latest work traverses the field occupied by those that have been mentioned, re-affirming certain positions that provoked discussion, particularly on the difference of choice and volition and the account of conscience and right, but differs from them in covering the whole nature of man, body and mind, as in "one system," and in attempting only, as the limits of one such volume required, "an outline study," and also, as the title-page indicates, in accompanying the survey "with illustrative diagrams and a method for blackboard teaching." The employment of this aid in such a treatise is novel, though the author gives credit to a friend for initiating it. The book is the outcome of a course of lectures by the author in the Lowell Institute, where in the delivery the blackboard and its diagrams could be constantly referred to, and the advantage is retained as far as possible in the printed pages. He believed that discussions generally regarded as too abstruse

* *An Outline Study of Man; or the Body and Mind in One System.* By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., LL.D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873. pp. 308.

could be made, particularly by such means, intelligible and interesting to a mixed assembly such as he there addressed, and the result so far satisfied him, and we presume the hearers too, as to lead to this publication. As to the "outline" character of the presentation, the author is certainly right, modestly as he puts it, in saying that it "has its advantages for both the teacher and the learner." Something of the kind was needed particularly as an introduction to studies larger and more minute. And the advantage of the "illustrative diagrams" is as apparent in the book as on the platform. To the eye the arrangement is not, it seems to us, as lucid in the upper part of the structure as in the lower, and of course there may be room for questions and improvements in this novel form of presentation, apart from the diversity of views held on the matters under consideration. The method will commend itself to other teachers, though not likely to be always used with the same judgment. By whatever method, Dr. Hopkins is sure to make himself understood whenever he writes or speaks, and on the mooted questions of mental and moral science stimulates discussion and aids thought where he does not command assent.

ON MISSIONS.*—The announcement of a lecture on Missions in Westminster Abbey by the "Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford," on invitation of the "Dean of Westminster," made a chief sensation of the day; yet it was only one instance of the greater latitude of methods allowed in the Church of England than in the kindred organization here, and another may be found in the countenance given by clergymen of that body to Mrs. H. C. Dening's evangelistic labors, as also Miss Sarah Smiley's preaching met with a freer reception among Presbyterians in Scotland than in this country. The Dean shows precedents too from earlier times for allowing public religious instruction by laymen (p. 26). The Professor's "Lecture" and the Dean's "Introductory Sermon" are properly given us together in this slender, comely volume. The former furnishes a novel and interesting argument for Missions from a comparison of the chief religions known in the history of the world. Of the six (besides the "religious systems of Confucius and Lao-tse"), three are

* *On Missions.* A Lecture delivered in Westminster Abbey, on December 3, 1873. By F. MAX MÜLLER, M. A. With an Introductory Sermon by ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, D. D. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874. pp. 77.

described as *Non-Missionary*, Judaism, Brahmanism, and Zoroastrianism, and these three as either dead or dying; while the other three, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, are *Missionary*, "from their very beginning," and are alive and expanding. The vitality and progressiveness of the latter are ascribed not to accident but to the quality of the faiths, the "spirit of truth" and the "spirit of love" that are in them. They are the only competitors for the conquest of the world, and it seems to be implied that among them Christianity, in its freer or more spiritual forms, is destined to the ascendancy. From the lecturer's disparaging references to "creeds" as compared with love, we infer that his view of what is essential to Christianity is of the "broad" school, as might be expected, yet we should willingly submit every question, as to the objective truth concerned in the honest use of such names, to the test he once indicates (p. 66)—"what satisfied Christ and the apostles," and "many a hard working missionary." Dean Stanley's sermon interests us even more than the professor's lecture, as a thoughtful and fruitful view, which we do not remember to have seen suggested before, of Paul's answer to King Agrippa, Acts xxvi, 29. The two discourses are a valuable addition to the literature of the main subject, and, in connection with their authors and the place of their delivery, suggestive of the advanced position now held by Christian Missions.

SONGS FROM THE SOUTHERN SEAS.*—The writer of this handsome volume, as his name might indicate, is an Irishman, and does not fail in a tribute to his "Native Land" (p. 151) creditable to her and to himself. He seems to have been a sailor, at least for a time, and conversant with Australia, where many of his subjects are found. The reader is drawn to him by the hearty, manly tone of the dedication to Capt. Gifford, who, he says, "picked him up at sea," "treated him with all kindness during a seven months' whaling cruise," and "lent him twenty guineas to help him on his way to America," adding that "one of the greatest pleasures this little book can ever afford him is the writing of this dedication." The brief Preface too is full of good sense and modesty. Most of the larger pieces are legends, some of them weird enough, drawn from "Southern Seas," and other narratives, including war-sketches

* *Songs from the Southern Seas, and other Poems.* By JOHN BOYLE O'REILLY. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1873. pp. 227.

breathing the patriotism of his adopted land. He is right in claiming for his work the merit of "realism" if no other, and justifies the publication when he well says, "Many of the scenes shown are memories, not imaginings,—things which clamored for recognition, and I have written them here." Without much of the culture he would himself desire, he has some of the best qualities of a poet, lively conception, descriptive power, and sincere utterance, and moreover is truly reverent and humane. Finding not a little native talent in the artist, we still more respect the elements of character in the man.

ON SELF-CULTURE.*—The accomplished "Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh" is already favorably known by other writings, and among them "Four Phases of Morals." The present work, of a very different character, not entering so debatable a field, nor so elaborate in execution, bears marks throughout of the same good sense, manly earnestness, fine culture, and Christian reverence. The clear-cut thought and direct lively style compel attention to the scholarly and mature judgments of the author, making him an admirable counselor to the young, whom he addresses. The "self-culture" he prescribes is a fit corrective for the enervating and vitiating tendencies of recent literature. Our readers will do well to remember it in making presents to their young friends. We suppose it must be downright earnestness that betrays so accomplished a writer into the use of such a word as "bumptious" (p. 27), though it is not without modern authority.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS GUTHRIE.†—Scotch memoirs have a racy flavor. Besides the noted instance in Dr. Chalmers, we recall that of William and Robert Chambers, very different but not less remarkable, which was freely commended in our pages. Like Dr. Chalmers, if not in so eminent a degree, Dr. Guthrie endeared himself to the Christian world wherever English is spoken, as no mere thinker or theologian could do. His personality was felt and cherished beyond the circle of all who saw and heard him. As an eloquent, magnetic preacher, and a philanthro-

* *On Self-Culture*, Intellectual, Physical, and Moral, a *vade mecum* for Young Men and Students. By JOHN STUART BLACKIE. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874. pp. 116.

† *Autobiography of Thomas Guthrie, D.D., and Memoir*. By his Sons, Rev. DAVID GUTHRIE and CHARLES J. GUTHRIE, M. A. In two volumes. Vol. I. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 424.

pist, and "whole souled" Christian man, he may be said to have left no superior. The portrait in this book is genial and benignant enough to require no certificate of truthfulness. The work itself must get a wide reception. More than half of this first volume is taken up with the autobiography, which every reader will wish that the author had begun earlier, so as to have completed it to the time of writing, instead of having "to lay it finally aside while in the midst of describing the Disruption conflict." It has the more sacredness now as being "literally the last thing he worked at on earth." Its value is the greater for not being confined to details of his own life, but giving us pictures, from such a hand, of Scotland in the early part of this century, particularly of religious habits and of education among the common people, and the writer's mature opinions on the subjects brought under review. Extracts have already found their way into our newspapers, and we are tempted to add others, but must refer our readers to his own pages. The rest of this volume is devoted to the first four chapters of the memoir diligently and dutifully prepared by his sons, and an appendix giving "two examples" of his sermons, the one "from his first discourse as a licentiate," and the other "from one in recent years," and extracts from an address in 1840. His early life, as delineated by himself, shows a certain robust vitality that helped to fit him for the hard work he was afterwards called to do. As a preacher he was eminent for "pictorial power," yet he was one of many examples showing that the predominance of this gift, or of power over the feelings, by no means disqualifies a preacher for commanding the most intellectual hearers,—as is strikingly suggested in the testimony of Dr. McCosh, which we cite from p. 322:

"Deeper down than even his power of exciting emotion by his pictures, was a foundation of sound common sense with a profound knowledge of human nature, and his pathos was an efflorescence from this root. Some years after this, Sir William Hamilton one day said to me quietly, 'Your friend, Dr. Guthrie, is the best preacher I ever heard.' I answered, I did not wonder at the opinion, but I was surprised to hear it expressed by so great a logician of one not specially possessed of large logical power. He replied with great emphasis, '*Sir, he has the best of all logic; there is but one step between his premise and conclusion.*' I am not sure that the great Edinburgh metaphysician ever uttered a profounder saying than this."

We await with interest the completion of this memoir, renewing the wish before expressed in this journal, that the occasion for such a tribute might have been deferred till the subject could

carry out his cherished purpose of visiting this land and bearing a part in the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, and that so we might have heard for ourselves this "prince of modern preachers."

FAITH WORK.*—Dr. Cullis and his manifold work in Boston have by this time won a place in the public mind large enough and warm enough to warrant an account of that work in its several departments and through successive stages from the beginning to the present time, about eight years. Instituted by him and now successfully carried on under his direction, are the "Consumptives' Home," "Children's Home," "Deaconesses' Home," "Grove Hall Chapel," and "Willard Tract Depository," while he is making preparations also for a "Cancer House," and a "Chapel and Training College for Christian Workers." He issues also three monthly papers, one of them for children. All these operations have been conducted and the requisite funds obtained through that method of "Faith" which was exemplified by A. G. Francke in Germany nearly two centuries ago, and for years past by Müller in England. Annual reports have been issued by Dr. Cullis, giving information of the character and progress of his work from year to year, in acknowledgment of the divine guidance, and showing his receipts and expenditures, in this last view serving as a balance-sheet in business transactions and properly averting public distrust. No doubt one effect has been to increase contributions in behalf of his philanthropic undertakings, but this was incidental and unavoidable, and it remains true that he has not employed direct solicitations. In his case, as in George Müller's, cavilers may allege this effect to disparage his reliance on prayer and Providence; but if, as they profess to think, such reports are themselves effective natural means of attracting contributions, why are they not depended on by other "collectors" and "agents" for similar purposes? And what chiefly makes these accounts attractive but the faith and charity they delineate? Dr. Boardman, in this little volume, sums up and sets forth in successive chapters the incidents and lessons that best deserve a permanent record, from information furnished by the "beloved physician."

* *Faith Work, under Dr. Cullis, in Boston.* By REV. W. E. BOARDMAN. Boston: Willard Tract Repository. 1874. pp. 296.

GAGE'S "FAVORITE HYMNS."*—It was a happy thought of Mr. Gage to bring together sixty-six pieces that deserve this title, as their authors first gave them to the world, often indeed without anticipating the use that has consecrated them to "the service of song." The compiler's judgment needs no commendation. The publishers have done their part in fitly investing them for the most fastidious eyes. The interest and value of the work are enhanced by a brief "Biographical Index," and the name and date of the author are appended to each hymn. Toplady's "Rock of Ages," though included, is not referred to in the table of first lines. This noble hymn is now never sung just as it was first printed, and the editor in the preface adverts to the original line, "When my eye-strings break in death," as an example of one reason why some things cannot be restored, the later version having rooted itself too strongly. Yet we cannot agree with him in his admiration of the original in this instance. We suppose it to have been discarded for some such reason as we should assign, that the image is too violent and non-natural. Apart from this instance, Mr. Gage in the preface has properly vindicated the propriety of making some changes in hymnology, as opposed to the indiscriminate prejudice often urged on the other side. Experience in compiling a hymn-book for use in public worship will reconcile the most sensitive critic to some innovations already established, and even tempt him further. Yet liberty in this direction cannot be too carefully guarded. By some oversight in the index of first lines, Cowper's hymn, "There is a fountain," &c., is ascribed to Toplady.

THE RELATIONS OF THE KINGDOM TO THE WORLD.†—This work, as we learn from a "prefatory note," is the third part of an "attempt to open up" our Lord's Sermon on the Mount, yet fitted to be read independently. "The two preceding parts," on "The Beatitudes" and "The Laws of the Kingdom," we have not seen, but the obvious excellence of the little treatise now before us leaves us to wonder that they are not more fully known as productions of the same thoughtful writer. After a careful introduction, it treats of the "Relations" of the divine kingdom "to the World

* *Favorite Hymns*, in their Original Form. Selected and verified by WILLIAM LEONHARD GAGE. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1874. pp. 115.

† *The Relations of the Kingdom to the World*. By J. OSWALD DYKES, D.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874. pp. 210.

as a Possession;" the "First Warning" being "against Covetousness," from Matt. vi, 19-24, and the "Second," "against Anxiety," from Matt. vi, 25-34. Then of the "Relations of the Kingdom" "to the World as Evil;" and first of "correcting" its evil, from Matt. vii, 1-8, second of "escaping" it, from Matt. vii, 7-14, third, "of detecting false teachers in the Kingdom," from Matt. vii, 15-20, fourth, "of judgment of evil within the Kingdom," from Matt. vii, 21-23, which is followed by a "Conclusion," from Matt. vii, 24-27. The subjects thus indicated are handled with much freshness and discrimination of thought and precision of language. The Scriptures brought into view are carefully interpreted and applied. Their moral lessons are most judiciously set forth. Both in matter and manner the work is scholarly, thoughtful, and devout. If we should take any exception, it would be to something like excessive elaboration here and there in the style. We cordially commend the book to intelligent readers as a fit accompaniment to the Sermon on the Mount, and an exposition of pure morality, at once stimulating and healthful. We observe that the writer or the printer falls into a practice now too common of dispensing with the capital in the adjective Christian. We have to ask also whether the phrase "wear done," on page 53, is a *Scotticism* or only a *misprint*.

ENCOURAGEMENTS TO FAITH.*—This elegant little volume is properly represented by the title. Mr. Kimball is already somewhat known among our readers, through occasional contributions to religious journals, as an earnest Christian in business life, strong and happy in his own convictions, a clear and sensible writer, concerning himself with questions of practical religion in the light of the Scriptures and personal experience. The publishing office is a voucher for the sentiments inculcated as of that "school" which has come to be known in connection with "the Higher Life." The writer is not so much restricted, however, as some of his brethren to a certain range of thought and a corresponding technical phraseology. He properly describes his own work when he says, "It is simply a transcript of direct, affectionate conversational endeavors, which the Lord deigned to use, to help a troubled soul out of a sea of doubts;" and it further interests us to learn that these doubts were those "of one whose father disallowed alike the claims of God and the promises of

* *Encouragements to Faith*. By JAMES WILLIAM KIMBALL. Willard Tract Repository, Boston. pp. 207.

God; of one whose ancestors, avowed skeptics, from time immemorial had done the same." The contents are distributed in twenty-seven brief chapters, or rather letters, addressed to such an inquirer. Their good sense, earnestness, conversational simplicity, and fidelity to the Scriptures, cannot fail to make them useful to many other inquirers. We commend them especially for the prominence given to simple faith in the personal Saviour as compared with intellectual processes and ethical resolutions.

THE GATES OF PRAYER.*—A beautiful little volume, the paper, type, and binding befitting its sacred office. It contains a prayer for every morning and evening in the month, each having its own Scripture text as a motto, and all preceded by the line, "This gate of the Lord into which the righteous shall enter," and followed by the verse, "Open to me the gates of righteousness: I will go into them, and I will praise the Lord." It is meant for private rather than for family use. The name of the author, Dr. Macduff, is a guaranty for the Scriptural quality and evangelic fervor of the prayers. We would not have any such books made, nor is this intended to be, a substitute for one's own prayers, yet these may be aided by the daily reading here given for a month.

DR. PRIME'S "SOUTH AND NORTH OF EUROPE."†—This is one of the pleasantest of the popular books of travel of the season. About half of the volume is occupied with a lively description of a run through the peninsula of Spain; and the other half is devoted to an account of a rapid journey which the author took to Moscow and St. Petersburg, to Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Few writers have the art of dashing off a story of travel in so attractive a manner as Dr. Prime. Long practice has made him nearly perfect, and the book before us is certainly one of his best.

TAINÉ'S "TOUR THROUGH THE PYRENEES."‡—The *New Englander*, we believe, was one of the first of the magazines of the country (1862, p. 553) to call attention to this very interesting book of M. Taine, which Messrs. Henry Holt & Co., of New

* *The Gates of Prayer*: a Book of Private Devotion for Morning and Evening. By the author of "Morning and Night Watches," "Memories of Bethany," &c. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874. pp. 363.

† *The Alhambra and the Kremlin*—The South and North of Europe. By SAMUEL IRVING PRIME. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 12mo, pp. 382. Handsomely illustrated.

‡ *Tour through the Pyrenees*. By HIPPOLYTE ADOLPHE TAINÉ. Translated by J. SAFFORD FISKE. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 349.

York, have now reprinted in an English version. The first edition, with illustrations by Doré, was exhausted at once. The present edition is without the illustrations.

UEBERWEG'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, (Vol. II)*—Professor Morris has completed, in a highly creditable manner, his translation of this excellent manual. No one who is not himself a scholar and versed in philosophy would be competent to such a task as Professor Morris has undertaken and has satisfactorily performed. The translator of such a work must not only be familiar with the German language, but conversant with the particular themes which are often discussed in precise and condensed statements, in this treatise. It will form an admirable, and the best accessible, text-book in the history of philosophy. The value of this volume is very much increased by the copious and learned chapters on the history of English and American philosophy, from the pen of the American editor of the work, President Porter, and by the dissertation on modern Italian philosophy, contributed by Prof. Botta.

RECORDS OF A QUIET LIFE.†—The Rev. W. L. Gage has done a good service by condensing in a single duodecimo the two rather thick volumes of the original edition of this charming Life of the brothers Augustus and Julius Hare. We have already spoken in high terms of these Memoirs; and if any persons have been hitherto deterred from reading these by the fact that they are so voluminous, this abridged edition ought to tempt them to make themselves acquainted with one of the most readable books of the season.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

The Structure of Animal Life. Six lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Academy of Music, in January and February, 1862. By Louis Agassiz, late director of the Museum of Comparative Zoölogy. Third edition. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874. 8vo, pp. 128.

A Summer Vacation. Four Sermons. By Edward E. Hale. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 16mo, pp. 75.

Bed-time Stories. By Louise Chandler Moulton. With illustrations by Addie Ledyard. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1873. 12mo, pp. 239.

Gold and Dross. By Edward Garrett. New York: Dodd & Mead. 1874. 12mo, pp. 305.

The Post's Gift of Consolation to Sorrowing Mothers. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 16mo, pp. 167.

* *Theological and Philosophical Library*. Edited by Drs. H. B. SMITH and P. SCHAFF. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

† *Records of a Quiet Life*. By AUGUSTUS J. C. HARE. Revised for American readers by William L. Gage. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1873. 12mo, pp. 373.

THE
NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CXXVIII.

JULY, 1874.

ARTICLE I.—THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SWEDISH
INVASION OF GERMANY.

Sveriges Historia under Gustaf II. Adolfs Regering, af ABRAHAM CRONHOLM, Stockholm, 1857–1872. (6 vols.)

Gustaf Adolf, von G. DROYSEN, Leipzig, 1869–1870. (2 vols.)

THE period of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War (1517–1648), as one of the four great epochs in the history of modern times—epochs in which the preceding age culminates, and from which are deduced the policy and institutions of the following, and in which the spirit of nationalism yields to a superior, universal tendency—is of special interest to us, inasmuch as from it proceed those principles of national and international politics, and those phases of religion and theology, which are particularly felt in our times, and which are the more immediate subject of study in modern history. The character and career of Gustavus Adolphus, forming, as they do, an important, determinative element of this period, have especially attracted the attention of writers of history; yet only recently has any considerable advance been made towards a correct un-

derstanding of the man and his work. "The history of his German campaign," says Professor Odhner, "has been regarded as the well-known heroic saga of Sweden and of the whole Protestant world—about as the history of the Crusades is that of Catholicism—and has, therefore, been surrounded with a nimbus, an ideal glory, which has rendered difficult a clear conception both of the characters and course of events. They have loved to see in Gustavus Adolphus a hero of the Protestant faith, comparable with Godfrey of Bouillon and St. Louis, as these stood forth in the Catholic tradition,—a conception which still forms the chief basis of the Swedish public's idea. Even in Protestant Germany the same became generally current in the last century, and as long as the cosmopolitan tendency in historical investigation was there predominant." But under the influence of particularism the participation of Gustavus Adolphus in the German war was discussed in a different tone; and those writers, as Hurter, Gfrörer and Koch, who considered the question from the Austrian or Catholic point of view, and who saw the weal of the German people in their unity and the revival of their national life through the Empire of Austria, represented the King of Sweden, in his last, great undertaking, with all the traditional prejudices of the party to which they belonged, denied to him, as a man, even the qualities of honesty and sincerity, and described him as an invader eager for conquest and plunder. And while the Swedes have been more justly moderate, denying through their later writers—Geijer, Cronholm, Hammarstrand, Svedelius—that Gustavus Adolphus ever became the saint-like character of popular tradition, and giving prominence to his political motives, some writers of North Germany have expressed views even more extreme than those entertained by the representatives of the Hapsburg party. They cast upon the King of Sweden the responsibility of Germany's lack of patriotism, her numerous petty divisions, her weakness and national humiliation, in that through him the plan of the Emperor had been thwarted when he was about to sweep away the multitude of States with their particular interests and effect their unity under a single sovereign, apparently forgetting that this sovereign was to be the head of the House of Hapsburg, whose purpose at one time was

to suppress the Protestant faith. All this exaggeration has, however, contributed little to our knowledge of the motives of Gustavus Adolphus in invading Germany, but it has helped indirectly to give the subject a more thorough investigation from various points of view. Finally, the radical idea of Professor G. Droysen, that Gustavus Adolphus was moved to undertake his German campaign entirely by political motives,* has not met with general acceptance, so that the question is still an open one; which may, perhaps, justify a brief examination of the negotiations relative to the Thirty Years' War, in which Gustavus Adolphus participated prior to the summer of 1630.

These negotiations show, that his policy in the first part of his reign was the continuation of that of Charles the Ninth; that he was willing, while he believed his kingdom not in need of foreign support, to join an alliance of the evangelical princes and States; and that later, especially after the defeat of Christian the Fourth, motives of a purely political nature were added to those which had already persuaded him, through the combined influence of which he determined to invade Germany, although he might not be able to make peace with Poland.

In the excitement that followed the death of King Eric, his brothers, John and Charles, received in common the homage the people were wont to pay their sovereign. Whatever may have been John's peculiar bent, both held the same apparent relation to the Church. Sweden was still united in the faith of the Reformation. John became king, and his son, Sigismund, with the consent of Charles, heir to the throne. The king sought to lead the nation back to Catholicism, and after him Sigismund, who had become King of Poland, continued the policy of his father. Charles endeavored to maintain the work of Gustavus Wasa. "What separated the brothers was in fact the same contest that now divided the world." (Geijer.) To

* In his preface Professor Droysen says: "Nicht dass für die Entwicklung der reinen Lehre Gustaf Adolfs Eingreifen in die deutschen Angelegenheiten entscheidend gewesen ist, bestreite ich; aber ich bestreite, dass er zu Nutz und Frommen des kirchlichen Lebens und der Glaubensfreiheit in sie hat eingreifen wollen. Ich behaupte, dass ihn Gründe durchaus politischer Natur zur Verwendung auch dieses Mittels bewogen, gezwungen haben."

Diese Behauptung sucht die nachfolgende Darstellung zu beweisen."

adjust this dispute a national council was called at Upsala in February, 1593.

Charles and the Estates were united on the side of Protestantism. The Augsburg confession was adopted unchanged, and the Bible was acknowledged as the only ground and rule of the evangelical doctrine. Conditions were framed, to which Sigismund was required to take oath before he could receive the crown: no Catholic should be able to hold office in Sweden; any Swede who should fall away to the Catholic faith, or allow his children to grow up in it, should lose his right of citizenship; Catholics might indeed remain in the kingdom, if they would conduct themselves peaceably, but no Catholic services should be tolerated, except in the king's chapel. The council also resolved, that "in the absence of his nephew, they would acknowledge Charles as regent, and promise him obedience in all that he should do for the maintenance of the Augsburg confession in Sweden." September 30, 1593, Sigismund landed in Stockholm. At first he refused to comply with these conditions, but, under the pressure which Charles brought to bear, he finally submitted, and was crowned. "The Estates sang the *Te Deum* as over a victory won." In this contest Sweden's ecclesiastical policy for the future was determined, and for it the nation was willing to give up even the legitimate heir to the throne. Sigismund was false to his oath, and sailed for Poland in 1594, leaving the people in discontent and bloody strife. The Diet of Söderköping confirmed the resolutions that had been taken earlier against the Catholics in the kingdom. In accordance with the frequently expressed wish of the Estates, Charles ascended the throne in 1604, and Gustavus Adolphus was recognized as Crown Prince. "The intrigues of the Catholics, together with Sigismund's hereditary claims and intimate connection with the House of Hapsburg, already determined Charles the Ninth to ally himself to the princes and States, which were induced either by ecclesiastical or political reasons to oppose the plans of the Catholic propaganda for extension, or at least the political influence of the House of Hapsburg." (Hammarstrand.) In 1610 he sent an embassy to England, through which he declared his willingness to form an alliance with England, the Netherlands, and France.

The envoy dispatched to Henry the Fourth, the same year, to effect the renewal of the alliance of 1559 and its extension to England and Holland, was recalled on the death of that monarch. At the same time, through Strole, van Dyk, Stenbock, and Skytte, he opened negotiations for an alliance with the Netherlands alone, or in connection with England and the Evangelical Union, against Poland and Spain, the common enemies of Sweden and Holland. These attempts were fruitless, and his endeavors to avert the impending war with Denmark were equally unsuccessful; yet even with this cloud rising before his eyes, he was not prevented from seeing the presage of a mightier storm in the distance; and in his last testament he especially urged his queen and children to maintain friendship with the Protestant princes of Germany.

"The foreign policy of Gustavus Adolphus—and in most respects the internal also—was in fact merely a continuation of that of Charles the Ninth, and rested in general on the same ground as this, even if the daring genius of Gustavus Adolphus in time opened for itself a more extensive sphere of activity." (Hammarstrand.) In behalf of the Union, which was allied with England and Holland, and was negotiating for an alliance with Switzerland, France, and Denmark, the Landgrave, Maurice of Hesse, sent John Zobel to treat with Sweden. In order rightly to understand the position of Gustavus Adolphus in the first period of his negotiations with the princes and States of Germany, it must not be forgotten that the Union of 1608 and the League of Smalcalde were similar organizations. Zobel had an interview with the king (June, 1614) in Narva. Among other things he communicated the information, that, in the project of the allies to embrace foreign powers, Sweden had been remembered, and that the Landgrave would endeavor to procure for the Swedish king an invitation to join them, if he desired to do so. Maurice was willing to act as agent in such negotiations. The king replied, that under the circumstances he regarded the Union both useful and necessary, and that he had charged John Casimir, by whom he had received previously some information relative to it, to obtain, through the Elector of the Palatinate and other members, an invitation for him to join it; yet, inasmuch as he was still ignorant of what

Casimir had accomplished, Maurice, by obtaining such an invitation, would not only give an especially welcome proof of friendship, but would also, by securing the participation of Sweden, strengthen the alliance and place it in a condition to command a greater degree of respect. Not long afterwards he received a letter from the Diet of the Union (dated Heilbronn, Sept. 25, 1614), which represented the deplorable state of affairs in Germany, the danger hanging over the Protestants through the increased activity of the Catholics, and urged the king not to abandon them; but, in case of outbreking hostilities, to assist them in the maintenance of the evangelical faith and German liberty; yet this "was not a formal invitation to alliance, like that which Gustavus Adolphus had desired, but merely the beginning, the initiative, of a so-called intimate correspondence." Gustavus Adolphus sent Balzar Niemand to the allies with the requested answer (March 2, 1615), and assured them, "that in consideration of their great danger and the justice of their cause, he would give them assistance as soon as he should have closed the Polish war, and with all diligence would undertake to maintain the Protestant faith." He closed, however, no formal alliance with the members of the Union: nor did Sweden, in its exhausted condition, its unreliable relations to Denmark, its wars with Russia and Poland, offer great resources for immediate aid.

The King of Sweden continued his negotiations: with Holland they led to alliance; with Russia to the treaty of Stolbova; with Poland to armistice; with Brandenburg to the marriage of Gustavus Adolphus with the sister of the elector; with Denmark to friendship between the two crowns; with England to splendid promises. Meanwhile the proposition to form a general Protestant alliance was frequently considered, and Gustavus Adolphus sought the assistance of Denmark, Holland, and England in the Polish war. About the same time (1618) he determined to seek the co-operation of the allied princes of Germany in the same undertaking. He charged van Dyk with a mission to Heidelberg, and instructed him to show how the king was not able to make peace with Poland and to represent the disastrous consequences of allowing Sigismund to execute his plan against Sweden, since then not only

this kingdom but also the Baltic would be at the disposal of his ally, the King of Spain, who would thereby obtain important means for the support of his naval power; whence there would result the overthrow of the princes and States on the Baltic and the suppression of the Protestant faith in Germany. Van Dyk should, therefore, exhort the elector and his allies "to take this into consideration, as the chief means whereby the King of Spain hoped at last to be able to attain to his long sought universal monarchy and to re-establish the papal superstition in all those places where, by the grace of God, it had been abandoned;" and to consider how, by the united strength of the Union, this might be prevented. The sending of the embassy was several times postponed and finally abandoned. With a similar purpose the King of Sweden had in the meantime opened negotiations with the Elector of the Palatinate through John Casimir, in which the project to form a general Protestant alliance was again discussed. He desired that the allied German princes should send an envoy to the Scandinavian kings and invite them—at least the King of Sweden—to join the Union. He wished also an influential agent at the elector's court, through whom he might be kept informed of the state of affairs in Germany, and by whom his interests there might be furthered. The elector appeared willing to comply with the wishes of the king: he sent Christopher von Dohna to England (Dec., 1618), as envoy of the Union, to advocate before King James the affairs of Sweden. Casimir found in Camerarius a zealous supporter of Swedish interests. Soon afterwards, probably through the advice of Camerarius, the elector asked the King of England to hinder, by means of mediation, the renewal of hostilities between Sweden and Denmark. On the restoration of Elfsborg to Sweden, friendship between the two northern kingdoms was restored; but their relations to one another and their common relations to the affairs of the Protestants in Germany were such, that they continued to be influenced more or less by jealousy.

The time had come that demanded unity on the part of the Protestants; "for with the Bohemian revolution the signal was at last given for a great and decisive conflict between the two chief interests, which for a century had separated the greater

part of the population of Europe into two hostile parties; and as King Ferdinand in his oppressed situation hastened to assure himself of the support of the Pope, Spain, and Poland, so also the Bohemian Protestants endeavored to make their cause a general concern of Protestantism." With this purpose they wrote to Gustavus Adolphus (March 3, 1619), vindicating their conduct and urging him to give them counsel and assistance and to induce the Netherlands and the Hanse towns to embrace their cause. But unity was not easily attainable. Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt continued to hold a doubtful relation to the Union, and exerted an influence for the House of Hapsburg and against the Protestants. Even the members of the Union themselves were not united, and the young and inexperienced Elector of the Palatinate had not the capability to be a successful head and leader of the same. One member, however, if not eminently fortunate, manifested, nevertheless, a commendable zeal. In view of the inability of the allies alone to withstand the threatening storm, he urged a general evangelical convention for the purpose of forming an alliance, that should embrace, as far as possible, all the Protestants of Germany, inclusive of the Bohemians; also Holland, England, Protestant Switzerland, and the Scandinavian kingdoms. In the letter which the members of the Union sent to Gustavus Adolphus and Christian the Fourth, Casimir saw a step towards more intimate relations between the Swedish king and the German allies.

In the diet of the Union in Heilbronn (May, 1619) preparations were made for war; the Elector of the Palatinate, Frederic the Fifth, was given the command-in chief; and the Bohemians were assured of a "friendly correspondence," but not admitted to alliance. The general convention, proposed by Maurice, was to be held in Mülhausen, and Christian the Fourth, as prince of the Empire, was invited to participate in its negotiations. The allies, in their letter to the King of Sweden, referred to the account of the condition of their affairs, made to him in 1614; represented the increasing danger to which the evangelical estates were subjected by the Catholics, and the increasing need of union and defence; and finally expressed the hope, that Gustavus Adolphus, as an esteemed evangelical

potentate, would consider the approaching peril and not allow the enemy any advantages in Sweden; but, on the other hand, that he would be willing to support the evangelical cause in the future, since there was involved in it "a question of the honor of God, the propagation of the gospel, and the maintenance of thousands of souls in the true faith." They desired to maintain meantime an intimate correspondence with him, and promised to give him assistance, when he should wish it.

Ferdinand was chosen Emperor, and Frederic the Fifth became King of Bohemia. Casimir had urged Frederic to accept the Bohemian crown, hoping thereby to effect an alliance between him and the King of Sweden; since they would then have the same cause to vindicate, and in the King of Poland a common neighbor and a common enemy. Hitherto the Elector of the Palatinate and the other members of the Union had refused to ally themselves with Gustavus Adolphus, not wishing to break with the King of Poland and the Elector of Brandenburg; but, having ascended the throne of Bohemia, Frederic had thereby put himself in a position hostile to Sigismund, whence there was opened a favorable prospect for the Swedish alliance. Both parties favored it. In his interview with Frederic at Frankfort, Casimir endeavored to persuade him to dispatch a commissioner to treat with the Kings of Denmark and Sweden in the name of the Union, or of the King of Bohemia. Casimir was willing to undertake such a mission. That they should agree on mutual support in men and money was his view of an alliance between the Union or the Bohemian king and Sweden. In case of inability to furnish such aid, Gustavus Adolphus might invade Livonia, and keep the Polish forces employed there. Among the letters which Frederic sent from Amberg to the courts with which he stood in friendly relations, informing them of his determination to accept the Bohemian crown, was one to Gustavus Adolphus, stating that he had not sought the crown of Bohemia, but had determined to receive it, in consideration of the danger that threatened Germany and the whole evangelical Church, and for the honor of God and the extension of the Gospel; the same letter contained also a petition for support. The general convention of Mülhausen was postponed to meet in Nuremberg in Novem-

ber, and before its opening Frederic received a letter from the King of Sweden, wherein the latter expressed "his desire to participate in the affairs of the German Protestants," his approbation of their preparations for war, and his willingness to furnish the required assistance. By rendering such assistance he would, as Frederic assured him in reply, acquire the especial friendship of the King of Bohemia and his allies. The convention at Nuremberg lacked energy: it refused to espouse the cause of the Bohemians, and in its military preparations assumed merely a position of defence, and resolved to continue negotiations with the enemy. The discussion on the Swedish alliance is said to have been secret, and was probably resultless. Frederic determined, however, to send an embassy to Sweden, which was intrusted to Casimir in January, 1620. Meanwhile Gustavus Adolphus, on receiving the information that Frederic had accepted the crown of Bohemia, dispatched Rutgers to Prague to congratulate the Estates and the newly elected king; but the more special business of the ambassador was to find out, and give the King of Sweden, information on the state of affairs in Bohemia, that he might determine his course according to the prospects and demands of the circumstances. Were these favorable, he wished to enter into more intimate relations with the Bohemians and make with them and their allies a common cause against Poland. Such a union, it was thought, would serve as the basis for a general Protestant alliance. Rutgers was instructed to negotiate first with the Elector of Saxony, in order to induce him to become an ally of the Protestants. He departed for Germany about the first of January, 1620, and a few days later Gustavus Adolphus received Frederic's letter from Nuremberg (dated Nov. 14, 1619), containing an account of Poland's hostilities against Silesia, and soliciting assistance. At the same time he received several letters from John Casimir, which exhorted him to declare formally his desire for an alliance with King Frederic, who would then comply with his wishes. Although he was now determined to espouse the cause of the Bohemians and the allied princes of Germany, he nevertheless desired King Frederic and his allies, through an embassy to Sweden, formally to solicit him to take this step and to assure him of their support, in case he should

need it; otherwise he would not give up the peace his kingdom enjoyed. Shortly afterwards he expressed his astonishment that the Germans manifested so little interest in this matter. He did not need to seek alliance with foreign powers, since experience showed that Sweden's forces in themselves were adequate for the nation's defence; and, on the other hand, he had strong reasons for not wishing to plunge his people into war, inasmuch as it seemed improbable that they would soon be disturbed by hostilities from Poland, since Sigismund's attention was called to the troubles in Bohemia; yet he was not unwilling to invade Livonia, when the term of the Polish armistice should have expired; in fact, was determined "not to take his hand from the common cause." When, therefore, Casimir informed him of the state of affairs in Bohemia and asked aid for the Protestants, the king declared that he would send them eight cannons and five hundred shot for each. In his account of this mission Casimir said, "that it was not owing to any lack of good-will on the part of Gustavus Adolphus, and still less to any neglect on the part of the commissioner, if its result did not correspond to the wishes of King Frederic."

Towards the close of April, having failed in the negotiations with Saxony, Rutgers arrived in Prague. The parties of Frederic and Ferdinand presented at this time a strong contrast. When Frederic accepted the crown, he had counted on the united action of the several Protestant powers in behalf of the Bohemians. In this he had been disappointed; where he had hoped to meet with zealous co-operation, he had only found hesitancy, coldness, and indifference; and the power of the nation itself was paralyzed by the prominence of its particular interests and by the incapacity of the king. The party of Ferdinand, on the other hand, had found support among the Catholics everywhere, who, while the Protestants were manifesting their imbecility at the convention of Nuremberg, had taken measures to strengthen the League and to put on foot an army of 25,000 men. Frederic received the ambassador with extravagant expressions of friendship and confidence; and, since the Union had refused to espouse the Bohemian cause, he sought to form a special alliance with Sweden. The King of Sweden wished to learn what conditions the Bohemian court would impose

upon those it might seek as allies, but commanded Rutgers not to make any agreement, whereby he would place himself or the nation under obligations to King Frederic. Gustavus Adolphus thus determined to wait for future developments before taking a decisive step, and in this he was confirmed by his ambassador and by the rapid succession of following events. The clouds gathered and broke at last over the Bohemian Protestants in the battle of White Mountain. Soon afterwards the unfortunate king wrote to Gustavus Adolphus, representing the necessity of union on the part of the Protestants and urging him to rescue the evangelical cause.

The King of England attempted meantime to persuade Christian the Fourth to embrace the cause of the Bohemians. Christian paid a subsidy of 200,000 rix-dollars, not, however, merely because he wished to assist Frederic, but because he hoped thereby to take a step towards an alliance with England; for he had already formed the plan of uniting the Protestant powers in a confederation. To effect this was the business of the Congress of Segeberg (March, 1621). Denmark, England, and the Netherlands, as well as a number of German princes, were represented; but Gustavus Adolphus replied to the call, that it was impossible for him to send a deputy, and quite as impossible to render immediate assistance; since the armistice with Poland drew near its end, and it was doubtful whether a treaty of peace or a renewal of hostilities would follow. In case of peace, as he wrote later, he would hasten to aid the allies. They determined to form a defensive alliance; to organize an army of 6,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, which should not only defend Lower Saxony, but also assist the Union. Denmark became the ally of England, and Christian promised to pay 100,000 rix-dollars to be used in the interests of Frederic. The negotiations between Denmark and the Netherlands were not equally successful. Through the Congress a step was taken towards a more intimate relation between the powers represented. While they were thus negotiating for the advantage of Protestantism, the members of the Union made an agreement with the Spanish general, Spinola, in which they pledged themselves not to aid Frederic, to dissolve their alliance, and to withdraw their troops from the Palatinata. The Union ended with the assembly in Heilbronn (May, 1621).

The renewed hostilities between Sweden and Poland demanded the attention of Gustavus Adolphus during these negotiations. After Frederic had been disappointed in his expectation of assistance from Denmark and England, he turned to Sweden, and revived the project to form a general Protestant alliance, with the new feature, that it should be under the direction of the Swedish king; and inasmuch as the means hitherto employed had been inadequate to restore to Frederic his hereditary possessions, it was proposed to transfer the Polish war to the Silesian and Moravian frontier, thus compelling the Emperor to call his troops from Germany. The King of Sweden was willing, in case he should be duly supported, to undertake the execution of this plan. The Netherlands offered a subsidy and endeavored to persuade the Venetians, the German princes, and others to give assistance. Camerarius, as agent of the Elector of the Palatinate, went to Sweden in the autumn of 1628, and found Gustavus Adolphus disposed earnestly to act in the cause of Frederic, yet waiting to assure himself of a greater degree of security from Danish hostility and to obtain a more favorable resolution in his behalf from England. King James, upon whom under the circumstances much depended, dispatched an envoy to the King of Sweden; yet his relations to Denmark had been such, since the Congress of Segeberg, as to make it improbable that he would now suddenly prefer Sweden, especially as the latter power was involved in a distant private war, and while he saw Denmark and Lower Saxony dangerously threatened, and thus under greater necessity of arming in their own defence. He sent, therefore, another envoy, Anstruther, to Denmark to form an alliance for the maintenance of the freedom of the princes and estates concerned, rather than for the benefit of the Elector of the Palatinate. In answering Anstruther, Christian the Fourth said that he was strongly in favor of the alliance and the proposed war. At the same time, there were present at the Danish court ambassadors from the Emperor, the King of France, and the Elector of Brandenburg. The Emperor wished to induce the King of Denmark to remain neutral; Louis the Thirteenth and George William desired to win him for an alliance against the House of Hapsburg. The king was willing to accept the

latter proposition, but the Council was opposed to hostilities with the Emperor, and through their influence Christian was compelled to modify his reply to Anstruther (July 27, 1624), to the effect that he would not join the alliance nor aid in the projected campaign against the Catholics.

Spens, the English envoy, arrived at the Swedish court in August. In addition to his commission from King James, he was secretly instructed by Frederic and the Prince of Wales not only to solicit Gustavus Adolphus to join an alliance, but also to engage in an independent undertaking. They promised support. He should transfer the war to Silesia, and confer with others on the plan of operations. The king replied (Aug. 22) that he would energetically begin the undertaking. Oxenstjerna sent the plan of the proposed campaign to Camerarius two days later. This was, that all evangelical powers, together with France and her allies, should unite in a great alliance against the House of Hapsburg; that the King of Sweden should have the command-in-chief, and lead the first division of the army through Poland. The relation of the Elector of Brandenburg to Poland made it improbable that this plan would meet with his approval, since in it lay the possibility that Prussia might become the seat of war. He favored rather a campaign whose chief basis of operations would be on the Rhine. To advocate such an undertaking Bellin had been at the Danish court, and for the same object he had an interview with the King of Sweden, who expressed his willingness to join an alliance for the advantage of the Protestant party, and gave essentially the same conditions to Brandenburg as he had previously given to the Prince of Wales, Frederic, and the Netherlands; and asserted that, notwithstanding the inconvenience of being so far from his kingdom, should the security of Sweden be guaranteed to him, he would join with the other powers to execute the plan proposed by Brandenburg. In the autumn of this year he was endeavoring to obtain allies and making other preparations for the undertaking. Brandenburg had allied itself with him, and he had a favorable prospect of support from other sources. He only awaited, before beginning the campaign, the favoring determination of England and France and the definite assent of the German princes.

While there was for Gustavus Adolphus but a single step to actual participation in the German war, he was destined to be tripped by Christian of Denmark. Obligated by his Council to reject the proposition, through the acceptance of which the King of Sweden was rapidly coming to the active leadership of the allied Protestant powers, Christian the Fourth was unable to suppress his jealousy and remain neutral. In spite of the articles of agreement (of 1624) between the two northern kingdoms, he began negotiations with Poland against Sweden. If Christian's conduct in this was opposed to the named treaty, it was in accordance with the determination, which he entertained both before and after it, not to let Gustavus Adolphus become more powerful than he then was. The King of Sweden was opposed to war with Denmark for the double reason, that it would give a strong ally to his enemy, Poland, and hinder the execution of his project against the Emperor. Christian's course was not quite plain to himself: particular interests made him desire to retain the friendship of the Emperor and Sigismund; yet to attempt to do this would be to break with those who had offered him the leadership in the proposed alliance before turning to Sweden; and, on the other hand, he saw the possibility of defeating the project of Gustavus Adolphus by other means than intrigues with the Catholics, especially by taking up the negotiations with the other powers where they were dropped in July, whereby he hoped to obtain what the King of Sweden had conditioned for himself and crowd him from his position of influence. With this plan he entered the lists, not as Gustavus' enemy, but as his rival in seeking to promote the welfare of the common cause; and he had hope of success from the fact that England had only with unwillingness and hesitancy sought the King of Sweden for a position previously designed for himself. Towards the end of 1624 the English court became the centre of important negotiations: Gustavus Adolphus urged the formation of the alliance under his direction; Christian the Fourth endeavored to elicit from the parties of the proposed union the proposition he had once rejected. In England's relations with Sweden King James had been little more than a passive spectator of the negotiations conducted by Frederic and the Prince of Wales; but, in

favoring Denmark, he had even participated in Christian's Polish intrigues, and was, therefore, glad of an opportunity to exert his influence in behalf of this monarch. Anstruther went again to treat with the King of Denmark in January, 1625, and before the end of the month he had communicated to James the conditions under which Christian was willing to espouse the common cause, and made an agreement with him.

Among the ambassadors present at the conference of London, which took place at this time, were: Spens for Sweden, Bellin for Brandenburg, Rusdorf for the Palatinate. Bellin conferred first with the king, and advocated an alliance with Sweden. James replied, that he favored the project, but wished to induce Denmark to participate in it, and that he would consent to form the alliance, even in case his attempt to win this kingdom should fail. Although in the previous correspondence it had been asserted that the King of England desired to employ the Danish forces in the undertaking under the leadership of Gustavus Adolphus, yet the impression made by these negotiations on the ambassadors was, that James would never consent to give the direction of affairs into the hands of the King of Sweden, and only awaited a favorable answer from Denmark before offering him a subordinate position. Nevertheless, towards the end of January, Conway communicated to them Buckingham's assertion, that the king accepted without reserve the Swedish proposition; that he would, without doubt, close the alliance; and that he hoped to effect the accession of Denmark and France. James had instructed Conway to obtain Christian's consent to the leadership of Gustavus Adolphus, because he feared that, under the direction of Denmark; neither the Hanse towns nor the German princes would participate in the Union. The commissioner neglected to act under these instructions, which provided for the recognition of Sweden as head of the alliance, until the result of Anstruther's negotiations with Christian were known in England, and James had accepted the conditions, whereby the Danish king became his ally. Louis the Thirteenth, although unwilling to become a member of the Union, offered to pay a subsidy of 500,000 livres yearly for two years, and to concede to Gustavus Adolphus the command-in-chief; still, in order that as large a force as

possible might be opposed to the Hapsburg party, he wished to induce Christian the Fourth to undertake a separate campaign, who to this end should receive one half of the promised subsidy. The inclination of both France and England to favor Denmark, together with Richelieu's plan, according to which these powers were to constitute the absolute authority in all negotiations, lessened the Swedish king's prospect of reaching the end at which he aimed; and the effect of Christian's intrigues against him became more and more evident, rendering the execution of his plan more doubtful. The Congress of Lauenburg, the acts of which were in the interests of the Danish king, ended March 25, after having resolved that the provinces represented should furnish nine times as many troops for the defence of the district as were ordinarily demanded of them. Christian, who was to have command of these forces, was also making preparations in Denmark for a campaign; yet, at the same time, the King of Sweden received information from Spens and Rusdorf that James accepted his proposition, recognized his leadership in the Union, and offered to bear one-third of the expenses of the war. The double dealing on the part of the English court, and the desire to conceal it in the resolutions of a general assembly, did not, however, escape Gustavus Adolphus. When, therefore, he received news of the projected meeting at the Hague in April, he instructed his minister in London to inform the king that he would not participate in it; that, if the powers concerned wished to treat with him further on the conditions he had already given, they might send their commissioners to Stockholm; and that, if they desired him to conduct the campaign, they must give him full authority to do so according to his own will; otherwise he would have nothing to do with it.

Affairs were at this time in a very unsettled condition. Gustavus Adolphus wrote to Christian the Fourth, March 24, expressing his satisfaction with the preparations in Denmark to resist the advancing forces of the enemy, asserting that he would endeavor to prevent the Poles from aiding the other Catholics, and promising to support the Danish undertaking when he should have made peace with Sigismund. This declaration caused Christian great anxiety; for he had hoped only

through intrigue to gain that which the King of Sweden now offered of his own accord ; and in the negotiations between the King of Denmark and George William, the former expressed his willingness to give over all his soldiers to Gustavus Adolphus. But a proposition was made to support two armies of 25,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, which should act independently of one another ; one under Gustavus Adolphus through Poland to Silesia, the other under Christian the Fourth through Germany to the Palatinate. Favoring this proposition, and fearing to assume the responsibility which the direction of the whole undertaking would impose upon him, Christian dispatched an envoy to Stockholm to offer the King of Sweden the whole Danish army, in case he should prefer to abandon the campaign rather than to consent to the proposed division of forces, demanding as compensation only the payment of the amount expended in its enlistment. The king replied that he did not intend to withdraw from the common cause, but, under certain conditions, was willing to engage in the war, in accordance with the plan of the allies for supporting two armies of equal strength. Notwithstanding his manifested anxiety, the King of Denmark was hereafter disinclined to continue the negotiations, and desired to cast the burden of them on the Elector of Brandenburg. Gustavus Adolphus received the news that King James had rejected his proposition, on account of its too great demands, and further correspondence convinced him that the hope of carrying out his project must be abandoned. He turned his attention from Denmark to Poland, and, the armistice with Sigismund having ended in March, made a successful campaign on the Duna the following summer.

After James had rejected the Swedish proposition, the Netherlands became the determinative power in the anti-Hapsburg party, and the policy of this nation was determined not only by its relations to the Emperor and the Protestant powers, but also by those which it sustained to Spain. A more extensive alliance than that proposed in 1624 was desired ; an alliance against the entire House of Hapsburg. In the east, Denmark, Sweden, and the princes and Estates of Germany should constitute one part of the Union ; while England, France, and the Netherlands should form the other part. Casper von Vossbergen,

who had been commissioned to negotiate with the eastern powers, was unable to accomplish anything in Copenhagen, on account of the irresolution of the king. In Riga he met the Swedish envoy, Salvius, who informed him that, when Gustavus Adolphus should have ended the war in which he was engaged, he would turn against the League and the oppressors of the Protestants in the Empire. The King of Sweden replied to Vossbergen's letter, that had the communication been made to him before he left Sweden, he might have rendered the assistance required, which he was now prevented from doing by the business of a campaign. He instructed Rutgers, his minister at the Hague, in accordance with Vossbergen's request, to treat with the other powers on the scheme of the alliance.

Shortly afterwards, while the king was encamped before Mitau, Adolphus Frederic of Mecklenburg dispatched an envoy, who informed him of the critical state of affairs in Lower Saxony, requested aid, and asked him to come to Germany in person. Gustavus Adolphus assured the envoy of his goodwill towards the duke, but was unable to assist him before the following summer, when, should it be desired, he would make a campaign in his behalf with a portion of his army. He urged the duke to procure the means necessary for the support of the expedition, and to this end advised an alliance with Holland. He also counselled the German princes to sustain Christian the Fourth, and suggested that they should make him Emperor. He nevertheless remained by his former plan, and began again to entertain hopes of being able to lead the allied army against the Catholics; consequently, on the death of James, he dispatched Gabriel Oxenstjerna to England, hoping to find in King Charles as earnest a supporter of Sweden's interests as he had had in Charles, the Prince of Wales. But the tide of English politics had turned. In September an offensive and defensive alliance was formed between England and the Netherlands. Rusdorf sought to effect an extension of it to Denmark and Sweden, but without result, inasmuch as the attention of the allies was no longer directed chiefly to the affairs of Germany, but towards Spain. However, much, therefore, they may have desired a union of the eastern powers, an

alliance with France appeared to them of vastly more importance.

The energetic politics of the Bourbons disappeared for a time from France, on the death of Henry the Fourth. The ability of Maria de' Medici was not equal to the task of government, and she sought support in closer relations with Spain. France fell into apparent indifference to the progress of the Emperor, which left him undisturbed by the French to extend his conquests in Germany, establish his influence in Switzerland and Italy, and undertake the subjugation of Holland. August, 1624, Richelieu took the reins of government. His plan was to employ, by a system of cunning negotiations, the enemies of the House of Hapsburg to obstruct its progress without bringing France itself into open hostility with it. "The renewed alliance between Holland and France, the marriage of the English Crown Prince with the Princess Henrietta, the expulsion of the Austrians from Graubunden, together with the deliverance of Valtelline from the papal troops, which in accordance with the treaty of Avignon (1623) had it in possession—these were the immediate results of that policy which led France back to the course followed by Francis the First and Henry the Fourth." (Hammarstrand.) It was to Richelieu a matter of comparatively little importance whether Christian the Fourth or Gustavus Adolphus should assume the command of the Protestant army, provided only that it should be successful against the Emperor.

The convention at the Hague met in November, and, December 9, an alliance was formed between Denmark, England, and the Netherlands. Through the illness and death of Rutgers, the Swedish interests were left without a representative, and Sweden was not included; nor were all the efforts of Buckingham and the English court adequate to persuade France to participate in it. Among other things, the articles of agreement conditioned, that the allies should support an army, consisting of from 20,000 to 30,000 infantry and from 7,000 to 8,000 cavalry; that England should pay monthly 300,000, and the Netherlands 50,000 florins; that England should strengthen her fleet; that the Netherlands should so increase its army as to prevent its territory from becoming the basis of hostile

operations against Denmark ; and that they should continue in arms until peace was re-established in Germany. Since James had rejected the Swedish proposition, because its demands were too great, his promise to give a monthly subsidy of 300,000 florins, which everybody, except perhaps the King of Denmark, believed the nation unable and unwilling to pay, appeared to Gustavus Adolphus like an insult, and removed all ground for the hope, which the allies still entertained, of persuading him to join the alliance. Camerarius' mission to Stockholm was, therefore, without result.

In the summer of 1626 Gustavus Adolphus transferred the seat of the Polish war to Prussia. This placed the Elector of Brandenburg in a doubtful position ; for he feared that hostility to Poland would result in the loss of this province, and that an attempt to resist the Swedish arms would make it the scene of actual warfare, ending in its unconditional subjugation ; while, by judicious neutrality and mediation, he hoped to obviate hostilities altogether, or remove them to some place outside of his dominion. Sigismund requested him to send troops against the Swedes, but Gustavus Adolphus reminded him of the allegiance which he owed, as a Protestant prince, to that party. He determined to avoid a breach with either, and was consequently neither a declared enemy nor a reliable friend of one or the other. The government of Königsberg accepted the conditions of neutrality proposed by the King of Sweden, and pledged itself to allow no hostilities to be exercised, during the war, from its harbor or territory against him or his kingdom. He, on the other hand, promised the inhabitants freedom of trade and the undisturbed enjoyment of their rights and revenues. Between Denmark and Mansfield, the Emperor, King Sigismund, and Gustavus Adolphus, George William was in doubt which way to turn. His interest in the government of Prussia, and the relation of that province to the two hostile kings, limited him, however, to two alternatives. Early in 1627 he agreed upon an armistice with the King of Sweden, but it soon became evident that he would not abide by its conditions ; it failed to meet with the approval of the King of Poland. Of Sigismund's commands to him, either to retake Pillau or to send all of his troops to the Polish headquarters,

the one was quite as difficult to execute as the other. He nevertheless attempted the latter, and thus cast himself once more into the arms of Sweden's enemy. This, however, contributed little to render his position more satisfactory to himself. Threatened, on the one hand, by the Swedish forces, which, since his attempt to reinforce the Polish army, had cast upon Prussia the burden of supporting a campaign, and with the loss of that province by the Poles, on the other, he was by no means in a condition to manifest strong inclinations towards either party. He opened negotiations with the King of Sweden in July, which led to a treaty about the middle of August, according to which Brandenburg was to remain neutral. It was renewed October 26.

The events which happened meantime in Germany were of such a character as to give to the Swedish negotiations that followed them a feature, which, if it was found in those that preceded, was by no means their only feature. Mansfield's army was destroyed; Christian the Fourth had suffered the inglorious defeat of Lutter; the imperialists were advancing towards the Baltic and the Danish peninsula; and that plan had been developed through which the Emperor hoped to become the head of the predominant naval power in the north. The effect of this defeat on the princes of North Germany was to banish all thoughts of further alliance with the Emperor's enemies. Mecklenburg, however, was occupied by Christian's troops, and obliged to hold to Denmark, although with little hope of finding there relief from the danger which became ever more threatening. Adolphus Frederic sent, therefore, to the King of Sweden, urging him to place one or two men-of-war before the port of Wismar; to which the king replied, that he was willing to assist the duke or the common cause, but hesitated to comply with the request, because he could not see that any benefit would arise from it. At the same time he advised that an alliance be formed between those powers whose territory bordered on the Baltic, and complained of the wavering and irresolute conduct of the German princes. The Duke of Mecklenburg manifested hereafter a faithful allegiance to the Protestant party, and more especially to the King of Sweden, hoping still to prevent his territory from falling into the hands of the

enemy. In the negotiations which he opened with Gustavus Adolphus, in the summer of 1627, the king showed a willingness to comply with his wish, but desired more definite information in regard to his plan, and, therefore, ordered Baner, who was residing at Lubeck to further negotiations, to confer with Adolphus Frederic in this matter. The result of this interview was: the duke declared his adherence to Gustavus Adolphus, requested that he should send a Swedish garrison to Wismar, and asserted that nothing could be accomplished in the way of the proposed confederation. While the king recognized that in garrisoning Wismar he would diminish his army, and in effect be engaging in war against the Emperor, this step was urged, on the other hand, by the special interest of his kingdom in excluding the Catholics from the Baltic, and by his desire to prevent the King of Denmark from taking possession of the city. He wished to send more than the few hundred men requested, in order that the duke might be effectually assisted rather than merely seem to be helped. He had ordered soldiers to be in readiness for the undertaking at Stockholm, and agreed upon conditions, under which the city should be garrisoned, when he learned through Baner's letter (August, 1627), "that the government of Wismar would not permit the Duke of Mecklenburg to place a garrison in the city." It had received assistance from another source: Lubeck had sent two companies "to protect the city against its own sovereign." The proud and independent spirit of the Hanse towns had not been broken, which led Wismar to refuse to accept a garrison from a foreign power, when it could receive the same from another member of the League, and by it the King of Sweden was prevented from doing that which he did a few months later in supporting Stralsund.

Seeing the hopelessness of his undertaking after the battle of Lutter, Christian the Fourth turned to Sweden for assistance. After several unsuccessful petitions, he described to the king (September 12, 1627) the desperate condition of his affairs, the success of the League, and the desertion of his allies, stating, at the same time, that he could see no means of security, except in the alliance of the two northern kingdoms. He desired Gustavus Adolphus to invade Germany in the interests of the

common cause, and to send immediately seven or eight war vessels to blockade the ports of Lubeck, Wismar, Stettin, and Stralsund, and promised assistance in return, if it should be wished. Since the King of Sweden had come to see the impossibility of making peace with the Emperor, this last friendly act of Christian the Fourth was by no means unwelcome. He wrote to him in October: "We have been able to see plainly that the design of the papal league has been directed towards the Baltic, now through direct, now through indirect attempts to subdue the Netherlands, the kingdom of Sweden, finally also Denmark. To this end not only force has been employed, but also plots and intrigue. We now learn that the new admiralship of the *imperii Romani* was offered to your Highness, together with the proposition to relinquish the Sound against the indemnification of the expenses of the war; so have also propositions been made to us recently underhand to ally ourself with the Emperor against your Highness, in which case they would not only help us to a perpetual peace with the King of Poland and the Polish crown and to permanent possession of Livonia and Prussia, but would also confer upon us the throne of Denmark as a fief of the Emperor, and much more of the like, intending by such intrigues to hinder our mutual alliance." He wrote thus immediately after arriving in Sweden from the campaign of 1627, and urged that both parties should make preparations, during the winter, for their defence and for the maintenance of their power in the north. While the aspect of affairs in Denmark was becoming continually more hopeless, through the advance of the enemy in Jutland and the discord among the authorities of government, Gustavus Adolphus dispatched Rasch and Baner to induce the king to send an embassy to Stockholm, for the purpose of negotiating an alliance between the two kingdoms. Christian the Fourth had already (October 15) commissioned Christian Frieze and Tage Tott to undertake such a mission; but, after the arrival of the Swedish envoys, in December, he gave them other instructions, in which he recounted the course of his misfortunes, and solicited assistance, in consideration of the fact that the danger threatened alike both kingdoms. A treaty of alliance between Denmark and Sweden was framed at Stockholm,

January 4, 1628. It conditioned, among other things, that the King of Sweden should send the King of Denmark eight men-of-war, with eleven hundred men and a specified number of guns, furnished with all the equipments necessary for service, which should be supported by Sweden; that these vessels should serve the King of Denmark five months yearly, but should only be employed in the Baltic; that the Swedish vice-admiral, who should have them in command, should be subordinate in authority to the King of Denmark; that, should the defence of his kingdom demand them, the King of Sweden might recall a part or all of them, having promised that, in case he could furnish more than eight and the King of Denmark should desire them, they should be at the disposal of the latter; that these vessels should not be separated, except on special occasions, and then only with the consent of the vice-admiral; that they should not be employed against any Hanseatic city, except where such city should undertake hostilities against Denmark, and then only under the Danish flag. The King of Denmark, on the other hand, should make war on all pirates and other vessels hostile to the King of Sweden, and prevent all ships from sailing through Danish waters to Dantzic, except where they had a pass from Gustavus Adolphus. Each king should inform the other of all his endeavors to make peace with the enemy, and allow him to participate in the negotiations.

In the numerous restrictions which Christian the Fourth placed upon his commissioners, he gave unmistakable expression to the jealousy with which he had long regarded Gustavus Adolphus. To have the Baltic securely and exclusively in their power, was a thought common to both; to have the chief authority in maintaining and directing this supremacy, was an object for the personal ambition of each. Their individual interests in a common end were the source of jealousy, suspicion, and mistrust; the threatened loss of the object of their common interest led to alliance. Christian did not, however, cease to hesitate and make restrictions. He refused, at first, to ratify the treaty as drawn up by the commissioners; but changed some points, and excluded others. Among the latter were those in regard to the traffic with Dantzic, which was

chiefly in the hands of the French, English, and Dutch, whom he feared to injure by depriving them of this trade. But Gustavus Adolphus informed him that he could not receive assistance from Sweden until he had ratified the entire treaty, and, in February, sent John Sparre to Copenhagen to persuade him to do this, holding out, as inducement, the promise that he would then espouse the cause of Denmark and enter into open hostility with the Emperor. It received the signature of Gustavus Adolphus in Stockholm, April 28; that of Christian the Fourth in Copenhagen, May 19. There is, however, a letter from the King of Denmark, dated April 7, in which he expressed his willingness to ratify the treaty in its original form, thus making Denmark and Sweden allies.

Gustavus Adolphus left Stockholm April 30, and sailed from the port of Nyhamn for Prussia, May 1; but adverse winds compelled him to seek shelter by the little island of Wigsten. While here, the ship "*Regnbogen*," sent by the admiral in command of the Swedish fleet before Dantzic, brought him a copy of the petition for powder, which the Council of Stralsund had sent to that city, together with the answer of the Dantzic magistrate, in which he acknowledged his obligations, as a member of the Hanseatic League, to give Stralsund all possible aid, but added that an express prohibition of the King and Estates of Poland prevented the city from sending the required support. In answer to this indirect request, the King of Sweden sent one thousand pounds of powder to Stralsund and a letter to the Council, in which he reminded them of the mutual interest of their city and his kingdom in the cause of freedom and religion, regretted the danger that threatened their security and independence, exhorted them to defend their liberty and the evangelical faith, and promised to give further assistance, when they should require it. Thus, with this first support given to the city of Stralsund, the war between Sweden and the Emperor was begun, and there only remained to be determined, on the part of Sweden, *where*, *when*, and *how* it should be continued. Henceforth, until he embarked in the great undertaking, the attention of Gustavus Adolphus was directed to preparations for the invasion of Germany, to the discussions of the Council and Estates of the kingdom, to negotiations for alliance with foreign powers.

When, in 1626, the King of Sweden was informed of Christian's defeat, he feared that the imperialists would advance to the Baltic and begin hostilities against him, and ordered his Council (September 4) to make preparations to avert this danger. The events which followed—the conquests in Lower Saxony, the subjugation of a part of Denmark, the disorder in the internal affairs of this kingdom—confirmed this fear, and gave rise to his remark to Axel Oxenstjerna: "We can scarcely avoid becoming involved in this war, since the danger comes daily nearer;" and that to the committee of the Estates, that they had nothing to expect but the complete ruin of the kingdom or a long and burdensome war. Oxenstjerna expressed the same opinion not long afterwards. It was not a doubted question among the Swedes, that, if their garrison remained in Stralsund, hostilities between Sweden and the Emperor were unavoidable, and it was not less firmly believed that he intended to overthrow the Protestants in the north, and that an invasion of Sweden was sure to follow the conquest of Denmark, regardless of the question of Stralsund's garrison. Whether this would have been the consequence of his complete triumph over Denmark may be doubted, but the belief that it was impossible to avoid war with him, was naturally taken as the ground of political action, and led to the question, whether the borders of Sweden should be made the line of defence for that kingdom, or its safety vindicated by means of an offensive war in the territory of the enemy. The already mentioned committee of the Estates advised the king to transfer the seat of war to foreign soil; and early in the same year (1627), during his conference with Knesebeck and Winter, Oxenstjerna showed how it would be more advantageous to make war with the imperialists in Prussia than to allow them to carry out their intention of invading Sweden. Towards the end of the year, while the king entertained the plan of making an expedition to Germany the following summer, he sought the opinion of the Council on the same question, and received the same advice as that given by the committee of the Estates. After the proposed expedition of 1629 had been abandoned, the relations between Sweden and the Emperor continued such as to confirm the king's belief in the unavoidableness of hos-

tilities. He was determined to invade Germany the next summer, and assembled the Council at the castle in Upsala (October 27) to discuss the proposed undertaking; not, however, because he doubted the propriety of his resolution, but because he foresaw the possibility of failure in its execution, and, in such case, the disposition of the Council and the people to cast the blame on him; he wished to give them the freedom of opposition beforehand, that they might not assume it afterwards, and that, in case of an unfortunate result, the responsibility might devolve, at least partly, upon them. After having advanced a long list of arguments for either side, they resolved unanimously to advise the undertaking.

Out of the foregoing arose another question; one on which Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstjerna entertained opposite views; namely, whether they should make the war against the Emperor offensive in Poland and defensive in Germany, or *vice versa*. The Council left its determination to the king, with, however, an expression of opinion in favor of Germany as the seat of offensive war. Although he had little hope of being able to make peace with Sigismund, he was, nevertheless, determined to carry the war to Germany, and to maintain an army for defence in Prussia. In the autumn of 1628, after various fruitless attempts to end the hostilities with Poland, he began to form plans and make preparations for a campaign against the Emperor in the spring. This failed to meet with the approval of Oxenstjerna, who saw the apparent inadequacy of the means to the end; and, in November, he wrote to the Council that he desired to find some way of escape from the affairs of Stralsund, Germany, and Denmark. In a letter to the king, a few days later, he gave his reasons for wishing to carry on an offensive war in Poland, rather than in Germany. However highly Gustavus Adolphus may have valued the advice and counsel of his great minister, in this case he was not persuaded by it; and in reply sent him his reasons for holding the contrary opinion. He remained by his former plan, and continued, in the spring of 1629, his preparations for its execution, when the rapid movements of the Emperor changed the state of affairs. After Ferdinand had ended his war with Christian the Fourth by the treaty of Lubeck, he sent an army to join the Poles. This

brought the Swedes in Prussia into a critical position, since a considerable number of their troops had been sent home the preceding autumn to be employed in the German campaign. They were also embarrassed by the fickle and unreliable Elector of Brandenburg, who seemed disposed to break his treaty of neutrality with Sweden. "This impending danger demanded the presence of Gustavus Adolphus and persuaded him to postpone the intended expedition to Germany." The execution of his plan was not abandoned, but merely delayed. "Meanwhile, by his military genius, which especially under critical circumstances always presented itself in its full superiority, he was able to check the progress of the Poles and imperialists in Prussia; and, during the summer, through the mediation of France, England, and Brandenburg, negotiations were begun, which finally (September 26, 1629) led to the six-years' armistice of Stumsdorff." By this he was relieved from the Polish war, which would have embarrassed him in his proposed campaign in Germany.

The chief motive by which the Elector of Brandenburg was persuaded to engage in this work of mediation was the desire to improve his own condition; for, as soon as the already mentioned agreement had been concluded between him and Gustavus Adolphus, the Poles began to demand that Prussia should participate in the war against the Swedes, and encamped their troops as much as possible within its borders. To be freed from this oppression, he undertook to negotiate peace between the hostile parties. He began with the consent of Gustavus Adolphus, but finally carried his zeal in mediation so far that he aroused distrust not only among the Swedes, but also among the inhabitants of Königsberg, who believed that he was endeavoring to betray the city into the hands of the Polish forces; and in the campaign of 1629 the King of Sweden felt the necessity of guarding against hostilities from Brandenburg. But George William found his circumstances little more satisfactory after the treaty of Stumsdorff than before it. He, like the other more powerful Protestant princes, had come to regard with disapprobation the proposed expedition of the Swedish king to Germany, and, as a final act in his character of mediator, sought to persuade him, in the spring of 1630, to abandon

it. The commissioners, to whom this undertaking was intrusted in May, had their first interview with the king in July at Stettin, and failed, as they would have done had they met him in Stockholm.

The power and influence of Saxony among the German States made it a desirable ally for either party. When, therefore, in 1629, the power of the Emperor was at its height, and the Edict of Restitution had been published, threatening the adherents of the evangelical faith everywhere, and it was desired to rouse them to a united effort of resistance, the King of Sweden wrote to the Elector of Saxony, vindicating his conduct in supporting Stralsund, offering his advice and assistance, and asking for more definite information in regard to Saxony's relation to the Emperor and to the Protestant princes. These letters, written in April and May, remained unanswered. During the negotiations of the following June, conducted by Peter Meyer, John George declared his unwillingness either to take up arms to support the King of Sweden or to aid him with a subsidy. The hope that Germany would be healed of all her ills by the Diet of Ratisbon, made the elector disinclined to treat with Gustavus Adolphus; whence the negotiations, that were begun shortly before his landing, were also fruitless, as were all his efforts to form an alliance with Saxony. The opinion generally entertained at the time, that he stood in secret correspondence with the evangelical Estates of Germany, was without foundation.

The Dukes of Mecklenburg wished to continue their friendly relations with the King of Sweden, and this was to him not a matter of indifference; for he wished to begin his campaign through their territory. Soon after their expulsion, Adolphus Frederic wrote, asking the king to intercede in his behalf; to which the latter replied, that, were there any possibility of effecting anything, he would willingly comply with the request, but feared that both would thereby become the objects of ridicule and further indignities. And in the autumn of 1629 he sent Adam Beer to Lubeck with a memorial, wherein he urged the duke to secure the co-operation of the several Estates, obtain possession of certain fortified places, and collect means for the support of an army. The memorial was received in Lubeck,

December 15, 1629, after the death of Beer, when the Swedish agent in Hamburg was authorized to conduct the negotiations, which, as well as those undertaken somewhat later by Rasch, were without important result.

Since the term of the treaty of 1614 between Sweden and the Netherlands expired in April, 1629, Gustavus Adolphus wished to form a new and closer alliance in its stead, but the war with Spain and the debts of the country presented obstacles. In the proposed union, the parties interested should seek to maintain their rights and privileges, as well as their power in the Baltic and North Sea; and to re-establish the princes and Estates of North Germany in their former condition. Should peaceable means be inadequate to the attainment of this end before the following June, they should then attempt the same by force of arms; in which case Gustavus Adolphus, who should have the command-in-chief, should furnish 20,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, fit out a fleet of 50 vessels, assist the Netherlands with 4,000 men, and grant them freedom of trade everywhere, except with the ports he had blockaded; while they, on the other hand, should furnish and support twelve men-of-war and 4,000 soldiers, and pay a monthly subsidy of 40,000 rix-dollars. These conditions were afterwards slightly modified, but the relations of the Netherlands to Spain and the Empire led them to meet the advances of Gustavus Adolphus with indifference. After the campaign of 1629 they were more inclined to accede to his wishes, but during the negotiations difficulties presented themselves which rendered all attempts fruitless; such as the scarcity of money, the debts of the State, the dissatisfaction of the merchants with the conditions of trade in Prussia; and notwithstanding the king's endeavors to remove these difficulties, Camerarius wrote, February 4, 1630, "that his sovereign had entered into no union with the Netherlands, which would give the common cause support." In spite of Oxenstjerna's negotiations, dissatisfaction continued, and the Dutch saw in the expected cessation of hostilities with Spain the possibility of becoming wholly indifferent to an alliance with Sweden.

In order to procure assistance in England, Gustavus Adolphus entered into correspondence with a number of influential Eng-

lishmen, who promised to use their influence with the king in his behalf; yet, on account of the continued hostility between king and parliament, he had little reason to expect aid in this quarter, notwithstanding Charles' professions of friendship and avowed interest in the Protestant party.

While the vessels designed for the support of Christian the Fourth were ready to be sent to Denmark, an envoy informed Gustavus Adolphus that the alliance between Stralsund and Sweden had been ratified, and requested aid in men and ammunition. The fact that the imperialists had turned their attention from the Danish peninsula to that city and the coast of Pomerania, and the consequent ability of Christian to defend his kingdom without foreign assistance, led the King of Sweden to comply with the request; for which purpose he sent to Stralsund the vessels with which he had intended to assist Denmark, and thereby failed to fulfill the conditions of his treaty with that kingdom. Towards the end of the year (1628), an agreement was formed between the Swedish and Danish crowns, probably for the re-establishment of that point of the previous alliance which conditioned that neither party should make peace with its enemies without allowing the other to participate in the negotiations. The King of Denmark had long sought a personal interview with Gustavus Adolphus, which he finally obtained February 20, 1629, at the parsonage of Ulfåbeck. But he made no proposition, and simply asked for two or three vessels; not, however, because they were needed, but "*ad augendam famam.*" The King of Sweden, on the other hand, proposed, that they should make an agreement in regard to the negotiations of Lubeck and the means for obtaining a general peace, and that they should form an alliance. To the first point Christian replied that he had sent his conditions to the Emperor and could not depart from them; to the second, that it would be necessary for him to obtain the consent of the Estates before an alliance between Denmark and Sweden could be formed. He also maintained that his inactivity was necessitated by his want of means. Gustavus Adolphus wrote an account of this meeting to Axel Oxenstjerna, which he closed with, "*Summa, parturiunt montes, nascitur ridiculus mus.*" The negotiations of Lubeck were ended without his participation

in them, and Denmark had, hereafter, but little influence on the development and execution of his plans.

However much the King of Sweden may have desired to ally himself with other Protestant powers, he had no hope of receiving from any of them as ample assistance as France was able to give; yet it was evident that, while there was a possibility that Christian's undertaking would end successfully, Louis the Thirteenth would not be earnestly desirous to form an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus. France stood in open hostility with Spain; yet by the insurrection of La Rochelle, the King was prevented from carrying on war against that nation, and the intrigues of the ultra-Catholic party compelled him to close the treaty of Barcelona. Not long afterwards France and Spain became allies against England and the Huguenots. After he had ended the siege of La Rochelle, drawn by his interest in the Mantua succession, Louis undertook a campaign to Italy, which led to the league of Venice in 1629, between France, the Pope, Venice, Savoy, and the Duke of Mantua. By the treaty of Susa the war between France and England was ended, but dangers had gathered in another quarter. Christian the Fourth had played out his rôle; the Emperor was victorious in Germany; Arnim had led an army to Prussia, in order to keep Gustavus Adolphus employed there; 10,000 men had been sent to aid the Spanish against the Dutch; a third army of 20,000 men had been sent through Graubunden and Valtelline to join the Spanish forces in Italy; and the Duke of Mantua found himself hard pressed by the enemy. Under these circumstances, Richelieu, after having seen the failure of the King of Denmark, looked for an ally in the North against the Emperor. Of England the Emperor's enemies could expect no support, and France saw in Sweden the only power through which the anti-Hapsburg party could receive assistance.

While France was at war with England, Lars Nilsson arrived in Paris; but his mission had no result, except to convince the King that Gustavus Adolphus wished to enter into closer relations with him; but in the negotiations of 1629 there first began to be entertained hopes of an alliance.

After the Polish armistice had been closed, Charnacé was induced to go to Sweden, where he had an interview with the

King, November 21. That the King of France had not intended in these negotiations to form an alliance with Sweden, may be seen from the fact that he had furnished his envoy with no instructions to this end; he wished to learn the opinion and plans of Gustavus Adolphus regarding the affairs in Germany, as a preparation for negotiating with a commissioner, whom he wished the King of Sweden to send to France. It was determined to send Charles Bauer to Paris, a resolution that was afterwards changed an account of the superior advantages which the King thought the Hague offered as the place for future negotiations. He sent his conditions to Louis by Charnacé, and asked him to send a commissioner to the Hague to treat with Camerarius. As the French envoy was about to leave Denmark, he received instructions to continue the negotiations with Sweden. The King of France had meantime begun negotiations with the German princes and Switzerland, in order to incite them to resistance against the Emperor; and had also begun to make extensive preparations for active participation in the war. In connection with this attempt to arouse Germany and Switzerland was the determination to secure Sweden by an alliance for the same end;* for when the instructions for Charnacé were given (Dec. 18, 1629), news had not yet been received in France of his interview with Gustavus Adolphus and the Council. The envoy returned to Sweden, and reopened negotiations in Stockholm. One circumstance which tended to give them a peculiar character was that Richelieu sought to use Gustavus Adolphus in the execution of his own individual plans, while at the same time the King of Sweden

* "L' intention de sa majesté est, que Charnacé engage le roi de Suède à s'occuper sérieusement des affaires d'Allemagne, autant pour délivrer les états et princes de l'empire de la tyrannie des Espagnols, qu' à cause de la jalousie qu'il doit éprouver de voir s'approcher de ses frontières une maison qui aspire à la monarchie universelle, et dont l'ambition n' a d'autres bornes que celles qu'elle trouve dans une forte et puissante résistance. C'est dans ce dessein que sa majesté a fait rassembler en Champagne une armée de 40,000 hommes, et une autre d'égale force en Italie, pour les opposer aux armes de l'Autriche; sa majesté très chrétienne, désirant faire le roi chef de cette glorieuse entreprise, lui offre, pour les frais de la guerre, un subside annuel de six cent mille francs; si néanmoins le roi de Suède exigeait un subside de neuf cent mille francs, Charnacé y consentirait à la dernière extrémité."—Charnacé's instructions, see Flassau, *Histoire générale de la diplomatie Française*, II, 383.

sought in an alliance with France means for the attainment of an end upon which his eye had long been fixed. Charnacé's flattering representations of the state of feeling in Germany towards Gustavus Adolphus failed to have the desired effect. This interview was fruitless. February 20, he began negotiations with Swedish commissioners. Certain articles of alliance were drawn up: Sweden should make a campaign in Germany, and France should furnish pecuniary support. Specified ends to be gained were: the re-establishment of the German Estates in their ancient freedom and rights, the driving back of the imperialists, and the security of commerce. The Catholic or Protestant service, wherever existing, should be left undisturbed; efforts should be made to extend the alliance by inducing other princes and Estates to join it, and the League should remain neutral. Gustavus Adolphus had various reasons for not wishing to ratify these articles, but chief among them seems to have been the demand that he should send an envoy to France, in order there to conclude a more definite agreement on the number of troops with which Sweden should carry on the war, according to which Louis would determine the amount of his subsidies. On this they could not agree; and although the amount of the offered subsidy was afterwards increased, the King of Sweden regarded it, nevertheless, still as insufficient compensation for submitting to the conditions proposed. A little later, while Charnacé was in Denmark, Swedish commissioners undertook to continue the negotiations, but found him less disposed than heretofore to form an alliance, and even unwilling to consent to the articles previously framed. The compliance on the part of Sweden, where objections had been made, only called forth from the French envoy other reasons for avoiding an agreement. The conduct of Charnacé in these negotiations caused Gustavus Adolphus to doubt that, through his mediation, he should be able to close an alliance with the King of France, and persuaded him to send Lars Nilsson to treat with that monarch directly, or with his minister; but before Nilsson's first interview with Richelieu, the King of Sweden had begun his conquests in Germany.

In this connection may be mentioned the negotiations of Sweden and France with the Venetian republic. Gustavus.

Adolphus dispatched Wolmar Farensbach, in November, 1628, to form an alliance with Bethlem Gabor. On his way to Transylvania he visited Mantua, where he sought to induce the Duke to become the ally of Sweden. March 11, 1629, he conferred with the Venetian senate. As the result of this visit, the Doge sent to the King of Sweden assurances of friendship, and an offer to enter into closer relations with him.

That Richelieu desired an alliance between France and Sweden, and that he had determined to pay Gustavus Adolphus ample subsidies, cannot be doubted, and it is also equally certain that he was too shrewd not to conceive the idea of inducing his Italian allies to contribute to such subsidia. Under the condition of affairs in Italy at that time, Venice alone was able to render any considerable aid; Richelieu, therefore, turned to the republic, and made a treaty with it to this end. "How far already in 1629," says Professor Adhner, "a treaty in this matter was closed between France and the republic, we are not able to determine: probably the statement about it rests upon some confusion with the other treaties of alliance of the same year. What is certain is, that a secret treaty was concluded between France and the Venetian republic, June, 1630, in St. Jean Maurienne (S. Giovanni Moriana), in Savoy, probably as the third French army stood ready to pass the Alps by Mont Cenis. We have not seen the document itself, but during the later negotiations on the same subject, the following was given as its contents: The republic pledges itself to pay for the year 1630 one-third of the subsidies for the King of Sweden, estimated at 400,000 livres; France should agree with Sweden on a definite sum, and inform the republic of it; and on the question concerning the continuation of the support the following year, new negotiations should take place. The Venetian government sent immediately to France exchange to the amount named, but, as the definite agreement of France with Sweden was delayed so long that an advantageous treaty of peace with the Emperor intervened, October 13, of the same year, in Ratisbon, the amount was, therefore, never paid."

The negotiations of Dantzic in the spring of 1630, by which it was attempted to effect a treaty of peace between Sweden and the Empire, through the mediation of Denmark, did not

advance beyond preliminaries. Inasmuch as they were undertaken without sincerity, they ended quite naturally without result. Meanwhile, May 19, Gustavus Adolphus took his farewell of the Estates, and soon afterwards left Sweden forever. He entered upon the undertaking without allies, which was a bold venture, whether we conclude that he was persuaded to engage in it by thoroughly political motives alone, or, more justly, by these in union with a strong and earnest desire to further the interests of Protestantism.

ARTICLE II.—ULRICI'S LOGIC.

Compendium der Logik von Dr. H. ULRICI, o. ö. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Halle. Zweite neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig, Weigel, 1872.

PROFESSOR ULRICI is well known as the author of various works, prominent among which are his *System der Logik*, *Gott und der Mensch*, *Gott und die Natur*. We have chosen his *Compendium* for notice, because it contains the germ of the author's peculiar philosophy, and that, too, in its latest and clearest form. Before proceeding to the discussion, however, some preliminary statement is necessary.

Three theories are possible concerning the relation of thought and thing: 1st, the thought is created by the thing; 2nd, the thing is created by the thought; 3d, thought and thing stand over against each other as equally valid and necessary factors of knowledge. The first two theories, or materialism and idealism, are alike destructive of philosophy. The consistent materialist can only view the logical laws and forms as the accidental product of forces, existing by chance, and uniting by chance in this or that accidental combination. Under such a view the logical laws and forms lose all authority, and all that is built up by their aid vanishes into an abyss of doubt and delusion. Pure idealism is no less fatal; for the consistent idealist cannot stop short of denying the existence of all but himself and his notions. Not alone the material world, but men also must fade into ideas; and the thorough-going idealist must believe himself alone in the universe—a position which not even a madman would dream of maintaining. If, however, one should, for argument's sake, assume such a position, he would do worse than expose himself to the charge of insanity—he would turn thought into chaos. The law of causation stands sponsor for the external world, and to deny one is to deny both. But to deny this law is to introduce anarchy into thought, and once more all is at sea. Out of this bog the third

view, or realism, offers to help philosophy by assuming that subject and object are equally real and necessary factors of knowledge. But, unfortunately, its mediation between these contending views has generally consisted in dogmatically appropriating the principles of both parties, without any attempt to reconcile them; and the inner contradiction of its teachings has been concealed by judiciously refraining from their logical development. In general, it may be said that the peace which realism has secured between materialism and idealism is such a peace as a fog might effect between hostile fleets. The hostility is there. It slumbers only because no one has vision keen enough to perceive it. Dogmatic realism has served as just such a fog-bank, in which the contradictory principles of idealism and materialism have slumbered, unconscious of their mutual hostility. By and by the sceptic comes with his confounding criticism. The mind is represented as holding with equal assurance both sides of a contradiction; and philosophy reaches one of its periodical crises. Idealism and materialism are both fatal to philosophy, and realism, unless it can vindicate the reality and necessity of both subject and object as equally valid factors of knowledge, is not a philosophy, but a dogmatic acceptance of whatever principles practical needs may force upon us. The question which realism has to answer is: What are the relations of thought and thing? and upon the answer depends the possibility of philosophy.

Of all the crises through which philosophic thought has passed, none will compare in importance with that produced by the scepticism of Hume. Realism at that time was little more than sensationalism; and the answer it gave to the question concerning the relation of thought and thing was that the thought is entirely subordinated to the thing. It would hear nothing of *a priori* factors of knowledge, but sought to lead all that we knew back to sensation. This is the unit from which all else is built up. The mind is passive in knowledge; it receives but contributes nothing. It is merely a register upon which our manifold sensations record themselves; and the so-called laws of thought are but abstractions from them. To this philosophy Hume applied a very short but convincing criticism. Is sensation the source of all knowledge? then it

follows inevitably that what is not in sensation is unreal; and all so-called knowledge which cannot justify itself in the court of the senses, must be treated as blank illusion. Hence the belief in causation and the logical forms, in morality, the soul, and God, must be abandoned as the results of unthinking habit. Plainly, these beliefs are supersensual; and sensation is the norm of knowledge. Out of doors they all must go, and science and religion must perish together. The argument was simple and convincing. The self-destructive nature of the experience-philosophy was clearly seen. In the clear demonstration of this fact lies Hume's great and inestimable service to philosophy.

The direction which speculation must take was evident. The denial of *a priori* factors of knowledge led to this sceptical result. To avoid it was impossible. To argue against the conclusion while admitting the premises was as hopeless as argument against the multiplication-table. Until philosophy could demonstrate, not the need, but the reality of *a priori* factors of knowledge, it must abandon all its claims. Only witless, reckless dogmatism could ignore the challenge. The problem was clearly stated; could it be as clearly solved?

An attempt at solution could not be avoided. Haunted by a belief in the reality of knowledge, the mind will never rest content with scepticism. It matters not that the stone ever comes bounding back, Sisyphus must upheave it once more. There was nothing to do then but to return to first principles, and re-investigate the relation of thought and thing. The result was the Kantian criticism. Before we begin to philosophize, said Kant, let us inquire whether our faculties are competent to philosophy. Let reason itself be called into court, and an inventory of its powers be taken. Let us inquire after the origin and development of our knowledge. It may be that the contradictions of philosophy lie in the imperfection of its instrument. At all events, the first thing to do is to investigate the knowing faculty itself; for if this be untrustworthy, all is at sea. The results of his criticism was his well known doctrine of mental forms. According to this doctrine, the raw material of knowledge is derived from experience; the form which it assumes is determined by the mind itself. The skele-

tion of knowledge is given in the nature of intelligence; the outline is filled up by experience. Apart from these forms, sensation itself is impossible; for sensation postulates the intuitions of space and time. Much more is the higher thought-knowledge impossible without the existence of forms of knowledge. Sensation, as such, is chaotic and meaningless. Of itself one sensation has no relation to another. They are connected in relation and judgment only by the mind within. This chaos of sensation can only become the unity of knowledge as law and order are imposed upon it by an inner activity. But this law and order are contributed by the mind, and are hence *a priori* factors of knowledge. This, then, is Kant's doctrine of mental forms. Knowledge necessarily contains two factors—form and content. Form without content is void; content without form is chaos. We can know things only under certain forms which lie in the nature of the mind itself. Knowing consists in subsuming the chaos of sensation under these forms; and not until it is so subsumed does it become a definite object of knowledge. Such was Kant's conception; and whatever may be thought of its value, one thing is certain: he demonstrated the helplessness of the experience-philosophy. At every step of mental development he showed the presence and working of *a priori* factors. Ignorant, reckless empiricism might ignore it; but all except the willfully or hopelessly blind could not fail to see that the experience-philosophy cannot advance one step without the use of the very *a priori* principles which it is supposed to displace. The clear proof of this fact is Kant's great service to philosophy, and also his undying glory.

Unfortunately, Kant stated his doctrine in such a way as to countenance the gravest errors. The philosophers who came after him proved far more capable of falling into his errors than of appreciating his truths. The critical stand-point was quickly deserted; and the dreadful treadmill-round of a one-sided idealism was begun over again. Since then German philosophy has been floundering in a dreadful bog. There has been any amount of speculation, but no principles. No one has troubled himself to inquire after the foundations of philosophy; but every one has snatched up whatever one-sided princi-

ple happened to strike his fancy, and forthwith proceeded to develop a system. Of course, the whole world has wondered after the beast; but the critic is compelled to declare that German philosophy since Kant has had little in common with logic, less yet in common with the facts of consciousness; and resembles nothing so closely as the Baron Munchausen as he sailed through the air on his wig.

In the work before us we have an attempt to recall philosophy to criticism. The aim is identical with that of Kant: to inquire into the possibility of philosophy in general; to subject reason itself to an examination. With great justness, the author remarks that the critical or logical question is the most fundamental question of philosophy. All the mental processes proceed according to the logical laws and forms. Doubt no less than belief, scepticism no less than dogmatism, are subject to them. Since then these laws control all and every mental operation, since the sceptic is as subject to them as the dogmatist, it follows inevitably that the validity not alone of science and system, but even of doubt and denial, rests upon the truth of logic. The first thing, then, to do is to investigate the origin and validity of these laws and forms to which all our thinking, whether affirming or denying, doubting or believing, is and must be subject. Until this is done philosophy is a house built on sand, which will be sure to fall with the first gale and flood. The conclusion which the author reaches is very similar to that of Kant. In a certain sense he holds to the doctrine of mental forms. The points of agreement and difference will appear during the discussion.

No fact in psychology is more clearly established than that the mind is active in all knowledge. The physical antecedents of sensation are simply nerve-vibrations; this is physiologically proved. But vibrations are not sensation; by no effort of imagination can a thought be identified with a swinging molecule. These vibrations remain mechanical motions until they are attended to, and interpreted by the mind within. This also is one of the most common facts of experience. As soon as the student's attention is concentrated upon his work, the hum of the room ceases. He does not hear the clock strike. All the sights and sounds of the

external world are unnoticed by him ; and for the reason that the attention of the mind was directed to other subjects. It is psychologically impregnable that sensation itself postulates a mental activity as its necessary condition. Much more is this true of the higher processes of thought. In comparing, recognizing, judging, imagining, constructing, the mind is consciously the actor to whom all this activity must be referred. But if knowledge is to have any unity or coherence, this activity must be an orderly one ; otherwise knowledge could have no fixed point, and the results of to-day might be overturned by the activity of to-morrow. Now the conception of the logical laws is that they are the rules and norms which control and lead all our mental operations. If then we could discover the laws which the soul consciously, or unconsciously, obeys in all its thinking, we should have reached the source of logic ; and if we could ground them in the nature of the soul itself, we should have demonstrated their universality and necessity ; that is, we should have found, first, that they are laws, and not rules ; and, second, we should have shown why they are laws, or whence they derive their law-power. But this question is not to be answered by any *a priori* speculation, no matter how pretentious, but by an inductive consideration of the mind itself. No awful voices from the upper air, nor oracular utterances from the "abyssmal depths of personality," but the facts of the common consciousness, must decide this question. And since any being manifests its nature only in its activity, we can only hope to discover the nature of the mind by an examination of its activity. It may be that in this way we shall win a conception of the mind which shall so thoroughly express its nature, that by mere analysis we shall come upon the logical laws and forms. In this hope the author proposes the question : How do we come to consciousness ? Or, since consciousness is used by the author in a far more restricted sense than our English word, How do we come to definite, specific knowledge ? How do we win definite perceptions of things ? How, in general, does consciousness gain a definite and orderly content ?

Nothing easier in the world, says the sensationalist. Here is a square thing ; there is a round one. Here is something hard ;

there something soft. Why, we see things all about us of different sizes, shapes, qualities, relations, &c. There is no mystery about it. We are surrounded by a universe full of things; and we see and hear and touch them, and so on. That is the plain common sense of the matter. If there are logical laws and categories, and mental forms, and all that kind of stuff, concerned in the operation, I don't know anything about them.

We agree most heartily with the latter part of the statement; but for the rest we must say that our friend has more enthusiasm than knowledge. "A universe full of things" is not given in sensation at all. Physiology proves incontestably that brain vibrations is all that the outer world directly gives us. Vibrations pouring up from skin and muscle, from eye and ear, constitute the psychological sum of sensation. But these vibrations mean nothing of themselves. They are not ideas; they are not knowledge. They are only excitements of the organism, and of themselves cannot go beyond the organism. The projection of the causes of our sensations into space is not the work of sensation itself. The perception of distance, of magnitude, of things external to the body, is all acquired. Psychology has established this beyond the possibility of question. "The universe full of things," which the sensationalist thinks he sees, is altogether an acquired perception. The connections and relations of things which he fancies he gains immediately through sensation are all something superadded to the sensations. A sensation is itself and nothing more. It lies unrelated and alone. It is not until it is worked over in thought and compared and related in judgment, that it makes any approach to definite knowledge. Sensation alone is meaningless and chaotic. The fact is unquestionable. Except law and order be imposed upon it, it must remain meaningless and chaotic forever. The sensationalist is invited to explain how these whirling molecules pass into sensation, and how sensation becomes orderly and definite knowledge. His reply needs only to be translated into thought to appear supremely ridiculous. His claim that they impose law and order upon themselves, implies that these emotions, which are all mechanical, recognize each other as like and unlike, and unite and separate in endless differentiation and integration, until an orderly frame of knowl-

edge is built up. In the first place, this explains nothing; for it leaves the chasm between thought and motion unbridged; and, in the second place, it stultifies itself by attributing to these motions the very mental qualities which they are invoked to displace. The importance of the author's question begins no appear. Sensation is not perception, not knowledge, not thought, not system; it is nothing but an unrelated, meaningless sensation. The problem is to win from this confused, indefinite mass, the definite and orderly content of knowledge. How from an internal excitement of the organism do we pass to a definite knowledge of the external world, of things far away, of their various relations, &c.? How from the blind affections of the soul do we reach clear self-knowledge?

The author's reply is that knowing is essentially a process of differentiation. To know is to distinguish. To distinguish is to differentiate. Things are distinguished only through their differences. Remove all difference, and things are identical. Make it impossible to establish difference among the objects of knowledge, and they remain as indefinite indeterminate chaos. The most fundamental act of differentiation is that whereby the soul distinguishes between itself and its feelings, thoughts, activities, thereby giving the distinction of subject and object. The necessity of this distinction is admitted by both materialist and idealist. Even grant that the mind is the product of organization, still in all its thinking and knowing it is forced to distinguish between itself, as knower and thinker, from the object as known and thought. Or grant with the idealist that the object is only a product of the mind's own activity, even then the mind is compelled to distinguish between itself and its representations. Objects, again, only become objects as they are differenced from one another. To know a thing is to know what it is, in distinction from the other things which surround it. If we were unable to detect in it, or attribute to it, definite, specific qualities, whereby it is distinguished from other things, its definiteness would vanish, and knowledge would become impossible. In brief, a thing is a thing only as it is distinguished from other things: and it is distinguished only by being different; and knowing it as a thing consists in the apprehension of it as different from other things. It is

only as we distinguish between our sensations that they acquire any definiteness or meaning. If we hear a confused noise, the mind seeks by attention to detect its import; and whenever we fail to note peculiarities, that is differences, in the sound whereby it is given a definite meaning, we say, it is wholly undistinguishable. The same is true in vision, in taste, in feeling: all our sensations are indefinite and meaningless until we are able to distinguish them from one another, by noting the peculiar qualities or differences of each. The same is true in science. Nature is tangled, confused, meaningless, until by the setting up of some standard its differences reveal themselves. Animal and vegetable life are chaos to thought, until some theory is ventured by which the differences of things appear. The chemist's atoms are also zero to intelligence, until we are able to distinguish them into classes with definite qualities or powers. We have given here only a few hints at the nature of the argument. Whoever would see the position explained at length may examine the author's own account, either in his *Logic*, or better, in his *Psychology*. The conclusion is, that knowledge advances only by a process of continual differentiation, that knowing is essentially differentiation, and that hence the knowing mind is in essence a differentiating activity. Out of this conception of the mind as a differentiating activity, as gaining knowledge solely by a process of differentiation, the author leads his logical theory by simple analysis.

At all events, it is plain that we cannot stop here. If we accompany the author thus far, we cannot refuse to go farther. It is open to any one to show the falseness of the author's conception of the mind and the process of knowledge; but if one cannot do this, then he is bound to admit all that analytically flows from the conception. The first deduction is the law of identity and contradiction. To know A and B as objects, they must be distinguished. But if distinguished, they must be conceived as different, and thus placed over against each other. Hence the conception, A is not B, and conversely B is not A, is a necessity of the differentiation. But to conceive A as not B, a positive content must lie in the conception of both A and B. Had they no definite content, no difference could be established. Hence to conceive A as distinguished from B, both A

and B must each be conceived as identical with itself. So then to differentiate A and B, that is to know A and B as objects, we must, at least tacitly, implicitly, conceive A and B as respectively identical with themselves and different from each other. But this is only to say that all our thinking and knowing is subject to the law of identity and contradiction; and the law as law flows directly and necessarily from the conception of the mind as a differentiating activity. Upon this law depend the axioms of mathematics and the divisions and classifications of science. The reason why we believe that like is true of like is simply that all our thinking is and must be ruled by the law of contradiction and identity. The same law plays a most important part in the logic of Induction. The passage from the particular cases examined to the general conclusion, is entirely unwarranted and false, except as we get the idea of a kind, or a like; and then by the law we pass to the universal conclusion. Like is true of like. . Hence, if Brown, Jones, &c., are mortal, all men are mortal.

This law, however, supposes objects to be given. It is another act of differentiation by which objects are furnished. The soul distinguishes not only between objects, but it also distinguishes between itself and all its objects. It distinguishes between itself as active, and its thoughts, efforts, &c., as its act. In this way the distinction of subject and object arises; which alone makes thought possible. On this act the law of causation depends. The soul distinguishes itself as cause from its thoughts, efforts, &c., as effects. This is done involuntarily, and for the most part unconsciously, but it is done universally and necessarily, nevertheless. Whether the law of causation applies to the outer world, we shall see hereafter; for the present this is certain: first, we know nothing of activity except as we get the idea from our personal activity; and second, this activity we do and must distinguish as cause, from its working as effect. The distinction of cause and effect holds for the only activity which we know directly; all other activities are, and can be, known only by assimilating them to our own. Hence if there be any external activity, we cannot help assuming that it too comes under this law. If it does not, it is not activity, but only as it comes under this law has it any meaning for thought.

But the distinction of subject from object, and the differentiation of objects from one another, comprises the entire field of possible mental activity. For the first distinction, we have the law of causation; for the second, the law of identity and contradiction. Hence there are two, and only two, logical laws. All others are either false or but specifications of these two; and these two flow necessarily from the conception of the mind as a differentiating activity. They are laws because all knowledge is impossible without their application.

Is this admitted? (and whoever denies it must show that knowledge is not obtained essentially through a process of differentiation) then we must go farther still. The notion of difference has a weighty content. First, to differentiate two or more things implies a comparison. Things which are uncom-
pared remain for thought neither like nor unlike, and hence undifferented. So then the notion of the mind as a differentiating activity implies that it is also a comparing activity; and we may say that knowledge advances by a process of differentiation, through a process of comparison. Second, the notions of both comparison and difference imply a point of comparison. Without such a point, at least implicitly given, neither likeness nor difference can be discerned. When we hear that two things are alike, we ask in what point they are alike. If they were said to be different, we must always know in what respect they are different. Until one can tell in what point, or relation, two things are alike or different, they are neither alike nor different. One compares two balls. If there is no point in mind in which he compares them, as color, form, size, quality, &c., the comparison ends in nothing. But when he compares them with reference to some given point, as form, size, &c., then the difference or likeness appears. Difference or likeness never, and can never, deliver themselves upon our consciousness, without at least the implicit presence of mental points of comparison. This truth is valid for the whole scale of knowledge. In science it is not until we set up fixed points of comparison that likeness or difference can be determined. We say let the freezing and boiling points of water serve as fixed points of comparison, and then we are able to distinguish differences of temperature; but without some standard, all

temperatures would be alike for thought. We are first able to determine the specific gravity of objects, after we have adopted some standard of measurement. Let hydrogen serve as a unit for gases, or water as the unit for liquids or solids, and then we can determine the relations of gases and solids; but unless some standard is set up, all remain entirely alike to thought. We take the presence of a spinal column as a distinguishing mark in natural history; and by means of this standard can distinguish the tangled mass of animal life into like and unlike. Or we assume a certain form of leaf or some peculiarity of development as distinguishing marks; and then again the likenesses and differences of things deliver themselves upon knowledge. But in every case the perception of either depends upon the presence of points of comparison. To know things as either like or unlike we must know in what they are like or unlike. Now all involuntarily and unconsciously we differentiate things in respect to space, time, quantity, quality, &c. The projection of the external world is chiefly a differentiation of things in relation to space. The orderly arrangement of our internal experience is a differentiation in relation to time. The ordinary distinctions we make among things is a differentiation in respect to quantity, quality, form, &c. This is done unconsciously for the most part; but it is done necessarily. The fundamental differentiations of knowledge are differentiations with relation to space, time, quantity, quality, form, &c. That is, space, time, quantity, quality, &c., serve as universal points of comparison and differentiation in all knowledge. But these are the logical categories; and hence we conclude that the categories are simply the universal points of comparison, according to which the soul proceeds in that differentiation whereby it comes to knowledge. Their application, consciously or unconsciously, is the postulate of all knowledge. Whatever we know is won only as we apply them, and hence they must be viewed as being in the strictest sense *a priori* factors of knowledge. To this the sensationalist may object; We see that things are differentiated in space; it is a direct perception, and needs no differentiating activity, and all that. The reply is that we see no such thing. An affected organism is all that we directly perceive; the projection of the physical

world is altogether a mental act of differentiation according to the category of space. In the same way the arrangement of the internal experience is altogether a mental act according to the category of time. Whether things be like or unlike in themselves or not, they can never become like or unlike for our thought, until they are compared with reference to some mental standard. In brief, it is only as the chaos of sensation is differentiated according to the categories of space, time, form, quality, quantity, &c., that it can furnish us with any object of knowledge whatever. But if this be so, then the categories lie in the nature of the mind, and are the *a priori* conditions of knowledge.

The author's view then may be summed up as follows: The categories are the universal points of comparison which the mind unconsciously, but necessarily, sets in gaining knowledge. They are the norms according to which it proceeds, the laws which it unconsciously obeys. They are not consciously present, but are implicitly given in the very nature of the mind itself. A given seed contains within it its laws of growth. If it develop at all, it will be along a certain line. An acorn is by its nature determined to develop into an oak. So the author conceives the mind as a nature which contains its laws within itself. It is developed, indeed, but still bears within it the laws of its activity. It is determined from within and not from without. These inner, constitutional determinations, when expressed in words, constitute the so-called intuitions, the laws and categories of logic. These laws, categories, and intuitions, are not originally present as ideas, or notions, but as manifestations of an inner nature, and hence of an inner necessity. The mistake of conceiving the intuitions as originally ideas, exposed them to Locke's convincing criticism against innate ideas. Such ideas do not exist. Neither the child nor the uncultured man has any mental notion or conception of the law of causation, &c. The mind brings nothing with it but its nature, or the determinations of its nature. But it does bring that; and because the logical laws and norms are the expression of this nature, therefore they are universally, though unconsciously, followed and obeyed. It lies not in the power of an acorn to develop into a peach tree, because it is

determined by its nature to develop into an oak. So it lies not in the power of the mind to violate the logical laws and forms, because those laws and forms are but the expression of that nature, conceived as a differentiating activity. Unconsciously as well as consciously, involuntarily as well as voluntarily, the mind obeys and must obey the laws of thought or logic.

At this point there is a marked difference between the author's conception and that of Kant. Both are alike subjective, but Kant stated his doctrine of mental forms in such a way as to be a kind of fifth wheel to a wagon. In the first place, he does not consider the most fundamental of all questions, the origin of consciousness, at all; and yet all the categories are really involved in every act of consciousness. If consciousness can originate without the application of his mental forms, there is really no further use for them. In the next place, he viewed them as empty forms, into which the manifold of sensation is subsumed and thereby becomes an object of knowledge. But of this act of subsumption he gives us no account; at all events, it is difficult to see how the mind could tell under what forms to subsume a given content, unless it first knew something about it. But if it can know the thing prior to the subsumption, the form is unnecessary to knowledge. With greater justice and better logic, the author views the categories, not as forms, but as norms according to which the mind proceeds in every act of knowledge, because these norms are but expressions of its inner nature.

This conception of the categories being true, Aristotle's view of them as being the universal predicaments of things is discredited. Originally, they have nothing to do with the thing. Fundamentally, they are the subjective determinations of thought, and not objective qualities of things. We reach the thing only through their application, and hence cannot learn them from the thing. The attempt of Plotinus and the Stoics to make them ontological principles, must also be viewed as mistaken. They are merely the conditions of knowledge, and by no means the postulates of being. Hegel's view, that they are the distinction which thought sets for itself, is equally untenable; because thought consists in thinking; and thinking

postulates objects of thought, definite ideas, conceptions, &c.; and these, again, pre-suppose the pre-application of the categories. The inverted procedure of ontological speculation also becomes clear. For the categories are necessary to the construction of all notions of whatever kind; hence the so-called notion of the absolute is a subjective creation which cannot serve as a starting-point of philosophy, until it is proved to have objective validity;—a proof not easily produced. A still more important result is the utter untenability of the experience-philosophy. This doctrine attempts to lead everything back to sensation. But, as we have seen, sensation itself is formless and lawless. It must be interpreted, arranged, differentiated, and integrated before it has any meaning. Hence the claim that we reach the categories by abstraction from the single thing, is the exact reverse of the fact; we reach the single thing by applying the categories. Besides, even if single things were given, it is only through mental confusion that the belief arises that abstraction is sufficient to explain their origin. We cannot get the category of space as an abstraction from co-existences; for to perceive things as coexistent depends on a differentiation in accordance with this category. No more can the category of time be abstracted from sequences, for the perception of sequence implies the category. The categories of quantity and quality in general cannot originate through abstraction, because to see things as different we must know in what they are different; and hence the categories of quantity and quality must precede the abstraction.

So far all has been subjective. Originally, the laws and forms of logic relate altogether to thought, and have no relation to the thing. The law of identity and contradiction is fundamentally a thought-law. The law of causation, too, is only a thought-law. The forms, or categories, are derived from the nature of the mind, and not from the nature of the thing. They are in the strongest sense of the word forms of thought. By means of them we attain to knowledge; by means of them we reduce the chaos of sensation to the order and unity of thought; but it by no means follows that they hold of the thing as well as of the thought. All that can be asserted at this stage is, that if there be any external objects to know, they

can be known only as they are subjected to these laws and forms. Precisely because they are thought-laws and forms, a philosophy of human knowledge is possible; but it may be that the same reason will make ontology forever impossible. Whatever we know can be known only under these laws and forms; hence the thing-in-itself, to which these forms may not belong, can never come into knowledge. We have next to inquire after the relation of these subjective forms to the objective thing.

Kant's answer to this question is well known. He declared these forms to be purely subjective, and hence without any application whatever to the thing-in-itself. This reality can never come within the circle of knowledge, because in order to do that it must put on the mask of these mental forms, and they so change its appearance that it is itself no longer. Unfortunately, Kant made his assertion without looking before and after. In the first place, if there be no reality in the appearance, it is hard to distinguish the latter from blank illusion; and besides, if the appearance can exist thus apart from the reality, there is no need of a thing-in-itself to lurk in the background of knowledge like a ghost which disappears the minute one sets eyes on it. In the second place, Kant asserted that the law of causation is only a mental form, and has no application to the thing-in-itself. Nevertheless, in his anxiety to save the reality of the outer world, he ascribes a causal efficiency to the external thing; a position which cannot be maintained without denying his system, nor given up without denying the external world, and everything, indeed, but the speculator himself. Luckily, this wholesale annihilation of being is rendered unnecessary by the contradictions of the philosopher.

Ulrici gives another answer. Before noticing it, however, we must refer to his criterium of certainty. This consists of nothing else than a thought-necessity. All argument of whatever kind, all intuition, all perception produce certainty only as they necessitate us to conceive a fact in a certain way. If they produce in us this thought-necessity, then are we certain that the thing is as we conceive it. When one is suffering from the tooth-ache, he is certain that he has the ache, and the reason is that he cannot think the ache away. It clings to him

like an accursed presence (we write in apprehension of an attack); and forces itself upon him by a necessity which he cannot resist. If one has an object in his hand, he cannot think it away; the thing forces itself upon his attention, and necessitates a recognition of its presence. This necessity, again, is the sole ground of certainty. If one has a square thing before him, he cannot conceive it as round, and the reason is that he is compelled to think it as square. And thought-necessity is not only the only ground of certainty, but it must produce certainty. One may object that a necessity of thought is no proof of a necessity of the thing, but the objection is either a verbal one or a thoughtless one. When I am compelled to think a thing as so, and not otherwise, then I am certain that it is so. When I am uncertain, that means that I am not compelled to conceive it in the given way. But when a true thought-necessity is present, then all doubt is excluded, and only certainty remains. The objection is commonly both verbal and thoughtless; as if a mathematical student should say, I, indeed, must conceive a circle as round, and must also admit the equality of the radii, &c.; but then if there were some being who should conceive it as square, why the radii would not be equal, and all our doctrines about the circle and sphere would be only relatively true; they would be true for us, but not true in themselves. True enough. Under the assumed conditions, all these dreadful consequences would surely follow. But what kind of nonsense have we here? What sort of an argument is this to bring against the reality of our knowledge? The terms which he has put together in his supposition are words which destroy themselves the moment they are developed into thought. What is a square circle? Where is this marvelous being who has such miraculous powers of conception? Let him be produced, before we believe in him. If there be some worthy who can conceive of square circles, triangular spheres, hollow solids, &c., we should like to have accurate information of his whereabouts, before we turn knowledge out of doors on the warrant of this thought-chimera. The entire argument is this: If our knowledge were false, it would not be true. Therefore it is not true. Not so fast; first prove that it is false. Whatever a thought-necessity forces upon us,

we must accept as real ; and the claim that we need not so accept it is impossible except in words. We can speak of a straight-curved line ; but only as we refrain from thinking. So we can speak of the unreality of our knowledge, but only as we refrain from thinking.

Furnished with this test of certainty, we have now to examine the relation of thought, form, and thing. Do these subjective laws and forms hold also for objective existence? Indeed, is there any objective existence? If so much is subjective, is not all subjective? Against this conclusion we have the law of causation. This law, though originally subjective, forces us to view every event, occurrence, every change in brief, as an act, an effect, of an activity or cause. Wherever there is an action, an occurrence, a change of any kind, whether within or without, we are forced to make this distinction. But a multitude of effects force themselves upon us through the senses, of which we are conscious that we are not the cause. We cannot escape them ; we cannot resist them. We are obstructed, resisted, hemmed in by them. Our effort is resisted, our progress impeded, our way determined by them. There is no escape from concluding that these are real, efficient causes of their effects external to us. The law of causation stands sponsor for the external world ; and so efficiently does it instruct us in the philosophical catechism, that neither madman nor fool, to say nothing of the way-faring man, ever dreams that he is alone in the universe, or rather, that he is the universe. The stoutest idealist never dreamed, in his most exalted moments, of teaching that his fellow-men are only notions of his own. The entire flood of idealistic speculation might be launched against the most idealistic speculator, without in the least shocking his knowledge of the reality of the external world. The fact is, the most idealists have not been strictly such. They have not denied the reality of things without, but have attempted to teach what this externality is. What is this external world which forces itself upon us? What is its inmost nature? Is it dead matter, or is it a spiritual activity? But this is not idealism ; it admits the reality of things, and seeks to reach their inner essence, their substantial nature. But strict idealism must deny the existence of all but the philosopher, and reduce

the entire universe to notions of the lonely dreamer. But this view is rendered absolutely impossible by the law of causation. The notion can be represented only in words; no one ever entertained or can entertain the thought.

We are not only forced to admit external objects, but also to admit that these objects are differentiated from one another. For the effects produced by them are different; and by the law of identity and contradiction, we are forced to assume that unlike effects can only spring from unlike causes. A further experience forces us to assume that external things are really different in respect to form, quantity, quality, position, &c. We cannot assume that the triangle and the square are identical in themselves. They affect us differently, and the law of identity and contradiction necessitates the assumption of unlike causes for the unlike effects. In the same way we are forced to admit that things are differenced in respect to quality, differenced in themselves, and not merely with reference to our thought. The same can be shown with reference to the other categories. We are not only forced to assume that things are differenced in themselves, but that they are differenced according to the logical categories of space, form, quantity, quality, &c. But wherever there is a real difference, we must assume the law of identity and contradiction to be valid. We cannot conceive of difference at all, except in connection with this law. So then we are forced to admit the reality of external objects; we are forced to subject them to the law of causation, and the law of identity and contradiction; we are forced to conceive them as differenced, and differenced according to the logical categories. This then is the author's conception of the relation of thought and thing: Thought-laws are also thing-laws. The laws and forms which rule the internal thought, govern also the external thing. Neither, however, is derived from the other. We reach the laws of the thing only by means of the thought-laws; but when we do reach them, they are really laws of the thing, and not subjective forms which we have imposed upon the thing. Things really have form, quality, causal efficiency, apart from any thought of ours. The thing is not subject to the thought, neither is thought subject to the thing; but thought and thing agree.

But what does this agreement mean? The laws and forms of mind prove to be the laws and forms of nature also. The astronomy which we study upon a piece of paper actually holds for the motions of the stars. The predictions which we make upon the basis of mental laws, or thought-necessities, nature hastens to fulfill. The connection which holds between thought is ever prophetic of relations between things. The divinations of the soul are the deeds of nature. The astronomer grows uneasy at the lawless movements of Uranus. The mind says, if nature is rational, there must be a disturbing body of a certain size in a certain quarter of the heavens. The telescope is pointed thither, and Neptune appears to vindicate the methods of the astronomer and the rationality of nature. But what does this agreement mean? If thought-forms were not also thing-forms, a knowledge of nature would, indeed, be impossible; because whatever we know must be known under these forms; and if nature were intractable to them, it must remain forever without our knowledge. But why should not nature remain without our knowledge? What necessity is there that nature should be known? Why should it not stand over against us as an eternal x ? Instead of being subject to the laws and forms of thought, why should it not be subject to laws and forms $= x, y, z$? In brief, the laws of thought are the laws of nature. The forms of thought are the forms of nature. The differentiating activity of nature is one which obeys thought-laws, and proceeds according to thought-forms. This agreement of thought-forms and thing-forms, this pliability of nature to the purposes of mind, alone fits the world to be the training-school of intelligence; and this agreement can only be viewed as a pre-established harmony; which in turn must be viewed as the work of an activity which proceeds according to logical laws and forms, that is, as the work of a Rational Mind. Such is the author's conclusion; and we must confess our complete agreement with it. The importance and signification of the fact that nature can be known and interpreted at all, has never been properly estimated. Unless nature's methods are rational they cannot be known. Unless nature obeys the laws which control our thought, it can never come into knowledge. The very knowability of nature postulates absolutely this

agreement; and all experience and observation confirm it. Whoever will be at the pains to clear his thought of confusion, and to put a content into his ideas, will see that the harmony of nature to the purposes of knowledge and intelligence assumes that nature is either informed with intelligence, or is the product and expression of intelligence.

The author reaches the same conclusions, again, by a consideration of the moment of relativity which lies in the conception of difference. Only those things can be differenced which are related and in some sense identical. In order that two objects be absolutely differenced, one must be conceived as being and the other as not-being. But not-being is nothing, and hence with the last element of relation the object vanishes into nothingness. Only the related, then, or those things which have something in common, can be differenced. But the differences of each depend upon the other. A thing is what it is only in distinction from, and relation to, another. The properties of a thing are its differences from others; but its differences are relative, and dependent not only upon itself but also upon those others from which it is differenced. Hence if we consider external objects as differenced, we must consider them also as related. If we conceive them as having different properties, we must conceive those properties as existing not in themselves alone, but as postulating other objects. These, however, are in the same dilemma; each postulates another, which, in turn, postulates a third, and so on. To apply this to the atoms into which science seeks to resolve the physical universe. Science is inclined to view all things as arising from the combination of certain ultimate elements, which are endowed with definite qualities or powers; and from a confused conception of these elements, not a few have imagined that such a mass of atoms might have existed from eternity, and hence may be entirely independent. But the belief rests really on subjective confusion, and not on objective fact. For these atoms are conceived as differentiates—as having peculiar powers. But each atom is what it is, not in itself alone, but in its relation to another. Thus oxygen depends upon hydrogen and the other elements with which it combines for those peculiar modes of working

which we call its properties, as well as upon itself. To change the oxygen would change its properties. In brief, every atom depends for its definite properties upon the nature and properties of all the rest. Each one is the condition of the others. Hence all are conditioned and dependent; and the atomic differences, or qualities, because of this mutual conditioning of one another, cannot be viewed as unoriginated, but must be thought as established. The atoms cannot be viewed as the primal source of things. This appears more clearly still, if we consider their activity. An atom absolutely alone would have no power whatever; it is only in relation to another that it can be active. All atomic working is a relative, a conjoint working. But such a working cannot be independent. In its very conception it is conditioned upon the working of another. It is granted that any given atomic action is dependent upon the entrance of its condition. If the condition were always present the action would be eternal. Hence the commencement of any atomic working postulates the pre-entrance of its condition. But this entrance is also an action, which is impossible without the entrance of its condition. But this second entrance is in the same predicament; and so on in indefinite regress. But this regress cannot be infinite; because in that case we should have a series of activities which is at once eternal and not eternal. Eternal because infinite; and not eternal because the series could not begin without the previous activity of its condition. If, then, we look upon the world as a collection of different objects; or if, with the scientist, we view it as essentially the product of differentiated atoms; in neither case can we view this variety, this manifoldness, as independent and self-existent, but must rather view it as originated and established. The relativity which lies in the notion of difference compels us to conceive the differentiation of external objects as the work of a Power which proceeds according to mental methods; that is, we must view this differentiation as originated and established by a Rational Mind.

Hence it appears that the categories have not only a logical, but also a metaphysical value. They are in origin purely formal, but are found to have an ontological application. The author's view includes those doctrines which we have just

denied. Aristotle was right in saying that the categories are universal predicaments of things; for the formal, logical laws are now seen to be also ontological laws. The Stoics were right in viewing the categories as the determinations of things, because things are actually determined according to them. Plotinus was right in teaching that they are the metaphysical prius of the thing; for a thing is a thing only as it is distinguished from others, and this distinction implies the application of the categories. Hegel was right in considering them as the universal determinations of thought. But all these committed the error of looking upon the categories as originally metaphysical, instead of formal—a position which either cannot be proved, or which involves insoluble contradictions. We believe that there is no possibility of either logic or metaphysics unless we hold, with the author, to the purely formal character of the thought-laws and forms. If ontology be at all possible, it will only be as we are compelled by these laws and forms to ontological assumptions.

The argument thus far may be summed up as follows: We reach definite knowledge only through a process of differentiation. But this process implies laws and norms. The laws are those of identity and contradiction and of causation. The norms are the fundamental logical categories. Only through the application of these can we gain any definite idea, thought, perception. With this proof the sensational philosophy is remanded to silence or dogmatism. But these laws and norms compel us to recognize an outer world, which is also subject to thought-laws and forms; and this is intelligible only as the work of a Rational Mind. With this proof, atheism is driven out of philosophy to take irrational shelter in the arbitrary assumptions of unreasoning prejudice. This manifoldness of the external world, again, can only be viewed as originated, and hence as postulating an originator. With this proof, pantheism ceases to have any rational ground, and sinks to the level of an illogical heresy. Finally, these laws and forms, being expressions of the essential nature of the mind, are necessary and universal in human thought. Hence, whatever knowledge flows from them is universally valid.

Such is the author's doctrine of the categories in general. They are not innate ideas, for there is no such thing. For philosophic thought, they become general notions, by the same process of difference and comparison through which we gain all our general notions. But fundamentally, and in essence, they are the universal points of comparison, the norms of differentiation according to which the mind proceeds in gaining knowledge. But it does not yet appear what notions are to be viewed as categories. The next thing is to answer this question.

This point we must pass over somewhat hastily, and content ourselves with an outline of the discussion. The author distinguishes four classes: primary categories, categories of simple nature (*Beschaffenheit*), categories of relation, and categories of order. Under the first class fall the categories of Being, of Activity and Act, of Space, and of Time. These express the most fundamental norms of differentiation, whence their designation. Whether they represent external relations or not, they do express the most essential conditions of our knowledge. Remove them, and thought lapses into indistinguishable chaos. Under the second class come the categories of quantity and quality, with their subdivisions. These are also categories, because they rule everywhere and necessarily in thought. The child and the uncultured man, no less than the philosopher, apply these norms. They are necessary, too, to give definiteness to the differentiations under the primary categories. That things should be differenced in relation to Being, Activity, Space, and Time alone, would give us no exact knowledge. It is only as the more definite differentiations, according to the categories of quantity and quality, are added that we attain to a knowledge of definite things. These two classes of categories are the conditions of knowledge in general. Upon them rest the principles of mathematics, and all the fragmentary disconnected knowledge of common life. The last two classes, the categories of relation and of order, are essentially categories of scientific knowledge. They are indeed more or less applied in the every-day judgments of men, but they find their chief application and importance in their relations to science.

It will scarcely be questioned by anyone that the first two classes of categories are valid for things as well as thoughts. Objects are really differenced in space and time, in quantity, quality, activity, &c. We are forced to assume a manifold of external things, and to admit that these are really subject to the two logical laws, and are differenced according to the simple logical categories. These laws and categories, then, bring us face to face with an indefinite multitude of things which differ in quantity, quality, activity, &c.; is it possible to reduce this manifold to the unity of scientific or systematic knowledge?

Whatever be the fact of nature, it is unquestionable that this manifold can become systematic knowledge for us only as we can reduce it to order, separate it into classes, subject it to law. If there is no system in nature, we must impose one upon it. If there be no order in nature, we must invent one. If there be no laws really controlling the activities of external things, we must imagine them. If there be no classes or kinds in fact, we cannot dispense with them in theory. Until this is done, nature remains for thought a chaotic collection of individuals; without rational connection, without order, without unity. System is a necessity, and the very essence of science. Law, order, unity are the goal towards which science unconsciously but necessarily strives. Whether this order represents anything more than a subjective necessity is a question, but it is beyond all doubt that it does really represent a subjective necessity. Dissolve the classifications of science, and knowledge relapses into an intractable, unknowable confusion. Abolish the laws in whose pattern science believes the web of the universe is woven, and once more chaos comes again. What now are the norms according to which science proceeds in reducing the manifold of creation to the unity and system of knowledge?

A first necessity is the formation of general notions, or concepts, under which individuals can be united. Under such general terms as man, plant, animal, metal, mineral, we subsume the individuals of the several classes, and thereby are enabled to gain a general outlook upon the multiplicity of nature. In the same way the conception of chemical affinity enables us to unite in one thought the myriad chemical changes

which are forever going on. The conception of gravitation makes it possible to collect the siderial movements and the greater part of terrestrial motion into one general thought. By the aid of the two notions, organic and inorganic, we distinguish all material existence into two great classes. By the aid of other notions we divide and subdivide these again and again; or we invert the process and from the lower proceed to the higher and more general. Gold, silver, iron, copper, &c., we unite under the one notion, metal. Granite, feldspar, quartz, trap, &c., we unite under the more general notion of stone. Stones, metals, &c., are subsumed under the notion, mineral. In the organic world, too, the implicit aim is classification, through the formation of general notions. We distinguish species, genera, orders, classes, types; and these notions with their subdivisions serve as guides to our investigation. Without the process thus roughly sketched all science is impossible. Not only must thing be distinguished from thing, but class must be distinguished from class, and type from type, to make systematic knowledge possible. Until this is done, we are lost in the bewildering multitude of individuals, and are as far from science as a dictionary is from a discourse. Without the notion of chemical affinity, chemical changes present an irreducible chaos to thought. Without that of gravitation, there is no possibility of relating the multiform movements of the earth and heavens so as to make them subjects of knowledge. Without organic classifications the scientific mind is lost in utter bewilderment. Whether the notions we form correspond to any objective reality, may be questioned, but at all events we must form them. All unconsciously, but necessarily, the process of generalization, the forming of classes, &c., goes on. Before science was dreamed of, the human mind was busy comparing and generalizing; and the work of science in this direction is only an attempt to give greater exactness and extension to this process. Hence from this subjective necessity, the author concludes that the notion in general is a logical category; meaning thereby that it is a norm given in the nature of our thought, according to which our thinking proceeds and must proceed in those differentiations which are essential to knowledge.

Again, in nature nothing stands, but all things flow. Nature is not a collection of resting, inactive objects, but is a constant activity, with its correlate of constant change. This necessitates new postulates as the condition of scientific knowledge. If nature is not to relapse into indistinguishable confusion, this activity must be an orderly one. There must be law there. Science assumes this necessarily. It never questions the existence of law, but only seeks to determine what it is. Whether there really are controlling laws in nature, whereby the multi-form activities of things are governed, may be questioned; but at all events, without such assumption science is impossible. Only as we are enabled to find in the unceasing change of things an abiding, unchangeable order, which all change obeys, are we enabled to look before and after. Without this conception, we are shut up in the present, and cut off alike from the past and the future. What has been, we cannot tell; what will be, is impossible to predict. The stream of things has no definite course, and knowledge is entirely impossible. If, then, there is no law, no abiding order in nature, we must invent one in order to bring it within the possibility of knowledge. The mind necessarily assumes the existence of laws in nature, and with this assumption another is implicitly made. Our own activity, so far as it is rational, has an end in view. We distinguish between our activity as means and our purpose as end. When, then, borrowing our conception of activity from our own consciousness, we attempt to extend that conception over external nature, we are forced to attribute to this activity all that belongs to our own. The activities of nature obey definite laws; they oppose and yet harmonize with each other in such a way that each supports the others, and all together effect an orderly and harmonious working. To such an activity we cannot help attributing purpose; at least, if we do, it is only by dwelling in the fog of confused ideas. Whether there be purpose in nature or not, nature never becomes intelligible to us, except as we view it as the fulfillment of a purpose. The balance of attraction and inertia, whereby the central and tangential forces are equalized, is only intelligible as having for its end the maintenance of the planets' orbits. The law of chemical proportions, whereby alone the constant chemical

changes are prevented from plunging nature into chaos, is only intelligible as the result of purpose. The revolution of the planets on their axes, whereby a constant inequality of heat is maintained, and terrestrial life and motion are made possible, is, again, only intelligible as we suppose it planned with reference to this end. But not to offer any more illustrations, nature becomes intelligible to us only as we view it as the result of a plan. Whether there be any plan is a question, but we must assume such a plan in order to bring it into the unity of systematic knowledge. From this necessity of our thought the author concludes that purpose in general is a logical category. We seek involuntarily to find not only what nature is, but what it is for; and in so doing we necessarily apply the idea of purpose as a norm of differentiation.

But if we must separate things into kinds and classes, and if we must view these as expressions of purpose, science is compelled to sum up all these several purposes in one great overruling purpose—the idea. If these subordinate purposes, activities, classes, &c., do not harmonize, then nature is at war with itself, and the possibility of the final unity of science is destroyed. This unity, however, can only consist in a thought, which ruled in the beginning in those primary determinations from which all things may have flowed, and for whose realization the whole creation exists. If the sciences are a unit, if nature is an order and not a discord, then from the centre to the circumference of creation, from the beginning to the end, there must be a ruling thought in which all lower thoughts are taken up and united. Whatever may be possible to absolute science, human science becomes possible only through differentiating the indefinite multitude of things and powers into kinds and classes, only by subjecting them to the reign of law, and making them the expressions of a purpose; and attains its final, highest unity, only by gathering up all these lower purposes into the harmony and unity of one all-controlling purpose, thought, idea, in which all else finds its explanation, and towards which the whole creation moves. Because of this necessity of our thought, the author makes the idea the last and highest of the logical categories; it is the category which we must apply in our attempts to reach the highest unity of knowl-

ledge. Until this is done, science remains unsatisfactory and incomplete; when it is done, science has reached its goal, and the mind is satisfied.

But here, again, we must remember that all this is purely subjective. We should completely misinterpret the author's view if we did not keep this fact in mind. These higher categories, like the simpler ones, express originally only subjective needs; and it does not follow that they correspond to objective fact. This inquiry does not properly belong to logic, but to metaphysics or theories of knowledge. Logic is concerned only with the investigation of the subjective laws and forms which knowledge and thought must obey and assume. When, then, it has proved that all knowledge must be subordinate to these subjective needs, and that scientific knowledge, in particular, involuntarily and necessarily proceeds according to the categories of relation and race, its work is done. But since we have already seen that the simple categories also correspond to things, we may leave the logical field once more, and inquire whether these higher categories correspond to objective nature. Are there laws and purposes, kinds and classes in the external world?

Here again the author departs from Kant. Hitherto we have found him in complete agreement with Kant as to the subjective origin of our mental forms, but asserting, in opposition to him, an objective validity for them. The same opposition appears here. Kant admitted the subjective necessity of these higher forms in order to give unity to knowledge, but allowed them only subjective validity. The author, however, insists upon their objective worth; and views the denial as resting upon confused notions instead of objective fact. No scientist would deny the existence of law, though many would question the presence of purpose. The laws themselves, they say, are sufficient to explain all that seems to be the outcome of a plan. Not unless we have become properly muddled in our ideas. Adopting the generally received atomic theory, we must say that the possibility of a law of atomic working rests altogether upon the atoms themselves. The nature of the atoms must be such that, in spite of their differences, they may unite in a harmonious working. But from an

examination of the element of relativity which lies in the notion of difference, we have already seen that these atomic differences and relations cannot be viewed as unoriginated. Hence the laws to which the scientist so confidently appeals must be viewed as imposed. The nature of the atoms was determined with reference to the rules which they were to obey; and the rules again can only be viewed as selected with reference to an ulterior end. If, then, the scientist were able to lead all things back to his hypothetical atoms, he cannot stop here, but must go behind them to a Power which determined them and their laws in accordance with a preëxisting plan and purpose.

This general proof is most strongly supported by experience. So plain do the marks of purpose appear as we observe the special activities of nature, that we are forced either to admit a purpose, or fall back on the positivistic position, that things are as they are, and there is no more to be said about it. This position, however, is tenable only in word. Its most determined supporters, as well as its author, have always been triumphantly successful in stultifying themselves. Here we cannot do better than translate the author's note:

"Involuntarily the thought forces itself upon us that the attraction of the sun and the tangential force of the planets are set in such exact balance in order that the planets may maintain their regular elliptical course around the sun;—that the earth constantly radiates as much heat into space as it receives from the sun in order to secure that disturbance and reëstablishment of the equilibrium of heat which is necessary to the maintenance of physical, chemical, and organic processes;—that the simple elements of organic nature unite only in definite, constant proportions in order that, in spite of the continual change under the influence of light, heat, and electricity, the same classes of mineral bodies may ever be reproduced;—that the soil holds fast to all those elements which are necessary to the nourishment of plants, giving up none of them to the filtering rain-water, but on the contrary depriving the water of all these elements, in order that plants may find their necessary nourishment, and the plant-kingdom may be preserved,—that the atmosphere is composed as it is, and that this

composition, though continually disturbed by the breathing of animals, is continually restored through the life-processes of plants, in order that plants and animals may continue to live.

* * * Not from walking and work, but beforehand, in the womb, the sole of the foot and the inner surface of the hand cover themselves with a thicker skin. Among all the higher animals the lungs, the eye, the ear, form in the womb or egg long before there is any contact with the air, or any affection of the auditory or optic nerve through the ether, or sound-vibrations. And everywhere these organs are formed in exact agreement, not only with the circumstances of the animal, but also with the nature of the light and air;—as, indeed, they must be, if lungs, eyes, and ears are to fulfill their purpose. Even the eye of the fish is constructed in exact conformity to the law of refraction in water, while its gills correspond exactly to the denser element which for fishes supplies the place of air. The human body maintains its existence only as the blood receives and removes from every single part whatever is worn out and injurious; and returns whatever is needful. In the bones it deposits phosphate of lime, in the muscles nitrogen, in the salivary glands saliva, in the ears ear-wax, in the eyes a crystalline substance, in the nails and hair horn-material, in the nerves brain-substance, in the gall-bladder gall, in the glands of the stomach the pancreatic juice, in the intestinal canal mucus, in the kidneys urine, in the lungs carbonic acid: everything at the right time and place, in due quantity and proper proportion, exactly as the needs of the whole and the functions of each single organ demands. This process repeats itself, *mutatis mutandis*, in all animals and, though in simpler form, in all plants. And in order that it may be completed, there is necessary not only a harmonious working and a constant equivalence of the great forces of inorganic nature, but also a continual disturbance of this equilibrium which, however, must never go beyond a certain limit, and must always return again to equilibrium." (p. 222.)

Whether then we view nature as subject to law, or whether we contemplate its specific working, the conviction forces itself irresistibly upon us that the subjective category of purpose is an objective fact of nature. The conclusion can be escaped

only by taking shelter in the friendly fog of meaningless phrases, and heroically refusing to think.

The question whether nature is really classified meets with a similar answer. We can, to be sure, form classes indefinitely by adopting artificial standards. In this way we could form classes which should cross and recross one another, and which would express only a subjective classification. Still we cannot help thinking that there is a natural, as well as an artificial, classification of things. Kepler declares that, in the order of nature, he thinks the thoughts of God; and Agassiz insists that a just and thorough classification is an interpretation of the Creator's thoughts. This, indeed, is the goal towards which rational science must strive, if it is to have any more than a subjective value. Even admitting a doctrine of development, it does not affect the conclusion. Have the various branches of the tree of life developed from a common stem? they are different branches now. However kinds may have originated, they are in actual existence. A man is neither a tree nor a toad, a mouse is neither an elephant nor a whale. Whatever bridges may have originally existed between these kinds, they are plainly broken down. There is a real and essential difference now existing between the various classes in the organic kingdom. In the inorganic we find the same fact. The elements are separable into classes; and so are their compounds. Gold is not lead; iron is not copper; limestone is not granite. An actual classification exists in nature. If the objector should claim that he can lead all the order of nature back to atomic combinations, and suggest the possibility of deducing even the chemical elements themselves from a common root, still he has not escaped the conclusion. For in that case this power which lies at the foundation of nature has differentiated itself into kinds and classes, and the essence of a class would exist in the predetermination of that power. Lead all things back to a single activity, if you will; that activity actually proceeds according to the logical category of kinds. Whatever has come out of it was in it. If you view it as free, the point is granted. If you view it as conditioned, then it owes the determinations upon which its development depends to the unconditioned behind it. In either case the

kinds and classes of nature about on intelligence, and can only be viewed as the development of a thought. Logically we proceed from the individual to the universal, but ontologically the idea is first—the old Platonic standpoint.

Thus we reach once more, but in a wider and more intimate sense, our previous conclusion that the laws of thought are the laws of nature. Thought is the pattern in whose diamond plan the web of the world is woven. Thought is the *prius* and the goal of things. The *prius* because in accordance with it nature received all its determinations; it is the goal because the whole creation works towards its realization. The particular purposes of nature are only to be discovered by examination, but the mind insists that there is purpose of some kind there. What it is we shall never fully discover. Of lower purposes we may learn something, but that primal thought, that final purpose moves far above our heads and is hidden from our sight. The clouds which are on the slope forbid us to view the summit. But both subjective need and objective fact alike compel us to assume its existence. We conclude, then, that the mind brings to the study of the universe the form of knowledge in general, and nature or experience fills up the outline. Each is meaningless without the other. Form alone is void, content alone is chaos. By the mutual interaction of the two, the solid structure of knowledge is built up, and a living advance is won.

Such is a general outline of the author's theory. Having conceived the mind as a differentiating activity, it was necessary to find the laws which such an activity must obey. Those principles without which differentiation in general would be impossible are the logical laws. Those norms which lead the differentiation are the logical categories. It will be seen that the author uses the word category in a more extended sense than it commonly receives. Instead of serving for the small list of predicaments of the Aristotelian or Kantian table, it stands for any norm of differentiation. The subdivision of the categories, the origin of our general notions, the polemic against the abstraction-theory, the doctrine of the judgment, the examination of the notions of Being, Substance, Change, &c., we are compelled to pass over. These last-mentioned no-

tions lie at the bottom of both science and philosophy; and misconceptions of their meaning have been the cause of nearly every error from the time of the Eleatics down to the latest theoretical abortion. A misconception of Being caused the Eleatics to deny the possibility of change, and hence the reality of sensuous knowledge. A wrong definition of substance led to Spinozism.

Nearly every philosophy has felt called upon to deny the possibility of change and motion for the same reason. We can only say of the discussion in general, that we know of none so satisfactory, none which so successfully steers clear of the contradictions which from the beginning have clung to these notions upon which all knowledge rests. It will be seen at once that the work is not a logic in the common sense of the word. *Barbara*, *Celarent*, and the rest of that unfortunate family are let severely alone. The aim of the work is to examine the subjective laws and forms of knowledge and thought, and to investigate the content of those fundamental notions on which all knowledge is based. We agree most heartily with the author in this aim. The whole machinery of words is utterly useless for purposes of reasoning. Clear notions necessitate right reasoning, and confused notions will result in confusion in spite of *Barbara & Co.* We conceive that the great want of to-day, whether in science, philosophy, or religion, is clear notions; and the only hope of escaping from the universal Babel which raves about us lies altogether in this direction. Thought, in all three of these departments, has been haunted and cursed from the beginning with meaningless phrases, which from long use are supposed to have some miraculous content; and with shapes of thought, which have lurked like ghosts in the background of knowledge, to the great advantage of error, and to the intense alarm of persons of weak nerves. For the clearing out of these myths and mischiefs, we look upon the book in hand as a most valuable ally. Taken in connection with the author's other works, we know of no other discussion in which the conditions and the limits of knowledge are drawn with so clear an eye and so steady a hand. The author is distinguished from the traditional German speculator in many important respects: 1st, in always

meaning something; 2d, in always knowing what he means; 3d, a clear expression of his meaning; 4th, by a profound regard for fact as distinguished from baseless speculation.

Thus far we have contented ourselves with exposition. In conclusion, we must say that this logical question is the most fundamental one in philosophy. Until it is settled, philosophy is only dogmatism, irrational, and baseless. Let it then be settled. Let the possibility and the limit of knowledge be inquired into. The author's position is a most sweeping one, and its truth is a matter of great interest. If, then, any one has aught to offer against the leading principle here expounded, we hope that he will not fail to urge it; and we promise him in advance a cordial and a candid hearing.

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ARTICLE III.—PRINCE HOHENSTIEL-SCHWANGAU,
SAVIOUR OF SOCIETY.

ROBERT BROWNING has been long enough in the eye of his generation to have achieved a somewhat unique fame. He is a thinker, plainly. He is a philosopher. He is a metaphysician. In the field of pure reason he handles keen logic, and handles it deftly. But his place as a poet is a vexed question, and seems likely to become more so with every book that emerges from his teeming brain. His poetic virtue is occasionally marvelous. But he is wont to build his airy fabrics upon the firmest and toughest of prose. From his sublimest flight through the firmament of song he suddenly drops upon the arena of debate, and plunges into abstruse dialectics which are equally fatal to his antagonist and to his reader. James Russell Lowell, in one of his delightful essays, has preserved for us a racy anecdote, whose moral, more in sorrow than in anger, may be commended to Mr. Browning: "Mr. Savage Landor once told me that he said to Wordsworth, 'Mr. Wordsworth, a man may mix poetry with prose as much as he pleases, and it will only elevate and enliven; but the moment he mixes a particle of prose with his poetry, it precipitates the whole.' Wordsworth, he added, never forgave him."

It has become common also to complain of Mr. Browning's obscurity. His logic is so pertinacious, his syntax is so curt, and he so disdains the verbal conveniences which his mother tongue has provided, that instead of poet, he is a very knight of the fog. We lose him, and have to watch for his reappearing. He prefers to write for the illuminati. Many of his metrical tractates are esoteric doctrine, prepared only for the initiated few. It is on principle too. If it were only the oracular utterances of a genius that must speak according to the nature of the inspiration which possesses it, or if it were only the eccentricities of a genius born under an odd star, the sin would be venial. But after whole generations of the finest and largest minds have achieved so much, both in prose and

poetry, towards purifying and glorifying English style and making it an instrument for expressing at once the subtlest and the sublimest thoughts in the clearest manner, it requires more of grace than we have ordinarily at command to stand by and see one of the foremost of modern poets spurning it and trampling it under foot. It is a pity that such an Olympian mind, that can speak so plainly, should think so meanly of his mother tongue and so heedlessly of his readers. The quaint fancy and tripping music of the Piper of Hamelin, the spiritual tenderness of Evelyn Hope, the intense dramatic velocity and glow of the Ride from Ghent to Aix, and to enumerate no further, the marvelous metaphors which glitter in every one of his poems, should have convinced their author that he had magnetic power over all hearts, and need not withdraw into the clouds. He might have made the whole world of English and American homes his constituency; but the circle of his readers is small, and even their homage is not unmixed. He writes two kinds of verse, one of which is poetry and addresses the kindling imagination; the other is metrical speculation, addressed to the cooler brain. His prolific genius has produced full reams of both. In a country which winnows its literature with such energy, it is not hard to predict which of the two has the best chance for immortality. A century and a half ago, the presses of London and Oxford issued in the course of two years more than eight hundred different works in prose and verse, of which it is said all but one have totally disappeared out of the knowledge or memory of man. Of the whole eight hundred, only Prior's ballad of Down-Hall still lives to illustrate the "survival of the fittest," and is occasionally fingered by some curious reader. A familiar couplet from the Dunciad might serve as a possible epitaph for the innumerable forgotten—

Yet sure, had Heaven decreed to save the state,
Heaven had decreed these works a longer date.

In less than a century and half ahead the writings of our time will be found to have experienced a like sifting, and it is to be feared that such literary ventriloquism as the Ring and the Book will have vanished forever.

I have just been re-reading for the severalth time (and will not stop to copyright the word—only to apologize for the im-providence of the language in not foreseeing the need of it—and to adduce the example of Mrs. Browning herself, who in one of her letters coins a similar convenient term concerning “the Reverend Robert Montgomery, who walks into his twenty-and-*somethingth* edition ‘like nothing’”)—have been re-reading that particular poem of Mr. Browning’s which bears the Teu-*tonic* title above written. It contains a fair average of his peculiarities, except in the article of poetry itself, which can be readily explained by saying that it stands in the second list, not in the first. It is metaphysics in rhythm. Only in occasional passages do the words vibrate with that delicious thrill which reveals the poetic presence. Here and there a flash of inspiration; the rest is an abstruse reverie, uttered aloud by a princely improvisatore across the table to a “bud-mouthed listener,” who very appropriately falls asleep before the close. Poor weak human nature!—but then, what can a body do when harangued by the Sphynx?

The scene of the poem is the principedom of Hohenstiel-Schwangau, a not over-manageable set of syllables, that give the muse some heavy work before she has done with them.

The soliloquizer is the Prince of this principedom of Hohenstiel-Schwangau.

His rôle is that of the Conservative.

The action of the poem comprises in detail a relation of all the political movements, with their causes and their philosophy, by which the Prince, though surrounded and nettled by reformers and specialists of every stripe and in all directions, sought to save his turbulent Hohenstielers-Schwangaese from their selfish selves, and that in the conservative way.

It contains some very sensible reasoning, sometimes violent, sometimes shrewd. It puts forward some grand ideas. But you rise from the study (and without study it is not intelligible) with the conviction that it must be hard to turn politics into poetry, for with all his genius Mr. Browning has not succeeded in doing it. The world has pretty generally settled to its own satisfaction that the business of its poets is to please it, not attempt to instruct it. Poetry must shun the laborious

tasks of the reason and the moral sense, and be content with kindling the heart and inspiring the imagination. If it can incidentally accomplish more—convince—persuade—reform—throw light upon duty—quicken the sense of right—that may be so much clear gain. But to poetry these objects must always remain secondary. And if it be an error to make them primary, it is *a fortiori* an absurdity to urge them with vehement casuistry and obscure turns of thought. Mr. Browning has made the Prince talk some strong didactic prose, but we can hardly receive it as a poem. It is a political pope's allocution.

The Prince opens on his fair *vis-a-vis* with the sagacious act of joining two blots with his pen. This is his point of departure.

You are taught thereby
That 'tis my nature, when I am at ease,
Rather than idle out my life too long,
To want to do a thing—to put a thought,
Whether a great thought or a little one,
Into an act, as nearly as may be.

And several pages later he recurs to his typical beginning to make the lesson still more specific :

Why, just now,
With nothing else to do within my reach,
Did I prefer making two blots one line
To making yet another separate
Third blot, and leaving those I found unlinked ?
It meant, I like to use the thing I find,
Rather than strive at unfound novelty :
I make the best of the old, nor try for new.

Others have a genius for reform ; he will hold things steady as they are. Others can destroy, transmute, rebuild : but he sees the possibility of good in society as already constituted, and chooses to maintain those possibilities, save what is good now instead of risking all in trying to create more.

Make what is absolutely new—I can't ;
Mar what is made already well enough
I won't : but turn to best account the thing
That's half-made—that I can.

He recognises God over him. His Maker has laid out a mission for him, just as he himself lays out a mission for his courier to some distant State. He gives his instructions at the start, and will require a reckoning with his courier on his return. It is every man's duty to follow the line of life marked out for him, whether God gives him instructions for his guidance every fifteen minutes, or gives him the whole life and directs him in general what to do with it. The Prince accepts the latter philosophy, and choosing his task, approaches it gravely :—

Touch

The work I may and must, but—reverent
In every fall o' the finger-tip, no doubt.

There follows soon an eloquent and almost indignant outburst of description, setting forth the dignity of man and the moral elevation of a life whose lines all lead into the infinite : from which he concludes

This makes it worth our while to tenderly
Handle a state of things which mend we might,
Mar we may, but which meanwhile helps so far.
Therefore my end is—save society !

He admits that he might have chosen a more brilliant profession. The radical reformer attracts the eyes of the world a thousand times sooner than the conservative. More than one of those national crises happen when

A solitary great man's worth the world,

and he could have been that one sole name of glory if he had wished. But he has taken on the burden of a sublimer task ; he is the natural guardian and protector of all the teeming population beneath him, specially of the outcast and the poor :

Oh those mute myriads that spoke loud to me—
The eyes that craved to see the light, the mouths
That sought the daily bread and nothing more,
The hands that supplicated exercise,
Men that had wives, and women that had babes,
And all these making suit to only live !

Of course his steps are dogged by a rabble of specialists, dogmatizers, cynics, fanatics, reformers. But the world was

not made in a day. All types were not cast in one mould. He has something broader to attempt than to make all the oceans run in one river-bed. He will accept none of their nostrums. There is no real substance to their pet theories. They are Voice, and nothing more. And he reminds them that he himself has risen through the same transition period where they are clamoring now ; there was a time when he, like them, was Voice, and nothing more ;

Ay, still my fragments wander, music-fraught,
Sighs of the soul, mine once, mine now, and mine
For ever !

It is Mr. Browning himself that speaks here—not the Prince. And he finds a comforting unction in the memory, for he claims that these music-laden soul-sighs have echoed all over the continent, have sounded the first notes of freedom in Italy, have helped to unmanacle commerce and to extend the suffrage. But now he is no longer content to be a mere Voice—he is a saviour of society ; re-enter the Prince.

Once pedestalled on earth,
To act, not speak, I found earth was not air.
I saw that multitude of mine, and not
The nakedness and nullity of air
Fit only for a voice to float in free.
Such eyes I saw that craved the light alone,
Such mouths that wanted bread and nothing else,
Such hands that supplicated handiwork,
Men with the wives, and women with the babes,
Yet all these pleading just to live, not die !

So he labors on, declining extreme measures, sustaining the framework of things, keeping the strain equal at every point, insisting on the general weal, patiently helping on the slow millennium. The review of his work (stated in the earlier part of the poem, however) affords him reasonable satisfaction :

I think that to have held the balance straight
For twenty years say, weighing claim and claim,
And giving each its due, no less, no more,
This was good service to humanity,
Right usage of my power in head and heart,
And reasonable piety beside.

His twenty years are up, and he steps down. The verdict upon his "equable sustainment everywhere" is no compliment. People demand some great thing, and the settled welfare of years is unsatisfying. No brilliant war has distinguished his administration—nothing but humdrum peace. No magnificent public works, no expansion of boundaries, no increase of domain, no famous expedition, no splendid diplomacy,—nothing but a steady pull at prosy commerce and trade, nothing but daily work and daily wage. A plodding people, and drowsy prince! So much for the judgment of the mob. So much for the common sense of the common mass. Forever unthinking, irresponsible, inconsistent; better suited with such a leader as Caligula of old, when some who mourned for his dead sister he punished because they ought to have known she was a goddess, and some who bore her departure with dry eyes he butchered because they ought to have remembered she was the sister of the emperor. They doubtless remembered after that. The Prince might well have been both exasperated and disgusted with his illogical subjects. But he is magnanimous, and forbears. He looks at them in sadness and silence. He calls to mind with brotherly sympathy a certain statue in Rome, and almost feels that the dead marble can sympathize with him even if his people cannot.

Just the judgment passed—

Upon a statue, luckless like myself,
I saw at Rome once! 'Twas some artist's whim
To cover all the accessories close
I' the group, and leave you only Laocoön
With neither sons nor serpents to denote
The purpose of his gesture. Then a crowd
Was called to try the question, criticize
Wherefore such energy of legs and arms,
Nay, eyeballs, starting from the socket. One—
I give him leave to write my history—
Only one said "I think the gesture strives
Against some obstacle we cannot see."
All the rest made their minds up. "'Tis a yawn
Of sheer fatigue subsiding to repose:
The statute's 'Somnolency' clear enough!"

And that is what the Prince gets for his pains. Twenty years of sleepless vigilance, of solicitude that hovers ubiquitous

over every point of the restless throng, his hand never loosed from the central controlling lever to the vast movement, his heart never free from the fellowship of suffering, his brain never tired of watching and working for the interests of the great mass—a life of incessant strain—to be told at the end that he has been sound asleep! The statue's Somnolency, clear enough! In these radical days such is apt to be the fate of the conservative.

There are some keen touches of human nature sprinkled along the lines which lead to this ill-starred unluck. Notably, one passage which uses the myth of Hercules to illustrate the views of the mob as to the comparative value of splendid exploit and enduring toil.

Now, observe,
Sustaining is no brilliant self-display
Like knocking down, or even setting up:
Much bustle these necessitate; and still
To vulgar eye, the mightier of the myth
Is Hercules, who substitutes his own
For Atlas' shoulder and supports the globe
A whole day,—not the passive and obscure
Atlas who bore, ere Hercules was born,
And is to go on bearing that same load
When Hercules turns ash on Cæta's top.
'Tis the transition-stage, the tug and strain,
That strike men: standing still is stupid-like.

After all, the actual facts in a given case make only half the story. Every coin has its two faces, and both are essential to its current meaning. Every man has his *alter-ego*. Every act stands over against its opposite choice. What is, may always be matched with what might have been. Accordingly the Prince lights another havana, turns a fresh page, and consoles himself and the rosy-cheeked unit who composes his audience by adding to the realities just recited an appendix of ideal history.

Hear what I never was, but might have been,
I' the better world where goes tobacco-smoke!
Here lie the dozen volumes of my life:
(Did I say "lie"? the pregnant word will serve.)
* * * * *
Something like this the unwritten chapter reads.

Hohenstiel-Schwangau has her assembly, as is her right. She appoints the Prince for its head, as is also her right. At the end of his long term of service, much to the surprise of the knaves and fools, who judge him by themselves, and expect of him a *coup-d'état* to keep his power, he lays aside the insignia of office and descends to the common level, a plain citizen again, his duty done. Little space is needful for the wonderment to spend itself, and then up spring all these same knaves and fools, pushing forward each his one hobby, clamoring each for authority and rule, crowding each the rights of the rest, and all alike preying upon the common weal. Order gives place to anarchy, and anarchy itself rushes on to chaos and riot. There is nothing for it but to put the Prince atop of the struggling mass once more, give him dictatorial power, and let these varlets feel the wholesome grip of law.

There was uprising, masks dropped, flags unfurled,
 Weapons outflourished in the wind, my faith!
 Heavily did he let his fist fall plumb
 On each perturber of the public peace,
 No matter whose the wagging head it broke.

Lively times these. The Prince describes *con amore*. His righteous indignation fairly blazes again when he recalls an ideal smash of his ponderous authority which annihilated whole battalions of political vermin; and he chuckles with grim humor when he remembers how many swaggering coxcombs were suddenly pinched out of being:—

What foolishness
 Of dust or feather proved importunate
 And fell 'twixt thumb and finger, found them gripe
 To detriment of bulk and buoyancy.

And doubtless, when the Prince got through with them, crowds more of the malcontents could have sorely sympathized with Bessus, the well-castigated poltroon in Beaumont and Fletcher's "King and no King"—

All my whole body's but one bruise with beating;
 I think I have been cudgelled by all nations,
 And almost all religions!

This sort of energy soon settles things, and once more "order reigns in Warsaw." The work of repression has been done

thoroughly and to the satisfaction of honest minds. Then comes the "inevitable comment" of those to whom the general gain is loss. This Bluebeard, they mutter, has wasted blood: he might have forewarned the mob, and they would have gone quietly home to their shops and trades; yet he pounced upon them unheralded, and now look at the full prisons and the busy gallows. But the Prince goes straight on with his work, sustained by all who love truth and are loyal to honor and order. Timid and prudent in handling the general movement, he has no nice scruples when a flagrant wrong rears its front—he swoops upon that with sudden extinction. Let the critics clamor. He knows his business. What if worldly Sagacity counsels war, to keep the *canaille* employed, to vindicate the importance of Hohenstiel-Schwangau, to avert the too neighborly advances of crowned harpies that sit on their thrones around the little principedom and covet and covet all day long? He will have none of it.

While I have rule,
Understand!—war for war's sake, war for the sake
O' the good war gets you as war's sole excuse,
Is damnable and damned shall be. You want
Glory? Why so do I, and so does God.
Where is it found,—in this paraded shame—
One particle of glory? Once you warred
For liberty against the world, and won:
There was the glory. Now, you fain would war
Because the neighbor prospers overmuch,—
Because there has been silence half-an-hour,
Like heaven on earth, without a cannon-shot
Announcing Hohenstieler-Schwangaese
Are minded to disturb the jubilee,—
Because the loud tradition echoes faint,
And who knows but posterity may doubt
If the great deeds were ever done at all,
Much less believe, were such to do again,
So the event would follow; therefore, prove
The old power, at the expense of somebody!

Whereupon the Prince—or it may be the bard—goes on to pursue the bubble glory with rapid and remorseless irony, and chases and hunts it down until it is punctured and slashed into a thousand atoms. But he does not leave the arena of his exploit without declaring one grand exception, and a noble utterance it is:—

I foresee and I announce
 Necessity of warfare in one case,
 For one cause: one way I bid broach the blood
 O' the world. For truth and right, and only right
 And truth,—right, truth, on the absolute scale of God,
 No pettiness of man's admeasurement,—
 In such case only, and for such one cause,
 Fight your hearts out, whatever fate betide
 Hands energetic to the uttermost!
 Lie not! Endure no lie which needs your heart
 And hard to push it out of mankind's path—

which is sound doctrine, and wholesome.

Worldly Sagacity finds it hard to manage this man. He cannot be persuaded to do anything from motives of interest or policy. He must have the naked truth; nothing less, or more, or different. And when he is urged to confirm all he has accomplished by "wedding the pick o' the world" and handing down this wise knack at ruling to an heir whose wisdom shall outdo his own, he punishes that fallacy also with a wrath still more bitter and fierce than he had wreaked upon glory; and cannot resist the temptation to affix a terrific bar sinister on the escutcheon of every reigning monarch around him—heirs to the "right divine" by sheerest luck. This sounds more like a bit of irascibility on the part of the bard, than a genuine conviction of the Prince, for being of royal flesh his highness occupies the same glass house at which he hurls such a paving stone. Sane men do not commonly cast reflections on their own pedigree.

Here the Prince rouses himself and looks around.

Where is the bud-mouthed arbitress? A nod
 Out-Homerizing Homer!

and for aught that appears, she is still asleep. The Prince's peroration of some sixty or seventy lines more would not probably disturb her slumbers. From this point he abdicates the poetical office and descends from the winged horse on which he has ambled thus far:—

Plain
 Pedestrian speech shall help me perorate.

That is, for the rest of the way he will foot it. I have several times footed it after him, and confess to a singular fatality in

coming out every time about where I went in. It is not easy to see just what the conclusion means, and most of us may expect to "die without the sight." Very likely, in view of such abnormal dullness, Mr. Browning might suggest the applicability of a simile which occurs within a page or two of the close, where, speaking of the contrast between that which passes in the soul and the same thing when brought forth and uttered, he says,

But where one ceases to soliloquize,
Somehow the motives, that did well enough
I' the darkness, when you bring them into light
Are found, like those famed cave-fish, to lack eye
And organ for the upper magnitudes.

But even if the present study should betray a lack of eye and organ for these upper magnitudes, it is no less a sore evil under the sun if a poet cannot so express his fancies as to make them intelligible to the great mass of his brethren and sisters who speak the same mother tongue with himself. We allow to poetry such indulgence of archaic phrase, of abbreviation, of ellipsis and inversion, as would be *tabu* in prose, upon every principle of right method or good taste. But when a poet assumes the right divine to stir his syntax like porridge, he must be admitted to be, what Mr. Browning is called by a writer in St. Paul's, the Carlyle of verse. Even though he be a genius, he walks disorderly, and the great fellowship of the finest and sweetest minds will not walk with him.*

* There is some sound sense in the furious flagellation Mr. De Quincey administers to poor Keats for the similar liberties he took in his *Endymion*, though he grows so wrathful as he lays on the lashes, that one cannot help laughing at his passion, and fancying that the victim himself would have joined in the fun, if he had not already been "snuffed out by an article" some time before.

"But there is another fault in Keats," says Mr. De Quincey, "of the first magnitude, which youth does not palliate, which youth even aggravates. This lies in the most shocking abuse of his mother-tongue. If there is one thing in this world that, next after the flag of his country and its spotless honor, should be wholly in the eyes of a young poet,—it is the *language* of his country. He should spend the third part of his life in studying this language and cultivating its total resources. He should be willing to pluck out his right eye, or to circumnavigate the globe, if by such a sacrifice, if by such an exertion, he could attain to greater purity, precision, compass, or idiomatic energy of diction. This if he were even a Kalmuck Tartar, who by the way *has* the good feeling and patriotism to pride

A millennium is coming, and now is, in which all artists of expression, whether with voice or pen, with chisel or brush, in poetry or prose, will recognize the demand of their fellow men for the absolute truth, and truth clearly put. There will be abundant room for the most unique utterances of original thinking, for the most unexpected effects of color and form, for the most delicate touches of gossamer fancy; there will be no clipping of any of these, no restraint, no short tether to imagination, no hood upon the eyes of reason; absolute freedom in all directions, for every possible phase of that which is intrinsically good, and tasteful, and true; but in all and through all a pervasive transparency, clear as crystal. The impatient world will not stay to read the hysterical prose of Carlyle, nor to "go solemnly spelling out" the obscurities of Browning, nor to sit mystified at the feet of the sphynx of Concord. Whoever has a message to the race, be he poet or priest, story-teller or savant, he must put it in terms which will be clear to the average mind, or to which at least the mind in its best estate can readily adjust itself. The age is hard beset by some of the keenest of questions, concerning not simply the transient society of this life, but the higher ends and services of the life to come; and it has a right to demand—it does demand—from all who assume to be its instructors, not only the help of hard thinking, but the courtesy of clear statement.

himself upon his beastly language. But Keats was an Englishman; Keats had the honor to speak the language of Chaucer, Shakspeare, Bacon, Milton, Newton. The more awful was the obligation of his allegiance. And yet upon this mother-tongue, upon this English language, has Keats trampled as with the hoofs of a buffalo. With its syntax, with its prosody, with its idiom, he has played such fantastic tricks as could enter only into the heart of a barbarian, and for which only the anarchy of Chaos could furnish a forgiving audience."

ARTICLE IV.—REMINISCENCES OF DR. ISAAC NORDHEIMER.

IN the month of September, 1839, Isaac Nordheimer could be seen in the yard of the Mansion House at Andover, Mass., under the shade of its trees (for the weather was warm), seated at a table, with no book near him, not even a Bible, writing a Concordance, in the Hebrew tongue, of the Word of God, as that Word came in the Old Dispensation, to the chosen people.

With the exception of Julius Fürst's, such a work had not been compiled since the days of Buxtorf, A.D. 1628. No one had a sufficient knowledge of the Scriptures to attempt it. To do so, it required that every text of the sacred writings should be committed to memory ; that thus the mind might trace, without the aid of a book, the place and occasion of any single word, from Genesis to Malachi. This knowledge Nordheimer possessed ; hence his insight into the structure of the Hebrew language. He could watch its growth through two thousand years, the period in which it was formed. He could see its changes, for he had them all before him in one book—the Old Testament. And he had them in chronological order, so that he knew where the expressions took variety of form with the incoming and expansion of ideas, and where events as they came in added to the vocabulary. As a stream observed by one who had sufficient sweep of vision to take in its whole course, would reveal much of the laws of rivers to a discerning and reflective eye ; so, as Nordheimer's memory laid before his observing faculties the whole current of sacred phrase pressed out of the soul of Abraham's race, from the days of Moses to the building of the second temple, his philosophic spirit took hold of the words thus presented, and from their origin, and progress, their additions, and inflections, discovered the nature and ways of the Hebrew language. As "the principal words, both notional and relational, contained in the Hebrew Scriptures," thus stood out before him, with all the forms in which they appear, and all the connections in which these forms are

severally to be found, with the places where they occur, he had the Concordance in his mind; and it only required time to make lexicons, and grammars, and to write down what seemed to be the rule and law of the mind's working when it put itself forth in expression. Hence his Grammar, so thorough, so profound. Hence his Article in the *Princeton Review* on Fürst; an Article which so absorbed Prof. Stuart of Andover, who commenced reading it in the early part of the afternoon, and who finished it only as the sun went down, to the neglect of an engagement made with Dr. Nordheimer for six o'clock, that, when he met its author at the door of the seminary, too late to rectify the omission, he exclaimed, as he caught Dr. Nordheimer's hands in his, "I ask your pardon a thousand times: I should have been at my house, but I strolled into the reading-room, long before the time appointed to see you, and there I found in the *Repertory* an Article on Fürst, written by whom I cannot imagine, for who in the world has knowledge so to analyze grammars, and undergird lexicons, and light up the haunts where language has been hiding?" And as Prof. Stuart poured out in this way his soul of praise in sentence after sentence, "O, I did forgive him every thing he ever did I could not like, and every thing he forgot to do about me, or my Grammar," said the grateful and childlike Nordheimer, as he described the scene. At that moment the unknown grammarian had something of the joy he afterwards experienced, when Dr. Addison Alexander, having placed him in his own chair at Princeton to lecture, while he sat at his feet, exclaimed: "Either I have received new eyes, or Hebrew grammar a new aspect, from this young German; for what was once a howling wilderness now buds and blossoms as the rose." The truth is, Nordheimer had made discoveries in the formative laws of language, and to such an extent, that Prof. B. B. Edwards urged him to apply the process to the elucidation of inexplicable irregularities in the German and English tongues. Into the nature, into the material of the declensions, reducing them from Stuart's thirteen, and Gesenius's nine, to four; into the working and creation of the verbs, he pressed his inventive soul; accounting for the uprising of the irregular ones, on the ground that the regular verbs could not, without violation of all proper laws of speech,

reduplicate their consonants sufficiently, when guttural, to give the intensive sense required; and that therefore new ones called irregular, but normally constituted, had to appear. No wonder Prof. Alexander, when reviewing Nordheimer's Grammar, writes, "This new work requires no painful effort of memory to keep its parts in order; the perusal in it of the most thorny part of Hebrew grammar opens a vista superior in clearness, extent, and beauty, to that exhibited by any other writer. Nothing but the fear of being thought to deal in sweeping panegyric, prevents our speaking in the highest terms" etc.*

In a private letter, Prof. Rood, who was for ten years President of the Theological Seminary and instructor in Hebrew at Gilmanton, N. H., writes: "I think Nordheimer's masterly power, that in which he excelled other writers, such as the Kinchis, Ewald, Gesenius, and Prof. Stuart, consisted in the magnificent ease and absolute perfection of his analyses. I think that this talent was so much a part of his nature, that he may have been quite unconscious of it. When his mind turned itself in a direction that called for the exercise of this faculty, it seemed like an eagle soaring over the heights, and yet peering into all below. He could separate elements, and throw aside all but the indispensable. He made the whole of the Hebrew grammar so simple, that a child can understand it, and can learn the Hebrew declensions in the time required to see and commit the case-endings of the first declension in the Latin nouns. By a single stroke, he unfolds the whole philosophy of the verbs, and the suffixes. With such help, one may certainly learn Hebrew without beating his head against the wall of his cell, as Jerome did, because he could not get the Hebrew with it."

It was when crossing the ocean, on his way to America, that his grammar came to him. There he had a little time for rest and reflection. For eight years he had been teaching, in a mechanical way, the dry details of the Hebrew language, in a German University. But as quiet, and the wide expanse, and new scenes began to excite his soul, the creative faculty that was in him plumed itself and wrought. To use his own words, "While I was on the vessel's deck, the night so grand, so still, my grammar did come down upon my soul: I could not eat, I

* *Princeton Repertory*, p. 199, vol. x, 1858.

could not sleep. For three long weeks I could not sleep: but I did pray to God, if he would spare my life, till I could write my book, then I would gladly die. And God did spare my life, and I did write my book."

After reaching New York, he went immediately to New Haven, and commenced writing his discoveries. There Prof. Gibbs visited him, and obtained his theory of the vowel sounds. After the manuscript was completed, Dr. Nordheimer took it to a publisher,* and asked him to print it. A member of the firm said, "The letters are peculiar, what is it?" Dr. N. answered, "A Hebrew Grammar." The gentleman then pointed to a well filled row of shelves, containing Conant's translation of Gesenius and said, "Those are Hebrew Grammars, and there they remain;" then to another row, saying, "Those are Stuart's, and no shelf is depleted;" then to another, containing Bush's, perhaps with a similar observation: and finally pointing to an empty set of shelves, said, "And yours will go up there, and stay there;" adding, "This country don't care much for Hebrew grammars." Nordheimer answered, "My book is for the teachers, not for the pupils." The publisher added, "There are too many such books for the demand." Nordheimer replied, "You do not know my book; if there is not discovery on every page, you may have my book." The impassive publisher said, "Your book will die." Turning pale, Nordheimer, raising the roll of manuscript in his hand, threw it on the counter, saying in broken English, "Den I will die wid my book," and turned to leave the store. The head of the firm seeing his emotion, and himself not without feeling, said, "Don't take it so hard, I will request some gentlemen to examine your work." And true to his word, he placed the manuscript in the hands of a committee, among whom, if I mistake not, was Dr. Shroeder. The committee reported favorably. At the time appointed, Nordheimer returned, and it was said to him, "We will publish your book." He replied, "I did not ask you to publish; I did ask you to print my book; I know what is in my book." And it was printed, and brought fame and revenue to its author. The power of the verb, and the causes of its promi-

*Not Wiley & Putnam.

nence in all language, well styled verb, *verbum*, *the word*, stood out from that hour before the eyes of students, as never before. Why, in the Hebrew, the pronoun followed the verb in its declension, instead of going before it, as in the English, was explained. And why the third person anteceded the second, and the second the first. If, in the English tongue, in the conjugation of its verbs, but few can tell why the word "did" indicates the past, and the word "shall" denotes the future tense; no such obscurities were left unexplained by Nordheimer in his treatment of the evolution of the Hebrew verb. According to necessary order, and well ascertained law, its parts were shown to be united. Reflection came in, and helped memory to commit without effort what hitherto had been an intolerable burden. A single statement of his reason why the *kawmets* was used in the absolute infinitive, and the *sheva* in the infinitive construct, fixed forever the use and form of those tenses in the student's mind. Similar statements as to the changes in other parts of the verb, and in all parts of the Hebrew speech, where reasons were given for unexplained departures, lifted the obscurity from the ancient writings, and opened wide their treasures to any moderately industrious mind. Thus no one is surprised, that with such a preparation, and such habits of close thinking, there should have arisen from the young German's soul, and is now printed in the introduction to his grammar, a theory of the formation of language, which stands like an adamant gate, guarding and yet opening the way to future philological research. Nor did the Hebrew teacher's toil confine itself to words, and their changes. He interpreted their meaning, and shed light on dark passages.

If one spoke to him of the tower of Babel, he would say, "for a sign or tower," in order that they, a nomadic people, might not be separated, was that tower erected; not to scale Heaven, nor to take refuge in, during another flood; but for a sign, "lest they be scattered," was it built.

If he was asked to explain an obscure passage spoken by Lamech to his wives, who appeared to be jealous, he would say, "Ah, that was to teach early, that it was not best to have two at a time" (Nordheimer was not married). Polygamy was not approved. "Addah and Zillah," said the alarmed husband,

who overheard the enraged rudimental women threatening his life, because of a jealousy on the part of each that his marital affections had been unequally distributed, "Addah and Zillah, I can slay a man, I have wounded a young man. I am vigorous and can do battle; and know too, if Cain, who was a murderer, was to be avenged seven-fold, on those who should destroy him, much more shall Lamech, a just man, 'seven times seventy' be avenged, on man or woman who shall secretly plot against his life."

To give his analysis of Ecclesiastes, and other books, would require too much space; it is already printed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*; but to the application of his principles of interpretation to Scripture he was just beginning to give himself, when it became apparent that unremitting toil had disintegrated the fibre of his flesh, and the edge of his spirit had cut the scabbard through. At thirty-two his hand grew too weak to write; soon his tongue refused to lecture, in the chair he filled so regnantly in the Union Seminary; and he died.

Platonism and Judaism, thorough as was his knowledge of them, and deeply as in early life the systems had taken root in his soul, he laid aside. His mental wants were greater than these could meet. In this respect, his mind's history was not unlike that of Neander. He studied Christianity; he revered it. With great pain he alluded to a sermon he heard at Andover, in which the student, as he thought, had not grasped or properly arranged, and pointed, the facts confirmatory of the Redeemer's resurrection. Truly his was an inquiring, a veracious, and a receptive soul. And as he threaded his way along the aisles of the Christian churches, meekly bending his form, as he would, in meditation, and absorbed supplication, one could not help thinking of the words, "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold." If to the Israelite in whom is no guile great things are revealed, things making the Son of God their centre, and radiating from Him, as from the head of a kingdom, and moving, as did angels, to and fro on the ladder's rounds, can it be supposed that the conscientious, inquiring, broad, reflective, devout, faithful Nordheimer was left without such a portion of the knowledge of Jesus as the Holy Ghost taketh and sheweth unto men? Judaism had fallen from him.

Any "philosophy" unfairly invested with that name secured no hold upon his thought. Some described him as "unclothed;" because of what he had thrown off. Yet he had "a little strength." And the promise is "The same shall walk with me in white; and I will not blot out his name from the book of life." There are garments dipped in blood; bridal vestures. And now, when we think of Nordheimer, it is not as unclothed, but "clothed again," and at the marriage supper of the Lamb.

ARTICLE V.—SALMON GIDDINGS.

LET us go back, in the history of our country, to the second decade of the century. Out of that vast, wild territory of the northwest, lying beyond the original thirteen, Ohio has been carved as a State: and Indiana and Illinois have been set up as Territories—to come into the Union in 1816 and 1818. The colony of ex-revolutionary soldiers from Massachusetts, for twenty years, has been developing its settlement at Marietta. The New Connecticut, as the Western Reserve, made in surrendering to the federal government its belt across the continent, is filling in her domain with settlers from the ancient commonwealth. Pioneer families, following the highways of nature, float down the Ohio and turn up the Wabash, the Mississippi, and the Missouri, making a line of occupation along those rivers. The French Catholic settlement, located in 1682, along the east bank of the Father of Waters and above the mouth of the Ohio, has come on to importance, with its centre at Kaskaskia, which has become the capital of Illinois Territory. Louisiana, purchased of Napoleon in 1808, is just coming in (1812) as a State, leaving Upper Louisiana to be cut up into Territories. One of these is Missouri, to be admitted in 1821. St. Louis, located in 1763 by La Clede, and named in honor of Louis IX, is its principal town. Along the eastern part of the Territory other French colonies have followed, so that, by the time of the annexation, the population has come up to 10,840. The original inhabitants were all Catholics; and, during the Spanish domination, no other religion had been tolerated. But now, in spite of Rome, here and there, Protestant Americans are pushing in. The school atlas of Morse, published in 1823, studied by many who may read this Article, picturing to the eye these wastes of territories, and revealing the points of settlement by patches of government surveys along the rivers, is now a decided curiosity.

At the date of our outlook, the Home Missionary Societies of Massachusetts and Connecticut were sending missionaries

into the upper parts of New England and out to the new communities of New York and New Connecticut. Out of that divine ferment in Williams College, which gave life to the American Board, came also a fresh impulse in the work of Christianizing our country. Samuel J. Mills, the associate of Judson, Hall, Newell, Nott, having offered himself to these two societies to make a tour of exploration through the western States and down to New Orleans, he and John F. Schermerhorn were thus commissioned, while they were also to act for the Bible cause. On horseback, they went forth, crossing Pennsylvania, skirting Ohio and Virginia, touching at Marietta, Cincinnati, Lawrenceburg, Frankfort, Lexington, Shawneetown, and Nashville. Thence, for thirty days, down the Cumberland and the Mississippi to Natchez, as the guests of Gen. Jackson, who, with fifteen hundred volunteers, was also going down that way on a mission! Thence, after a stay of a month, down to New Orleans; and hence back across the territory of Mississippi, through Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Their reports, as found in the *Conn. Evangelical Magazine* and the *Panoplist*, of the statistics of ministers and churches of all denominations in the regions passed over, were probably the most full and accurate of anything of the kind to be found at that day. The account of their labors reads like a chapter from the Acts of the Apostles. They organized Bible societies in all the leading towns along their way. In New Orleans they gained the consent of Bishop De Bury for the circulation of the Scriptures in French among the Catholics, who were three-fourths of the population of the State, and in whose hands the bishop said he did not believe there were ten copies of the Word of God. In that city they found no Protestant church. For a few weeks they preached the Word and held prayer meetings.

At Shawneetown, Ill., on the Ohio, they fell in with Judge Griswold, of the United States Court, formerly a Congregational minister in Connecticut, who aided them in their mission. Here they wrote to Stephen Hempstead, of St. Louis: "It was our intention to have gone through Illinois to St. Louis, but we were told by a gentlemen of information that the route was not safe. This induced us to abandon it and keep on through Kentucky and Tennessee. We are now on our way

to New Orleans. You will oblige us by sending a succinct account of the state of religion in Louisiana and Illinois Territories, and what the prospect of organizing Congregational or Presbyterian Churches." Now this Stephen Hempstead was from New London, Conn., where, in 1787, he had joined the Congregational Church, having been a soldier in the Revolution. In 1811 he had followed to St. Louis his four sons, who had settled there soon after the association. He replied: "I made it my daily business to converse with prominent heads of families on the necessity of having stated and regular worship in this place. There was no one but expressed a desire to have it, if a clergyman of regular order (a Congregationalist or a Presbyterian would be preferred), one of good moral character and professional abilities, could be obtained.

In 1814, the Massachusetts Society commissioned Samuel J. Mills and Daniel Smith to repeat that tour of exploration, which was made along the old track, save that back from New Orleans they went around by the ocean. The Massachusetts and the Philadelphia Bible Societies furnished them a supply of Bibles, and shared in the expense of the trip. At Shawnee town Judge Griswold gave them letters to Gov. Edwards at Kaskaskia and Gov. Clark at St. Louis. Father Lippincott says: "The missionaries made a deep impression upon the family of Gov. Edwards." Both Governors fell heartily into their plans, as had also Gov. Posey of Indiana. "Seest thou a man diligent in his business, he shall stand before kings."

St. Louis they found a place of two thousand people, three-fourths of whom were French Catholics. Of the town, at that date, Father Watson says: "I have an indistinct recollection of a tumble-down French village, built mainly of wooden slabs and poles set vertically, and well daubed with mortar mixed with straw, though there were many log houses." Reporting themselves to Mr. Hempstead, the missionaries preached in a school-room, on the Sabbath, Nov. 6th, the first Congregational or Presbyterian sermons on the west side of the Mississippi. Rev. John M. Peck, D.D., the pioneer Baptist minister in St. Louis, 1817, referring to this visit of Mills and Smith, says: "Baptists and Methodists, though scattered throughout the country, had never preached the Gospel in this town."

Yet Mr. Hempstead, in a letter to Rev. Wm. Channing of Boston, 1813, says: "There are in Missouri six itinerating Methodist preachers. They preach in our Court-house, perhaps once a month. They are uneducated men and have gathered but few members." Dr. Bullard, in his historical discourse, says: "These brethren," Mills and Smith, "were gratefully received by the inhabitants of all ranks. They had crowded houses whenever they preached. Could either of them have remained in this city, he would have been supported by the people. They were, however, obliged to complete their tour of the West, which resulted in arousing all New England to a simultaneous effort to supply the spiritual wants of this great valley." Yet the people were encouraged by the visitors, who reported that on their way out they had had a letter from Salmon Giddings, then at Andover, informing them that his classmate, Daniel Gould, had been appointed by the Connecticut Society to go to St. Louis. But Mr. Gould, on his way out, was lodged in New Connecticut. Eight months later, Mr. Hempstead wrote Mr. Channing again, expressing disappointment, and, in sending salutation to Messrs. Mills and Smith, said: "Tell them we have not heard a sermon since they were at St. Louis, and do not know that we shall ever have another opportunity." In behalf of Gov. Clark and the Judges of the Supreme Court and other leading citizens, he begged the Society to send back Mr. Smith. But the Society were just sending him to take charge of the Presbyterian Church which the explorers had organized at Natchez. And it was fifteen months before another Presbyterian sermon was heard in St. Louis. In February, 1816, Rev. Dr. Gideon Blackburn, of Nashville, preached several times in the theatre. "The little shanty (for such it was)," says Mr. Watson, "was crowded, and I stood for nearly three hours, just outside the door, listening, with rapt attention, to such praying and preaching as I had never heard before."

But the man whom God was preparing to be the apostle to Missouri and Illinois was yet in the East — Salmon Giddings. Born at Hartland, Conn., March 2d, 1782, a cousin of Joshua Giddings, received to the Congregational Church in 1807, and educated at Williams and Andover, where he imbibed the

freshened missionary spirit of the time, he had for several years thought of the foreign field. Leaving the seminary, he itinerated for a year in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and his labors proved instrumental in bringing many souls to Christ. He had read with deep interest the report of Mills and Schermerhorn; but it was the report of Mills and Smith that brought him to a decision to devote himself to the work of missions in the region of St. Louis. Having received a commission from the Missionary Society of Connecticut, at the request of this body, he was ordained on the 20th of December, 1815, by the South Association of Hartford County, to go as a missionary to St. Louis. He left Hartford at once to make his winter journey of twelve hundred miles, on horseback, through the wilderness, to arrive at St. Louis, April 6th, 1816. As commissioned, upon opportunity, he preached along the way, in the destitute settlements of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. The people were kind and hospitable, fed his horse, and made him welcome on his journey. He slept in their cabins, partook of their plain fare, prayed with their families, and talked with their children as they gathered around him to listen.

Mr. Giddings did not come into St. Louis by lightning train, having telegraphed beforehand the hour of his arrival, to be received by waiting friends. But dismounting from his faithful horse, he walked lonely from house to house to find a resting place, and took quarters at a small hotel. Composing himself and taking up a St. Louis paper, the first article that met his eye was headed "Caution," and was a warning to the people of the city against a man who had been commissioned to visit them from New England, as a political maneuver of the Hartford Convention! He found there no Protestant organization or house of worship or minister. To the Catholics of a foreign tongue and prejudiced against Protestant encroachment, he wisely adapted his policy, that of distributing among them French Testaments and tracts. Of the American citizens the only man whom he found of Church affinity was the old settler, Stephen Hempstead, whose residence was five miles out of the town, where is now the Belle Fountain Cemetery. The missionary at once set up service. He preached

four or five Sabbaths, and then went out for an exploring tour, leaving his appointment in charge of Rev. Timothy Flint, whom the Connecticut Society had just transferred from South Bend, Ohio, where his preaching place had been the house of Gen. Harrison, late Governor of Indiana. Of that first tour, the 18th Report of the Connecticut Society says: "By letters from Mr. Giddings, it appears that he had performed the various duties of a missionary at St. Louis and a large number of settlements in those parts. The people where he traveled were generally disposed to attend on religious instruction, and some would go ten miles to hear a sermon. He had formed a church at Bellevue, and had agreed to visit the people in Bonhomme and form a church there." Bellevue was eighty miles distant. After occasional preaching for three months, he organized the church with thirty members, ordained elders, administered the sacraments, preached to a large assembly in the open air, and was cheered at once by indications of revival. At Bonhomme, twenty miles out of the city, after preliminary preaching, he organized the church and ordained elders. As there was not yet material enough for a church in St. Louis, Mr. and Mrs. Hempstead united there, and for more than a year he served as a valued and efficient elder of that church.

To have a specimen of this itinerant work, let us run over his journal for a couple of months:

"Four days' service at the organization in Bellevue. On Monday rode thirty miles through a rough, mountainous country. On Tuesday, preached in a block house. On Wednesday, preached at the church and then rode twenty miles. On Thursday, rode thirty miles. Rested on Friday and Saturday. On the Sabbath, preached to a large congregation at Judge Thomas'. On Monday and Tuesday attended a Methodist meeting. On Thursday preached at a private house. Visited on Friday. On Saturday rode to the Dutch settlement. Preached on Sunday. Rode to the Cape on Monday. On Tuesday, preached and then rode to Jackson. At St. Genevieve, a Catholic settlement, by Thursday, 118 miles for the week; did not preach, as the people could not circulate the notice. Saturday rode to Kaskaskia, in Illinois Territory. Sabbath, preached and baptized. Thursday, rode into the country and preached. Friday, rode to the Irish settlement. Saturday, rode to Kaskaskia, to see about some Bibles left there, and back to the Irish settlement. Sabbath, preached. Monday, rode to St. Genevieve and preached. Tuesday, rode thirty miles to Col. Cook's and preached. Wednesday, rode eight miles and preached. Thursday, preached and rode twenty miles. Friday, rode five miles and visited. Saturday, back to Bellevue: "My horse was lame for several days and unfit for use." No wonder. Sabbath, preached. Wednesday, rode twenty miles. Thursday, preached. Friday, rode to Potosi and attended a Methodist camp meeting; "Had

my feelings greatly hurt by the improprieties of speech and by the doctrines advanced." Sunday, preached, by an appointment of five weeks' standing. Monday, organized a Bible Society. Tuesday, rode fourteen miles, preached and rode six miles. Thursday, rode eight miles and preached. Friday, thirty miles back to Bonhomme. Sunday, preached. Monday, talked up the organization of a church, then fourteen miles to St. Charles. Wednesday, twenty-two miles back to Mr. Hempstead's.

On this trip of eight weeks he had ridden seven hundred miles, organized a church, preached in twenty places, baptized thirteen children, visited and prayed with many families, and prepared the way for other churches. How apostolic was this!

Preaching over the Sabbath in St. Louis to full audiences, and administering the Lord's Supper without a church organization, he sallies forth again for a tour of a month, in which he preaches twenty times and rides four hundred miles. Mr. Giddings, though he had better congregations in the country, soon perceived the importance of concentrating his labor upon the city as the metropolis for the two territories. Seeing the need of a school as well as of a place of worship, he purchases a house and lot for \$1,080, and in December of that first year he opens a school. No other place of meeting is procured until the first church edifice is built, seven and a half years later. Progress in the city is slow, so that it is not until November, 1817, a year and a half after his arrival, that he is able to organize a church of nine members, of whom the only two male members are made elders, and five are of the Hempstead family. This is the first Protestant organization of the place. For four years, from one-fourth to one-half of his time is given to the outside settlements. Gradually the church is enlarged, with additions at almost every communion, until, in ten years, the number comes up to ninety-nine, one-half of whom have entered on profession. The process of securing a house of worship was one of great toil and trial and hope deferred on the part of Mr. Giddings. In January, 1819, he called a meeting of citizens to devise ways and means to erect a Protestant church. Thomas H. Benton was clerk. The minister was made an actuary to raise money, to plan and build the house. For six weary years he was the life and soul of the effort. In 1820 he went on to attend the General Assembly at Philadelphia and to solicit funds in New England. By the Assem-

bly he was sent as a delegate to the General Associations of Massachusetts and Connecticut. From Hartford he wrote back: "I have not collected any money, and I think it will not be expedient to attempt it. There is considerable prejudice existing on account of slavery, and there is a general impression that the people are able to build meeting-houses for themselves. It would be necessary for me to state that the people are very poor and full as degraded as the heathen, in order to succeed in making collections. As I could not, and would not, do this, I found it useless to attempt to collect funds." It was not until November, 1822, that the building lot was purchased; and not until August, 1823, that the cornerstone was laid. In the spring of 1824 he ventured East again; but a six months' tour brought little aid, though among the donations was one for \$25.00 from the President, John Quincy Adams. In June, 1825, the house, which in brick had cost \$8,000, was dedicated, at once to be filled with attentive audiences and to be honored with unusual spiritual manifestation. Then he could write: "God has done great things for us; I have received during the last nine months fourteen on profession of faith. The moral state of society is fast improving." One year and a half after the dedication he was installed. And a month after the installation, he was married at Collinsville, on the other side of the river, to Almira Collins, a sister of the founder of the place, whose going west from Litchfield, Conn., Dr. Lyman Beecher had pronounced "a wild goose chase." Mrs. Giddings was a woman whose devoted piety and superior qualities were well fitted to the position to which she was called.

With the pastor now so well settled, let us turn back and bring up his itineracy. The next day after he had formed his church in St. Louis he started off upon another preaching tour of three weeks, which reads in his journal just like the specimen quoted above. In the first three years he organized five churches, all on the Missouri side. He then struck across the Mississippi and organized at Shoal Creek the first Presbyterian Church of Illinois, with thirty-three members. The 19th Report of the Connecticut Society says:

"The travels and labors of the Rev. Salmon Giddings were extended over a large space. He repeatedly came over into Illinois Territory, continuing his labor several weeks. A part of the year he was employed in the instruction of a school in St. Louis. During that period, however, his preaching on the Lord's day was not intermitted, and in several instances he made short missionary excursions. He either formed or assisted in forming a number of churches, and found it no small consolation to behold them rising in the wilderness. The French Bibles and Testaments, and several hundred copies of the Scriptures in English, which he distributed, were received with gratitude and read with interest.

The 20th Report, in 1819, says :

"Rev. Salmon Giddings is stationed at St. Louis, but makes frequent excursions into the country to preach the Gospel, and has already formed seven churches. Two of them are supplied. Five are dependent altogether on missionaries for a supply. The two most distant from each other are not less than 140 miles apart. 'Those destitute churches,' he says, 'are calling on me for preaching, and consider themselves as under my pastoral care. I can feel for them and pray for them, and that is the most that I can do for some of them.'"

In 1820, the same Society reports :

"The Rev. Salmon Giddings has continued, with much diligence, a series of labors for the instruction of the people. A large proportion of his time has been spent, by particular engagement, in St. Louis. The last year he labored as a missionary about fourteen weeks. His travels were extended in various directions, and, in several instances, a considerable distance from St. Louis. He repeatedly crossed the Mississippi and preached and administered ordinances in Illinois. On each side of the river, he found much to encourage and animate him."

In Illinois he organized the first eight Presbyterian churches of the State,—those of Shoal Creek, whence came Rev. Robert Stewart, Rev. A. M. Dixon, D.D., and Rev. Robert W. Patterson, D.D., who has just closed his pastorate of thirty-one years in the Second Presbyterian Church of Chicago, in order to take the chair of Christian Apologetics in the Presbyterian Seminary; Kaskaskia, the capital of the Territory; Lebanon; Bellville; McCord's settlement; Turkey Hill; Collinsville; and Edwardsville, whence came Rev. C. L. Watson, who for forty-five years has been serving the Presbyterian and Congregational churches of Illinois, and who says that but for the kindness of Mr. Giddings he has no reason to suppose that he would ever have been in the ministry. In each one of the succeeding eight annual reports of the Connecticut Society, mention is made of Mr. Giddings and his work. In the 29th Report, 1828, it is stated :

"Until a few months past the Rev. Salmon Giddings had been engaged some of his time as a missionary for the trustees in the States of Missouri and Illinois, but as the society over which he is pastor in St. Louis now requires all his attention, he has resigned his commission. The following is an extract from his last journal: 'The society will consider this as a resignation of my office as a missionary. I shall ever bear in remembrance the patronage bestowed on me by the society, and the confidence they have reposed in me. I trust it will appear, in a coming day, that their labor has not been in vain in the Lord. My principal regret is, that I have not done more in their service, and for the advancement of the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ. Seventeen churches have been formed in these two States by your missionaries. They contain more than 400 communicants, at this time, and have most of them been received and gathered into the church by the exertions of the Missionary Society of Connecticut. Many benevolent institutions are now connected with these churches. But few of these churches are supplied. Some are visited by a regular clergyman only once or twice in a year. I shall still write to the society occasionally, if God give me life and health, and communicate such information as I think may be of use.'"

In 1822, at the instance of the Missionary Society of New York, and in company with Major O'Fallon, Mr. Giddings made a tour out to the Indians at and beyond Council Bluffs, to see if they did not wish to have schools among them. The journal of that trip reports marvelous traveling. Thus:

"At the Green River, made a raft and swam our horses over; and at the west branch of the same river, which was one hundred yards wide and twelve feet above low-water mark, made another raft, ferried baggage and swam the horses—crossing a slough forty yards wide and twelve feet deep. Major O'Fallon lost John, the black man. In next two days, traveled sixty miles, swam three streams, and encountered thunder storms; on the next, rode thirty miles and swam two streams, fell into one and had a thunder storm; on the next, swam two creeks, cut trees and carried over the baggage; on the next, no rain, but mired the horse and got covered with mud; on the next, a thunder storm all day, with wind and hail; earth inundated. On prairie twenty-five miles from timber for camping; very cold; never suffered so much. Made 237 miles from Grand River to Council Bluffs in ten days!"

Arrived, he visited the Pawnees, Ottos, and the Mayhaws. "Though his expedition to the Aborigines," says Dr. Dimond, in the *Presbyterian Reporter*, "did not ripen into the establishment of a mission, it does not on that account reflect on his energy or penetration, but, perhaps, commends both. He made some suggestions in regard to the Indians, which must be admitted to be wise and discerning. He advised that Government should make them presents and pay annuities, not in clothing and money, but in agricultural tools and domestic animals, thus encouraging civilization. He would have the

traders located at given places and forbidden by law to roam among the tribes."

To Mr. Giddings as the bishop of that region, missionaries, sent on from the East, were directed for counsel as to location. We have already mentioned the transfer of Timothy Flint from Ohio to Missouri and his settlement at St. Charles. He was a native of Salem, Mass., a son of a Congregational minister, and had himself been pastor of a Congregational church at Luxemburg, Mass. "He was a quick scholar," says Rev. Timothy Hill, "and a writer of real merit, master of a style that for clearness and beauty is seldom equalled." At St. Charles he took many of his missionary tours on foot. In one week he walked eighty miles. In a trip of seven weeks he crossed the Missouri, that treacherous river, sixteen times. In May, 1817, came John Matthews from Pennsylvania. In the November following, from North Carolina, came Thomas Donnell, of Scotch-Irish stock, to be put in charge of the church at Bellevue, where he remained for twenty-five years. That same fall these four men, with their four churches, were organized by the Synod of Tennessee into the Missouri Presbytery, with all of Missouri and the greater portion of Illinois for its territory. Its first work was to install Mr. Donnell at Bellevue, where Mr. Giddings preached the sermon, which was printed, being the second discourse that had been put into type west of the Mississippi; the first having been that of Mr. Giddings upon the death of Hon. Edward Hempstead, the elder's son, who was the first Representative of the Missouri Territory in Congress. Next, in 1818, came David Tenney and Charles S. Robinson, from the Young Men's Missionary Society of New York. Mr. Tenney was sent to Shoal Creek, where in one year he closed his labors in death. Mr. Robinson followed Mr. Flint at St. Charles, where he preached half the time, and occupied the other half in preaching at fifteen or twenty places. He was from Granville, Mass., a son of Williams and Andover, a dear friend and coadjutor of Mr. Giddings, whose installation sermon he preached in St. Louis. He was a man of more genius than Mr. Giddings, but he had not the same power of endurance, and the opportunity of his position was not so great.

Both went to their reward within the same month and by the same disease, pneumonia. Mr. Robinson makes this touching record :

"I have worn myself out in the missionary service, and now I have not the means of making a journey,—the only way that remains of restoring my health; and, indeed, scarcely of securing for myself the comforts of life as I sink into the grave, and leave my family none knows to whose care, except there is a God of the widow and the fatherless. Since I have been in St. Charles I once had, for a considerable time, nothing to eat but milk. I went to the store for necessary food, and was refused, because I had not the money to pay for it. I returned to my destitute family, you may imagine with what feelings. None knew of our distress but those who felt it. It was November; the cold wind found ready entrance to our cabin, and we had no wood. I procured a spade, with a view of remedying the evil, as well as I could, by throwing up a bank around the house. I had scarcely dug into the earth a foot, when, to my surprise, I threw up a *silver dollar*, which had long been bedded beneath the surface! The goodness of God filled my heart, and I must say I wept plentifully at the sight of it. I could not help it. This served to furnish us with a little wood and a few necessaries."

In 1820, from Andover, under the Connecticut Society, came David Gould and Edward Hollister to labor in Illinois and Missouri, as the Society refused to commission them for a field so limited as Illinois alone. In 1821, they organized a church at Alton; the relation of that place to St. Louis at one time having been such that letters were addressed, "St. Louis, near to Alton." Mr. Gould remained a year and then went to South Carolina. Mr. Hollister, the next year, went over to Missouri, and in connection with Mrs. McFarland, who had been sent on by the Presbyterian Board, organized the church at Boonville and one on the Chariton. Of Mr. Thomas Alexander, sent on by the Presbyterian Board, Mr. Giddings writes: "Mr. Alexander is highly esteemed in this country, and has, I hope, been the means of doing much good." In 1822, Oren Catlin and Daniel Sprague came on, commissioned by the Connecticut Society to "labor in the United States, west of the Alleghany Mountains," and "instructed to go as directly as possible to St. Louis and there to take counsel with Mr. Giddings." They were sent over to itinerate among the churches he had organized in Illinois. They also gathered the yet prosperous church at Carrollton. At St. Germanus, Ill., Mr. Sprague reports that he saw a physician, who told him that he, the doctor, had himself witnessed in that place the burning of

three hundred Testaments, which Samuel J. Mills had left there, and this burning was with the approbation of the priest; and this after Bishop Flayët had assured Mr. Mills of his approbation of the distribution of the Testaments. In 1824, the Missouri Presbytery, at St. Louis, ordained Jesse Townsend, who had been sent on by the Connecticut Society, and Col. Ball, who had been an officer in the war of 1812, and who had sought instruction from Mr. Giddings. In this year came E. G. Howe from Andover, under commission from the Connecticut Society. Reporting himself to Mr. Giddings, he is sent to itinerate in Illinois, preaches at Diamond Grove, where Jacksonville is to be, and at Vandalia, since 1818 the capital, where he finds not a single professor of religion, except a Methodist backslider, and where he is entertained by the young clerk of the U. S. Court, Wm. H. Brown, who afterward, at that place, became the first convert of Theron Baldwin, and whose estate, in the reciprocity of the home and the foreign work, is now paying over \$35,000 to the American Board. In 1825, the United Domestic Missionary Society commissioned three young men, sons of New England and of Andover, to come to this field, John M. Ellis, Augustus Pomeroy, Hiram Chamberlain. The last had ridden from Vermont, fifteen hundred miles, on horseback, preaching every Sabbath and often during the week. The latter two were located in Missouri, and Mr. Ellis at Kaskaskia, Ill.

In May, 1826, the United Domestic Missionary Society was merged in the American Home Missionary Society, which, receiving as auxiliaries the several State societies of New England, assumed the outside work of these several societies, starting off the first year with one hundred and sixty-nine missionaries. All the commissioned men of this region were thus transferred, except Mr. Giddings, who remained under the Connecticut Society; even those of the Presbyterian Board were thus passed over, for the reason that the Board sent its men with the promise of \$100 a year, leaving them to get what they could from the little churches, while the Society made good a salary of \$400. In 1827 the new National Society sent on Solomon Hardy and Thomas P. Durfee from Andover and Wm. P. Cochran from Princeton; Mr. Hardy to be

located at Shoal Creek, Mr. Durfee to be ordained in Mr. Giddings' church, and Mr. Cochran to be called for a time to supply Mr. Giddings' pulpit after his death, and yet to abide the senior member of the Missouri Synod. Mr. Ellis conceived the idea of starting a Christian seminary in that region. He consulted with leading men of the State; he traveled and lectured upon the importance of starting such an institution. President Sturtevant, in his historical discourse at the Quarter-Century Celebration of Illinois College, in 1855, says: "The first attempted organization was in Bond County. In the summer of 1827, Mr. Ellis visited a settlement on Shoal Creek in that county, in company with one whose name can never perish from the records of early missionary labor in the city of St. Louis and in the surrounding country, Rev. Salmon Giddings." "In order to obtain the endorsement of a body of men whose reputation for wisdom, piety and learning would secure for it a greater degree of respect and confidence, both at home and abroad," they laid the matter before the Missouri Presbytery, to which the Presbyterian churches of Illinois yet belonged, and a committee was appointed to consider the matter, confer with the friends of the projected seminary at Shoal Creek, and report at the spring meeting. That committee consisted of John M. Ellis, Salmon Giddings, and Hiram Chamberlain, and Thomas Lippincott, an elder of the church at Edwardsville. "Before the meeting of the Presbytery in the spring," President Sturtevant says, "the committee, in common with the whole West, was called to mourn the early death of Rev. Salmon Giddings, of whom one who knew him well, a co-member of the committee, says: 'The pure-minded, far-sighted Giddings, in whom whatever things are lovely and of good report, whatsoever tended to promote the welfare of man and the glory of God, found an advocate and a friend.'" The committee, after having visited Carrollton, Springfield, and other such new towns, in their venture out upon the extreme northern limits of settlement, had settled upon Diamond Grove (not yet called Jacksonville) as the site for the seminary. Mr. Ellis having removed to this place to labor as a missionary, in his report to the Home Missionary Society made a statement regarding the projected seminary and appealed for aid. That

report in the *Home Missionary* fell into the hands of the young men of the Society of Inquiry in Yale College. Some of them were thinking of going out as a Band. They corresponded with Mr. Ellis, and as a result the "Illinois Band" was formed, consisting of Mason G. Grosvener, Theron Baldwin, John F. Brooks, Elisha Jenney, William Kirby, Asa Turner, Julien M. Sturtevant, William Carter, Albert Hale, Flavel Bascom, Romulus Barnes and Lucien Farnham. The rest of the story is well known. They came; they founded Illinois College, and planted its constituency of churches. They gave character to the State; they made their names as household words in Illinois. Out of this movement came also Monticello Seminary, now one of the most flourishing institutions in the State; the Female Seminary at Jacksonville, founded by Mrs. Ellis; and the National College Society. Mr. Giddings took the lead in developing the wilderness into a fruitful field to invite the planting of the Christian college and its cognate institutions. He brought on John M. Ellis, and entered at once and heartily into his plans for a seminary. Ellis brought on the "Illinois Band." The "Illinois Band" prepared the way for the "Iowa Band."

After his marriage, he had only fourteen months more of work. But that last year was one, even to him, of unwonted activity. The city was leaping forward in its growth. New religious enterprises were coming into life, in all of which he must have a hand. Out of scorn and derision and grievous discouragement, he had become recognized as a successful man. During that last winter there was unusual wakefulness to religious truths in the congregation, and not a few found hope in Christ. "He worked," says his faithful old elder, "like a man who had realized that the harvest had come, and that all diligence and care were requisite to save every sheaf. Though feeble and in bad health, he could not be persuaded to remit his toil, till his physician remanded him to his bed. To be confined at such a time was the greatest of trials. How he longed to be among his people." On the 1st of February, 1828, he closed his earthly career. A short time before, as he was returning from a funeral in the country, some youngsters came running their horses by him, which caused his own to

throw him off and bruise him severely. He had only recovered from this so as to attend to his duties when he was attacked with a pneumonia, by which in a few days his life was ended. He left an infant son, Frederick Salmon, who is now a lawyer at Quincy, Ill. His wife, residing with her son, in the maturity of matronly grace, survived him until 1872. As a providential compensation, not unusual in pioneer missionary experience, a few lots purchased by him, early, in the heart of the city, have made the son a wealthy man.

His funeral attested the hold he had taken upon the young city. It was attended by two thousand people. The services were conducted by the other three city pastors. Again the old elder writes: "I have never seen so much sympathy as is manifested on the death of Mr. Giddings by all classes in St. Louis. His remains were deposited in a vault, constructed for the purpose, under the pulpit; and in the wall by the side of it was inserted a memorial tablet; which, after the items of his personal history, bore this testimony: 'As a man he was kind, prudent, and decisive; as a Christian he was pious, cheerful, and prayerful; as a minister meek, laborious, and persevering.'" For twenty-five years that treasure was kept by the old sanctuary; until, in 1858, it was displaced by a more stately edifice, which also, at the dedication of the new church, took the memorial witness into its place of honor, while the remains were again deposited under the pulpit with solemn ceremonial; Dr. Bullard, the pastor, giving a delineation of his character, and Dr. J. M. Peck, the old associate, offering prayer. Salmon Giddings has had an illustrious following in that pastorate; by Wm. S. Potts, D.D., seven years; Wm. Wisner, D.D., two years; Artemas Bullard, D.D., seventeen years, of whom Rev. Timothy Hill says: "No other minister ever exerted so wide-spread an influence in the Presbyterian Church in Missouri," and whose career was so sadly cut off by the Gasconade disaster; Henry A. Nelson, D.D., twelve years, now of Lane Seminary; and Charles A. Dickey, D.D., now in the fifth year of service. That original church, numbering now four hundred and forty-five members, has been a fruitful mother of churches, claiming as her daughters the Second Presbyterian to which she gave sixty-nine members, and to which, once

under E. F. Hatfield, D.D., and now under Samuel J. Nicolls, D.D., and to the granddaughter, the Walnut St. Church, now under James H. Brookes, D.D., two hundred members have been transferred; the Third Presbyterian Church (since 1852 the Trinitarian Congregational Church, under T. M. Post, D.D.), to which eighty-five members were originally given and more than one hundred in all; the Pine St. Presbyterian Church, fifty of whose members came from the First; the North Presbyterian, to which twenty members were sent; the High St. Presbyterian, receiving twenty-seven members, and the Webster Grove Presbyterian Church, which, though not a formal colony, has received from the First a majority of its most influential members. Besides these, other Presbyterian churches have sprung up in the city to make the whole number sixteen. The original Presbytery, no longer attached to the Synod of Tennessee, has expanded itself into the Synod of Missouri, with six presbyteries, two hundred and two churches, one hundred and twenty-nine ministers; while yet another Synod of Missouri, the Old School, has six presbyteries, one hundred and forty churches and seventy-four ministers. Then of the Congregational faith and polity there have come on, in that city, the Trinitarian, Dr. Post's; the Pilgrim, Rev. C. L. Goodell's; the Mayflower; and the Plymouth; and in the State, since 1865, sixty-four other churches.

Evidently the first men are the historic men. Salmon Giddings, in his self-forgetful fidelity, enthusiasm, and endurance, was unconscious of the history which he was initiating. As the run of time throws him into the past, he becomes a marked personage. Different lines of historic investigation, missionary, ecclesiastical, educational, civil, are found, for a large district of country, to converge upon him. His church still preserves his dust, keeps his tablet before the eye of the congregation, cherishes his portrait in its social parlors, and compiles a volume of memorabilia under the title of the "*Giddings' Papers.*" Sketches of his life are published by Drs. Artemas Bullard, David Dimond, and Timothy Hill, to all of whom the writer of this sketch is indebted for information. And "that which has been is that which shall be," and is now. Not a few other men have been making such history—are making it now

Other fields are opening to such exploits ; but they only offer the arena ; they reserve their crown for the victor. A class-mate of Giddings, who remained at the last, writes : " He went to the far West—*so far*, that we almost lost sight of him." Those are the points, discerned by a prophetic faith, almost out of sight, where a man is to weave his life into history. Who are the men of this spiritual vision, of this self-sacrifice, who will yet go into the deep interior of our country to possess it for Christ?

Surely, it was only this spirit among New England Christians which, through those old State societies, furnished the men and the money for the campaign of evangelism, which has here passed in review. Caring more for the Gospel than for its adjuncts, they poured their life-blood into another church system at the West and the Southwest. Besides those men who, with Mr. Giddings, have gathered and served the seventeen Presbyterian Churches, which he reported as the children of the Connecticut Society, that foster mother, after his death, through Secretary Hooker, fished out of Auburn a lot of men and sent them to Missouri. They were Benj. F. Hoxie, from Williams, whom Dr. David Nelson called "a little son of thunder"; Joel Goodell, Cyrus Nichols, Geo. C. Wood, Alfred Wright, and Joseph M. Sadd. Then into Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee, from 1816 to 1880, that same old society sent Revs. Hezekiah Hall, Nathan B. Darrow, David C. Proctor, Lyman Whiting, Samuel Balding, Horace Smith, Asa Johnson, Oren Fowler, Isaac Reed, Ahab Jinks, Joseph Treat, Stephen Mason, Herman Halsey, and Daniel C. Banks, the last named, as a specimen, making his winter journey of four months and 1,842 miles from New England to Kentucky, and preaching fifty-four times by the way. Rev. Daniel Smith, the associate of Mills, was sent back by the society to serve in Natchez the church which they had organized on the exploring tour. To Alexandria, in Louisiana, Rev. Samuel Royce was sent; and to New Orleans, Rev. Elias Cornelius, that distinguished man who in two months prepared the way for the church, which he organized and turned over to the eloquent Larned, sent by the same society to take up the pastoral call which Cornelius had declined. All of this went

to build up Presbyterianism. Then into New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio this society was pouring a constant stream of evangelizing force, Ohio having an average of sixteen men a year; and the mass of all this influence was going into the same church system. Then the history of the American Home Missionary Society, as it has followed on, has been, largely, a repetition of the same process, until the New School Church came to be simply a New Englandized body of Presbyterianism. When, a few years ago, the writer of this Article began to search out "What home missions have done for Illinois," he expected to find, that as the State had been settled first at the lower end and by people from Presbyterian sources, the lines of evangelism would be found coming from that direction. Indeed, as one of that stock, he confesses that the wish was father to the thought. Great was his surprise to find that, not only in the northern belt of migration, but in southern Illinois and in all the southwestern country, the stream of Christianization, so far as these two church systems were concerned, had flowed out of the Congregational and had emptied into the Presbyterian. Rev. Timothy Hill, in his historical sermon before the Synod of Missouri, says: "Not the least interesting and curious of these things is the fact that two of these men [Giddings and Flint, two of the four who formed the Missouri Presbytery] were New England Congregationalists, educated and ordained there, and so far as I can discover, never had any connection with the Presbyterian Church until the formation of this Presbytery. They were supported by the Connecticut Home Missionary Society, a Congregational institution, but they formed Presbyterian churches and entered upon their work as Presbyterians as if this were the only possible plan, and everything was satisfactory to their patrons at home." No wonder that the preacher marveled. Had ever such a thing been known before—one church system, voluntarily, making haste to pour itself into another? It was just as the preacher says, not only as to these two, but as to the whole company that followed them. In all the sifting to which the writer has subjected the letters, journals, and reports of the time, the only evidence of Congregational self-consciousness he has found is the single occurrence of the phrase "Congregational or Presby-

terian" in the letter of Mills and Schermerhorn to Hempstead, and in his reply. And so, nearly all of the "Illinois Band" entered at once into Presbyteries and went to organizing Presbyterian churches as hard as they could. Nor was it by anticipative over-reaching on the part of the Presbyterians. What was there to have hindered the Congregational missionaries, under Congregational patronage, with Congregational material (the Hempsteads furnishing five of the first nine members and most of the pecuniary and social strength) from organizing a Congregational Church in St. Louis and so turning the whole of that ecclesiastical development into the Congregational way? Under the sublime impulse of giving the Gospel to their country, they had not yet learned the value to that country of the gift, which it was in their power to make in their church order. They had even rested under the delusion, as inspired by the Plan of Union, that their own New Testament polity had better not go out of New England, and had taught their emigrating families and missionaries so. Surely the Presbyterian people of St. Louis, and of all the west and southwest, have only occasion to be grateful for all of this Congregational contribution to their strength and prestige,—only occasion to welcome, in all good fellowship, these later efforts of their brethren to set up their own system of ecclesiastical housekeeping. Yet, as to the past, the Master may repeat his saying: "Whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all." And so, once more, we have the evidence that the Puritan ideas have been the predominant moral power in this land.

ARTICLE VI.—THE PROTESTANTISM OF MEDIEVAL
GERMAN ART.

PROTESTANTISM is a protest against existing forms or principles; a revolt, more or less violent, from established things; a rebellion of speech or action; a solemn declaration of dissent, or an instinctive rebound of conscience or will. In order to differ in opinion, it is necessary to have an opinion; in order to have an opinion worth having, it is necessary to think, to discuss, to feel, to perceive, and to decide; in short, to use the mental faculties powerfully and freely. All these presuppose character and capacity, and these exercises tend to strengthen character and capacity. A robust individuality creates a *protestant*, and Protestantism strengthens the inherent force of the individual.

In Germany, chivalry, the offspring of Northern nations, was the forerunner and inspiration of Protestantism. The individual was all potent. Knightly valor and success depended upon personal qualities. Knightly devotion to the king, the Church, or the maiden, was limited only by the soul where it throve. There were no limits to self-sacrifice, to endurance, to enthusiasm, but the natures of knights who exercised them.

After the decline of chivalry, the culture of individual force perpetuated itself in Germany under fresh forms of art. Verse, architecture, painting, sculpture, religion, and music, all showed the spirit of Protestantism, and even now the German mind is in an attitude of unrest, of investigation, of or against established things. It is curious to see how nations adhere to their original characteristics. As the satires of Juvenal make many allusions to the rhetoricians of Gaul: "Wouldst thou derive a revenue from thy eloquence? Then go to Gaul." And again: "Deserted Gaul has furnished the Island of Brittannia with advocates; and that of Thule already talks of engaging masters of rhetoric;" so Germany adheres to her first strong types, as shown in her past appearance in history, in Cæsar's.

Commentaries, and maintains above all things individual freedom in the domain of thought.

The investigation of art from the historical standpoint has revealed that it is an expression of the civilization of its age; nay more, that it is a visible record of the spiritual life of a race; of its growth and progress or its limitations and decay. There is a gradation of ascent in sepulchral honors, from the rude tumuli of the Scandinavian heroes to the noble cathedral of Westminster Abbey, filled with the sarcophagi of the poets; and the Egyptian pyramids, useless masses of stone, with their solemn and mournful idea of immortality, express the national feeling as entirely as a memorial hospital which shall benefit the living as well as reverence the dead, or a church or lovely stained glass window signifies our respect for life as well as death.

The idols of worship show the ideals of their makers; and the men's heads on horses bodies of the centaurs are far beyond the apes' and cows' heads on men's bodies of the Egyptians. Their beautiful sphinx-head on the lion's body shows an advance in conception. From the picture hieroglyphics of the Indian to a transfiguration of Raphael, there is an infinite scale of imaginative power revealing the inner impulse of time and race. The mysterious impulse towards art which all nations seem to feel when they have reached a certain point in civilization, the desire to leave behind them symbols and monuments of expression, is an instinct which has given after-ages materials for history, and mirrors which accurately reflect their past lives. Looking in these mirrors as in Cornelius Agrippa's magic glass, we see scenes, individuals, and epochs of distant countries, and understand the centuries that are past.

The same impulse, in a small way, makes men of fortune, at certain stages of their experience, long to build houses that shall outlast them, and found families. In this age of utility, people bequeath libraries, establish institutes, and endow colleges, in obedience to the same instinct, and each man's bequest partakes of his individuality. The Catholic Church, on principle, merges the individual in the mass and her most beautiful cathedrals are the gifts of millions of unknown contributors

to the world. But in the tenth century Protestantism began to stir in Medieval Art.

The first impulse of the Teutonic mind towards individual expression was in verse. Through the Crusades the imaginative Arabian mind acted on the imaginative Teutonic mind, and griffins and jotuns and sorcerers and spectres show kindred tendencies and sympathies. The Germans at once accepted the Saracenic influence, which blended naturally with their own instincts, and Gothic warmth supplanted classic coolness. They abandoned Greek and Latin forms of metre, and their standards of versification. It must be remembered that the admiration of what we now call the dead languages was so great, at one time, that in an old French romance of eleven thousand verses, called "*The Knight Jauffry, and the fair Brunisende*," the very birds are made to sing in Latin. Think of elegantising the nightingale!

"Chantan désobre la verdor
E s'alegron en or latin."

"They studied or conned Latin." But rhyme, the gift of the fluent South to the frozen North, the gift of the richly-vowelled languages to the consonantal tongues, had been introduced from the Orient, and at once was naturalized in Germany. In the twelfth century began the use of the German language by cultured men and scholars. Suabia, touching France on the one side and Switzerland on the other, bounded on the west and south by the Rhine; full of vineyards and rich wheat culture, and yet holding the mines and mysteries of the Black Forest in its heart, gave first its rich southern dialect to poetry, and to the nation. The divine spark kindled there into a flame. The castle of Wartburg, when owned by Landgrave Herrman of Thuringia, who was to that time what the Duke of Weimar afterwards was in the age of Schiller and Göthe, was the home of the minstrels. Its brave old banqueting hall, where the *Sänger Krieg*, or minstrel contests, were held, has just been renovated. There, later, Luther struggled bodily with Satan, and banished him with his inkstand. There he lived in the disguise of Squire George, translating his Bible in safety. There bloomed the St. Elizabeth of Kingsley's "*Saints Tragedy*," whose bread and cheese blossomed as roses and lilies. There

at that castle, the Bach family, one hundred and twenty musicians, met every year. And even now Ludwig of Bavaria, the patron of Schwanthaler, and the friend and patron of Wagner, shows the inspiration of the old Suabia. Her lovely fields smile on art, and her Black Forest stimulates the imagination.

Here, while the Hohenstauffen dynasty reigned, poetic composition rose to high splendor. Kings and queens were its nursing fathers and mothers. Beautiful women smiled on the troubadours, and the choice of a mistress of song, made in the silence of the poet's heart, was held a sacred secret of the soul. They chose her as a spiritually betrothed, as well as a poet's dream and inspiration, and held true to her as the one spouse, from boyhood through old age. Individual force and prowess were honored, and true democracy, the worth of the man against his circumstances, began to rule. This democracy had been fostered by chivalry, and now the adoption of the common national tongue, for noble and peasant alike, introduced literature to the populace, and stimulated all progress. The young squire who studied obedience first of all; who learned to obey, that he might afterward command; who saw before him no limits of achievement, save those that his own strength and courage might make for him, aspired and wrought with the utmost earnestness. Once a knight, he wandered in search of adventures. Single-handed he met giants, dragons, enchanters, powers of the earth and powers of the air, all to be vanquished single-handed; either with his lance and battle axe, or by fidelity, purity, and prayer. This was the ideal of chivalry.

In breaking away from classic forms, the impure Latin of the monkish chronicles, or the soldier's ballads, fell into disuse, and the native dialects of the poets gave freshness and spontaneity to their natural thoughts and emotions. To write in a foreign language of itself imposes constraint, and as language is a growth of race, modified by climate and circumstance, expression is far more forceful and graceful in that mother tongue which is plastic to the breath of her children, and whose mother soul sways to their intelligence. The songs of the Minnesingers show this natural grace and instinctive harmony, but they are obedient to a severe set of laws which develop indi-

vidual character and capacity for verse to its utmost. Their rhyme was not a steel gauntlet into which the moving, living hand was crushed or lost, but an elastic silken glove, which fitted the potent hand without constraint, leaving it its full force and freedom. In Mr. Kroegeer's admirable book on the Minne-singers he explains their system, and we quote his paragraph as much better than anything we can say. "Now that lines of a given number of accentuations or feet,—in music we say beats—should have optionally five or ten syllables, seems barbarous rudeness to those who look upon rhythm as anything else than the mere relation of sounding time-moments to each other. To a musician it is clear as sunlight, that four beats of common or triplet music may have any number of notes, provided the tongue can utter them sufficiently quick or slow to fill the accentuations? If the musician can rest his rhythm with exquisite effect on long notes or syncopations, as Beethoven loves to do, why should not the poet be allowed to check his rhythm all at once, and rest slowly on monosyllabic feet, if he can but find the proper long syllables? If the musician can alternate $\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{2}{4}$ time, as modern music loves to do within a few beats, why may not the poet modulate suddenly from trochaics to anapests? That such a free construction will not answer for songs is evident enough; songs must have a fixed melody, that once established, must remain precisely the same for all strophes; but for the narrative, the raconteur-style, this constantly varying, and yet in the main, in the accentuation, uniform rhythm seems to me most admirably adapted." In this freedom of rhythm which showed the very fluttering pulse of the singer, as it now hurried, now faltered with feeling, lies a part of the spontaneous charm of the German minstrels. But some of their severe rules also kept them fresh; for instance, no poet was ever allowed to use the same form as another poet. Moreover, a poet was obliged, by the pressure of public opinion, to use a different form for every single poem of his own creation. Think how these bards were put to their mettle to comply with these stern requirements of the German muse, and notice the varied and vivid forms of verse which sprang from the lips of these improvisatori! Their verses were all written to be delivered orally, "To sing and to say," Minnelied and

Spruch, hence the dramatic and oratorical effect of their verse. The noble and beautiful rhythms of these troubadours have never been equalled nor their metrical skill surpassed even by professed metre students, as Tom Moore, Swinburne, Morris, and their imitators.

At first the mythology of classic art blended with the saints and martyrs of Catholicism, but later there was nothing left of these borrowed traditions except the worship of the feminine side of religion in the Virgin Mary, and the enthronement of woman as a divinity, a view borrowed from the Arabs. The saints and martyred virgins of the Romish Church vanished before these human beings, not too wise or good to live and enjoy life and share it with their lovers, but better, holier, and more spiritual than their sworn knights. The German idea was of woman's equality; the Minnesingers raised her to a half divinity. But these singers borrowed no blood from other veins. They shuffled off the old coils of classicism on the one hand, and the stern, rude, coarse courage of the Scandinavian on the other. They found a new and lovely climate of song, a California of virgin gold, and they bequeathed it to us.

A fresh spirit was breathed from chivalry into literature, and it behooves us to ask, what was this chivalry? It was not merely a brilliant fiction, gilding the dark ages with incredible glories of romance and devotion, but a general state of mind, which disposed men to heroic and generous actions, and led them to cultivate their nobler and higher powers of all kinds. It corresponded in the nation's life to the period of youth in the individual. Indeed, the period between childhood and manhood was called by the Anglo-Saxons "*cnihtþád*," knighthood, and in the old ballads knights were called children, as in the familiar line, "*Child Roland to the dark tower came.*" Every bright and noble boy is in his sentiments a knight and a son of chivalry. Nature works thus in him, till the actual hardships of life batter out the unselfish instincts of self-sacrifice, and he learns the lesson of self-interest from the necessity of self-preservation.

Now Bacon remarks, "that for the moral part, youth will have the preëminence, as age hath for the politic," and this youth of chivalry is the flower and freshness of sincere, genuine poetry.

Its form was dictated by the breathing soul, which moulds the form. As a deep breath changes the very shape of the body, expanding the chest while the pulse quickens, and the blood flushes to the extremities, so the inbreathing soul forms the plastic language, flushes and pales it, heaves it with tumult, heats or cools it.

Each of these poets followed a naive and generous instinct, without knowledge and without limiting the power of beauty. Wherever there is life there is beauty, and the poet has but to choose out of the whole world. Let him but listen and repeat the sounds of life on his magical instrument. His soul gives utterance to the dumb silence of matter, or the stammering speech of man. Each thing in nature has its own song, long or short, high or low pitched, rhythmical regularly, or irregularly. These melodies the poet is bound to translate, each intact and pure in its sentiment, thought, and measure. In connection with this subject, a cultivated friend wrote, alluding to the correspondence between the established measures in poetry and the metronomes which nature establishes, that he once amused himself by a comparison of the Spenserian stanza, and the Homeric line, referring both to a sea-beat, the former to tidal movement, as discovered by him on land, the latter to the less involved wave-movement which one in a boat would perceive. These were the first protestings against customary limits which fetter the individual and throw chills on his burning impressions, putting out the sacred flame of poesy, and leaving only its dead embers behind.

These minne-singers have just this originality, and all their works please, though they bear no resemblance to each other. With all their close study of metrical form, they kept a simplicity of feeling which is of more value than art, for they never seem to correct or embellish. There is no tormenting or fashioning their moods. They yield to them, and in their very awkwardness there is the grace of nature. Mad. de Stael says, "but there is often in true genius a sort of awkwardness, similar in some respects to the credulity of sincere and noble souls." There is a constraint of sensibility which affects one as the broken utterances of deep emotion. The same thing appears later in the German paintings and wood carvings. The feeling of the

beautiful and true lay deep in their lines and their labor was to bring that out; the form in which it came was quite secondary. This spontaneous feeling of beauty, this fruitful imagination, a soul full of love, are the highest gifts of youth to man. As the first Adam was placed in the garden of Eden to till it, so each beautiful, youthful nature is surrounded with flowers and growth until the sword of knowledge waves between the ideal life and the practical.

It is a saying ascribed to Pythagoras, that he who exclusively exercises his mind from youth in mathematical reasoning, and the exact sciences, will be deficient in wisdom.

Taine says: "To calculate long and short, to be always thinking of sounds, of final cadences; all these classical researches spoil a writer. Every idea has an accent, and all our labor ought to be to make it free and simple on paper, as it is in our minds. We ought to copy and mark out thought with the flow of emotion and images which raise it, caring for nothing but its exactness and clearness. One true phrase is worth an hundred periods; the first is a document which fixes forever a movement of the heart or the senses; the other is a toy to amuse the empty heads of verse makers. . . . Regular rhythm mutilates the impetus of natural invention; the shades of inner vision vanish; we see no more a soul which thinks and feels, but fingers which count."

But the minne-singers prepared themselves for singing, by stimulating the glow of inspiration. They cultivated a wide, free interest in their narrow range of ideas, a wide, free imagination. They cultivated also their art of poetical composition, and gave to it hard study and great practice, such a study of rhythm, language, and music, as even the most thorough poets of modern time do not undertake. Reading these songs only through a translation, which aims at literalness, one can hardly understand the purity of rhyme and elegance of rhythmical construction in the original. But form is never superior to spirit. They yield to the creative power and not to the critical. Some one says, "All original art is self-regulated, and no original art can be regulated from without; it constitutes an inviolable whole. It carries its own counterpoise, and does not receive it from elsewhere. It is an animated existence, which

lives on its own blood, and which languishes and dies if deprived of some of its blood and supplied from the veins of another."

This intense love of nature in art, as well of nature in the physical world so characteristic of the Teutonic mind, this rapturous sense of the earthly and the heavenly glory, this pantheistic presence of divinity everywhere (added to deep respect of their race for womanhood), is their native inheritance. But beside this feeling of woman's equality there is blended with their song an element of love and worship brought by the Crusaders from the Arabian Orient, where at that time women were learned and accomplished, and not the inhabitants of the harem and the seraglio. This inspiration for their minstrelsy wove a glittering intershot in their poesy, which seems now gold, now green, now blue, now white, in its changeful beauty.

The old Northern elements of courage, fidelity, heroism, are still potent in their character, but the Northern religion seems of the past. Catholic mysticism has rather expression, and sunny Italy seems to tinge the gloom of the Saturnine north. Honesty was refined to honor, simplicity and good feeling expanded to courtesy, hospitality was a virtue, and coarse, rude courage, such as now vents itself in England in dog and cock fights and the prize ring, was turned against the enemies of the Cross. This spiritual motive ennobled them, and from their Saracen antagonists they learned letters and poetry. But the individual was never sacrificed to any rule or theory, and conscience grew. Love and religion were the two strongest forces of this renaissance, or perhaps new birth altogether, of letters.

They prided themselves on their adorations, and truly the capacity to admire and reverence is one of the noblest in the human soul. These minne-singers were lovers, perennial lovers. There is an elevation of feeling and a religious aspiration which attends the birth of all true love. The mood of every good affection is religious, unselfish, consecrate, and holy. The soul is then the very temple of adoration, of faith, of humility, of holy purity, of heroism, and charity. The human being at that moment shoots up into the angel; there is nothing on earth too great, too hard for its new divinity to conquer. And this exal-

tation of the natural and the spiritual life, the desire for victories in earth and air, these battles with the sword, and spiritual victories over the senses, were the natural states of these minnesingers. This was the first outbreak against the customary rules, the first protestantism, the first throwing off the fetters of the understanding which often cramp the individual and throw ice upon his burning impressions.

The second development was in architecture, and some account of Roman architecture and its characteristics is necessary to understand the hold it had taken on the German mind, and the upspringing of strong, new life which made them so elevate and change the old forms.

The Roman basilica was distinguished by strength. Wherever the Romans extended their empire, they left traces of their fortifications, their jurisprudence, their architecture. Trèves, in Germany, is full of Roman buildings, and Roman ruins are found all over Germany. They had in full development the column and the rounded arch or the vault, and these were combined in such proportions as to produce power and vastness. Solidity of execution and excellence of material make even their ruins defy time, and express, even in their decay, dignity and glory. The walls are richly painted and mosaic adorned the floors. The *thermae* of Caracalla are like the debris of some huge, wild mountain. They held sixteen thousand marble seats for bathers, and splendid paintings and magnificent sculpture decorated the galleries and immense halls. In these decayed and destroyed baths were discovered the Farnese Bull, the Hercules, and the Flora of Naples. This architecture became, in the concluding epoch of the Roman power, more and more gigantic. To express material force was their object. Aurelian's temple of the Sun was tremendous. Later, the fanciful Eastern mind influenced the rigid Roman. Palmyra and Tadmor give examples of what has been called ancient rococo work.

The secular buildings in Prussia are of the old Teutonic order. The Artushof of Dantzic, the old hall of assembly of the merchants, is a distinguished work of the kind. The principal castle of this order is the proud Marienburg; but the churches adhered to the flat-roofed basilica and the romanesque arch. Many of these great buildings are in ruins, as for in-

stance, Eilchau, which took twenty thousand men to build, and Ingelheim, the favorite castle of that mighty emperor whose dominion extended from Palermo to the Baltic, and from the Ebro to Raab. Here once stood that palace with its hundred gates and hundred marble columns which had been brought from Ravenna, whose walls glittered with gold and jewels, and resounded with the clang of arms and the song of the minstrel.

Architecture is a positive expression of the mind and soul of a people. It can be the expression of mere convenience and comfort, a sort of instinctive self protection, or it may minister to the highest pleasures of the intellect and the emotions.

As the German mind broke away from classic forms and priestly traditions and Runic spells, and ventured to use their national tongue and inform it, and enrich it anew with fresh thought, language, and higher soul; the plastic art of sculpture, and the imaginative and mechanical art of architecture, began to express the same change and to develop original and powerful creations. They did this from no theory, but from a divine instinct seeking after the relief of expression, and to embody their new conceptions of the ideal. Life was astir in their veins and their glad free instincts could not be cramped. As there was an inner joy in the perpetual love feasts of the Minnesingers, those nightingales of melody with the joy of the lark in their song, so these designers wrought in gladsome cheer. "Most musical, most melancholy," could not be applied to them, but "most musical, most joyful."

In architecture this new joy, this aspiration of all yearning souls, found vent. A lofty and delicate construction took the place of heavy strength. The solidity of the Roman forms ceased to express their necessities and the troubadour verse brought as its next gift after fresh and delicious poetry, a romantic and imaginative architecture. The national mind strongly awakened longed to give course to itself with greater freedom and independence in every sphere of life. The buildings became bold, light, slender, and yet sublime. The pointed arch borrowed from Egypt by the Moslems, and by the Crusaders from them, was first made the leading law and the central point of construction. Beginning with the choir of Magde-

burg, and reaching its loftiest expression in the Church of Cologne, the work of this kindled and inspired age is still the delight of the world.

The formal character of the ornamentation also changed; the conventional leaf work of the Roman style gave place to the Teutonic love of nature, which revelled in the abundance of its native flora, and delighted to portray the beautiful leaves of the thistle and ivy, the oak, the rose, and the holly. Nature spoke in the great lines of the buildings, in its towers, its curves, its lights and shadows, but also in the details and decorations. Glass windows with their rich illumination took the place of the flat wall painting. The high ceilings lifted the soul as the lower vaults of the massive Roman buildings had depressed it, and the aspiring pillars, the bold arches of these solemn temples, lit, or partly luminous by colored light, expressed a period of fresh youthful faith. Gothic cathedrals were the offspring of this mood. Their characteristic features are so well understood that it is not necessary to dwell upon them, as on the specialities of the Minnesinger verse. Travel, photographs, and description have made them familiar to our readers, and there are good examples to study even in New York.

A new style in sculpture soon took the place of the calm classic forms. The pure antique, noble though it may be, did not satisfy the awakening of the national mind. The old subjects were conceived with new feeling, were surrounded with new treatment, and each man desired ardently to breathe out his own belief in sacred things, his own personal interest in the doctrine of the redemption. The ascetics of the Byzantine period vanished, and tender, joyous, youthful figures grew into shape, beneath the loving sympathetic touch of the carver's hand. Even the masculine figures have almost womanly sweetness; expressing the love of the Minnesingers; the mariolatry of the time, and the respect of the feminine element.

Coleridge says that in the faces of England's bravest admirals, even the most adventurous like Admiral Dampier, there is always a feminine element; and we all know Nelson's last words, "Kiss me, Hardy." These strong, vigorous creators of a new style, the *trouvères* in architecture, sympathized with

womanly tenderness, and the delicate feminine imagination. The draperies of these figures were full and rich, though sometimes formal, and they flowed in soft grace over the slender limbs. In Italy, linen was the chief clothing which fell in stiff and parallel lines from its very texture, but in more northern climates, woolen garments were necessary and this softer material influenced the draperies and made them looser and more varied.

The statues of Christ and his mother and his apostles in the choir of Cologne, are very beautiful specimens of this rebound from classicism. Their attitudes are noble and beneficent, their elevation natural, and the draperies are full of freedom and grace. These statues likewise are touched with color in a very effective manner. Nuremburg is full of fine ornament. We often see photographs of the porch and main portal of the Frauenkirche, the central point of which is the glorification of Mary.

Suabia was very rich in this plastic and carved work, as her language was richest for poetry. Wolfram von Eschenbach displayed in the German chivalric epic the wondrous perfection and highest finish of the poetry of that day. The beautiful architecture of Nuremberg has its mate in his song and Suabia may also be represented by Gottfried von Strasburg, the greatest of all the poets of the Minnesinger period, whose long poem of Tristan and Isolde can hardly be praised too highly. It is much beyond Tennyson's in nobility of conception, and its beauty of execution is simply wonderful.

It is curious and interesting to see how color came to this intellectual race, which had studied form so severely. The middle ages delighted in the most extensive use of tinting, not only on wood carvings but also on the stone images that are found in the interior of churches for ornament and monument. This sprang from the intense emotion and life of the time; as the best critics now seem to decide that Turner's immense color was his expression of intense emotion. Form did not express their feeling, only their thought, and they needed the tenderness of color to qualify the severity of their form. Also the many colored light that streamed in from the painted windows required that the same principle, or tone of color, should be carried through all the other ornamentation. The beautiful

altar shrines, for instance, were filled with statues and reliefs, shaded with perspective painting and standing out from a richly designed gold ground. These little figures are covered with gilded and damasked draperies with the edges and reverse sides tinted with glittering color, especially blue and red. The nude portions, especially the head, were colored in the most tender manner after nature, and the gilded hair alone indicated artistic pedantry. The frames of these altar pieces are equally beautiful. These were carved in the most elaborate manner and painted gold, blue, and red, with the most masterful and practised use of color.

These costly carved altars were new expressions of the new instinct of the nation for varied and beautiful form, as much so as the lofty and ethereal Gothic architecture. Travelers still see them with admiration, and in many of the old German churches they have preserved the polychromatic ornament of the carving. For instance, there is an altar in Tribsees in Pomerania which has a very original but somewhat rude representation of the Lord's Supper.

The illumination of manuscript and the German miniatures deserve notice from the harmony of the designs with the poems or matter to be illustrated. These at first were only lightly shaded with pen and ink, without color, but they all betray the same freshness of feeling, tenderness of sentiment, and a naïve originality which harmonizes with the character of the poems. There is a manuscript of Gottfried von Strasburg, in the library at Munich, which is very attractive. The limbs and physical organization are deficient, but a just feeling is expressed in the attitudes; and the heads are simple and natural. The figures are uncolored on a colored ground, but the draperies are shaded. The paintings all through the Minnesinger manuscripts partake of the Gothic style. This characterizes the Weingartner manuscript in the Royal Library at Stuttgart, belonging to the latter half of the thirteenth century; the numerous pictures of the Manesian manuscript in the library at Paris, and the manuscripts of William of Orange, in the library at Cassel, in the year 1334, which exhibited lightly sketched figures gracefully placed on a gold or tapestry background.

There was often a play of humor in the illustration of sacred events. The artistic fun of the Germans indulged itself in peopling the margin with gay branch work filled with devices of the free, merry fancy. Their humor and life broke out into frolic in these edges of leaves.

But there was danger that the verse and the decoration in following tenderness should lose robust strength and turn to mannerism. This actually happened later, when sentiment became sentimentality; but just here, the Cologne school of noble and pure development rose into activity. They added depth of expression to grace of demeanor and childlike purity. There was an exaltation in their devotion, a fervor in their humility, that atoned for the lack of strength and manliness, or the absence of passionate action. The Klaren Altar now in the Johannes Kapelle of the Cathedral at Cologne contains numerous representations from scenes in the childhood and passion of Christ. Here the heavenly glory quite overpowers the earthly. "The soul is quite alive, the body scarcely so."

Stephen Lochner, whose name is preserved to us by the traveling manual of Albert Dürer, was the noblest artist of this school. He had thought added to feeling, and he fills his carvings with the same depth of innocence and pure tenderness, and uses the same simple and noble figures, but he models more strongly, and drapes them with richer ornamental dress. But he never loses the spiritual, etherealised atmosphere of genuine medieval work.

Stone sculpture was introduced later, but in this art the Suabian mind shows especially its power and activity. Jörg Syrlin the elder adorned the choir stall of the Cathedral at Ulm with the richest wood carvings, and about the same time Meister Christoph was building and carving. The Sacraments Gehäuse in Ulm Cathedral was one of the most splendid works of stone cutting. The pulpit of the Cathedral of Freiburg is another; also the beautiful pulpit in Strasburg Cathedral. Also the rare pulpit in St. Stephens in Vienna, by Meister Pilgram, and many other rich tabernacles and lectoriums throughout Germany are worthy attention.

Painting rose to great excellence in the North under Hubert von Eyck, but never to the large splendor of Italy. There

was great sublimity about it; blending something of the antique grandeur with youthful freshness. The Teutonic artist's love for nature made him transport his figures into the midst of smiling life, and spread about them the glory of a perennial spring. But it ended in prettiness. Denied the large wall surfaces of Roman architecture that would hold the cycles of great events, it had to confine itself to panel painting and miniature work. They never had the opportunity or training to paint large subjects or the fulness of possible existence.

Upon the small panels an artist could work with grace and delicacy; he could portray the never-ending beauties of nature, he could express Teutonic joy, the same joy of old Chaucer, and Shakespeare, and Milton; and draw carefully, as they had carved carefully, trees and plants and spires of grass. But painting never attained to large and broad treatment, and in its details, like some of the modern pre-raphaelites, neglected sometimes what was essential. Even Albert Dürer felt the fetters of this style. After this Cologne movement, painting sank into ossification, and only in this century have the prophets called the dry bones from their graves. The mood of these art workers, the poets, the architects, the painters and sculptors of Medieval Germany were very similar. There was always the same ingenuousness, the same ignorance of rules, the same frankness of intention. In all the arts there is a difficulty in preserving fresh and natural grace. But in this old work, so awkward, so prim, the feeling of the beautiful and true shines through every position, and they are all full of grace and action. The ornaments are simple and broad, and this simplicity, this spontaneity of feeling, is infinitely more attractive than knowledge. Mad. de Stael, quoted before, says, "but there is often in true genius a sort of awkwardness, similar in some respects to the credulity of sincere and noble souls" (witness Abraham Lincoln); "and we should do wrong in endeavoring to subject it to arbitrary restrictions, for it would free itself from them with much greater difficulty than talents of a second-rate order." Here the formality is full of true feeling, which is greater than art. A modern workman would be shocked at the absence of knowledge. He would wish to measure or decorate, and would have tortured and embellished these simple forms, so full of

grace in their stiffness, to correct their formality. There are things which are spoilt by elaboration. The cry of anguish from the heart would be ludicrous sung in the opera wail of despair. The spontaneous smile of a child is infinitely more charming than the studied affability of a prince. In a word, the product of unspoiled natural faculties, of that happy, holy confidence, that is the charm of childhood, constitutes the best power of the artist. The true artist is he who feels his life bounding within him, who enjoys everything, who obeys his inspirations without reasoning on them, and who loves all that is beautiful. The beauty that he worships may come to him in common or mean shapes, but he sees it and recognizes his own. He knows his own needs, he knows his own soul, and nothing that that soul adores is common-place to him. "Neither call I anything common or unclean." It is beauty that he seizes and holds. These old troubadours, painters, &c., were all governed by the same laws of production. They possessed poetic originality, an exalted sensibility and more imagination than science. Not that study and painstaking were not necessary. These men were close students of nature's forms and colors, and laborious in the extreme; but while they were in the prime of their powers, they applied their efforts to the elaboration of their thought and not to its ornamentation.

It will be seen from this brief history that medieval art in Germany broke away from tradition in poetry, leaving the strict forms of Latin verse on one hand, and the cold, dry narrative of facts of their Scandinavian ancestors on the other, and bloomed in fresh verse filled with tender sentiment and melody of metre.

Gothic architecture became a protestation against the old Roman, with its massiveness, rectangular lines, and low rounded vaults. The decorations of carved work were original and instinctive, and the change from flat wall painting to stained glass windows was equally novel. The demand for polychromatic color was a fresh and spontaneous instinct.

In reviewing this period of splendid art activity, there are certain strong characteristics, which all express the same state of mind, and are all in sympathy one with another.

1st. The warmth and sincerity of feeling which broke through all form, good and bad alike.

2d. Simple truth and naïveté of form united with candor and purity of feeling.

3d. The mere beauty often sacrificed or made subordinate to moral power.

4th. The variety and fertility of individual life, such as no other artistic school possesses.

5th. The democratic character of art, while the aristocratic prevailed in Italy and France.

6th. The outbursts of German humor, best known to us by Holbein's "Dance of Death," pathetic if fantastic.

The next impulse toward Protestantism was in religion. The great reformation movement of Luther absorbed all serious and ardent minds, and in struggling for freedom of individual conscience and will, they renounced for a long period the delights of art. The deliverance of the individual in every way from hierarchical fetters was the steady aim of these Protestants against priestly power. This struggle is historical and well known to all readers.

The next great outbreak of German originality was in music. Bach and Mozart here were the Protestants. Music is essentially an art of Christianity. It is an expression of yearning, of aspiration, of suffering, of penitence, of striving for holiness, and of inner spiritual joy. The latest child of the Gods, it is the most divine, the most ethereal. It is essentially the language of feeling, and though modern composers are using it as a vehicle of thought, their music as yet has only been accepted by the thinkers, and not by the populace, as their natural expression. Bach left the thrilling strains of Italy for purer melodies, and his strict scientific counterpoint is a perfect protestation against the languors and passion that filled the old masses. His is the music of the conscience and the will. Luther, a charity boy, singing in the streets of Eisenach, prepared the way for Bach who was born at Eisenach, three-quarters of a century later, and his chorals for the people were the lights that showed Bach his great works. The Minnesingers at the great hall of the Castle of Wartburg prepared the way for Luther, and all made ready for Mozart.

John Sebastian Bach was a perpetual protestant in his contrapuntal science against the luxury of penitential passion and the seductive melody of the Italian mass. In his stern dependence on the organ which he almost recreated, he struck the first blow at the unnatural voices of the pope's choir. Simplicity, individuality, and truth, characterized his works, and the greatest of all, "The Passion after St. Matthew," is the glory of music. This single-minded soul so full of genius was full of conscience also: "*Ne chantant que pour les muses et lui.*" The musicians of his time adored him; "*Ils avaient reconnu qu'il était le plus habile de organistes, les plus étonnant des improvisateurs, le plus savant des musiciens de l'Allemagne,*" but his full recognition by the world has hardly come yet.

Mozart was deeply moved by his works and spent hours over them. Indeed the celebrated forty-eight preludes and fugues of Bach, called "*Das wohl temperirte Clavier,*" was his favorite relaxation. He was never without it, and not content with simply playing them, he copied them in his own handwriting to better enjoy them through the help of another sense. His praise gave an impulse towards the study of Bach's exalted works, and Bach's creations stimulated Mozart.

The great Miserere of Palestrina, and also one of Allegri, were the exclusive property of the Sistine choir. The score was never permitted to be copied, but when Mozart went to Italy, he caught it from the singers in the chapel and made it his own first and the property of the world afterwards. His father gives this account of it: "You are aware that the celebrated "Miserere" of this place is in such high esteem, that the musicians of the chapel are forbidden, under pain of excommunication, to take any part of it away, to copy it themselves or through another person. However, *we have it already.* * * Meantime we will not intrust the mystery to strange hands; *ut non incurremus mediate vel immediate in censuram ecclesiæ.*" Holmes, in his *Biography of Mozart*, adds, "The difficulty of putting down in notes the music performed by a double choir, abounding in imitation and traditional effects, of which one of the chief is characterized by the absence of a perpetual rhythm, is hardly conceivable. Hence the wonder of the unexampled *chef d'œuvre* of the Miserere of Allegri. Mozart accomplished his task.

in two visits at the Sistine chapel. He drew out a sketch on the first hearing, and attended the performance a second time on Good Friday, having his MS in his pocket for correction and completion. It was soon known at Rome that the *Miserere* had been taken down, and he was obliged to produce what he had written at a large musical party, where the *Musico Christofori* who had sung in it confirmed its correctness. The generous Italians were so much delighted that they forgot to call upon the Pope to excommunicate the culprit." This mass he emulated and surpassed. It was the seed which in his hand and planting grew to great blades of noble, weighty grain. His masses soar as well as melt; ethereal, noble, and tender. If you ask the difference between a beautiful Italian mass and a beautiful German, we would say that it was the difference between a line and a cube. The single voice-part-masses of the old Italians are linear, the instrumental masses for all instruments with many parts are solid. Italian ears were slow to approve the piquant chromatic harmony of the Germans, and they said Mozart's quartets were "full of mistakes, or the engraving." Slowly his genius has conquered the ignorance and self-will of his adversaries; and now M. Fétis, whose authority in music is so high, "considers Idomeneo the basis of all the music of our day." The joy and gladness of Mozart's work exhibits the true troubadour spirit of enthusiasm and happiness. Melancholy was sceptical and joy was faith and belief. Gayety with them was a religious grace, an act of piety; and melancholy was weakness and degeneracy. He reflected these moods in his music and added the play of humor in his *Magic Flute*, and *Marriage of Figaro* in true German full-heartedness. The Italians accuse him of neglecting the voice. This is not true! He learned in Italy as none of the later Germans have learnt, to write for the voice, and consult its capacities and necessities. But he superadds the powers of the instruments to the voice, sustaining, enriching, and completing it. The human soul enlists matter in its service, brass, and wood, and ivory, and governs them. Mozart's influence has been far more universal than Bach's, for Mozart wrote operas, cantatas, quartets, &c., while Bach's artistic career culminated in the oratorio and the chorale. Protestant church worship and the

development of that austere instrument the organ, received his life's attention. But the two, together with Beethoven and Handel, coming after, reorganized music.

In criticism the Germans are still *protestant*; Lessing, the Schlegels, Winkelman, Lübke, and Niebuhr, have rebuilt the drama, fine arts, and history. Kant, and Spinoza, and Hegel have their systems of philosophy, and the Bible and the Christian religion find its severest judges in this thoughtful, earnest nation. As their past has been, their future will probably be; but they build as well as tear down; create as well as destroy, and are a sort of universal touchstone among the nations.

ARTICLE VII.—THE SECT SYSTEM.*

THE phrase which stands at the head of this Article is not original with us. It first attracted our attention in Dr. Philip Schaff's "*Religion in America*," reviewed in this journal several years ago. It seemed to us at that time an absurd form of expression, little short of a contradiction in terms. Sect, thought we, as it exists among us, is not a system, but the negation of system, rendering, by its prevalence, system impossible.

But there are men among us that profess to think, who take a very different view of this matter—Christian teachers in whose thought the division of the Church of Christ into so many separate organizations and governments as at present is not confusion and anarchy, but harmony—a normal order of the Church of God, which is to last as long as the mediatorial reign of Christ—an order into which the Church, when governed wisely and faithfully, grows and develops itself as naturally as childhood grows into manhood.

Such a view of the subject has high claims upon our respectful consideration. If diversity of sects springs from false conceptions of the nature of the Church, from unwarrantable usurpations of powers which the Founder never conferred, and which are contradictory to the spirit of the gospel, then the prevalence of such divisions is anarchy and confusion. It is to be regarded as a symptom of a morbid social condition, which calls on us to apply appropriate spiritual remedies in cheerful hope of a cure. Apologies for sect are in that case no more respectable than apologies for any other form of social error and wrong.

But if, on the contrary, religious sect has its foundation in the established laws of God and human nature, if it rests on clear and definite principles, which are capable of being definitely ascertained, formulated, and proven, principles without the reverential observance of which the soundness of the faith and

* We give place to still another contribution to the more full discussion of this subject.—EDITORS OF THE NEW ENGLANDER.

the purity of the Church cannot be preserved, then are we bound respectfully to hear and weigh the words of those who come to the rescue of this established order of the Christian ages, at a time when its foundations are a good deal shaken, or certainly put to a severe test, by the blows of many earnest and powerful assailants.

It was for this reason, we presume, space was given in the last number of this journal to the able Article on "Sectarism, Alliance, and the Basis of Fellowship." Its very worthy author, Rev. S. B. Goodenow, has, with a hearty good will, undertaken the task of reducing religious sect as it exists in Protestant Christendom to a system. This, the author rightly judges, is exactly what must be done, if the existing condition of things is to be defended and conserved. If sect is to live and be perpetuated, it must be as a system and not as an anarchy. He therefore rightly begins, as all system-makers must, by laying down the definitions and axioms, out of which system must grow, as the plant grows from its germ. He manifests a confidence in the results which he has reached, which is quite refreshing in these days of doubt and unbelief, by exhibiting these fundamental elements of his system, in the way of naked statements, as possessing such self-evidencing power as to require no confirmation either from Scripture or reason. He will, however, pardon us for reminding him that it is hardly reasonable to expect that they will be accepted as self-evident by all his readers. We must ourselves call some of them in question, in the very outset. We are really unable to see that all his definitions are truly descriptive of the fundamental conceptions of the Church, as we receive them from its Founder, or that all his assumed axioms are really self-evident truths. We admit that if sect, as it exists among us, is to be constructed into a permanent system, that system must be built of the very materials which he assumes. But this cannot hinder our inquiring whether those assumptions rest on any substantial foundation. If not, the structure which is built of them is but a cloud castle, which will be dissipated into thin air as soon as the sun is up.

1. What is a church? Our author answers, "A particular local church is an organized company of persons engaged together in

honoring Christ and advancing his cause." This definition is evidently quite too broad. No one would think of calling a local woman's board of foreign missions a church, and yet it agrees in every particular with the author's definition. In like manner, the definition includes a multitude of other religious societies, actual or possible, which could never be thought of as churches. There must be in our conception of the church some characteristic feature, which distinguishes it from all other organizations, religious or secular. Our author gives us no information at all, as to what that feature is. His definition is, therefore, an entire failure. It distinguishes nothing.

There is no definition of the word church in the Scriptures. We must derive our conception of it from what we learn of the nature and constitution of the churches founded by the Apostles, and from the intimations given by our Lord himself, of the nature of his kingdom on earth. A careful consideration of all the intimations which come to us from these sources, seems to us to point directly to the one characteristic feature which distinguishes the church, whether universal or local, from all other societies. That feature is, that it is a brotherhood of Christian disciples, united together simply and only by the one bond of faith in Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world. Its foundation ever standeth sure, having this seal, "The Lord knoweth them that are his." In God's unerring view they, and they only, are members of it in whom this faith is vital and genuine. To our view, appearances must be accepted, and all lovingly recognized as belonging to it, who make a profession of such faith, with lives that do not contradict such a profession. Whether this is the conception of the church which pervades the New Testament, we submit to every candid reader of that book.

2. Our author not only furnishes a definition of the church which is utterly indeterminate and latitudinarian, but in perfect consistency with such a definition, he assumes a liberty of individuals to organize churches according to their taste or their judgments of the fittest way of promoting the spread and prevalence of the gospel in the world. One limitation only does he distinctly recognize to the right of multiplying separate organizations, and that is "where there is room for them." Of how

much value this limitation is in practice, may be seen from the fact that, in nearly every village of our country, outside of New England, churches have been multiplied till there is generally more than one church to every five hundred people. To Paul it was utterly shocking that, at Corinth, men should say, I am of Paul, and I am of Apollo, and I of Cephas, and I of Christ, though they had as yet made no organic division. But many of our modern doctors of the church, instead of rebuking the first manifestations of such a partizan spirit, as a sure symptom of carnality, instruct such partizans not to think of living together in the same church, but to separate themselves and form a church of their own, and that to do so "is not sectarian." It is "not sectarian for each person to prefer his own church method, if only this be kept subservient to charity and the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom." To Paul, the very manifestation of such partizanship as threatened such a division, seemed destructive of charity, and a decisive proof of a carnal spirit. How do our brethren who are rallying to the defense of our denominationalism reconcile Paul's view of the matter with that which they defend? Why could not Paul see that such a partizan spirit is inseparable from human nature, and that to repress it was not only unwise but impossible? Why did he not at once settle all those troubles as we do, by advising to organize the Pauline Church, and the Church of the Apollosites, and the Church of the Cephasites, and the Church of Christ. Then matters might have been arranged as satisfactorily and wisely at Corinth, eighteen centuries ago, as they are now in Boston, and New York, and Chicago, and St. Louis. Blessed discovery of these modern ages! Why could not Paul see it? Must it not have been on account of his Jewish prejudices? Let us not deceive ourselves. Nothing could have been more shocking to one imbued with such a conception of the church as Paul held and fervently cherished, than such a factious condition of Christendom as that on which we look out. From whatever quarter this idea came, that it is not sectarian to multiply separate churches "where there is room for them," it did not come from the New Testament. In the estimation of Paul, there is no "room for them" within the limits of Christian charity.

3. Our author still further maintains that no credible evidence of being in a "*regenerate state*" is any reason why one should not be rejected when applying for membership in a particular church, or why he should not be excluded from it, if, in the judgment of its members, that person will "not honor Christ in that particular organization." They have constructed their church after their own taste or fancy; they have a perfect right to do so according to the assumption on which we have just remarked; and if this fellow disciple does not like their way, he must pass on and find some other church that is constructed after his fancy. If he cannot find such an one, he must stay without till he can make a sufficient number of proselytes to his peculiar views to form another church according to his taste. Then we may be sure he will have no difficulty in finding that there is "room enough for it."

The author is perfectly right in regarding this principle as fundamental to the sect system, and yet it is of very recent origin. There is no trace of its recognition in the Apostolic age, or, so far as our information extends, in any other age previous to the Reformation. The reformers themselves were very reluctant to give it any countenance. It is still resisted by the Roman Catholic Church, and by all High Church Episcopalians. The different Protestant communions have never assented to it as a doctrine of Scripture, but only as a necessity of their position. The various Protestant organizations exist, and have been multiplied, and they meet each other face to face on the same territory. Each asserts its own right to be, and in doing so is forced to concede the same right to other organizations. Thus the right of any company of believers to organize a church for themselves, and according to such constitutions and laws as they may choose to adopt, has become recognized as a necessity of our present condition, and to a great extent accepted as an axiom. No one pretends to prove it from Scripture, or to reconcile it with Apostolic teaching and practice. It is purely the result of an effort of the various Protestant denominations to vindicate their own right to be. But its adoption has opened all the flood-gates, and while it is retained and acted on, to form a new Church of Christ will be regarded as a thing as easy as to form a debating society, and sects will

swarm through Christendom in ever increasing numbers, so long as there is room for them ; and when at last there is no longer room for them, the sustaining of any organized church will be an impossibility. We can, within our personal knowledge, point to places where this consummation has already been reached.

We say this assumption has no support from Scripture. Who ever heard in Apostolic times of two churches organized on the same territory, or even on different territories, to represent different phases of religious belief or practice ? To ask the question is to answer it. What did Paul mean when he said "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye ?" Why was not the question about eating things sacrificed to idols solved by organizing churches of two denominations, representing this diversity of views and practices ? Why did not those who thought it wrong to eat such things, when in the majority, make rules shutting out those that thought and practiced differently ? Why did not the Apostles recommend the organizing of separate churches, and then exhort those churches to tolerate and recognize one another, instead of insisting on toleration of individuals in the same church ? Why was not the same course pursued as to the differences between the Judaizing and the Gentile Christians ? When these questions can be satisfactorily answered, we shall see some possibility of engrafting the sect system upon the churches of the Apostles. But we venture to predict, not only that this will never be done, but that it will never be attempted. Till this can be done, the assumption of which we are speaking must be regarded as a sad necessity, created by the sect system itself, in its hopeless struggle to defend its own right to be, and as resting on no other foundation whatever.

4. Though our author admits the existence of the Church Universal, and that all its members have a right to all the privileges which God has given to his people, he still assumes that local churches alone possess the "power of the keys;" and that consequently no one can ever gain admission to the Church Universal, or a right to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, except by the action of some particular church. When one has thus gained admission through the door of a particular church, he becomes entitled to communion, not only in the particular

church which has admitted him, but in all other churches. If a particular church excludes one who is in "a regenerate state," as it may with propriety do, when in the judgment of a majority of its members he will not "honor Christ in their body," he is out of the Church Universal, till he can find some other particular church that will open its doors to him, and to whose laws he is willing to submit. If he is unsuccessful in this search, he must stay out of the fold, till he can persuade others to unite with him in organizing a new church which, as soon as organized, will possess the mysterious power of the keys as fully as those that previously existed. One Christian disciple, however dear to the Master, is out of the Church Universal and cut off from its rights and privileges. But if he can find a handful of believers in Christ who are of the same mind with himself, they can effect a new organization, and not only thereby open a door for themselves into the kingdom of heaven, but obtain "the power of the keys," and admit all others who accept the peculiar views which they wish to represent in a church organization, not only to communion with them, but with all other Christian churches.

It is quite unnecessary to waste time in showing how utterly alien these assumptions are from that conception of the Church which is found in the New Testament. No sane man will ever attempt to find any sanction for them in that book; they are purely the results of the dire necessities to which sect has reduced us. We cannot deny the blessed oneness of the Church Universal, or that every true disciple of Christ has a right to a place in that Church, and to the enjoyment of all its privileges. If then we claim for each particular church the right to frame its own constitution and its own laws, we cannot deny to other Christians whom by those laws we exclude from our church, the right to organize a church for themselves, representing their own ideas, as our church represents ours. We cannot disown the communion of saints. We therefore admit and maintain that all persons in regular membership with any particular church, "all members in good and regular standing with sister churches" are entitled to a seat at the Lord's table whenever it is spread. Thus, though we have rent the Lord's body into a thousand fragments, we seek to heal all those ghastly, bleeding

wounds, by the barren form of occasional communion together in the Lord's Supper.

Such is the "sect system" as it is accepted and explained by one of its most earnest and sincere defenders, and as we believe it is held and defended by thousands of devout Christians and zealous ministers of Christ at the present time. We do not believe any more argument is necessary to show how utterly false and untenable are its principles, and how utterly indefensible it is as a system. When it is distinctly contemplated as a whole, and with a clear statement of the assumptions on which it rests, its own intrinsic hideousness is not only apparent, but very shocking to every mind that is accustomed to contemplate with affectionate reverence the moral scenery of the New Testament.

But though it seems to us that fairly to state these assumptions is to refute them, there are other relations of the subject more or less distinctly brought into view in the Article on which we are commenting, which require a little further consideration.

We have here definitions of "Schism" and "Sectarianism"—sectarianism we prefer to say. "He only is a schismatic who encourages separation into distinct churches where they are not needed; where there are not members enough to warrant the outlay." And who is to judge whether they are needed? What numbers would warrant the outlay? Every one must, in the nature of the case, answer these questions for himself; and when a brother has answered them conscientiously, what right has another to arraign him for his decision, and call him a schismatic? If all the churches in the community in which one lives impose creeds to which he cannot sincerely subscribe, or governments to which he cannot conscientiously submit, and make the acceptance of their creeds or governments a condition of admission to the privileges of the household of God, it will surely not require much time to decide, that in that community there is room for a church to which one can be welcomed, without receiving any yoke on his neck which Christ has not imposed. A Christian disciple in such circumstances would not long hesitate to accept any number of fellow disciples willing to join with him in such an organization, as a "sufficient

number to justify the outlay." If he was charged with schism, if he was told there were too many churches already, his sufficient answer would be, that the fault lay not with him but with those who persisted in excluding their Christian brethren from the privileges of the church by arbitrary rules of their own devising; that theirs were the churches for which there was not room enough, not that church whose doors were always open to all the Lord's dear people. The guilt of schism always does lie with those who exclude from the privileges of the church persons who make a credible profession of discipleship. If such exclusion is not schism, then there can be no schism. The very same principle that sanctions the exclusion, authorizes the excluded to make for themselves such a religious home as their tastes and consciences require. The limitation, "where there is room enough," becomes utterly futile, and the sin of schism impossible. If this principle is admitted and acted on, sect will not only be as lasting as Christianity, but the number of sects, not only where there is room for them but where there is not, will go on increasing with ever accelerated rapidity, and the only end will be, when they are so multiplied that the support of any religious organization has become impossible. Nor is the day distant when that end will be reached.

So of sectarianism, he is the sectarian who necessitates sectarian separation, and not he who favors the formation of another church where the number of churches is already inconveniently large, provided he is excluded from the churches that are there, by creeds, forms, and governments, to which he cannot submit with good conscience. This can easily be tested by a case. For a community of one thousand souls one church is much better than two. Suppose, then, that in such a community there is already a Baptist church embracing a majority of all the Christian people, in which all is right and Christian, except that close communion is rigidly enforced. A minority of the Christian people are conscientiously opposed to close communion. What shall they do? There is not room for another church. If this minority organizes a church in which the privileges of the Christian household are free to all true disciples, are they guilty of schism? Or does the sin of schism lie at the door of the exclusive majority? Or shall we adopt the fundamental prin-

ciple of sect, that the majority have a right to organize the church according to their fancy, and the minority have the same right? We cannot escape the conclusion. Either the sin of schism and the charge of sectarianism lie at the door of the exclusive majority, or they lie nowhere. The same considerations apply with equal force to any other condition of full membership than credible evidence of true discipleship, in any church whatever.

This position is not a novelty. It is as old as the Church of Christ. It is the doctrine especially of the fathers of Congregationalism from the beginning. Our fathers of the early New England churches did not impose their creeds as denominational tests to ascertain the fitness of the candidate to honor Christ in that particular church, but as tests and evidences of genuine faith in Christ. In no part of the history of the Congregational churches has the acceptance of a creed been regarded in any other light than as affording evidence of the genuineness of the candidate's faith in Christ. Mr. Goodenow's conception of a basis of Congregational fellowship as distinct from Christian fellowship is a very recent novelty among us, and we suppose that few of our leading minds have to this day adopted it. We believe the accepted doctrine of Congregationalism to day is, that credible evidence of discipleship is the only proper condition of membership in the church, "credible discipleship," not "creditable," as Mr. Goodenow has it. We never set ourselves up as searchers of hearts, or represented our fathers of New England as having attempted any "system of judging hearts and destinies."

As our author proceeds, he warms with the friction of his own argument, and points out "*the fatal result.*" "This system" (that is, the doctrine that there should be no condition of church membership but credible evidence of discipleship) "must do away with all church discipline, all law and order in the household of God—and must introduce complete license and anarchy." As we read these sentences we paused to wonder what the writer's ideas of church discipline might be. If the design of church discipline is, as set forth in Christ's own words, to reclaim and restore our erring brother, and, in case of a failure of all effort to persuade him to return to obedience to

the laws of Christ, to separate him from the company of the believers, we are quite unable to perceive that the sect system which our brother has constructed, has any tendency to encourage and facilitate the exercise of it. No enactment of any new law is necessary; the very words of our Lord referred to above are law enough, and any addition to it by our enactment is an impertinent usurpation which, in practice, can only be vexatious to the "household of God." If credible evidence of discipleship is the one only term of admission, then the lack of such credible evidence is the only justifiable ground of exclusion. This, and this only, is the discipline which our Lord enjoins. Our author seems, however, to have quite another notion of discipline. With him it is the right to enforce, by exclusion from the supper of the Lord, any constitutions, rules, and laws which a particular church may choose to adopt. This is the church discipline of the sect system, which every sectarian and schismatic church adopts. To our author's mind sect is not only a system, but the only possible system. The absence of it is anarchy and confusion. Anarchy indeed! How the moral order of the universe will come to an end, when neither close communion nor any particular mode of applying water in baptism, nor submission to the authority of bishops, nor to the jurisdiction of Presbyterian Church courts, nor subjection of any other laws of man's enactment over the house of God, can be any longer enforced by church discipline and exclusion from Christian rights and privileges! No wonder he shrinks away with horror from the prospect, and hastens to take refuge in the admirable "law and order" of his cherished sect system, under which, in these later years, the Church has enjoyed such charming tranquility. How peaceful the Church has been during the last half century! Our soul hath in remembrance the trial of Dr. Lyman Beecher and Mr. Albert Barnes for heresy, the "Act and Testimony," the disruption of the Presbyterian Church, the trial and condemnation of Stephen H. Tyng, Jr., the Cheney case, the disruption of the Protestant Episcopal Church now going on, and many other incidents of our church life, too numerous to mention. No wonder our brother is appalled at the prospect that this blessed tranquility may one day end in the destruction of all church discipline, except what Jesus enjoined in the eighteenth chapter of Matthew.

Are we asked if the Church can make no laws and regulations for herself? We answer, the regulations which a particular church needs for its own convenience are not properly laws. They do not form a basis for the exclusion of members. They are in no sense conditions of membership or terms of communion. They are matters of common consent for the general convenience. They are not matters of conscience, but of taste. A very moderate share of the Christian temper will always suffice for arranging them in a spirit of concession and harmony. And they can rarely, if ever, be the basis of a church division. Difficulties of this sort are in no way relieved, but greatly aggravated, by the presence of the sect system. If in the arrangement of these details, any ill feeling has been occasioned, a permanent rupture of fraternal ties, a removal of church relations to the "church of another denomination," may be expected. As easy divorce fosters conjugal discontents and alienations, so the facility of rupturing church relations afforded by the proximity of other denominational churches aggravates all tendencies to broils and contentions in the family of Christ.

As already intimated, the recognition of the oneness of the Christian brotherhood, which is provided for in the "sect system," is utterly inadequate to the necessities of the Christian cause, and fruitless of any valuable results. Any one who has regarded this subject in a practical and not merely in a theoretical and sentimental light, knows well that the unity which is needed is unity in action, coöperation in Christian work. This is precisely what the sect system renders, for the most part, impossible. However united in formal acts of communion, the practical aspect we present to each other and to the world is one of separation and rivalry, often of antagonism. We do not unite to build so many houses for the worship of God, and of such costliness, as the common cause, in our united judgment, demands, but such and so many as our separation and our mutual rivalries render necessary. These lines are written in a city of about ten thousand people with twenty church edifices, and it is expected the twenty-first will soon be erected. The number of churches we build depends not at all upon the wants

of the common cause, but upon our ideas of denominational necessities. The same necessities of the sect system compel us to sustain twenty or more pastors when all the simply Christian interests of the community could be better served, in the judgment of all intelligent men, by five pastors than by twenty. The same necessities of sect render it impossible for us to unite in founding colleges and other seminaries of learning, and compel us to fritter away our resources and our personal energies in many feeble and starveling institutions, where a few only are needed, or can be sustained. When sensible, practical men outside of the Church ask us why we commit all this wasteful extravagance and folly, our only answer is, the necessities of sect compel us. The sect system renders it impossible that we should be united in these practical works of patriotism and Christian munificence. This is practical schism—practical sectarianism, and while it remains, it will be the weakness of the Christian cause, and the reproach of the Christian name, however we may seek to throw over it a covering of sentimentalism by our occasional acts of inter-communion. The gospel is not sentimentalism, but love and good works. Our occasional inter-communion is sadly contradicted by our habitual lives of separation and rivalry.

With what fervid enthusiasm have millions of hearts been filled in reading of that ever memorable communion season at the Madison Square Presbyterian Church, during the sessions of the Evangelical Alliance in the fall of 1873. In the joy inspired by that grand occasion, we could almost believe that the Church had escaped at last from the wilderness, and crossed the Jordan into the Promised Land. But how momentary! It was only a glimpse of the "gate of the celestial city" from the "Delectable Mountains." Those great and good men of many communions only a few hours afterwards left those high places of the Church of God, to return to that wilderness of practical sectarianism from which they had only for a brief hour escaped, there to struggle and toil in weakness and sorrow till God shall call them home. One thing only was wanting to have made that scene perfectly satisfactory to the longings of every devout soul. It was that on that holy mount of realized Christian brotherhood, they should have built a tabernacle for the whole Church of

God, into which she should enter and go no more out; that the oneness of the Christian brotherhood should hereafter be as completely realized in all the details of Christian work and practical beneficence, as in the holy fervors of that reunion of the dispersed tribes of Israel around the cross. No other "communion of saints" can satisfy the longings of Christian hearts, or the exigencies of the Christian cause. Till such a blessed consummation can be realized, such seasons of joyful communion will bear no real fruit, except as they revive the hopes and the courage of God's people, while they are making their journey through this wilderness of spiritual barrenness and drought. The sentimental fellowship of this formal communion can never be any substitute for the practical fellowship of united labor and sacrifice in the cause of the Master.

The feeling widely pervading the religious world which gave rise to the Evangelical Alliance is eminently fraternal and Christlike, and the influence exerted by the institution has been powerful and beneficent, especially that of its first and only General Conference on the American continent. But the conception of the Church of God which is expressed in its name is yet narrow and inadequate. The perfect manifestation of the oneness of the Christian brotherhood can never be accomplished by "alliance" between separate and independent powers, which, because exercising jurisdiction over the same territory and seeking indefinite territorial and numerical enlargements, are rivals to each other. The only true conception of the Church of Christ is not that of many kingdoms in alliance with each other, but still retaining many rival interests, to stimulate their ambitions and their jealousies; but one kingdom in harmonious subjection to their one only Lord. Each of the innumerable local assemblies of disciples is a household of God. They are not rivals to each other, they are not exercising jurisdiction over the same territory, and anxious to extend it, but they are loving helpers of each other's faith and joy, and all together run up into the General Assembly and Church of the First-born. They are not rivals in alliance, but members of one body, of which Christ is the Head. The Evangelical Alliance has done good in the past and will continue to do good in the future. But it will be only by filling the Christian world,

with such a conception of the peculiar oneness of the Christian brotherhood as will render the whole sect system odious and intolerable.

Perhaps we shall be asked if we would go back to the idea of an organic unity of the whole Church on earth. That is the one fatal error which for so many ages crushed so large a portion of Christendom under the iron heel of the Papacy, and since the Reformation has entailed on Protestantism all the anarchy and confusions of sect. The Church Universal is one; but its unity has no organic representative but that of the Hierarchy of Heaven, and no Head but Christ. On earth this oneness is purely moral and spiritual, made visible to the world by the external rites of baptism and the Lord's Supper, and by a common faith and a common aim. But this moral and spiritual oneness must not be contradicted and its impression nullified by organic arrangements of human devising, which divide the whole multitude of the Lord's people into rival camps, with rival banners displayed over against each other, and render union in plan and work impossible. Precisely such are the arrangements necessitated by the sect system. They do not represent unity, but are always and everywhere contradictory to it.

Mr. Goodenow speaks much and well, towards the close of his Article, of toleration of that in other men and in other churches than our own, from which we dissent, provided it is not inconsistent with a credible confession of Christ before men. He seems to suppose, that in some way we are proposing to set aside this great law of Christian charity. We think that for some reason he misunderstands us and the other brethren whom he criticises. We hold to all which he has said on that subject. But why not carry this beautiful doctrine of Christ back to the place of beginning, and apply it to the constitution of the Church itself? If we can fellowship a church some of whose principles and practices we disapprove, why not fellowship the members of that church in our own, and thus make the boundary lines which divide the two churches unnecessary and impossible? Let us again take an example from our Baptist brethren. Many of them do not practice close communion at present, but fellowship churches

which do not practice immersion. Why is it not just as consistent with good conscience and fidelity to Christ to fellowship an unimmersed brother in the same particular church as in the Church Universal? Why is it not as Christian to forbear with the errors of an individual brother as with the same errors in a whole church? In principle we can see no difference, while in practical tendencies and results the difference is exceedingly palpable and important. If we compel all individuals who hold a given error, as we think it, though not such an error as discredits a profession of Christ, to go out from us, and form a separate organization, to represent that error for themselves and their children after them, we do what we can to render that error as lasting as the Church militant. If we had begun our toleration in our own church, we should have held the whole question open to candid argument. No partizan passions would have been excited, and the truth would have had a fair chance. After those sect lines are drawn, it never can have a fair chance. The question has been withdrawn from the dominion of argument and given over to the domain of passion. Could the contest about Psalmody in the Scotch churches have lasted till this time, if it had not been made a dividing line between churches of different denominations? As things are, it is likely to last till the millennium at least.

Mr. Goodenow has fallen into the mistake of charging upon those from whom he dissents the design of eliminating from the creeds of our churches all doctrines from which any Christians dissent. He quotes some one, we know not whom, as saying, "The way to form a church is for the professing Christians in any locality to unite upon the doctrines to which no one objects." If he will turn to the sermon before the Boston Council in 1865, page 50, he will find the following paragraph:

"For myself, I must frankly declare, that, to me, the whole beauty and preciousness of the Congregational system lies in this: that it is a method by which the whole Church of God under heaven may stand in blessed moral unity, on the basis of the gospel, the whole gospel, and nothing but the gospel, divided and distracted by no forms, or ceremonies, or governments which man hath devised. And I think, in such a scene of religious anarchy as that in which I have lived, such a

polity is worthy of being explained, defended, and adhered to till God shall call me hence."

This brother should begin anew ; he should go back and try to understand his brethren before he undertakes to represent to the public those who are quite as competent to represent themselves as he is to represent them. Our hope of reuniting the scattered tribes, or even of arresting the process of dispersion now so rapidly going on, is not, as he represents, in giving up all Christian truth which any body denies, but in so separating that truth of God which is the only basis on which the Church of Christ can rest from all those additions which human ingenuity has devised, that the recognized basis of this Church may be "The gospel, the whole gospel, and nothing but the gospel." It is not the truth of Christ which divides the Church and multiplies sects, but the inventions of men usurping a place among the laws of Christ. The gospel, the truth of Christ is the only cement which binds the spiritual temple of God together, and we have never yet been left to such a degree of spiritual blindness as to forget or deny this precious truth. Our only hope is and has been to unite men *in* Christ and not *out* of him.

Our brother speaks of the writer of this Article as "one who has long been" a chief influential champion of this "liberal" theory of church membership. The quotation marks around the word *liberal* are his. If by them he means to be understood as quoting the word from us, it is a great injustice. We shall never belong to the self-styled liberal party in religion. Nothing can be liberal but the candid and loving reception of all the truth which God hath revealed. Nothing can be illiberal but the bigoted rejection of revealed truth, or the no less bigoted adherence to falsehood as though it were sacred truth. We have never claimed anything for what we teach, but that in our judgment it is true ; and if it is, then it is liberal enough for us. The wounds of the Church of Christ are not to be healed by disregarding the everlasting distinctions of truth and falsehood in a spirit of false and sickly liberality, but by courageously proving all things, and holding fast that which is good. Why we should be charged with this sickly liberalism, we really cannot tell. We advise our brother to be more careful for the future and then he will be more just.

And yet there is nothing in all this inconsistent with our maintaining, as we do, that it is absurd and monstrous to require of every little one in Christ who knocks at the door of his fold, the knowledge and belief of a whole completed system of Christian theology. We must construct all our arrangements for church door-keeping, so as to receive him, though weak in the faith, and nourish him, not with "doubtful disputations," but with such "milk for babes" as he can digest. Our only question is whether his profession of faith in Christ is credible; if it is, we must gladly receive him, and not tell him "our church is not meant for such 'feeble folk' as he; he must go to such a church as is precisely fitted for the nurture of feeble-minded children." If we will persist in requiring at the door of our churches assent to a creed which contains in brief a whole system of theology, we shall for the most part receive only those who assent to propositions the terms of which they do not understand, simply because the church requires it; while we shall exclude many who would not only "honor Christ in this particular church" but in any Christian church with which they might unite.

We are very sorry that we are not yet quite done with the errors into which this brother falls in attempting to represent those whose views he opposes. He says the writer of this Article writing for the *Congregational Quarterly*, Oct., 1871, "takes the ground of no church government." The doctrine of that Article is that the Church is wholly under the invisible and spiritual government of God. Does our author mean to say that the invisible and spiritual government of God over the Church, which has been an article of Christian faith in all ages, is a delusion? That such a government of God is no government at all? and that a church only thus governed is "no church"? If this is his faith, he must settle the question between his own creed and the orthodox faith of all ages as best he can. But if he still holds that the government of God over the Church, though invisible and spiritual, is a solemn and blessed reality, and that the Church Universal considered as a perpetual society bound together only by faith in Christ and governed only by the Word and Spirit of God and the love of Christ, is yet the hope of humanity, then let him hasten to

retract his very unjust representations of the Article in the *Quarterly*. We would respectfully suggest to the brother, that to teach that the government of God is no government, because it has no human representative, and that a society held together by so mighty a force as the love of Christ, and pervaded by the ever present power of the spirit of God, is no society, because its only Head is Christ, its only laws the laws of God, and its only judiciary the judgment of the great 'day, is rather a grave matter, and should be well considered before, even in the heat of controversy, it is entered on.

We are by no means sorry for the publication of the Article on which we have commented. We think Mr. Goodenow has rendered a valuable service to the cause of Christian freedom and unity, by stating thus clearly and definitely the assumptions on which the sect system must rest. We think he has done this accurately and thoroughly. He was qualified to do this by the implicitness of his faith in them and in the superstructure which rests upon them. We think such a statement of principles is very timely, for thousands think the system a necessity of Christian faith and freedom, without ever having thought out its fundamental principles. When they come distinctly to discern them, they are by no means prepared to accept them. We think Pope's couplet may, with the utmost propriety, be applied to this subject, with the change of only a single word :

Sect "is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be dreaded needs but to be seen."

Our brother has done much to make the "monster" visible.

ARTICLE VIII.—A NEW THEORY OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION.

THE end sought by all systems of minority representation is this: Every vote cast at the polls for a member of a law-making assembly should count in every vote taken in that assembly, whether or not the particular person voted for is elected.

The object of this Article is to show wherein the five systems hitherto proposed—the Proxy, Limited, and Cumulative Vote, the Free List or Registered Ballot, and Mr. Hare's Scheme—fail and must fail to compass this end, and to suggest a sixth system, which seems to promise its accomplishment. First, however, the necessity of some change in our present method must be made clear. We subjoin a few of the proofs of that necessity. About 2,650,000 of the 6,500,000 voters who cast their ballots for members of the Forty-third Congress have no representatives whatever in that body.* That is, our system practically disfranchises forty out of every hundred men to whom our laws give the suffrage. If we take the votes for Grant and Greeley in November, 1872, and divide each by the number of congressmen elected by the party in question, we find that a successful Republican candidate required, on an average, 18,076 votes, while a Liberal, to ensure success, had to get 30,474. That is, our system made one Republican vote worth one-and-three-quarter Liberal votes. The administration received 55.93 per cent. of the popular vote; the opposition 44.07 per cent. But the respective strengths of the two parties in the Forty-third Congress are 68.15 and 31.85 per cent. That is, our system has added nearly 44 per cent. to the just congressional power of the majority. Some interesting tables in Mr. Salem Dutcher's recent work on minority representation in America, may be condensed into the following:

* The figures in this Article, except when referred to other sources, are copied or calculated from the *New York Tribune Almanac* for 1873. The especial figures here quoted are obtained by adding the votes for the defeated candidates for the Forty-third Congress.

Congress.	Popular Vote.		Quota of Election.		Membership.			
	Rep.	Dem.	R.	D.	Actual.		Proportionate.	
XL.—	2,179,645	1,825,928	16,350	37,263	142	49	107	84
XLI.—	3,177,215	2,899,168	19,982	34,930	159	83	127	115
XLII.—	2,786,547	2,726,500	20,549	25,722	136	106	123	119

Thus the Republican majority in the Fortieth Congress should have been 23, and was 98; in the Forty-first it should have been 12, and was 76; and in the Forty-second the corresponding figures were 4 and 30. In the Forty-third they are 34 and 107. In 1866, when the Fortieth Congress was chosen, one Republican vote had more weight than two-and-a-quarter Democratic ones, and in 1870, although the increased numerical strength of the Democrats prevented any such glaring inequality, a vote for the party in power counteracted one-and-a-quarter votes against it.*

The blame of this state of things rests on the clumsy machinery we use in choosing our law-makers. It wastes nearly half the raw material of votes it has to work upon, and gives an inferior sort of legislator as the product of the rest. This demands reform. We must have minority representation. The name has something of terror in it to a devout believer in *vox majoritatis*, *vox Dei*—a curiously groundless terror, inasmuch as the only way to effectually guard against being ruled by a minority, is to grant minority representation. The paradox is easily explained. A majority of Congress may not represent a majority of the nation. Any 147 of the 292 congressmen can carry a vote. There are 147 of them who represent only 1,500,000

* Great Britain is, in this respect, worse off than we are. To understand the injustice of the system now in vogue there, the reader has but to refer to "Essays and Lectures, Political and Social," by Professor and Mrs. Fawcett, or to the Essay of Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, for November, 1872. He will learn that one member of the House of Commons received 18,292 votes, while another got 69; that "at the general election of 1868, ten successful candidates, in various places, polled 159,650 votes, ten successful candidates in other places polled 1,873 votes, [and] ten unsuccessful candidates in various places polled 83,117 votes;" that ten millions of Englishmen elect 302 members of Parliament, and twelve millions return but 187; that, of the fortunate ten millions, 1,850,000 send eighty-one members, while 3,008,000 send only twenty-two; that 400,000 persons "return to Parliament within three of the number of representatives returned by upwards of 6,250,000 of their fellow-countrymen;" and that "952,000 persons return 120 members, against 96 members returned by a population of about seven and a half millions."

of the 6,500,000 votes cast for the whole body.* It is, to be sure, improbable that precisely these men should ever vote together against the 145 others, but it is possible. In such an event a minority of about one-quarter would rule the country. Other combinations by which a somewhat larger minority could dictate the country's policy for a term of years, are not only possible but probable. If the worshipper of majorities will finish this Article, he will find stated herein a theory which, if practiced, would make majority rule certain and minority representation equally sure.

We repeat, the end sought is this: Every vote cast at the polls for a member of a law-making assembly should count in every vote taken in that assembly, whether or not the particular person voted for is elected.

The Proxy Vote regards every ballot cast for a legislative candidate as an informal power-of-attorney, and authorizes him, *if elected*, to throw as many votes for or against any proposition as he has himself received at the polls. In the italicised words lies the fatal objection. If a candidate is not elected, his supporters have no representation whatever. This scheme, in fact, merely makes the power of local majorities greater even than it is now, and so offers a standing reward for the increase of such majorities by fraudulent registration, false returns, ballot-box stuffing, etc.

The Limited Vote applies only to elections in which more than two places are to be filled. Every elector can cast as many votes as there are vacancies, less one. If three men are to be chosen, he can vote for two; if four, three. But he cannot give more than one vote to one man. The limited vote fails to give representation to any but a large minority. Suppose 1,000 electors and three places to be filled. A minority of 399 can elect nobody, for the majority of 601 can cast 1,202 votes, which, divided among three candidates, will give each 400 $\frac{2}{3}$. But 401 electors can choose a candidate, because they can throw 401 votes for him, while the remaining 599 can give three candidates only 399 $\frac{1}{3}$ votes apiece. If the 599 are foolish enough to run three men, the minority can elect two, giving each 401

* Both these sums are in round numbers and so only approximately correct.

votes, and so get two-thirds of the representation. Such cases have occurred in England. If the election results, as it usually does, in giving the two-thirds to the majority, this is a lesser injustice, but is still unjust. For then each of their two members represents only $299\frac{1}{2}$ electors, while the opposition delegate represents 401. Thus, in whatever way the election turns out, there is a waste of votes, and the minority gets too little or too much representation. In case of an accidental vacancy under this system, a direct majority vote, with its concomitant of an entirely unrepresented minority, must decide the succession. As a secondary but important objection to the limited vote, we may mention that it makes caucus action of very great importance, since a party by aiming at too much may easily lose its fair share of power. This puts a premium on bargainings between party managers at the cost of party voters. When the relative strengths of the parties vary but little from year to year, it is easy to calculate the precise share of offices each can win. If each confines itself to nominating only as many men as it can elect, a nomination becomes equivalent to an election. When this is so, Caucus is king. Both parties are practically united to crush independent movements, and these must be strong indeed to win the fight against both.

The Cumulative Vote gives every elector as many votes as there are places to be filled, and allows him to concentrate or scatter them as he will. Let the number of vacancies equal x .

A minority of less than $\frac{1}{x+1} + 1$ loses all representation.

If there are 1,000 electors and three vacancies, $\frac{1}{4} + 1$ of the thousand, or 251 men, can secure one member (which is more than their share), but any less number must go unrepresented. For the 251 can throw 753 ballots, while the majority of 749 can give three candidates only 749 votes apiece. But if the minority numbers 250, the four candidates have a tie vote of 750 each. Again, if the minority of 251 runs two men, neither of them will be elected, for their average vote will be only $376\frac{1}{2}$, which is below the average vote of their three opponents. Again, a very large minority fails to elect its fair quota. Let the thousand electors stand 505 to 495. The minority can get but one member, provided their opponents concentrate on two.

For the latter can cast 1,515 votes, or $757\frac{1}{2}$ for each of the two, while the former's 1,485, divided among two, gives each but $742\frac{1}{2}$. In this case, their single member represents 495 men, while the other two have a constituency between them of only 505. The Cumulative Vote is apt to involve a great waste of votes. In the election by it of the London School Board, the leading candidate, Miss Garrett, received nearly 50,000 votes, while her colleagues were elected by from 8,000 to 13,000, and 50,000 were wholly lost. Allowance must be made for the fact that this was the first trial of the system on a large scale, but it is evident that great waste is its very possible concomitant. The same objections that we have urged against the Limited Vote in regard to the filling of accidental vacancies and the making nomination equivalent to election, when the party-strength does not vary, have equal weight against the Cumulative Vote.

The Free List or Registered Ballot system provides that a certain number of citizens shall make nominations by depositing with some official a list of names, the number of which shall not exceed the number of places to be filled. The quota necessary for a candidate's election is found by dividing the number of voters by the number of vacancies. Suppose there are 1,000 voters and ten vacancies. The quota is then 100. Four tickets are in nomination. The first receives 350, the second 300, the third 274, and the fourth 76. As the first has three times the quota, the first three men on it are elected. The second carries three and the third two. There are now eight men elected. The two largest remainders are those for the fourth and the third tickets, 76 and 74. The first nominee of the fourth and the third of the third are therefore chosen. The figures of this explanation show one great objection to the scheme. The men elected on the four tickets represent respectively $116\frac{2}{3}$, 100, $91\frac{1}{3}$, and 76 citizens. Since 76 ballots suffice to elect a candidate, there is a total waste of 240 out of 1,000 votes, or 24 per cent. If the votes are more equally distributed, the waste is smaller, but a minority of less than half a quota may be wholly unrepresented. If 900 votes have been exhausted in electing nine candidates, and the two remainders are 51 and 49, the latter is cancelled. To the Free List, too, apply the last two objections made to the Limited and Cumulative Vote.

The fifth of the schemes now before the public is the one which bears Mr. Hare's name in England and America, although it has been practiced in Norway for half-a-century, and in Denmark since its introduction there in 1856 by Mr. Andræ. This is the best in theory and has proved most successful in practice. It is, in brief, as follows: The quota of votes necessary to elect a candidate is found as it is under the Free List. Every elector has several names written or printed on his ballot. When the ballots are all deposited, they are taken from the box one by one, and credited to the name which is first upon each. If the full quota necessary to election has already been cast for this first name, the ballot is credited to the second name, and so on till all the full quotas have been ascertained. The largest fractions of quotas then elect, as under the Free List system. There are three grave objections to this admirable scheme. First, in transferring votes, the wishes of very many of the electors may be wholly ignored. Suppose 5,000 electors and two men to be chosen. A is the first choice of the whole 5,000. B and C each stand second on 2,500 papers. It is evident that it makes a very great difference which 2,500 votes are counted for A. Again, suppose B to stand second on 3,700 papers and C on 1,300. If all the votes counted for A have B as second choice, the latter's remaining 1,200 votes are eclipsed by C's 1,300, and the latter is elected, although B's real majority over him is 2,400. These extreme cases are unlikely to happen, but somewhat similar ones are inevitable. In every election the element of chance is introduced and the element of choice correspondingly disregarded. Second, there may be no representation whatever for any number of voters less than half-a-quota. In Massachusetts the congressional quota would be $(191,949 \div 11 =) 17,450$. When the ballots were counted, it would take 174,500 to elect the first ten representatives. This leaves 17,449. If anybody had 8,725 of these, he would be chosen. Then 8,724 would have no weight, even if they had all been cast for one candidate. This is a loss of 4.54 per cent., which would amount to nearly 300,000 votes in the whole country.*

* In the well-known case of the election of directors of the New England Society of Orange, N. J., in 1871, by Mr. Hare's system, two of the 46 votes were

If there were many scattering votes, a plurality of two or three thousand might elect, and leave fourteen or fifteen thousand voters in one State without representation. Third, all vacancies occurring between the general elections would necessarily be filled by a direct majority vote. The minority at such an election, however large, would be robbed of all representation.

Thus the five systems hitherto proposed all fail to compass the end of making every vote cast at the polls for a member of a law-making assembly count in every vote taken in that assembly, whether or not the particular person voted for is elected.

The problem still remains. Here is its possible solution:—

After every general election of a law-making body, let the aggregate number of votes cast by each party be ascertained. Divide this by the number of representatives elected by the party in question. The quotient will be the number of votes which each of those representatives is entitled to cast.

Suppose that of 6,500,000 voters, 3,500,000 belong to one party and 3,000,000 to the other. It is quite possible that the Congress chosen by these voters would stand 200 to 100. This estimate gives less proportional weight to the majority than it has in the Forty-third Congress. While the parties in the nation were as seven to six, they would be in the House as two to one. The legal majority in the latter would be 100; the equitable one 28. But apply the plan here proposed. Each of the minority has $(3,000,000 \div 100 =)$ 30,000 votes; each of the majority $(3,500,000 \div 200 =)$ 17,500 votes. The end sought for is attained. The strength of each party in the House becomes a precise index to its strength in the nation. Every vote cast at the polls counts in every vote taken in the House. There is not an unrepresented man in the country.*

Four questions demand consideration.

How would the vote of an independent congressman be reckoned? If he were *sui generis*, he would cast the number of

lost. This was a loss of 40 per cent. of a quota, and 4.34 per cent. of the whole vote. Mr. Lytton's official report of the working of the Andræ (i. e., the Hare) system in Denmark gives no statistics of waste.

* This plan has never been published, to our knowledge, except in a brief note by the author of this Article in *The Chicago Tribune* of October, 1872.

votes he received. The ballots thrown for the man he defeated would go, of course, to that man's party. This question, however, suggests another. If an independent candidate were defeated, how could his supporters be represented? Their votes could be added to the quota of a successful independent, or could go to swell the sum-total of one of the two great parties, as they might desire. Their wishes in this respect might be expressed on their ballots. The weakest point of the new plan is that it does not encourage independent candidacies as most of the other systems, notably Mr. Hare's, do. But it does not vie, properly speaking, with those systems. Its field is different. It is a possible supplement to all of them, taking up the question where they leave it and righting the wrongs, be they great or small, which they have worked. It prevents the great waste of votes involved in each and every one of them as well as the greater waste caused by the mechanism now in use. Perhaps the most perfect electoral system possible would be Mr. Hare's plans supplemented by the one here proposed.

Would proper local representation be prevented? The fortunate candidates of the administration, for instance, might come almost wholly from manufacturing districts, but they would cast the votes of the agricultural administrationists as well. The obvious answer is that the latter would be well enough represented, as agriculturists, by the opposition candidate elected from their district, and that the proposed plan, while it in no way abridged such representation, would give them in addition representation as politicians. If, however, the paramount question should be free trade, would it be just to allow the successful candidates of Pennsylvania, whose constituents want raw iron protected, to cast the votes received by the unsuccessful candidates in Connecticut, whose would-be constituents want manufactured iron protected? It is at once the strength and weakness of our protectionists that they join hands all around and try to take care of everything. If this policy should ever be abandoned, if each producing interest should try to get protection renewed for itself and abolished for others, the system would fall *instantly*. Since this is so, there is small danger from the cause here noted. Probably no

similar dilemma, based on any other question, could be formed. Of course congressmen would sometimes vote, as they do now, in opposition to the wishes of both their remote and immediate constituents, but this is necessary and not undesirable in a representative, as distinguished from a delegate, government.

Would there not be more fraudulent returns, when they would be felt by the whole country as well as by one State? Spread over a larger surface, they would be felt less than they are now. Taking the figures already given,—a vote of 6,500,000, divided into parties of 3,500,000 and 3,000,000, represented in Congress by 200 and 100 members respectively,—suppose a ballot-box stuffing of 50,000 votes in favor of the former. This would doubtless ensure the election of ten more representatives. Under the present system this would give the party in power 210 congressmen to 90 of the opposition. Under the proposed plan it would give the party in power a voting strength of 3,550,000 to 3,000,000, or 355 to 300. In the first case the fraud would increase the party strength by 10 per cent.; in the second, it would increase it by 1.43 per cent.

Would the process of recording the votes of the House be so slow as to retard business? After two or three days' experience under the apportionment that would follow each general election, a good mathematician could reckon the result of a doubtful vote about as quickly as if it were taken by yeas and nays.

The chief advantages claimed for this system are these:—

It would make every vote cast at the polls for a member of a law-making assembly count in every vote taken in that assembly, whether or not the particular person voted for was elected.

By giving every vote its proper weight, it would bring many habitual absentees to the polls, and would thus tend to maintain a healthy public interest in the country's welfare.

It would involve no sweeping changes either in electoral districts or in modes of election. It would allow the ignorant suffragan to vote as he had been wont to do. He would not be perplexed by new methods. All the necessary calculations would be made for him after the election. The scheme would therefore be comparatively easy to introduce.

It would allow an accidental vacancy to be filled at once, without leaving the minority in the particular district without representation. The new figures from this district would be substituted for the old ones in the aggregate vote of each party; each aggregate would be divided as before; and the quotient would be the number of votes which every representative of the party in question would now be entitled to cast. In satisfactorily meeting this dilemma, the system differs from all other proposed plans.

It would put a stop to the crying sin of "gerrymandering" by making it useless. A vote, wherever cast, would count.

It would greatly diminish the effect of fraud.

ARTICLE IX. — NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL.

FORGIVENESS AND LAW.*—This volume has been awaited with the more interest by many of Dr. Bushnell's admirers from vague expectations raised as to the relation it would bear to the views propounded in some of his foregoing works. That relation is clearly stated in the "advertisement" or preface. It proposes "a discontinuance of the last half," the third and fourth parts, of his "former treatise, *The Vicarious Sacrifice*," and "is put forth to occupy the place made vacant." His "design is, at some future time, to put the former first half and this last new half together, and recompose the treatise in a form to more satisfactorily represent what" he "would like to say of the whole subject." The "not less weighty part," which he retains, relates "to Christ as a power on character." That which this work supersedes is "what is included topically in our theology under the head of atonement"—the God-ward side or bearing of Christ's sacrifice—which he admits "may justly be more dear to us all that so many of the best and holiest believers of the past ages have found their life centered in it." It is characteristic of his discernment and his candor thus to appreciate the importance of this department of the subject, which to many he has before seemed to underrate or deny; yet we think injustice is done by overstatement to "the vast majority of disciples" when he says that to them this "has been and still is the whole topic;" for, ably and eloquently as he has expounded the bearing of Christ's work "as a power on character," we cannot concede that it has been by them so entirely overlooked. Rather we should say that according to their own testimony Christ's power on character in their experience has lain largely in their conception, however imperfect or partial this may have been, of his sacrificial work. One thing is certain and really wonderful to all readers of this volume who know the author, and that is his indomitable enterprise and unabated intellectual vigor, amidst physical infirmities that have clung to him

* *Forgiveness and Law, Grounded in Principles interpreted by Human Analogies.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 12mo, pp. 256. 1874.

these many years as if ordained for a new proof of the mind's superiority to the body, and especially of "man's unconquerable will" After the ten volumes (enumerated before the title-page) which have brought him desirable renown, another man's ambition might have rested on his laurels, but like a prophet he has still wrought on by the momentum of his message, nor has his genius, as tried by former achievements, here come short of itself. The powerful writing in all these pages scarcely needed his name to indicate the author. For compass of language, vivid imagery, flow and fervor of thought, and what we must call "inspirational" gleams and flashes, they will not suffer by comparison with their predecessors. Particularly we refer to the whole account in the first chapter of the "propitiation" required to the sentiments of the divine nature through the "cost made" in order to forgiveness, and to what is said in the first article of the fourth chapter, of "sin" as distinguished from "sins," and of the "defects of the old methods" as compared with Christ's reproofs. We make no attempt to set forth the doctrine of the book, which our readers will hasten to learn for themselves. The introduction shows how the author conceives himself to have been led into new views here opened, reaffirms "the moral view of atonement," notes modern changes in theological thought, and vindicates, in view of the times, a revision of current doctrine. The first chapter on "Forgiveness and Propitiation, without Expiation," while not taking back what he has before maintained, or accepting the "legal" or "forensic" views, is an advance on his former position, setting forth a more positive doctrine, ascribing to Christ's work a real propitiation on the divine side, and thus far meeting a want left by the earlier treatise. He rightly appeals to human analogies for the necessity of some propitiation; but here his rationalistic admirers may complain of something like anthropomorphism, while other admirers, more orthodox, may ask why he should not as well appeal also to other human analogies in the legal and judicial processes of society. The sort of propitiation he contends for does not seem to us so novel as he supposes, nor so contrary to current conceptions. The citations from Shedd and Wessel (page 58) could be accepted by many others in the same qualified sense as by him. Yet there is great power and novel impressiveness in Dr. Bushnell's interpretation here of the divine from the human. We suppose too that many an orthodox believer has substantially meant what is expressed so well in the citation from Edwards

(p. 20) in the Introduction. Prof. Hovey, in the same book which is partly a review of Dr. Bushnell's earlier discussion, when adopting the most extreme doctrine of Christ's substitution even to the extent of his partaking of the remorse of sinners, seems to resolve it into substantially this. The second chapter, on "Law and Commandment," the latter importing Christ's exposition and gracious work, we think will be held to be even more valuable than the first. The two words indeed, exegetically considered, may not be admitted to bear the stress here laid on them as related to one another, and the author disclaims for them (p. 100) the uniform rigid distinction. Yet the two factors in redemption here intended are admirably so set forth as not to displace or dishonor either, but rather to harmonize and exalt both in the work of man's recovery. The third chapter, on "Justification by Faith," reaffirms and amplifies what the author is understood to have maintained before, with the same divergence from the received Protestant doctrine. In admiring the great Reformer while dissenting from his favorite "article," he is still obliged to say, "Luther's head did not understand his heart." We think, however, that in so entirely excluding from justification what is called the "legal" or "forensic" element, he differs as well from the Roman Catholic as from the Lutheran doctrine; for instead of making justification and sanctification "virtually identical" (p. 210), we understand the Romanists by the former term (whatever else they include) to make account of the pardon of sin on the ground of the atonement, holding the expiation and merits of Christ to be the foundation of forgiveness. Pardon on this ground they would make a positive, though not the main, element of justification. The fourth chapter is on "the threefold doctrine of Christ concerning Himself," or the Spirit's work "in and by Christ's work," in reproving "the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment" (John xvi, 7-15). We must still, with those whom we reckon the best critics, interpret "the prince of this world" of Satan, while the author's doctrine as before developed makes it evil as "a fearfully despotic organizer" (p. 237). The largest treatment of the passage under consideration we have found in Hare's "Mission of the Comforter." But Dr. Bushnell's discussion here is exceedingly rich and suggestive, and indeed we scarcely know any part of his writings more vivid in conception, or at once more just in thought and brilliant in style than some of these pages. In fact, we have become so accustomed to these high qualities in his treatises and sermons that to note them may seem,

superfluous. We may add that while it is his lot, and one that he accepts, to differ in important respects from the several "systems of theology," the followers of each, though disliking his dissent on one point, welcome his agreement with them on another, and he must needs find many earnest readers. He sheds light on every subject that he treats of, though it may not take the course nor exhibit the results most expected or desired. Dealing freely with ancient forms of truth, it is his habit to despoil them of some cherished meaning and then to enrich them with another to be also cherished. In the meantime such thinking as his quickens his readers, and we may be sure that, vindicating as it does the supernatural element in Christianity and the divinity and grace of its Head, in the result it will have enriched theology.

BOWNE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER.*—This volume will be recognized by our readers as a reproduction, with some modifications, of Essays that appeared in the *New Englander* during the year 1872. Few who then read them will have forgotten the searching criticism to which they subjected Mr. Spencer's Principles of Philosophy, or the lucid and damaging exposure of his errors which they so successfully made. It is seldom that a critic, before unknown, has attracted by his first published writings so general an attention as was bestowed upon these essays; or awakened so lively an interest in the abstract themes of philosophy.

The attempt itself is quite an adventurous one. A new comer, with no prestige of reputation, and little aid of experience, enters the lists, for a strife *à l'outrance* with the disciplined and mature combatant who has long held public admiration, and who now, since the death of Hamilton and Mill, is the acknowledged champion of his party; but the issue is not even doubtful. There has been but one voice among those who are accustomed to the critical estimate of such conflicts. Mr. Bowne's conduct of the contest may be somewhat open to criticism, on the ground that it is more eager and enthusiastic than considerate towards his distinguished opponent; but that is a small matter. The unusual vigor of his onset cannot be questioned; the general fairness of his allegations is unimpeachable; and the essential success of his bold undertaking is beyond dispute.

* *The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer*: being an Examination of the First Principles of his System. By B. P. BOWNE, A.B. New York: Nelson & Phillips. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden.

Mr. Bowne has confined himself to the subject mentioned in his title, and assails Mr. Spencer only upon the fundamental points of his philosophy. It is no part of his design to call in question the ample extent of Mr. Spencer's acquisitions, his remarkable acquaintance with the science of our age, or even the value of his varied and ingenious suggestions, in any of the numerous departments of investigation over which his encyclopædic volumes extend. It is only within the province of psychology that Mr. Bowne questions his opponent's claims to respect; and even here he assails only the few grand principles of the system. These, however, he subjects to a rigid investigation, and probes them with a penetration which it will be useless to affect to despise.

On these points he shows that the new philosophy is weak. He shows that the grand admission by which Mr. Spencer would defend his system from the reproach of Atheism—the admission of a fundamental ground of phenomena, which is Infinite, but Unknowable—is fatally at variance with its author's own objections against a self-existent God; that Spencer's doctrine of the Absolute derives its force wholly from a confusion of the different senses in which the term is employed, and that a careful discrimination of these reduces it to a plain fallacy; and that his assertion that the Infinite is inconceivable, applies to no infinite in existence, but only to one in the fancy of a metaphysical theorist. Especially does he illustrate the weakness of the system in the demonstrated inconsistency of its two great parts. He shows that the philosophy of "the Unknowable" is constructed upon the principle that the necessities of thought afford no adequate ground for affirming a necessity of being or fact; while in the philosophy of "the Knowable," the author forgets utterly this whole and sole ground of his former reasonings, and offers the necessities of thought as the all-sufficient basis of his scheme.

The same critical and discriminating method Mr. Bowne carries through those portions of Spencer's philosophy which affect our conclusions in religion and in morals; and everywhere he finds the same fatal defects. Nowhere is Mr. Spencer in harmony with the fundamental principles of human thought, in the assumptions which he postulates as the basis of his system; and nowhere is he consistent with his own assumptions, in the scheme which he constructs. The dryness of the discussion is relieved by an occasional gleam of humor or a keen thrust of sarcasm; and often by passages of suggestive thought that possess great beauty.

Altogether, the treatise is one of uncommon merit and interest.

It thoroughly accomplishes its main work, and impeaches the character of this system of belief or no belief, with a success by which the philosophical authority of Mr. Spencer must be permanently impaired.

The appearance of Mr. Bowne in the arena of philosophical discussion will be to the religious public a matter of congratulation, not only from the interest and success of his present effort, but from the hope which it holds out of future discussions in the same important field.

CHRISTLIEB'S MODERN DOUBT AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF.*—There are eight lectures in this book, the titles being as follows: The Existing Breach between Modern Culture and Christianity; Reason and Reflection; Modern non-Biblical Conceptions of God; the Theology of Scripture and of the Church; the Modern Negation of Miracles; Modern Anti-Miraculous Accounts of the Life of Christ; Modern Denials of the Resurrection; the Modern Critical Theory of Primitive Christianity. The field is extensive. The topics are handled with laudable candor. The best influence of Dr. Christlieb, as we judge, in his recent visit to America, was through his earnest plea for a larger tolerance, and his demand for such concessions on the part of Christian apologists as the results of sound criticism require. In the present volume, among other important themes, the Tübingen school is copiously discussed. Dr. Christlieb was a pupil of Baur, and although he differs in his theology *toto cælo* from the Tübingen Doctor, he at the same time knows how to pay due respect to his vigor, industry, and extraordinary acquirements. For their tone and temper these lectures deserve much praise. They contain valuable thoughts pertaining to Christian doctrine, as well as good arguments in defense of Christian revelation.

HENRY ROGERS' LECTURES ON THE SUPERHUMAN ORIGIN OF THE BIBLE† are scarcely equal in point and speech to his well-known Eclipse of Faith, but they take more than a respectable position among the many defences of a supernatural revelation, with which

* *Christlieb's Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*: A series of apologetic lectures addressed to earnest seekers after truth. By THEODORE CHRISTLIEB, D.D., University Preacher and Professor of Theology at Bonn. Translated, with the author's sanction, chiefly by the Rev. H. W. Weitbrecht, Ph.D., and edited by Rev. T. L. Kingsbury, M.A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

† *The Superhuman Origin of the Bible inferred from itself*. By HENRY ROGERS, author of *The Eclipse of Faith*. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

the press at the present day seems to be almost burdened. Many of the trains of thought are striking and original. We miss in it some of the best fruits of the historic sense, and of the combination of critical scholarship with the historic imagination. It will find abundance of readers, however, for its unquestioned and striking merits.

THE ARENA AND THE THRONE.*—The title of this book gives no idea of the contents, and it is difficult to see how the contents could have suggested the title. The table of contents is as follows: 1. The Field; 2. The Defeat; 3. The Triumph; 4. The King. We look for four chapters connected in some way with one another. But we find four independent discourses, having no special relation to each other. The first is an astronomical discourse designed to make it appear probable that the earth alone is inhabited; the second is on Judas; the third on Job; the fourth on the position of man on the earth. The first discourse is quite interesting and instructive. We see nothing particularly striking in the others. At all events, made up as the book is, it is inevitably disappointing.

LANGE'S COMMENTARY ON REVELATION.†—This is the last volume in the extended commentary on the New Testament by Dr. Lange and his associates, which Professor Schaff has been introducing into this country. It resembles the former ones both in the general plan, according to which it was originally prepared, and in the character of the additions made by the American editor. Dr. Lange, who is himself the author of this part of his great work, brings the same peculiar powers of mind to the examination of the Apocalypse, which his readers have observed elsewhere in his writings. But as this book affords special opportunity for the operation of these peculiarities, they are displayed most fully in this volume. In his introductory treatise he discusses at length the characteristics of apocalyptics in general, and

* *The Arena and the Throne.* By L. T. TOWNSEND, D.D., author of *Credo*, &c. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874. pp. 264.

† *Lange's Commentary.* American Translation by Dr. PHILIP SCHAFF and others. Vol. X. *The Revelation of John.* Expounded by JOHN PETER LANGE, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn. Translated from the German by EVELINA MOORE. Enlarged and edited by E. R. CRAVEN, D.D., Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church at Newark, N. J. Together with a Double Alphabetical Index to all the Ten Volumes of the New Testament, by JOHN H. WOODS, A.M. New York: Armstrong & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 491.

after discovering what he regards as the true view with respect to their essential elements, and the correct theory of their symbolism, he applies his conclusions to the work of St. John. This work he justly considers as the highest development and crown, as it were, of all the writings of its class. His introductory treatise is an extended and thorough one, as presenting his own views. It is written, however, in a style which obscures its meaning, oftentimes, and somewhat taxes the patience of the reader. Dr. Lange gives a statement of the most important systems of interpretation applied to the Apocalypse, in the different periods of history, with an account of the opinions of the representative scholars of every class. His own view is that the book is a series of visions presenting the course of the world's history in respect, not to a regular succession of time, but to the forces and elements of its progress towards the final consummation. Dr. Craven has added many notes, giving his own views and those of other commentators, and the volume closes with a double index covering all the ten volumes of the work.

MEYER'S COMMENTARY ON ROMANS.*—In the number of this Quarterly published in October last, we presented our readers with a brief statement of the general characteristics and excellences of Meyer's great work on the New Testament. We would simply, at this time, call their attention to the fact that a second volume of the translation in course of publication by the Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh,—namely, Vol. I. of the Commentary on the Romans,—has appeared. This volume contains a General Preface by the English Editor, Dr. Dickson, a brief sketch of Dr. Meyer's life, the preface which he himself prepared just before his death for this translation, and the commentary on the Epistle as far as the sixth verse of the seventh chapter. The second volume on this Epistle will appear in a few months.

WHEDON'S COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. JOSHUA TO II. SAMUEL.†—This volume is the third in the series of commen-

* *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Romans.* By HENRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, Th.D. Ober-consistorialrath, Hannover. Translated by Rev. John C. Moore, B.A., Hamburg. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873. 8vo, pp. 324.

† *Commentary on the Old Testament*, Vol. III. Joshua to II Samuel. Book of Joshua; by D. STEINLE, D.D. Books of Judges to II Samuel; by REV. M. S. TERRY, A.M. D. D. WHEDON, LL.D., editor. New York: Nelson & Phillips. 1873. 12mo, pp. 558.

taries on the Old Testament, which correspond in general plan and character very closely with Dr. Whedon's volumes on the New Testament, which have been noticed in the *New Englander*. Dr. Whedon holds the position of General Editor of the whole series; but the preparation of the volumes on the Old Testament is assigned to other persons. Of this particular volume the Rev. Milton S. Terry is the author, though with some assistance in the earlier portion of it from Rev. Dr. Steele, of the Syracuse University. The plan of the commentary determines its character. It is designed for Sunday school teachers, and, as Dr. Whedon himself expresses it, for popular use. The notes are brief, concise, strictly exegetical and explanatory, and such as will be helpful to the common reader. The author has bestowed much thought upon his work. He has examined leading authorities, and has gathered his results in a form convenient for use. The ordinary translation is placed at the head of the pages, and in some cases, in poetical passages, a more literal translation, conformed to the order and idiom of the Hebrew, is added. In the portion of the Church with which the author and editor are especially connected, and for which this and the other volumes of the series are more particularly designed, we cannot doubt that this commentary will be regarded as well supplying a need. The wide circulation of somewhat similar commentaries in other denominations would seem to give promise of a like result here, and to show that many teachers and private readers are glad to get such helps in their Biblical studies.

CANDLISH'S SERMONS.*—The Church of Scotland, and since the disruption the Free Church especially, has always filled a large place in the regards of American Christians of more than one denomination, and her great names, who "seemed to be pillars," have been familiar to our ears. Next to Dr. Chalmers, who was *facile princeps*, Dr. Andrew Thompson seemed to stand foremost, and we can hardly believe it to be now more than forty years since he died in his prime. And now within scarcely more than a year the two who were left to be most honored at this distance on the roll of the Free Church as its successful champions, Dr. Guthrie and Dr. Candlish, have passed away. The former, we suppose,

* *Sermons by the late Robert S. Candlish, D.D.*, Minister of Free St. George's, and Principal of the New College, Edinburgh. With a Biographical Preface. New York: R. Carter & Bros. 1874. 12mo, pp. 315.

had no superior in his time for fervid and picturesque eloquence. The latter, too, was eminent as a preacher, though not his equal in popular oratory, and stood even higher as a theologian, an adroit debater, and a leader in ecclesiastical affairs. The work before us is a "Memorial Volume," giving us eighteen of his sermons, with a brief biographical sketch. They deserve the name of sermons as being not mere essays, nor discussions in philosophy, nor poetic or dramatic delineations, but clear and cogent presentations of truth; evangelic in the themes and the expositions; practical, yet with a doctrinal basis that is distinct though not obtrusive nor dogmatic; and more attractive than we had expected to find them, indeed remarkable, we think, for combining in an unusual degree the excellences of written and spoken style, so that while read deliberately with pleasure, they seem to be addressed also to hearers as by a living, earnest preacher. We have the higher respect for the author's ability and candor from having read some years ago his work on the extent and efficacy of the atonement, which then seemed to us the happiest attempt we had met with to reconcile the doctrine of limited atonement with the universality and sincerity of the gospel invitations. As compared with other leaders of the Church of Scotland, he has not been here so widely known through his writings as he deserved to be; yet he is certainly another proof of that country's fertility in effective preachers, or in what Isaac Taylor called "the concionative element."

SEGNERI'S LENTEN SERMONS.*—The first volume of Lenten Sermons by Segneri was published in 1872, and the demand for them appears to have been so great as to call for the publication of a second volume. But who was Segneri? The name is not familiar to Protestants, though he appears to have some celebrity among Roman Catholics. The first volume of the Lenten Sermons informs us that Segneri was born at Nettuno, in Italy, in 1624; that he entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus at the age of thirteen, and was ordained in 1653; that, twelve years later, he entered upon the missionary labors by which he is best known, and which continued till the year 1694, when he was appointed by Innocent XII. to preach in the pontifical palace. He retained that office about a year, when he was appointed Theologian of the Sacred Penitentiary, in which place he continued till his death in

* *Lenten Sermons.* By PAUL SEGNERI, of the Society of Jesus. Vol. II. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1874. pp. 314.

1694. He is said to have been a "man of most eminent virtue and of great austerity of life."

These sermons were published in Florence in 1679. And we may say of them, in general, that they are sermons that it would do Italians, or any other people, good to hear. We fear there has not been much of such faithful preaching in Italy as is found in this volume. If there had been, Italy would have been in a better condition than it is now.

The sermons contain sound doctrine, applied, with great directness and force, to the conscience and the heart. Except for frequent quotations from the Apocrypha, and profuse illustrations from patristic literature, and accounts of miracles of saints, which, to the Protestant mind, are of doubtful credibility, we should not know they had been preached by a Roman Catholic.

There is one particular in which they differ greatly, we think, from the sermons of modern preachers of the Church of Rome. It is in the absence of reference to the Virgin Mary. We have not noticed in this second volume a single allusion to the Virgin. The sermons of Catholic preachers of the present day are full of ascriptions of praise to the Blessed Virgin, and in this respect are in marked contrast to those of Segneri, and indeed to those of the great French preachers, Massillon, Bourdaloue, and Bossuet. There has been, as adherents of the Roman Church must themselves admit, a marvelous development of devotion to the Virgin in that Church in modern times; a development which seems to us singularly inconsistent with its profession of immutability in doctrine.

We confess, we think the Roman Catholic sermons of the times of Segneri far superior to those of modern times, and we unite with the translator in earnestly commending these sermons to the Catholic clergy.

STRAUSS AS A PHILOSOPHICAL THINKER.*—Dr. Krauth has done the public an excellent service in translating from Fichte's *Zeitschrift* the criticism of Strauss' last work entitled "The Old Faith and the New Faith," with an ample Introduction on the materialistic philosophy. The author of the Review, Dr. Hermann

* *Strauss as a Philosophical Thinker.* A Review of his book, "The Old Faith and the New Faith" and a confutation of its materialistic views. By HERMANN ULRICH. Translated, with an Introduction, by CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D.D., Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1874.

Ulrici, is well known as an able and practised critic, especially upon questions of literature and philosophy. In his review of Strauss he does not write as a theologian but as a philosopher. The number of points which he notices may be learned from the table of contents. The treatise of Strauss may not unjustly be regarded as a confession of faith, by one of the most advanced of modern thinkers. The review of Ulrici is a faithful exposure of the inconsistencies and the meagreness of this starveling creed. The Introduction upon modern materialism by the accomplished translator adds to the value of the Essay by Ulrici.

WHAT IS DARWINISM ?*—Dr. Hodge's brief but comprehensive treatise, in answer to the question What is Darwinism? is remarkable for two things: first, the clearness and force with which it sets forth the fact that Darwin himself rejects the doctrine of design as an essential feature of his theory; and second, the abundant extracts from various writers by which he illustrates the atheistic spirit of the great majority of the naturalists of the Darwinian School. Dr. Hodge does not contend, as he might, that the Darwinian theory, as a theory of the actual development of the successive powers of organic existence, might be held by a scientific theist who should use it as requiring more imperatively than any other theory of the universe the prevalence of design, the more comprehensive thought, and the more varied skill of an intelligent originator. In this omission Dr. Hodge has failed to add a most important argument against the atheistic conclusions on which naturalists rest with such confidence, a confidence which, in our view, on their own showing is entirely misplaced. The abundant evidence against the theory of Darwin from the facts and analogies of natural history Dr. Hodge does not undertake to present, very wisely; and yet there are a few conclusions and facts which even a layman is competent to reach and to employ. The work does not, however, profess to be exhaustive. It is fitted to be very useful, and to leave a strong impression upon many classes of readers.

THE SACRED ANTHOLOGY.†—In this book the editor has collected, from various sources, moral and religious maxims and

* *What is Darwinism?* By CHARLES HODGE, Princeton, N. Y. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

† *The Sacred Anthology.* A Book of Ethnical Scriptures. Collected and edited by MONCURE DANIEL CONWAY, author of "The Earthward Pilgrimage." New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 480.

teachings from the sacred writings of different races and peoples. His design, as expressed in his preface, is to show what he styles "the sympathy of religions" and "the converging testimonies" of all nations and ages to great moral principles. In carrying out this design, he places these testimonies by the side of the words of the Old and New Testament Scriptures, and probably with a special purpose that the reader may compare them and find the similarity of other teachings with those of the Biblical writers. He mentions no further purpose beyond such comparison—whether he intends to lead his readers to see the equal claims of other religions, or the superior claims of the Christian system. But whatever may have been his intention in this regard, it seems clear to us, that the latter impression will be produced on those who candidly examine the volume, and that the collection which the author has made is calculated to produce the same conviction, which all similar ones must make, of the divine elements in the teachings of the Bible. Mr. Conway has gathered a very large number of these passages from the eastern religious teachings and ancient books, and thrown them into a convenient form and classification for the uses of the reader.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.*—The second President Adams left behind him an almost continuous diary, stretching over a period of sixty-five years. His own public life extended through fifty three-years. His first public appointment was received from Washington; he was an active participant in the political contentions which preceded the war of 1812, and he lived to mingle as a leader in the anti-slavery contest of recent times. He had rare opportunities for education at home and abroad; he had the means of becoming acquainted with the great statesmen of his own country in the earlier period of our national history, and with eminent public men abroad. In many of the interesting events of which he was a spectator, he was also a prominent actor. His biography is, therefore, a history of political affairs, as well as a disclosure of the traits, the principles and the motives of its subject. Mr. C. F. Adams, who has already enriched the historical literature of the country, by the publication of his the

* *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*: Comprising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Vol. I. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874.

first President Adams's writings, accompanied by an excellent memoir, now undertakes the pious filial duty, as well as the public service, of presenting to the public the biography of his father, mostly in his own words, from the diary. To the editorial care, conscientiousness and judgment manifest in this first volume, the highest commendation is due. The narrative is carried as far as the appointment of Mr. Adams as Minister to Russia, by Mr. Madison. It covers his residence in Holland, and in Prussia, his service in the U. S. Senate, in Jefferson's administration, and his brief work as Professor of Rhetoric in Harvard College. The work has the peculiar charm that always attends the story of important events, when told by actors and eye-witnesses. It shows, on every page, the independence of thought which marked John Quincy Adams from his youth; the strong feelings, as well as just moral principles, by which he was actuated. The narrative of this volume leaves us just at the time of his separation from the Federal party, an act which some old Federalists never could forgive. The parts of his career which are touched upon are far less interesting than those which will form the theme of subsequent volumes. Yet the work has much historical value, and the continuance of it will be looked for with a high degree of curiosity and interest.

THE LIFE OF TIMOTHY PICKERING: Vols. II., III., IV.*—The first volume of Col. Pickering's Life, from the pen of his son, appeared several years ago, and was noticed in this Review. The death of the author has devolved upon Mr. Charles W. Upham the task of completing the unfinished work. To literary abilities and a literary experience which are uncommon, Mr. Upham adds the qualification of an intimate personal acquaintance with the subject of his biography. These volumes are well arranged and are written in an interesting manner. If to some readers they may appear in certain passages too copious, it must be remembered that pages which one reader may find no difficulty in passing over, may be, to another reader of a different taste, or more nearly connected with the subject of the memoir, fraught with interest. Col. Pickering took an active part in the Revolutionary war, being entrusted with a responsible office, and brought into close personal relations with Washington. As a member of the

* *The Life of Timothy Pickering*: Vols. II., III., IV. By CHARLES W. UPHAM. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1874.

cabinet of the first President and of John Adams, and afterwards a Senator and then a Representative in Congress, he was a conspicuous and influential public man, one of the pillars of the old Federal party. He was warmly attached to the section of which Hamilton was the leader, and the abrupt dismissal of Pickering from the post of Secretary of State, by Adams, was one of the principal events in the division of the Federalists, which precipitated their downfall. Mr. Upham tells his story with candor, and with a laudable freedom from partisan feeling. Pickering was a strong character. The energy which he manifested in plunging with his family into the forests of Pennsylvania, at the close of the war, and in once more becoming a farmer in the same State, after leaving Adams's cabinet, was characteristic of the statesman, and could not fail to give him a decisive influence in public affairs. The qualities were such as were adapted to make warm friends and bitter enemies. Independent in his judgments, he was extremely averse to everything that savored of hero-worship. Of Washington's military talents he had not the highest opinion. Mr. Upham has printed Col. Pickering's strictures upon some of the military operations of his chief. Yet, the perusal of all that Pickering has written of General Washington leaves the reader with a heightened impression of his greatness and excellence. In common with all other witnesses, Pickering bears emphatic testimony to the unequalled disinterestedness and moral elevation of Washington's character, and to the wonderful *presence* by which he cast a spell over all who approached him. The rupture, in the Federal party to which we have adverted, is a matter with regard to the merits of which a hasty judgment should not be pronounced. Adams chafed under the consciousness that the leading Federalists, including members of his own cabinet, were inspired and guided by Hamilton, and ready to promote his elevation. On the contrary, they complained that the jealous temper of Mr. Adams and his rashness broke up the great party which had organized the government, and administered it during the first twelve years of its existence. This is certain, that the progress of time more and more vindicates the character of the Federal party against the aspersions of those who overthrew it, and demonstrates the wisdom of the Federal policy, the essential features of which have been practically adopted in the management of the Government since, even under the adversaries of Federal rule.

HÄUSSER'S PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION.*—Häusser's Lectures on the period of the Reformation are here presented in English, and deserve to be widely read. They are lucid, condensed, impartial, and present, mainly from the political or secular point of view, an interesting and instructive summary of the events comprised within the era which begins with the posting of Luther's theses and ends with the Peace of Westphalia. The religious and theological aspects of the history are quite in the background. The estimates of character are fair and judicious. The lectures are founded on original studies. It is to be regretted, however, that they were not prepared for the press by their author. They are a posthumous publication, and, although edited with care and judgment, they lack the introductory discussions with which Prof. Oncken was accustomed to preface them in his class-room. The translation is in good English and is respectably done. But epithets are frequently omitted, and sometimes whole sentences are left out. Too much care cannot be exercised in rendering into another language the sentences of so compact a writer as Häusser.

THE OXFORD METHODISTS.†—The group of young men at Oxford, of whom John Wesley is the most celebrated, comprised, besides Whitefield, a number of persons whose biographies are narrated by Mr. Tyerman in the volume before us. Henry became a writer of distinction in his day. Each of them had a career peculiar to himself. Several of them became alienated from Wesley, on account of strong differences of opinion and from their repugnance to his measures. Mr. Tyerman has made an interesting book, which serves as a supplement to his extended Life of the Founder of Methodism.

TYTLER'S "OLD MASTERS" AND "MODERN PAINTERS."‡—These little volumes contain brief biographical statements respecting the most renowned painters, together with criticisms, partly

* *The Period of the Reformation* (1517-1648). By Ludwig Häusser. Edited by WILLIAM ONCKEN, Professor at Giessen. Translated by Mrs. G. Stugre. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 702.

† *The Oxford Methodists*: Memoirs of the Rev. Messrs. Clayton, Ingham, Gambold, Henry, and Broughton. With biographical notices of others. By the Rev. L. TYERMAN. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1873.

‡ *The Old Masters and their Pictures*: For the use of schools and learners in art. By SARAH TYTLER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. *Modern Painters and their Paintings*: For the use of schools and of learners. By SARAH TYTLER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874.

selected by the author from other writers, upon their principal works. The aim is to furnish an introduction to the study of art, which shall be free from scientific classification, and from dry details, but which shall stimulate readers, who are not versed in the subject, to further studies. The circumstances related of the masters in painting are interesting, and the remarks upon their productions are generally judicious. Without any pretence to originality or profundity, these little books are valuable, and may be read with pleasure by persons conversant with art as well as by novices.

GILMAN'S FIRST STEPS OF HISTORY.*—The object of this book is to stimulate young persons to the study of Natural History, by mapping out the ground for them, and by selecting such facts respecting each period and each country as one of capital importance. There are plain maps interspersed through the volume. There are also chronological tables and indexes. The aim of the author is praiseworthy, and he has attained a good degree of success in carrying it out. His book is much more inviting and readable than the common abridgments, which give only the dry lines of history.

MISCELLANEOUS.

PROFESSOR W. STANLEY JEVONS' TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE,† is likely to raise higher and more numerous expectations than it will meet and satisfy. Following, as it does, such works as Sir John F. W. Herschel's "Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," Dr. William Whewell's "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," and John Stuart Mill's "System of Logic," etc., and being written by a gentleman who was already distinguished as the author of several logical treatises, it would not unnaturally be expected, that it should reduce to a systematic and satisfactory form what is already known and accepted in respect to the principles of science and of scientific method. We confess to no little disappointment in respect to the matter and form of this treatise. The writer shows abundant

* *First Steps of General History*. By ARTHUR GILMAN, M.A. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1874.

† *The Principles of Science*. A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method. By W. STANLEY JEVONS, M.A., F.R.S., etc., etc. Special American edition, bound in one volume. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

reading of the writers of his time on all the principal and secondary topics. His own remarks are usually just and often ingenious. His conclusions are sober and reverential, rarely conflicting with a sound common sense and rational theism. But his method is far from being thoroughly scientific, and he lacks that "gründlichkeit" which we naturally and reasonably look for in a book that professes to treat of the fundamental principles of scientific thought. We accept with a grateful recognition the many acute and comprehensive suggestions with which the treatise abounds; but we cannot but report its very serious deficiencies.

The book will be generally read, as it deserves to be. The questions which are so freely mooted and discussed at the present day have awakened an ardent interest in the principles of knowledge of every kind, among first and second rate philosophers, and even among readers who have small claim to be called philosophers of any class.

The logic of science and the logic of faith are keenly scrutinized, and any writer who contributes anything in answer to the numerous questions which are raised upon these subjects will be carefully read and closely sifted. The English publishers have done wisely in providing for a large sale for their own edition by issuing the two volumes in one, for the American market.

SUMNER'S HISTORY OF CURRENCY.*—In this book Prof. Sumner has presented a very clear, and, as it seems to us, very just and impartial history of American currency. Beginning with an account of the wampum currency, he speaks of the system of barter which was introduced into this country very early, of the "Pine tree coinage," of the first institution of banks, of the paper money which was issued in the wars in which the colonies were from time to time engaged, and in the Revolution against Great Britain. The history of the United States Bank occupies a very large space in the book, and the history of the currency is brought down to the present time, telling of events which are within the memory of the present generation. It is a very interesting and very instructive history; especially so at the present time.

The experience of the past is the best guide for the future, and we have the fallacy of many prevalent theories demonstrated by

* *History of American Currency.* With chapters on the English Bank Restriction and Austrian Paper Money. By WM. G. SUMNER, Professor of Political and Social Science in Yale College. To which is appended "The Bullion Report."

the result of their previous trials in this history of two hundred and fifty years.

We think no one can read the book without interest and profit, but it would have been more useful if the reasons for the opinions expressed had been given more frequently. A narrative of the facts connected with a course of financial policy which has resulted disastrously will carry conviction of itself to the student of finance, but many readers will need some explanation of the relation of the facts to the result, and will not be sufficiently enlightened by a simple statement of facts, or by the bare assertion that the result was a necessary consequence.

We are especially pleased that Prof. Sumner has added to his work the "Bullion Report" made in 1810 to the House of Commons of Great Britain, in which the questions pertaining to currency are discussed in the most masterly manner. There is no single treatise on the subject so well worthy of study at the present time in this country, none which will throw greater light on the questions we have now to settle. We trust Prof. Sumner will give to the public more of the results of his studies.

THE POETRY OF THE ORIENT.*—This comely volume is meant to draw the attention of general readers to the poetry of the East. "The whole field of Oriental literature, so far as accessible through English, Latin, German, and French translations," says the author, "has been with me a favorite province for excursions in such leisure hours as I could command." He has been "in the habit of versifying the brief passages which struck him most forcibly." With these he has gathered also translations by several European authors into their own tongues, again rendered into English verse. The result is the compilation of brief specimens of "Arab, Hindu, Persian, and Sûfi poems," making the bulk of this volume. The first ninety pages are occupied with a "Historical Dissertation," aiming "to convey to the reader some conception of the vast contents of the imperial treasure-house of Oriental poetry," to sketch "the labors of modern scholars" in this department, and "to give an illustrative analysis" of its "distinguished characteristics." The essay is carefully prepared and interests a thoughtful reader, though the style is more ambitious and profuse in epithets than we should have expected from Mr. Alger, and the enumeration of

* *The Poetry of the Orient.* By WILLIAM ROUNSEVILLE ALGER. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 371.

European works on the subject more full and minute than seems needful. The examples furnished in connection with the analysis are more valuable than the "metrical specimens" which follow and take up the larger space. The reader is propitiated by the touching dedication—"To the dear and pure memory of my dead boy, Henry Lodge Alger, who loved many things in this book."

PREVALENT MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING THE PHYSICAL FORCES.—Among the valuable Articles which have lately appeared in the "*College Courant*," we call especial attention to a series just completed by Prof. William A. Norton, under the title quoted above. The first paper, published May 23, 1874, concludes with the following paragraph.

"The readers of recent publications of physical researches and discoveries, have had their attention so especially directed to modes of motion, and transformations of motion, that many of them have failed to discover anything else as present in physical phenomena, and the notion of force as the cause of motion has, to all essential purposes, passed out of their minds. With all such persons the imperfect conception referred to has taken a wider scope. The physical forces have now disappeared from view, and have left a world made up of motions, changing from one mode to another without intervening causes.

The tendency so rife at the present day to pay attention chiefly to the motions and transformations of motion that are the conspicuous features in physical phenomena, and overlook or disregard the molecular forces at work in the processes of transformation, is the more to be deprecated from the fact that it has played a prominent part in the origination and maintenance of the "scientific" atheism which has sprung up in the path of recent scientific research, and presents so bold a front to the world. When one fails to perceive in Nature anything but different modes of motion, and recognizes in physical phenomena nothing but changes from one mode of motion to another, paying no heed to the intimate mechanical processes by which the changes are effected, he may fail to discover in Inanimate Nature any indications of the sustaining Hand of a Spiritual Power. To him the transfer of motion from one body of matter to another, is a mere phenomenon of no more significance than the mere fact of the flow of water from one vessel to another. Certain conditions occur, and a certain result follows. But little or no thought is given to the active agency that accomplished the result. This active agency is not

matter; nor is it derived from any of the forces of actual energy that make up the class of correlated physical forces, so called. It is some entity, of the essential nature of which we can form no conception, that in every encounter of one body of matter with another, takes effect from one particle at the point of meeting upon another, arresting their approach and urging them asunder. We call it force. A definite amount of this force comes into operation in every instance of the impact of bodies, or of the conflict of atoms or molecules. This active agency, capable of producing effects definite in amount, and which suffers no diminution of intensity—an inexhaustible active cause taking effect upon matter—our reason authoritatively affirms, must proceed from an Infinite Spiritual Source. Though in every instance of its operation its immediate source is a certain portion of matter, the fact that it is an active cause operating at a greater or less distance from this immediate source, upon other portions of matter, and controlling their motions, affords convincing evidence that it is an entity distinct from matter, and communicated to it from without, and therefore from a Spiritual Power. If this be true it matters little, from our present point of view, whether this entity (which is force, or immediately originates force), flows, so to speak, in a never-ceasing stream, from the throne of Infinite Power into and through matter—breaking upon its countless atoms in reflex waves, and ever diffusing itself through the infinite realms of space; or was permanently communicated to matter by the breath of the Creative Spirit.

It must be admitted, we think, that certain distinguished physicists, by fixing attention upon the brilliant results of modern physical research, and the general principles by which they are connected, and not heeding the mechanical processes that form the essential feature in all phenomena, have in their publications, with probably but little thought of such a result, sowed the seed from which a large crop of “scientific scepticism” has sprung up. It is not that their science is false, but incomplete—one-sided. True physical science, taken in its most comprehensive sense, is not chargeable with these lamentable results of the recent remarkable progress of science. This looks beyond the mere phenomena, seeks for their causes, ascends from effects to their highest physical causes, and does not fail to discern that these must emanate from the First Cause of all things.”

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The History of Greece. By Professor Dr. Ernest Curtius. Translated by Adolphus William Ward, B.A. Vol. IV. New York: Scribner & Armstrong. 12mo, pp. 530.

Memorials of a Quiet Life. By Augustus J. C. Hare, author of "Walks in Rome." [Messrs. George Routledge & Sons have reprinted an American edition of this very popular memoir, "entire from the ninth English edition, the two volumes complete in one," with an introduction by F. D. Huntington, S.T.D.]

The Brooklyn Council of 1874. Letter-Missive, Statement, and Documents, together with an official Phonographic Report of the Proceedings and the Result of Council. New York: Woolworth & Graham. 1874. 8vo, pp. 250.

Ten Minutes Talk on all Sorts of Topics. By Elihu Burritt, with an autobiography of the author. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874. 12mo, pp. 360.

Prophetic Voices concerning America. A Monograph. By Charles Sumner. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874. 12mo, pp. 176.

Record of Mr. Alcott's School, exemplifying the principles and methods of Moral Culture. Third edition, revised. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 297.

Modern English. By Fitzedward Hall, M.A., Hon. D.C.L. Oxon. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1873. 12mo, pp. 394.

A Lawyer Abroad. What to see and how to see it. By Henry Day, of the Bar of New York. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 348.

Valentine, the Countess; or, Between Father and Son. Translated from the German of Carl Detlef by M. S. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates. 1874. 12mo, pp. 377.

The Circuit Rider. A Tale of the Heroic Age. By Edward Eggleston. Illustrated. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 332.

Cassy. By Herba Stretton, author of "Max Kromer," "Bede's Charity." New York: Dodd & Mead. 16mo, pp. 236.

The Reef, and other Parables. By Edward Henry Bickersteth. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, pp. 322.

Lord of Himself. A novel. By Francis H. Underwood. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1874. 12mo, pp. 512.

Pleasant Talk about Fruits, Flowers, and Farming. By Henry Ward Beecher. New edition, with additional matter from recent writings, published and unpublished. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 498.

From the Plow to the Pulpit. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1874. 16mo, pp. 121.

Modern Skepticism. A Journey through the Land of Doubt and Back Again. A Life Story. Philadelphia: Smith, English, & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 448.

An Introductory Hebrew Grammar, with progressive exercises in reading and writing. By A. B. Davidson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew in the New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York, Scribner, Welford & Co. 8vo, pp. 166.

Christianity in the War. By A. S. Billingsley, late Chaplain U. S. Army. Illustrated. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, & Haffelfinger. 12mo, pp. 429.

Desperate Remedies. By T. Hardy. Published in "Leisure Hour Series." H. Holt & Co. New York. 1874. 16mo, pp. 402.

THE
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OCTOBER, 1874.

ARTICLE I.—AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL.*

THIS is a frank and truthful record of a life marked by more than ordinary distinction in its external contact with the world, and peculiarly strange and sad and instructive in the unfolding of its inner phases. Its interior development furnishes the thread of the whole narrative, as the author meant it should. For he gives three reasons for leaving this memorial of himself: first, that there might be "some record of an education which was unusual and remarkable;" second, that there might be open to study "the successive phases of a mind which was always pressing forward," "in an age of transitions in opinions;" and third, and most especially, that due acknowledgment might be made of "the debts which this intellectual and moral development owed to other persons."

This life began in London, on the 20th of May, 1806. Its earthly career was closed, as other hands make record, near Avignon, on the 8th of May, 1873. The sixty-seven years included between these dates form a period of stirring activity and conflict in the political history of Europe, and of yet more

* *Autobiography*. By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1873.

stirring activity and conflict in the domain of human thought for the world. The circumstances of this individual life brought it very peculiarly under the molding pressure of one set of influences incident to such a time. We cannot wonder, therefore, that the development was abnormal and one-sided, almost to deformity.

In the case of most men of eminence, the impress of a mother's animating spirit and plastic touch of love is seen to be determinative of best results. But it is a singular fact that the word "*mother*" does not once occur in this autobiography, and the sketch shows hardly a sign of anything like home-affection, filial or fraternal, in its subject. As soon as the birth is announced, the prominent figure in the foreground is the father, only the father, and such a father! A Scotchman born, strong in brawn and brains, with a powerful intellect, improved by high culture and tasked with intense work, he was by constitution and by habit devoid of the gentleness and sympathy which are essential qualifications of one who undertakes the training of a child. Then, as in spiteful hostility to the truths of Christianity he broke away from the faith of his fathers and abandoned the service of the Church for which he was educated, he became, by that very act, more cold, skeptical, bitter, unfeeling, and cruel in the rigor with which he insisted on his own ideal of mental development. Hence, almost before the child could go alone, this father snatched him from his nurse's arms and subjected him to a course of intellectual discipline which seems to us terrible.

Mill says: "I have no remembrance of the time when I began to learn Greek; I have been told that it was when I was three years old." The precocious development thus early commenced went on under steady pressure, which excluded him from all participation in the ordinary sports of childhood and from all association with other boys. Mill rates himself rather below than above par in the natural gifts of quick apprehension, retentive memory, and active, energetic character. Yet we find him at eight years of age reading Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, with only his father for a lexicon. In his eighth year he commenced Latin, a learner, and, at the same time, a teacher of his younger brothers and sisters, compelled

to evince his own proficiency by the results of his teaching. During the next four years, he read the works of all the leading Latin authors, also those of the Greek poets, dramatists, orators, and philosophers, even to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. During the same period, he learned thoroughly geometry and algebra, and was compelled to grapple alone with the problems of the calculus and higher mathematics. This close application to study was interspersed with extensive private reading, chiefly of history, to an extent that seems almost incredible; the topics of his reading being made the subjects of earnest conversation in frequent, long walks taken with his father. His chief amusement he found in reading books of experimental science without either performing or witnessing any practical experiments.

The inexorable rigor of his training is illustrated by the fact that in the higher mathematics, with which his father had not kept up his early acquired knowledge so as to give needed explanation, the boy "was continually incurring his father's displeasure by his inability to solve difficult problems for which he did not see that the necessary previous knowledge was wanting." Some relief from this he found in a voluntary exercise which he took up and called writing histories. Thus in his eleventh and twelfth years, he compiled from Livy and Dionysius a history of the Roman Government, writing enough, he says, to make an octavo volume. This was his play. At about the same age, in addition to his other tasks, he was compelled to write English verses, having been introduced to a few of the choice old poets. But for this exercise he had but little of either genius or taste, and in it he made no great proficiency.

From the age of twelve, he entered on what he calls an advanced stage of his education and took up Logic, beginning with Bacon's *Organon* and following that with some Latin treatises on the subject. His subsequent reading of Latin and Greek authors was for the sake of their thoughts, his father requiring him to read aloud in the Greek, especially Plato and Demosthenes, and to answer questions when asked, and making this, at the same time, a severe and irksome drill in Elocution. In his fourteenth year, he was taken through a complete course of Political Economy, partly by the study of such books as were then published on the subject and partly by a sort of peripatetic course of lectures and discussions in walks with his

father. "At this point," he says, "concluded what can properly be called my lessons." When about fourteen, he left England for a year, the most of which was spent in the south of France, and on his return his education was carried forward by a different method.

The question naturally arises, What moral influences accompanied this severe intellectual discipline? In a distinct chapter, our author answers this question squarely. His father, stumbling at the problem concerning the existence of evil in the world, had fallen into complete atheism. He found it "impossible to believe that a world so full of evil was the work of an author combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." "He considered what is commonly presented to mankind as the creed of Christianity to embody the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness." Hence, with no less pains than marked the rigor of his intellectual drill, he labored to impress it upon his son's mind "that the manner in which the world came into existence was a subject on which nothing was known;" that the question "Who made me?" cannot be answered because we have no experience or authoritative information from which to answer it. Coming up under such a teacher, who conscientiously carried out his own convictions on this as in other parts of his son's education, the result was what must be expected. John Mill thus frankly confesses: "I am one of the very few examples in this country of one who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it. I looked upon the modern exactly as I did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned me."

Then further on, he says, "My father's moral convictions, wholly dis severed from religion, were very much of the character of those of the Greek philosophers. In his views of life, he partook of the character of the stoic, the epicurean, and the cynic. In his personal qualities, the stoic predominated. His standard of morals was epicurean, inasmuch as it was utilitarian, taking as the exclusive test of right and wrong the tendency of actions to produce pleasure or pain. But he had (and this was the cynic element) scarcely any belief in pleasure. Accordingly, temperance, in the large sense intended by the Greek philosophers—stopping short at the point of modera-

tion in all indulgences, was with him as with them about the central point of educational precept." There was nothing in the associations of the youth to qualify the strong influence of such a father. The habitual frequenters of his father's house were Bentham and a few of his disciples of the utilitarian school. He seems to have been carefully guarded from all contact with any who might impart other views of Christianity and virtue till his habits of thinking and feeling were unalterably set.

The year spent on the continent introduced him to mountain scenery and modified his tastes for life. While in France, he also took lessons in various kinds of bodily exercise, attended lectures on science, and went through a course of the higher mathematics under private tuition. But he thinks the highest advantage of his residence abroad was the fact that he breathed, for a whole year, the free and genial atmosphere of continental life, and thus by contrast apprehended the great defect of English life—that lack of friendship and sympathy. He carried home with him a strong and permanent interest in continental liberalism, which qualified his subsequent political views.

On his return to England, young Mill was called to help his father in preparing for the press a work on Political Economy, by making a running abstract in the form of marginal notes on the manuscript. Soon after, he commenced reading law, intending to make that his profession. But his guide was John Austin, a devoted disciple of Bentham, and very naturally Bentham's treatise on Legislation was made their leading text-book. Other works of Bentham were taken up, and then, passing to some of the principal English writers on mental philosophy, his course of law-reading seems only to have brought him out into the field of metaphysics a thorough Benthamite, so that "the principle of utility" became the keystone of his knowledge and beliefs. Mill claims for himself the credit of giving to that philosophical school the title Utilitarian, taking the term out of one of Galt's novels and applying it to a little debating society which at the age of sixteen he formed, and which was kept up for three and a half years.

At the completion of his seventeenth year, his father secured for him an appointment from the East India Company, in whose

service the most of his own life was spent. John Mill, for thirty-five years, until the abolition of that corporation, continued his connection with it, rising steadily from the lowest grade of clerks to the highest post in his department. This position gave him a support and, at the same time, much leisure for the prosecution of literary pursuits. His chief duty was to write despatches and conduct the political correspondence of the company—an exercise which he deemed profitable both as a training in the expression of opinions and as qualifying his speculative theories by practical observation of the difficulties and obstacles always met with in the conduct of public affairs. He thinks these labors were of considerable value to him as a theoretical reformer of the opinions and institutions of his time.

In 1828, the same year that he entered the service of the East India Company, the *Westminster Review* was established by Mr. Bentham and his followers, avowedly as a Radical organ in politics and religion, to make head against the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly Reviews*, then in the full height of their reputation and influence. The first number opened a direct assault in an Article by James Mill, reviewing the *Edinburgh Review* from its commencement. The younger Mill had during the previous year commenced his "youthful propagandism" of the new opinions by writing articles for the morning papers. He was now called to assist his father in this attack by reading through the forty volumes of the *Edinburgh Review* and noting the articles most open to criticism. The assault made a sensation at the time, but the object of it survived and continues still to hold its leading position as an exponent of the sound conservative thinking of the times, as they move on. From this time, for about five years, young Mill was a constant contributor to the *Westminster Review*, guided chiefly by his father's very positive opinions, which, he says, "gave the distinguishing character to the Benthamite or Utilitarian propagandism of that time."

During this period, he was brought into close relations with Bentham by being made the editor of his great work on Evidence, and this labor he thought gave a great start to his powers of composition. Meantime, for his better self-cultivation, he was learning German with a class of a dozen or more,

who also, in reading and conversation, studied and discussed Political Economy, Logic, and Psychology. In another association, his powers of argument and oratory were cultivated by spoken debates on the leading questions of the day.

So we find the subject of this sketch, at the age of twenty-one, occupying an office which ensured a support for life, and in literary associations which gave him ample scope for working influence on the world through his pen, for the facile use of which his whole training had given him excellent preparation. His ambition was to be a Reformer, and everything seemed to favor success in his aims.

But just then, he was brought to a strange crisis. His soul passed under a dark cloud. He went on mechanically with his ordinary occupations, but gloomy thoughts filled his mind. He could find no rest or satisfaction in what he was, or in anything before him. He thus describes his condition, in the autumn of 1826 :

"I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement; one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times becomes insipid or indifferent; the state, I should think, in which converts to Methodism usually are when smitten by their first 'conviction of sin.' In this frame of mind, it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized: that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered 'No!' At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this one end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for. . . . In vain I sought relief from my favorite books; those memorials of past nobleness and greatness from which I had always hitherto drawn strength and animation. I read them now without feeling, or with the accustomed feeling *minus* all its charms; and I became persuaded that my

love of mankind and of excellence for its own sake had worn itself out."

In this state, he had no friend to whom he could turn for advice. Instinctively he seemed to apprehend that his father could give him no relief, for the trouble came from a defect in his education which had been guided mainly by that father's will. The susceptibilities and sympathies of his nature which had been repressed, almost crushed, by the severity of a purely intellectual discipline, were crying out against the wrong done them. We must think he was nearer right than he supposed, when he compared his state of mind to that of one under religious influences, feeling his way towards a Christian conversion. Pity that he could not have fully understood that God was dealing with him to bring him to know Himself and "Jesus Christ whom he had sent, whom to know is life eternal." But every avenue through which the true light could find entrance to his soul seems to have been shut. So, for half a year or more, he floundered on, in the depths of gloom. So great was his distress that he says, "I frequently asked myself if I could, or if I was bound to go on living when life must be passed in this manner. I generally answered to myself that I did not think I could possibly bear it beyond a year."

At length a little ray broke in upon his gloom from the simple circumstance that as he read in Marmontel's "*Mémoires*" of the sudden inspiration which a mere boy, on his father's death, felt to be everything to the distressed family, the fountains of feeling in his own soul were opened; he was moved to tears, and that evidence that all *feeling* was not dead within him lifted the cloud slightly, and gave a new aspect to the possibilities of his future. Shortly afterwards, the power of music, in which one of the imaginative arts he had always found pleasure, touched his sympathies anew as he listened to the melodies of Weber's "Oberon." Then, taking up Wordsworth's poems, he found his soul soothed and charmed by his simple expression of "states of feeling and of thought colored by feeling under the excitement of beauty." The fact is the man was love-sick, in the sense that he was pining for some object to love. The first step to relief was to apprehend that state, as he could do through the quiet, sentimental verse of the

poet of nature, who tells how "the light of love not failing" is the source of strength and cheerfulness to bear "the burden of existence." Again we cannot repress the wish that he had seen that "light of love" as it beams from the cross of the Crucified and kindles all the soul to a kindred feeling responsive. It was a blessing to him to get this partial relief, increased as it was by an earnest debate into which he entered in defense of the merits of Wordsworth as compared with Byron. The process of recovery was aided by the contact into which he was brought with men of some religious faith and spiritual aspirations, such as Maurice, and Sterling, and Coleridge. His heart, in its new experience, was drawn towards the men, even while it repelled the religious elements which made them attractive. Thus gradually, as the months and years rolled on, he emerged into enjoyable life and action.

Mill himself names two marked effects of this experience. The first was the conviction that while, according to his old philosophy, happiness is the end of life, this end is to be attained only by not making it the direct end. "Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on the happiness of others rather than their own." The other effect was, so to speak, the revelation of the fact that "the internal culture of the individual" must be placed among the prime necessities of human well-being,"—"that the passive susceptibilities need to be cultivated as well as the active capacities and require to be nourished and enriched as well as guided." Another consequence of this crisis, gradually unfolded, was a change in his philosophical views, involving a considerable dissent from the opinions early received from his father and Bentham, and an emancipation, in part at least, from the narrowness of a strict interpretation and application of the one fundamental principle of the utilitarian school. Of this change he says:

"If I am asked what system of political philosophy I substituted for that which, as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, no system; only a conviction that the true system was something much more complex and many-sided than I had previously had any idea of, and that its office was to supply, not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the institutions suitable to any given circumstances might be

deduced." In connection with all this, a deep interest in the political movements and discussions on the continent, consequent on the French revolution of 1880, came in, with the writings of Comte and the socialist theories of Saint Simon, to qualify his Liberalism and his hopes and efforts for accomplishing something for the general elevation and improvement of mankind.

That strange crisis of this strangely developed life ended with the beginning of a new association—the introduction of a new influence, more effective, if we may accept the author's conviction, than all others on the last forty years, and on the lasting fruits of this man's life. In 1880, when in his twenty-fifth year, Mill, whose soul had been so sick, if we read the case aright, for the want of some object to love, found an object towards which, for all the rest of his days, his affections went out in idolatrous devotion. It so happened that she who so charmed him was the wife of another man and the mother of children by him. But their mutual affinity was strong enough to overcome this barrier. It only qualified their mutual passion, repressing, for the time, the sensuous element, and bringing out what comes nearer to that ideal Platonic love, much talked of, than anything else we have read of in these modern days. For, no doubt, we may believe Mill's distinct statement that during the lifetime of the legitimate husband, their personal intercourse was held under due restraint, though passing many hours of every day in each other's society. At the same time, each seems to have cherished a true esteem and strong affection for the man whom, according to the current sentiment of Christian morality, they were both so flagrantly wronging, but who submitted to the wrong without complaint. In this restriction upon their otherwise constant and familiar intercourse, however, they simply deferred to the common sense of propriety in the community. For he says explicitly, neither the principles inculcated by his father, nor his own convictions, nor the lady's views of duty, would have hindered their devoting themselves to each other, in entire disregard of the previous marriage connection. As it was, this intimacy involved the breaking of friendship with other women of great worthiness into whose society he had been thrown, and who had shown him great

kindness. Those ladies justly refused to receive, even as their friend's friend, a woman so lightly held by her sacred marriage-vows. The consequence was that they were shut up almost exclusively to each other and to the full force of their mutual influence.

To the imagination of Mill, Mrs. Taylor is presented as the ideal of personal excellence. He says :

"I soon perceived that she possessed in combination the qualities which in all other persons whom I had known I had been only too happy to find singly. In her, complete emancipation from every kind of superstition (including that which attributes a pretended perfection to the order of nature and the universe), and an earnest protest against many things which are still part of the established constitution of society, resulted not from the hard intellect, but from strength of noble and elevated feeling, and co-existed with a highly reverential nature." . .

"Her intellectual gifts did but minister to a moral character at once the noblest and the best balanced which I have ever met with in life. Her unselfishness was not that of a taught system of duties, but of a heart which thoroughly identified itself with the feelings of others, and often went to excess in consideration for them by imaginatively investing their feelings with the intensity of its own. The passion of justice might have been thought to be her strongest feeling, but for her boundless generosity and a lovingness ever ready to pour itself forth upon any or all human beings who were capable of giving the smallest feeling in return. The rest of her moral characteristics were such as naturally accompany these qualities of mind and heart; the most genuine modesty combined with the loftiest pride; a simplicity and sincerity which were absolute towards all who were fit to receive them; the utmost scorn of whatever was mean and cowardly, and a burning indignation at everything brutal or tyrannical, faithless or dishonorable in conduct and character, while making the broadest distinction between *mala in se* and mere *mala prohibita*—between acts giving evidence of intrinsic badness in feeling and character, and those which are only violations of conventions either good or bad, violations which, whether in themselves right or wrong, are capable of being committed by

persons in every other respect loveable or admirable." This passage may stand without comment both as his fancy-portrait of the woman whom he loved, and as a type of that morality which has no settled foundation in the recognition of a supreme God.

Of this woman's influence on himself and his subsequent labors, he says, "What I owe even intellectually to her is in its detail almost infinite." "Not only during the years of our married life, but during many of the years of confidential friendship which preceded, all my published writings were as much her work as mine; her share in them constantly increasing as years advanced. But in certain cases, what belongs to her can be distinguished and specially identified. Over and above the general influence which her mind had over mine, the most valuable ideas and features in these joint productions—those which have been most fruitful of important results, and have contributed most to the success and reputation of the works themselves, originated with her, were emanations from her mind, my part in them being no greater than in any of the thoughts which I found in previous writers, and made my own only by incorporating them with my own system of thought." His whole strain of enthusiastic eulogy of this woman sounds like infatuation, especially when we read the statement from one competent to say it, that "nobody else among those who knew her discovered in her these lofty gifts." There is no doubt that Mill's mind was encouraged and strengthened by her influence in a "*skepticism*" in matters of morals and religion which, though he terms it wise, we may safely call his greatest folly. In the autobiography, we have detailed accounts of the manner in which those works which have given him his chief distinction were conceived, matured, and published to the world. But we will not follow the narrative through those details nor stop here to criticise their merits or their influence.

Mr. Taylor died in July, 1849; and in the year 1851, after twenty years of the strange intimacy already referred to, that which Mill calls the "most valuable friendship of his life" was consummated by a formal marriage, and so, he says, "was added to the partnership of thought, feeling, and writing which

had long existed, a partnership of our entire existence." For seven and a half years they were spared to each other, and after her death, near Avignon, he fixed his residence near her grave, where, with her eldest daughter, he cherished her memory as "*a religion*" and endeavored still to regulate his life with supreme regard to her approbation.

To complete the outline sketch of this life, we need only notice the facts that, on the dissolution of the East India Company in 1856, Mill retired from the office he had so long held and occupied himself altogether with his literary labors till 1865, when he was returned to Parliament. His career in that body was not particularly marked. It seems to have disappointed his constituents. He showed some independence in action, but had not much influence. He says of himself, "The most important, perhaps the only really important public service I performed in the capacity of a member of Parliament, was the motion to amend the reform bill so as to admit women to the suffrage." This measure was rejected, and in the subsequent new election he also was rejected, his extreme views on that and other subjects having intensified the opposition of the Conservative party and weakened the enthusiasm of the Liberals towards him. Here the autobiography closes with the statement, "I returned to my old pursuits and to the enjoyment of a country life in the south of Europe, alternating twice a year with a residence of some few weeks or months in the neighborhood of London," and a brief notice of the miscellaneous literary work to which he devoted his leisure.

We do not propose to speak at length of the merits of the man and his works, nor to estimate the measure of influence which has proceeded or may yet proceed from the life thus sketched. It was evidently a life of wonderful mental activity, through the whole period of which a strong and highly cultivated intellect was tasked to give to the world its best thoughts on the philosophy and the practical problems of man's social state. But, as evidently, there was wanting all along the balance of sound judgment and the nerve of established principle which are essential elements of that influence which is abiding and controlling for best results in the world's progress. As his own mind, warped off from the old foundations of

knowledge and belief, found no stable resting-place, so the first and chief effect of his writings is to unsettle the existing foundations of human society without furnishing any new and reliable supports. This autobiography seems to come in as a timely safeguard against the worst mischief of many of his other books, because it reveals so clearly the purely destructive tendency of his theories of reform.

We may fitly linger a moment and gather up the lessons of the book as they appear in connection with the three reasons named by the author for preparing it.

1. The course of education presented was "*unusual and remarkable*" as respects its early beginning,—its authoritative direction by the single mind and will of a stern father,—its wide range and the intense pressure under which it was carried on,—the prominence given to the study of language and the methods by which that study was advanced,—the special effort made to develop the pupil's power of thought and expression by conversation and discussion with the teacher on the topics of study and reading,—the seclusion of the boy from the ordinary associations and sports of boyhood,—the utter omission of all culture of the affections, and the rigorous exclusion of all religious truth and practice, or rather the positive and persistent inculcation of ideas adverse to all faith and godliness. The most remarkable thing of all is that such a process could be carried through and that it should prove successful. For it must be acknowledged a *success*, so far as realizing the aim of him who planned and guided it is concerned. Rarely is it the privilege of a teacher to see his desire so fully accomplished. There is, however, little reason to expect or apprehend that the example, as a whole, will be often imitated. It stands before us in this presentation, self-condemned. For some reason, the father never repeated the experiment with another of his children. Scarcely one child in five hundred could be found with physical and mental constitution capable of enduring the process. The details of the process shock our common sense of what is right and wise and good, so that a father willing thus to deal with a son whom he loved will yet more rarely appear. And not more than once in a generation could it happen that father and son should be thrown together

with the mutual adaptation essential to the carrying out of such a course of education.

At the same time, the example, forbidding though it be as a whole, is suggestive of some considerations that seem timely and valuable. It encourages intelligent parents to take the education of their children, in its first stages at least, into their own hands more than is ordinarily done, and to begin some intellectual exercise early. The tendency to a contrary course of action, especially in our country, has run to an extreme that needs correction. It suggests the importance and value of authoritative requirement in order to secure the thorough and effective discipline of young minds. We see a tendency growing in certain quarters to depend too much on "the persuasion of soft words," rather than the prescription of authority, and to leave the pupil to apply his mind to what best pleases himself, rather than to what, in the judgment of wisdom, will be for his best good. It suggests also the advantage of occupying the mind of a child early with the study of some language not its own, and by methods more simple than the rules and formulas of abstract grammar. Words and sounds and idioms of speech may be most happily mastered before the mind attains maturity sufficient for their accurate analysis. And especially does this example indicate the great value of that which Mill terms "the cardinal point in his training,"—the effort of his father to make his education more than mere "*cram*," by requiring him to master for himself and to express as his own what he learned and read. No one knows that he knows a thing till he can tell it, and in this view those talks as they walked are worthy of frequent imitation. Though these things appear in Mill's case to have been pressed to a violent extreme, they are nevertheless hints worthy of special notice and capable of being used to real profit.

Then, by the glaring mistakes of this education, we are instructed. For a full knowledge of mankind and their wants—for power to sway men and reform society, the training of the boy must be in contact with boys, the ripening of the man in contact with men of more than one type. Only so can the ability be acquired of harmonizing the theoretical and the practical in well-balanced judgments. Furthermore, for the

symmetrical development of the individual, the culture of the intellect and the culture of the feelings must advance together, that they may reciprocally warm and regulate each other. And finally, the success of this father in impressing his son with his own convictions and feelings respecting religion, and the sad consequences of that success, may well confirm our faith in the necessity and the efficiency of a genuine Christian nurture, that some positive religious elements may flow into and qualify the whole course of education from its earliest beginning. So, only so, will the God of our religious faith be apprehended in his true relation to all science, all history, and the enduring well-being of mankind, and the intellect reach its legitimate climax of strength and glory, when pervaded and ruled by the sweetness and power of love supreme to Him who is Most High and Most Holy.

2. From noting, as we have endeavored fairly to do, the successive phases of this mind, as it pressed forward in an age of transition in opinions, we learn, first, how the progressive advance of such a mind may be determined for it, as by a fixed law of momentum, through the direction given by the first force impressed; and second, how easily such an one may come under the self-deception of thinking that he is dealing fairly with all questions and forming opinions candidly, as in a pure white light, while he is really taking a one-sided view of everything, by a light that comes through a medium which excludes all colors but one. Mill's mind never really broke from the leading-strings of his father's early influence. The other forces which were permitted to act upon it come in only as accelerating forces to hasten its progress in the line on which it was started. This seems to us the great fault and failure of that education of which we have just spoken. It did not so draw out the soul as to give it full freedom for the exercise of all its capacities. It did not launch the soul into the pure air of heaven for a lofty flight on balanced wing under the free impulse of its own noblest instincts and the attractions of grandest objects distinctly apprehended, in a wide world, all open to its gaze. This was an active soul, shut into a contracted sphere,—really in bondage, while glorying in its liberalism. And does not the same thing characterize much of the

boastful progress of self-styled "*liberals* generally." "If the truth," the whole truth, "shall make you free, then are ye free indeed."

8. To some it may seem a mere affectation of modesty in Mill to make formal acknowledgment of his obligation to other persons for the intellectual and moral development on which he so evidently prided himself. We are inclined to regard it rather as the prompting of an ingenuous soul, who, with a high estimate of what he had grown to, was conscious of having been much aided by the influence of others, and felt in honor bound gratefully to indicate the sources of that influence. Through all his life, it appears plainly that he was, more than most persons, susceptible to impression from other minds. He was not an original thinker. His chief distinction was the ability to give fresh, clear, and forcible expression to ideas which, with quick perception, he had received and made his own by absorption. It is creditable to him that he understood himself so well and was so frank as to avow his indebtedness.

In this recognition were included, no doubt, Mr. Bentham and his disciples and others with whom Mill was associated in the years of his greatest activity in his intellectual progress. But chiefly, the tribute belongs to the father, whose authority was supreme and unresisted in the first stages of his life, and to the wife, whose spell was like the witchery of magnetism over all his later years, to life's end. Honorable as this tribute was in its motive, and just as it was in its recognition of real merit, yet to the sober judgment of common people the expression of it seems excessive towards both persons. The abject submission of the youth to the absolute, sometimes unreasonable exercise of parental authority, goes beyond the requirement of the fifth commandment; and in later years, the language of deference and admiration for that father's judgment is such as men are wont to use towards one whom they conceive of as a superior being, endowed with wisdom infallible; nor could any worshiper of Astarte, or Venus, or the Holy Virgin, express his adoration in higher strains of eulogy and devotion, than we find here employed respecting the woman who became the idol of this man's affections. Indeed, it does seem that the religious instinct, in this case, suppressed towards its legitimate object,

could not be stifled, but burst forth in this direction because it had no other range on which to exercise itself. The veneration which was meant to flow towards God, the Sovereign Lord and authoritative guide of our life, was turned aside to spend itself on a human father. The love which a divine Saviour, in self-sacrificing devotion, came to engage and fill forever, shut off from this its true object, was forced, in a false apotheosis of a frail mortal, to frame an object for itself and find such satisfaction as it might in the ephemeral illusion, fondly cherished for its day.

It is the almost universal experience that the perusal of this book fills the reader's soul with sadness. Traced to its source, this sadness is found to proceed from the simple fact that it is the truthful story of one who lived "having no hope and without God in the world." And the saddest thing of all is the last, where, under his bereavement, the poor man is shut up in his extremity, to make a "*religion*" of watching the grave and cherishing the memory and fancying the approbation of her whom he had buried out of his sight, with no believing thought or hopeful anticipation of anything for her or for himself beyond the decay and dust of that narrow house of the dead.

ARTICLE II.—GOTT UND DIE NATUR.

Gott und die Natur, von Prof. ULRICI, o Prof. der Philosophie an der Universität Halle. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig. Weigel. 1866.

THE works of Prof. Ulrici stand in the front rank of the various reconstructive attempts which have been made in Germany since the breaking up of the great philosophical schools. Apart from its intrinsic merit, the work in hand is interesting as showing that German thought has entered upon a new and more healthy direction; and one which, we may hope, will result in at least some relief from the materialistic gloom which has followed like an avenger upon the previous idealistic glow.

The attempt to make the absolute the first principle, the beginning of knowledge, was common to all the later theorizing. Beginning with the notion of the absolute, the problem of philosophy was to trace its necessary development into its relative manifestations. Nothing short of an *a priori* construction of God and the world was to be thought of. To pay any attention to facts was treason to philosophy; to insist that philosophy should be based on facts was to degrade the Bird of Jove into a barnyard fowl, and yoke Pegasus to a plow. With Schelling, the absolute was the pure identity of subject and object, the absolute indifference of opposites. It was neither subject nor object, mind nor matter, ideal nor real, but it was all these at once. The task of Schelling's philosophy was to show how this pure indifference, which was at once everything and nothing, must develop itself into the polarities of the actual world.

Hegel and his followers conceived the problem in essentially the same way. They were even more superior to facts than Schelling; while they took logic itself by the horns and announced the identity of contradictories as the first principle of philosophy. With Hegel all development is but the unfolding of the absolute idea according to the eternal laws of logic. This climbs through conquered contradictions from point to point, ever uniting opposites in a higher unity in its upward movement, until at last it emerges into self-consciousness. That

which began as pure unconscious thought returns into itself; the absolute finds itself again; and the circle is complete.

To give no further examples: the first fault of all this absolutist theorizing was that the absolute, as these and kindred speculators conceived it, is merely a subjective notion, which corresponds to no objective fact whatever. If we are to begin philosophy and science with the absolute, then, inasmuch as the absolute is given only in thought and never in perception, there must be first of all a strong, cogent proof that the subjective notion corresponds to objective reality. This proof failing, the whole argument floats in the air, and concerns itself with fancies instead of facts. But in order to give this proof it next becomes necessary to inquire into the validity of the laws of thought upon which the affirmation of the absolute depends. The absolute is no fact of experience; the affirmation of it rests entirely upon certain subjective needs. The mind declares that there must be more than we see and hear; that besides the waves of phenomena, there must be an abiding deep of being below; that besides the finite and conditioned objects of experience, there must be something unconditioned and eternal. But are we justified in attributing objective validity to these notions? This is, indeed, the great question of philosophy; the one which sceptics have thrust upon the thinker's attention from the beginning; and the one which Kant answered with a tremendous No. Before the absolutist can begin his theorizing at all, he must first rout and silence the sceptics, and reverse the decision which Kant based upon an analysis of reason itself.

The second fault is that thought falls into insoluble contradictions in attempting to represent such a development. Not to notice the contradiction in the notion of a necessary development of the absolute, these speculators never succeeded in completing the evolution without cutting the ground from under their feet. If we assume, with Schelling, that the absolute is the pure indifference of opposites, it becomes utterly inconceivable that it should not remain pure indifference forever. Schelling felt this, and attempted to smuggle a principle of differentiation into the absolute to set the evolution a-going. Accordingly he assumes an obscure duality in the absolute, a

dark nature-ground, which by some unexplained accident fell out into reality and produced the antitheses of God and world, mind and matter, ideal and real, &c. To spend no time in inquiring into the thinkability of such a process, or into Schelling's sources of information on this interesting point, it is sufficient to remark that by the introduction into the absolute of this dark nature-ground, of these blind polarities, the assumed identity and indifference of the same is destroyed. The original dualism remains unconquered, and the system stands in contradiction with itself.

We succeed no better if, with Hegel, we conceive the absolute as pure thought. We lack proof, first, that there is any absolute thought or idea; second, that such idea, if it exist, can be conceived as existing apart from an absolute thinker; third, that such thought can develop into concrete being. It is not at all easy to conceive of notions floating about without belonging to any one in particular, and which thus take to realizing themselves. The entire system lacks the moment of inertia or resistance. It is simply so pliant and various as to include all views, from the loftiest idealism to the atheism of Feuerbach and the materialism of Strauss. Voices are heard and sounds as of great deeds; but in this case ignorance is surely the mother of devotion.

For these reasons we must agree with the author in rejecting the theorisings of the absolutists as "words, words, words." On this road no advance can ever be won. It begins and ends alike in the land of dreams and fancies, and impenetrable fogs. The author's conception of the problem of philosophy reverses completely the direction of this speculation. The knower is the first element in knowledge. The knowing mind is the constant factor which enters into every equation of science. Belief, doubt, denial, all are subject to the laws of thought. Escape from them is impossible. Sceptic as well as dogmatist is forced to yield obedience. But are these laws trustworthy? If not, then there is an end to all philosophy and science. This question must be preliminary to all discussion. This question the author discusses in his *System der Logik*. (See *New Englander*, July, 1874.) Granting that these laws are valid, what is the test of knowledge? A thought-necessity is the

only valid test. Whatever we cannot help admitting must be admitted; and nothing else can lay claim to reality. But in the first instance all knowledge is self-knowledge; it arranges itself around the knowing mind as its major axis; and we are to assume the existence of nothing else, unless we are compelled. But by the laws of thought we are forced to recognize an outer world. The mind finds a manifold of objects standing over against itself. Escape them it cannot; the admission of their reality is unavoidable. Unless compelled to go farther, we must stop here. Analysis and reflection may force us to make further assumptions, but, whatever they may be they must be only such as the facts force upon us. Immediately, we know nothing of absolute, infinite, unconditioned, &c.; and the objectivity of these notions must in no wise be affirmed unless a necessity of thought compel us to do so. The contact, too, of these notions cannot be determined beforehand, but must depend entirely upon our internal and external experience. How we shall conceive the absolute—what qualities we shall ascribe to it, are questions which no *a priori* speculation has any means of answering. This, then, is the course of knowledge. We begin with experience, external and internal. Analysis and reflection reveal that we cannot stop with them but must proceed to certain assumptions concerning their cause and ground. By the necessities of thought we pass from the facts of experience to the metaphysical notions of cause, absolute, &c. Hence the absolute can never be the beginning of knowledge, but is rather the end of investigation. We can pass from the conditioned to the unconditioned, but the reverse process is forever impossible. However light we may build, the foundations must be laid in the solid earth.

It is a wide-spread thought of many that science has laid such successful siege to all Theistic strongholds, that a surrender at discretion is only a question of time. Science is mentioned in certain quarters as a young Hercules who has already strangled an unlimited number of theological snakes, and who will, as soon as he gets out of his cradle, proceed to cleanse the human mind from the worse than Augean filth which the superstition of ages has allowed to fester there. Or it is a glacier, descending with irresistible force upon the valleys where faith has

nourished its high and tender dreams, and will by its frosts strike a speedy and fatal chill to the heart of all that the soul has cherished. Now if it be indeed true, there is nothing to be gained by shutting our eyes to the danger. Denunciation is not argument; and terror is powerless with law. The only way out of the present trouble is to listen calmly and critically to the last and worst word that science can utter, and see if the facts warrant the prophecies. This is the road upon which the author has entered. Furnished with the philosophical principles we have noticed, he proposes to discuss scientific theories in the light of scientific facts. It must be observed that a large part of science is not fact, but theory. For example, the law of multiple proportions and constant equivalents is a fact of chemistry, and one which plays a most important and beneficent roll in nature. To explain this fact, Dalton revived the atomic theory of Democritus, and later scientists have very generally accepted it. But the atomic theory is far enough from being a fact of observation; it is simply a supposition which science makes in order to form some faint kind of notion of the internal nature of matter upon which the law of multiple proportions depends. Certain phenomena of light and heat are observed, and for their explanation a peculiar æther is postulated; here again we have a supposition made only to enable the mind to form some kind of conception of the underlying activity in these phenomena. Again, various resemblances are noticed among the several members of the animal kingdom, and science sets itself to account for them. One school explains them by a plan common to all; another by assuming a common origin. Neither view claims to be an observed fact; both are hypotheses which explain the facts more or less indifferently. Thus it becomes plain that there is a vast amount of intellectual scaffolding in science, and it is precisely in this part of science that its danger lies. That which is really a makeshift of the mind, in order to form some conception of the antecedents of phenomena, is forthwith interpreted into a fact of nature, and sundry mischievous doctrines are built upon it. At all events, we are justified in insisting that the theories thus introduced should be thinkable. If they involve unthinkable conceptions, then the explanation is

through the unknown, which leaves us no wiser than before. We are also justified in demanding that the theories, if admitted, explain the facts; because if theories are invented to explain the facts and then fail to give any tenable account of them, they are of no very striking service. So in the light of scientific facts we have, first, to undertake a criticism of scientific theories; and second, to inquire whether these theories themselves do not postulate something beyond and above them.

It will surprise no one acquainted with scientific literature to learn that the author finds the metaphysics of physics fearfully out of joint. Thus, matter and force are the first words in the scientific catechism. They alone were in the beginning, and they alone created the heavens and the earth. Such is the view, not indeed of our best scientists, but of many who claim the name. But what is matter, and what is force, and what are their relations to one another? Surely, it is not unreasonable to insist upon having something more than a nominal definition of these important notions. At all events, if science is unable to tell what it means by matter and force, how can it assert that mind and spirit are not the realities of creation; that phenomena are not the realization of the abiding thought underneath? It must be confessed that very many of our scientists seem never to have reflected upon these questions, and those who have, have not met with any striking success. According to Helmholtz, matter is something resting and inactive. It has no qualitative differences whatever, for these belong to its inherent forces. (*Erhaltung der Kraft*, s. 8 f.) But how the absolutely inactive could accomplish anything to speak of, is not easily made out. To help us out of this trouble, matter is endowed with certain unchangeable forces, but we experience little relief. It is possible to conceive of inactive matter as moved by external forces; but how the inactive can at the same time possess these forces, that is, how the inactive can be at the same time the active, certainly is visible only to those gifted with at least second sight. According to this view, matter is at once the utterly inactive and the possessor of all kinds of activity—which is simply a conjunction of contradictions, a logical chimera. But if the forces which move matter are not inherent in it, and if we adopt this view of matter, they

cannot be inherent; then, since scientists emphatically declare that no force can exist apart from substance, we must assume, alongside of matter, an immaterial substance and power to account for material phenomena. One may take whichever horn best suits him, but either will prove disastrous. Brücke solves the problem by declaring that the notion of force rests upon a mental impotence. It may be, but surely science cuts a rather sorry figure in trying to create the world with mental impotences. It is extremely questionable whether a mental impotency would have any great influence with a flying planet. Lotze shows with great acuteness the untenability of the current notions of constant inherent forces, but is hardly as successful in attempting a substitute. The forces of matter vary with conditions. Carbon and oxygen, or oxygen and hydrogen, have no affinity for each other at low temperatures; but when raised to red heat they combine. Now, a force which thus comes and goes cannot be viewed as a constant force inhering in the atoms. According to Lotze, we must view it much more as depending on the relations which things bear to one another. Forces depend upon conditions for their activity. But we fall into difficulty at once in attempting to think out this solution, for conditions and relations, in order to have any effect, must themselves be forces; and the old riddle comes back unsolved. Force cannot be conceived of as adhering in a condition, for a condition is a mode, not a thing. Here again we can take our choice: we can put the forces back into the things, which Lotze repudiates, or we can leave them floating free as conditions, which, though able to accomplish many things, are themselves simply nothing. (*Mikrokosmos*, i, 40 f.) Du Bois Reymond apparently grows vexed at the troublesome question, and expresses his opinion as follows: "Force is nothing but a covert product of the irresistible tendency to personification which is stamped into us. It is, as it were, a rhetorical artifice of the brain, which seeks for metaphor because clear notions are wanting. In the ideas of matter and force we see returning the same dualism which expresses itself in the notion of God and the world, soul and body. It is the same need, only refined, which once drove men to people bush and fountain, rock, air, and sea, with creations of the imagination. What is

won when we say that the approach of two particles depends upon their mutual attraction? Not the shadow of an insight inso the nature of the antecedents." (*Untersuchungen über thierische Electricität*, s. 40.) This is pure positivism. We know the fact and nothing more. This is to give up all attempts at explanation, to rout gravitation, chemical affinity, and all the other forces as mental imposters, and to content ourselves with a lifeless registration of orders of co-existence and succession. This is an intelligible position, but, unfortunately, it cannot be maintained. Comte, although he was constantly upon the war-path against the metaphysicians, did not scruple to deliver himself of some very bad metaphysics; and Du Bois Reymond also, apparently, finds the "rhetorical artifice" too strong for him. Thus he insists that "Natural Science . . . is a reduction of the changes in the material world to motions of atoms caused by constant central forces which are independent of time, or a resolution of the phenomena of Nature into atomic mechanics. It is a fact of psychological experience that, whenever such a reduction is successfully effected, our craving for causality is wholly satisfied." Now, it is difficult to believe that by "constant central forces" he understands only "rhetorical artifices." If he does, however, we must insist that our craving for causality is not satisfied. We read in Aurora Leigh of "yoked thoughts that draw like griffins;" but we suspect that it would require a transcendently brilliant stroke of rhetoric to hold Jupiter in his place.

Fechner answers the question in pretty much the same way. He says: "Force in Physics is nothing but an auxiliary expression for the representation of the laws of motion and equilibrium, and every clear conception of physical force comes back to this. We speak of the laws of force, but if we look more closely, they are only the laws of equilibrium and of motion, which hold in every opposition of matter. The sun and the earth exercise an attractive power upon each other, but this means only that the sun and the earth move mutually according to law. Of force the scientist knows nothing but the law. We say that there must be a ground for the mutual motion of the sun and the earth, and this ground we call force; but this ground is nothing but the law." (*Physikal- und Philosoph.*

Atomenlehre, s. 120.) We remain still in the old confusion. Law means almost anything in science, and Fechner does not tell us what we are to understand by law. Besides, if the law is to control anything, it must have power; and the relations of law and force would be still more difficult of explanation.

But it is useless to worry ourselves with the endless examples that might be given. The sum is this: Although matter and force are the first and last words of science, yet scientists are unable to give anything but the most confused and unsatisfactory account of these, its first principles. Down in this theoretical region we meet with a confusion of tongues which is popularly supposed to belong entirely to the Babel of theology and philosophy.

But whatever matter may be in itself, scientists are agreed upon its atomic constitution. It is, indeed, impossible to get any defined notion of what an atom is, or how it is related to force and to other atoms. According to many of the most important scientists and mathematicians, the atom is an absolutely unextended point. Other equally weighty names can be given for the opposite view. These atoms contain infinite powers of attraction, although they themselves are infinitesimal. Each atom fills all space with its forces. It is not very easy to see how this can be; it looks very much like postulating the infinite in the infinitesimal. Still, all are agreed upon the atoms so far, and all agree that the atoms explain everything. According to the passage quoted from Du Bois Reymond, science is a reduction of all the phenomena of the material world to questions of atomic mechanics. Mr. Huxley says: "If there is one thing clear in the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to reduce all scientific problems, except those which are purely mathematical, to questions of molecular physics; that is to say, to the attractions and repulsions, motions and coordinations of the ultimate particles of matter." (*Lay Sermons*, p. 166.) Prof. Tyndall suggests (*Frags. Science*, p. 418) that life, emotion, thought, would receive a sufficient explanation, if we were able to trace the molecular interactions of the atoms which compose the body. If, then, we overlook the confusion in the conception of the atom and its relation to force, and allow it to be extended and unextended, active and inac-

tive, identical and different, the question next arises whether, with all this capital, the scientist can give a satisfactory account of the facts. Let it be kept well in mind that we are in the region of theory, and that the atom and its forces are only hypotheses invented to help us to understand the facts. If the theory only serves to confuse instead of explain, we are justified in dispensing with it.

Here, again, the author finds, what we were prepared to expect, that the atomic machinery works very indifferently. The Eleatic notion of the persistence of Being has modified very strongly scientific conceptions. That Being itself should change, involves the contradiction of a thing's being at the same time itself and something else. Accordingly, the scientist views his atoms as unchangeable, and attempts to lead all change back to a change of relation among these unchangeable atoms and constant powers. It is not easy to understand how unchangeable atoms should change their relations at all, but such is the doctrine. But what kind of insight does this afford us into even the simplest chemical change? Two unchangeable atoms of hydrogen (formerly it was one) unite with one unchangeable atom of oxygen to form water. But surely the approach of these unchangeable atoms a half millionth part of an inch nearer each other, gives no very clear account of the sudden abandonment of all their separate properties, and the assumption of others directly opposed. Conceive these unchangeable atoms disposed in all possible relations to one another, and still not the shadow of an insight is afforded by the hypothesis. Still more marked is the failure of the theory to explain the more complex phenomena of organic chemistry. Even the nascent condition of gases is very indifferently accounted for. It is found that gases, when first freed from combination, have much greater combining power than afterwards. Upon the theory of constant chemical force, this fact renders necessary a modification of the atomic theory. This is the molecular doctrine of the elements. According to this view, the elements do not exist in the atomic form, but in combination as molecules. At the moment of liberation the atoms of a gas have not yet entered into atomic combination, and hence have greater affinity for other bodies than they have

after combining into molecules. The explanation is quite indifferent, because there seems no reason why the atoms of an element, if they can combine at all, should not unite to the extent of their combining power and thus become inert. Of the facts of isomerism, however, we have no account. Thus many substances, as strychnine and quinine, are composed of the same elements in the same proportions. The explanation is that the molecular management is different. In the first place, the assumed difference of molecular arrangement explains absolutely nothing. Why the same atoms, with the same powers, should have one set of powers when arranged in the form of a pyramid, and another set entirely different when built into a cube, no scientist can pretend to explain. He may say: it is so; it is a fact; and then we ask him how he knows it is a fact. These are not facts but hypotheses, introduced to explain the facts; and they utterly fail to do it. But granted that the assumed difference of molecular arrangement is a fact, then the different arrangement is to be explained. How comes it that identical atoms with, of course, identical powers, should build themselves into one kind of molecule in strychnine and into another in quinine. If the same atoms have different forces, they would not be the same, and yet only unlike forces can account for the unlike effects. At all events, it is not at all easy to see how the same forces should have such widely different results. So patent are these and a host of similar difficulties, that many thoughtful chemists admit the utter inadequacy of the theory (Graham-Otto, *Lehrbuch der Chemie*, s. 702), and even that it seems opposed to many of the best established facts of chemistry. Berzelius, and many of the modern chemists, assume that the atoms themselves have neither quantitative nor qualitative differences, and that the actual differences of compounds depend upon the different arrangement of the atoms. This, we have seen, explains nothing, even if the difference were admitted; and in the next place, it is incredible that anything like order should exist among chemical compounds if this were the case. Accordingly, Ettingshausen declares: "Without the express assumption that the nature of the atoms allows only certain groupings, the atomic hypothesis would not include the law of definite proportions." We do,

indeed, seem forced to this assumption, but as an explanation it ranks along with that of Martinus Scribblers. The spit roasts meat because it has a meat-roasting quality; and the atoms combine because they have a combining quality. It would puzzle one to detect any difference in the quality of the explanations. Worst of all, too, even this theory does not account for the facts of isomerism; unless we assume that the unchangeable atom has one set of combining qualities in one isomeric compound, and another set in another compound. It is needless to inquire how it would fare with the doctrine of unchangeability under these interesting circumstances.

We have not time to follow the discussion of the theories of light, heat, electricity, and magnetism. We dismiss it with the remark that here, too, the author finds the same confusion which rules in all theoretical science. A slight comparison of the teachings of the masters serves to expose a multitude of opposing views, while a still slighter comparison of fact and theory makes it evident that there is absolutely no theory which is not beset with a host of difficulties for which, as yet, science has no remedy. All these great theories, as the author justly observes, belong to the realm of scientific faith; while many of them find so little support from the facts, and have so little self-consistency, as scarcely to rise above pure fancy. By calling them objects of scientific faith, it is not meant that they may not possibly be true; but only that while so many and weighty objections can be urged against them, they cannot claim the rank of knowledge. Faith is as necessary to science as it is to religion.

The much-talked-of doctrine of the correlation of the forces deserves notice because it is the darling doctrine of those who attempt to explain the universe by a single impersonal force. Here even scientists, e. g., Prof. Tyndall, complain of the confusion into which the teachers have fallen. It is very often asserted that light, heat, electricity, &c., are modes of motion. If so, they are not forces at all. Motion is effect, not cause. They may indeed be attended with peculiar motions, but the true force is not the motions, but their cause. How could motion attract anything as magnetism does? How could motion manifest itself as attraction in one pole of a magnet and as

repulsion in the other? Besides, as magnetism does not reside in the mass, but in the single atom, each of which is furnished with poles, how can magnetism be motion at all. It can only be conceived as a polar force capable indeed of producing motion, but without other relation to motion. The same is true for electricity, which the authorities also assure us is identical with chemical affinity. How electricity, as a mode of motion, could lock two atoms together, is a problem which sadly needs explanation. No easier is it to discover how heat, which, in general, drives the atoms asunder, can be the same as chemical affinity, which draws them together. To relieve some of these difficulties, Prof. Tyndall assures us that the correlation of the forces says nothing whatever about the forces by which matter attracts, but only of the work which these various forces can do. This may be, but if so, we have no correlation of forces at all; and the various rhetorical deliverances about "Protean force" and his "myriad manifestations" are of no manner of use, and may as well be laid under the table. In fact, the half bombastic notion of the identity of force which science makes so much of just now, has not the shadow of a warrant, except upon a supposition which takes force from the physical list entirely. We have, first, gravitation acting at all distances, and varying as the inverse square. According to Proctor, in his recent lectures on Astronomy, it not only acts at all distances, but acts instantaneously. If this be so, then gravitation stands entirely apart from all the other forces, which act only at molecular distances, and which propagate themselves only in measurable time. In chemical affinity we have a force which acts only under conditions, and which varies at least as the inverse cube of the distance. In cohesion we have still another force, different from either gravitation or affinity. In magnetism and electricity we have forces which split into polarities in the most unaccountable way. Besides these there are repulsive forces, which vary probably as the inverse fifth power of the distance. If, then, there is only one force in nature, it is plain that this force changes not only its manifestation, but also its law and nature. Now it attacks and now repels. Now it varies as the inverse square and now as the inverse fifth power of the distance. These considerations, apart from Proctor's suggestion,

make it impossible to view such a force as physical or mechanical. Mechanical forces know nothing of selective activity, as in affinity and cohesion. They cannot be conceived as abandoning all their old properties and assuming others entirely new. Such a force can only be conceived as spontaneous. It is an emphatic logical contradiction to attempt to lead such various and even opposed workings from a mechanical source. Such a force, too, could not reside in the atoms. These would rather be objects of its activity and not its possessors. To make them its possessors would be to split the one force into infinitesimal bits, and also to deny the unchangeability of the atoms. It is open to the believers in a single force to teach that the phenomena of gravitation, affinity, cohesion, electricity, &c., are only definite modes of manifestation of one underlying force; but in order to do this they must make that force immaterial and spontaneous. If, however, they refuse to do this, there is no possibility of making out the correlation even among the great physical forces. If in chemical action heat is liberated, there is no need to assume any identity of heat and affinity; the accepted teachings of the physicists suffice to explain this fact. The approach of the atoms through affinity disturbs the equilibrium of the ether by which the atoms are said to be surrounded. This, in virtue of its elasticity, quivers; and the result is heat. There is not the slightest reason for supposing any correlation between the affinity and the heat. The same is true for all the stock illustrations of the pretended correlations. The great forces of nature are so related to one another as to work in harmony. This is a scientific and most important fact; without it, nature would be either a dead equilibrium or a wild chaos. But this is the only meaning of the so-called correlation. If science assumes a physical force of gravitation, of affinity, of cohesion, then it is impossible to lead these several forces back to any single physical force.

With the failure to establish the identity of the physical forces, the great presumption against the reality of a vital force is all gone. If we are compelled to view gravitation, affinity, electricity, &c., as real forces, and are also compelled to view them as distinct from one another; then there is no *a priori* objection whatever against assuming the reality of a separate

vital force, if the phenomena find no explanation in the common physical forces. Here again is a department where we have had an abundance of assertion, with a minimum of proof. Of late years, this question of vitality has been a kind of test of scientific orthodoxy. Whoever was bold and loud in denial proved himself sound; and whoever was not, was looked upon as not yet freed from superstition. Vitality is an empty word with which we cover our ignorance; it is an asylum of impotent credulity. The body is a mechanism; and has its full explanation in the atomic machinery which composes it. This is the express view of many of the most advanced.

We have already seen that the molecular machinery is a rather confused affair, and does not give any very promising account of even simple physical phenomena. Possibly, however, we shall succeed better with the more complex phenomena of the organism. Concerning the emptiness of the word, vitality, it may be remarked in advance that it does not fare much better with the other scientific terms for force. What does science mean by cohesion, or chemical affinity? What are these but words? Why does it distinguish the two at all? How can it be said that both classes of phenomena cannot be derived from one single force of attraction? It is simply taking refuge in an asylum of ignorance to set these up as distinct forces. Or what are magnetism and electricity? By what authority are they set up as different from affinity? Who knows but that if we only had better instruments or keener insight, that these might all be led out of gravitation? Can any one prove that they cannot? Why, then, these words too are only asylums of ignorance. We are also instructed that to explain vital phenomena by assuming a vital force is no explanation at all; but how much better does it fare with the other forces? To explain chemical phenomena by a chemical force, electrical phenomena by an electrical force, facts of gravitation by a gravitating force, &c., is really not much better than to explain vital phenomena by a vital force. It is decidedly good to find men suddenly turning positivists upon the question of vitality, while they talk without scruple of chemical, electric, thermal, magnetic, and other forces; against each of which it might be urged with equal justice, first, that they explain nothing; and, second, that they are asylums of ignorance.

But may it not be possible to lead vital phenomena out of the qualities of the atoms? This is stoutly asserted by not a few leading scientists; we have now to inquire what proof they have to offer.

An organism manifests properties unknown in the inorganic world. It is a system of means and ends; each part exists for every other and for the whole. It is an exquisite mechanism full of the nicest contrivances and balances. It is the expression of a purpose throughout, which refers not to itself alone, but to a perpetuation of the organism. In the constant flow of the component atoms, it maintains its identity and unity; it is never the same, and yet always the same. Even the lowest organism has definite functions, and maintains itself by an inner activity. It nourishes itself, propagates itself, and as soon as this self-activity ceases, the organism begins to perish. This intelligent adaptation, this inner resisting activity, never occurs in inorganic nature, while it is the essential mark of an organism.

To explain these facts, some assume that the body is a pure mechanism, that the attractions and repulsions among the ultimate particles of matter are a sufficient explanation. But we have already seen that the different disposition of a mass of unchangeable atoms gives no account even of the simplest facts of chemistry. These atoms never touch each other, are simple and unchangeable, and yet when their relations are changed by an infinitesimal distance, suddenly a new compound appears. Anyone may be safely defied to torture any explanation of inorganic chemistry out of this notion, to say nothing of explaining vital phenomena. In fact, this explanation is a blank assertion which there is no means whatever of proving, and which, when followed out in thought, ends in nothing. To explain the facts by the chemical qualities of the atoms is to forget the fact that affinity in general is at constant war with the organism, that as soon as the inner activity ceases, affinity begins its work of destruction. Another explanation is sometimes ventured to the effect that the atoms in certain combinations exhibit cohesive qualities, in others they exhibit chemical qualities, and in still other combinations vital phenomena appear. It cannot be claimed, however, that this explanation serves to identify vitality with the other forces. From the phenomena of cohesion, we

infer a force of cohesion; from those of affinity, we infer a force of affinity; hence from those of vitality we must infer a force of vitality. In short, this theory of vitality explains life in the organism by assuming it in the atom—not a very brilliant explanation after all; for almost anything can be brought out of a juggler's hat, if one is first allowed to fill it with the desired material. With atoms qualitatively alike, the pure mechanical view, nothing whatever can be done; and all the other explanations consist in assuming in the atoms all that is afterwards brought out of them. The atoms explain cohesion, because they have the power of cohering; they explain affinity, because they have the power of affinity; they also explain life, because they have the power of producing it. As an explanation this is a great truth, and worthy of all acceptance; but even yet the facts of vitality are not accounted for. How the vital powers of the myriad atoms can produce the single, indivisible life of the individual, is simply inconceivable; still more difficult is it to see why the same atoms should go to build up such different forms as the organic world presents. The same atoms ought to do the same things; but they really produce the greatest diversity. Mr. Spencer explains it by referring these facts to the "as yet unexplained principle of heredity," a principle, by the way, which has in it the gist of the matter. In fine, we must view the conclusion which the author reaches, at the end of a long and careful criticism of all that the authorities have said upon this matter, as fully established. There is just as good reason for the assumption of a vital force as of any other; and all attempts to lead vital phenomena from any amalgam of the lower forces is a conclusion resting, partly on scientific prejudice, and partly on wretched logic.

There is, then, little need of inquiring into the possibility of deducing spiritual phenomena from atomic motions. In fact, there is a contradiction in the very notion. Physics cannot view its atoms as spontaneous, and hence physics can never produce the spontaneous. To suppose a mechanism of atoms to produce a being endowed with spontaneity, is to contradict itself. The necessary can never create the free, nor the unintelligent give birth to the intelligent, because in doing so, it would contradict itself. If, then, there is in man any power of self-deter-

mination, any ability to react against nature and control or guide it, then the necessary physical forces of nature alone cannot have given him birth. The science which assumes that they have, must first fly in the face of every man's experience, and give the lie to the universal consciousness. Here, as in the case of life, if thought, feeling, and mind in general are to be evolved from matter, they must first be involved into it. Whatever comes out of a thing must have been in it. Some few are beginning to recognize this. Thus Prof. Tyndall says: "Had we not better recast our definitions of matter and force: for if life and thought be the very flower of both, any definition which omits life and thought must be inadequate if not untrue." (*Frag. Science*, p. 123.) But to get mind from matter by first enlarging the definition of the latter so as to include the former, certainly throws no great light upon the subject. If we attempt to lead all phenomena out of a single cause, that cause must be the highest type of power. Not mechanical, nor chemical force, not electricity, nor magnetism, but mind and will, must be taken as the only type of force on which the actual universe rests. All attempts to base it upon any lower form involve the contradiction of trying to bring out of a thing what is not in it.

We may sum up the argument thus far as follows: Science assumes that matter is composed of atoms, but no one is able to tell us what these atoms are. They are next endowed with forces, but no one can tell us what these forces are. The relation of the atom to these forces is also a subject on which we seek in vain for information. After the atoms set to work, they give a very unsatisfactory account of the facts. The attempt to make mechanically intelligible the simplest chemical change, is an utter failure; while the claim that all this talk about poles and powers, molecules and atoms, explains the harmony and order of the universe, is simply to mistake intolerable subjective confusion for an objective solution of the problem. In our own opinion, science has succeeded in discovering some of the laws of phenomena, and has made more clear the universal order; while its claim to have explained anything whatever, is utterly without foundation.

Yet if we admitted all that is claimed for the atoms, philosophy would still have many questions to ask before it could be

admitted that science had proved its independence. If Mr. Huxley, or Du Bois Reymond, should succeed in reducing every scientific problem to questions of atomic mechanics, the question would next arise whether the atoms themselves can be viewed as unoriginated and eternal, or whether they must not rather be conceived as created and dependent. This brings us to what the author calls the ontology of science; and out of the admitted, or rather the emphatic, teachings of science, he concludes that the laws of nature are enactments of a Will above them, that the forces of nature abut on a supernatural power behind them. This is next to be examined.

The author agrees with the scientists in viewing matter as having an atomic composition, and in viewing the atoms as being centers of force. The notion of matter as something dead or inactive, he throws away as a logical chimera. Purely inactive matter could never come into knowledge, for it is only as it produces effects upon us that we become aware of its existence. The essence of matter is this resisting power; and an atom can only be viewed as a center in which various dynamic forces, or forces capable of producing motion, are held together by this central static, or resisting force. After seeking to vindicate this conception, and thus rescue the scientific doctrine of the atomic constitution of matter from the internal contradiction which the common conception involves, the author next proceeds to inquire what further postulates we are forced to make.

According to the express teaching of science, the atoms are mutually conditioned by one another. Everything in the physical realm, whether it be matter or force, is what it is, and does what it does, only through the co-presence and co-working of another. The force of affinity only acts when the proper conditions are present. The forces of electricity, of magnetism, &c., all are dependent upon conditions. Science knows nothing of the unconditioned or absolute. Philosophy, however, does; and after listening to the scientist as he describes the conditioned existences of the physical realm, philosophy insists that, back of these conditions, atoms, and forces, there must be an unconditioned Being upon whom these depend. It is open to the scientist to say that, while each atom is conditioned by other

atoms, yet the sum of the atoms is unconditioned; but this bridge is untenable. A sum of conditioned existences can never make an unconditioned. The notion involves the contradiction of being at the same time conditioned and unconditioned. The conditioned nature of atomic action is still clearer. The commencement of any atomic action presupposes the pre-entrance of its condition. But this entrance of the condition is also an atomic action which, in turn, is impossible without the pre-entrance of its condition. But such a series cannot be infinite, for that supposes a dependent activity, which, by the supposition, had a beginning in time, to be also eternal. That is, all atomic activity is dependent. It cannot depend on itself, for that would make it independent; it must then depend upon another activity, which is the true absolute. The warrant for this conclusion is, that if we make our minds clear upon the subject, we shall see that it is impossible to escape from it. If we trust reason up to this point, we must trust it still further. This final affirmation of an unconditioned Being back of all the conditioned existences and forces of experience, is as emphatic as any other to which we yield unhesitating credence. We can escape it only by remaining in the fog of mental confusion, or by assuming a suicidal position with reference to the validity of our mental operations.

We shall reach a similar conclusion if we consider another scientific dogma—the void between the atoms. Scientists in general insist upon the void space as strongly as upon the atoms themselves. So, then, each atom sits alone, cut off by an absolute void from all of its neighbors. And yet this atom is said to affect every other atom in the universe, to send its influences across the dizziest distances of space, and to fill space, indeed, with its activity. It would be hard to conceive a doctrine more palpably absurd. Scientists have repeated it, until familiarity has covered its inconceivability; and ease of repetition has passed for understanding. In truth, the notion is positively unthinkable; and when clearly represented to the mind, it is repudiated as impossible. Not to insist upon the absurdity of supposing the infinitesimal atom to fill all space with its activity, the notion involves a positive contradiction. The doctrine is that the atom acts across void space, and with-

out any media whatever. Be the distance molecular or stellar, this doctrine always involves the decided contradiction that a thing acts where it is not and is not where it acts. It is just as impossible for science to reconcile this doctrine to its other dogma of the inseparability of matter and force, as it is to reconcile it to philosophy. At all events, the force must be where the effect is produced, but if so, then, according to the doctrine, we have an absolute void between the force and the atom in which it is said to inhere—a condition which is as much like a separation as we can easily conceive, although such separation is declared impossible. It is impossible to reconcile this doctrine to either philosophy or to other scientific dogmas. If, now, science insists upon its atoms, and the void between them; then philosophy insists that, alongside of the atomic forces, we must assume another continuous, immaterial, super-atomic force as the only possibility of atomic working. If science clings to its atoms, philosophy proves that they are utterly powerless without this further assumption. Let it be always kept in mind, that we are in the realm of theory. Science attempts to make phenomena thinkable by its atomic theory; and philosophy proves that all the atomic explanations are unthinkable, unless a continuous, immaterial, independent force be assumed as the condition of atomic activity. If we think at all, and think consistently, we cannot avoid the conclusion, that science as well as religion demands something behind phenomena and the conditioned forces of nature.

Thus we are forced to the assumption of an absolute Being; and the attempt to construe the universe into atomic mechanics is seen to be a failure. But the absolute thus assumed is as yet wholly undetermined. It is far enough from being God in the common sense of the word. We have now to inquire how we are to conceive this absolute which science, philosophy, and religion alike are forced to assume. At this point, it has been the fashion with the German speculator, and also with Sir Wm. Hamilton, Mr. Mansel, and H. Spencer, to leave experience, and begin to chop logic and split hairs over an *a priori* notion of what the absolute must be. Out of this mistaken procedure has arisen ineffable confusion and all kinds of mischievous notions. Hamilton and Mansel, on the authority of their self-

made absolute, denied that we can have any knowledge of it whatever, although they left it to faith. Mr. Spencer, more logical than they, turned it into the darkness of utter nescience, and left us only the relative and the conditioned. But all these notions arose from analyzing an *a priori* conception of the absolute, without inquiring whether there is any authority for supposing this home-made absolute to have any objective reality. But, as we have already seen, this *a priori* construction of the absolute is impossible. We rise to the absolute from the conditioned facts of experience, and the content which we put into the absolute must be determined entirely by those facts. How, then, are we to conceive this absolute Being which we plant at the base of phenomena?

We have given a partial answer to this question in our review of the author's *Logic*. (*New Englander*, July, 1874.) The author applies and illustrates those principles at great length in the present work. The argument is briefly as follows: Thought is governed by laws which are entirely subjective in their origin. We must think according to certain laws and forms. Whatever contradicts them cannot come into knowledge, or if it could, it would wreck the whole fabric and plunge knowledge into irredeemable chaos. And yet nature is knowable. The laws without correspond to the laws within. The forms of thought are also the forms of nature. The world is cast in the moulds of intelligence; it is a thought-pattern in which the web of the world is woven. This supposition lies at the basis of all science, yes, of all knowledge of nature whatever. Deny it, and the possibility of science falls away. Admit it, and the agreement demands explanation. Whence this harmony between mind and nature? There it stands, an undeniable fact; whence comes it? If we think at all, we are forced to admit that the unconditioned Power upon which nature depends, proceeds according to the laws and forms of intelligence. If we look more closely at nature, we find that it is a vast system of means and ends. Its exquisite contrivances outrun not merely our highest understanding but even our power of admiration. From the wide-reaching law to the single organism everything bears the stamp of adaptation and purpose. There is absolutely nothing new to be said

on this subject. Let one open his eyes, and he will see the illustrations. This absolute which we are forced to assume, proceeds not only according to the general laws and forms of thought, but it also sets purposes, adapts means to ends, and out of the crossing and conflicting forces of nature, wins results which are intelligible only as intended. However they have been brought about, by law or otherwise, the conclusion is still irresistible that they existed in thought before they existed in fact. If you say that they flow out of the atoms, the sufficient reply is, that nothing can come out which was not in. If the materialist objects that by a system of trial the right forms are at last chanced upon, the answer is, that this system of trial would be useless without the express assumption, that the atoms are so constructed as to make the best the strongest, as to form intelligent combinations, and destroy the opposite. Evolution without a previous involution is nonsense. This absolute, then, must be conceived as working according to the methods of a rational mind, as proposing ends, and adapting means to their realization; that is, it must be conceived as intelligent, free, self-conscious, personal. Free because absolute; intelligent because it works intelligently; self-conscious because it has plans and aims; and personal because these notions are the root-factors of personality. It is a decided contradiction to suppose the higher to be the work of the lower. If intelligence and volition appear in the created, then there were intelligence and volition in the Creator.

One objection which the materialist urges deserves notice. It is claimed that, granting the intelligent activity and the working toward certain ends, it by no means follows that it results from intelligence in the Creator. It may spring from instinct, from a blind impulse which works toward certain ends, and yet has no consciousness of them. We see this manifested in the instinct of animals. The bird, the bee, the silkworm, manifest the greatest skill in preparing the nest, the comb, the cocoon; and yet we attribute no intelligence to them. Why not, then, suppose the entire activity of nature to be of a similar character; and, instead of a personal Creator, assume a blind instinctive force as the best explanation of the phenomena?

This objection would have much more force, if some one

could tell us what instinct really is. It appears to us that the psychology of the lower animals is very much in the dark. Who knows whether they have consciousness or not? Who is prepared to give anything but baseless assertion upon this point? If one chose to assert that the lower animals are conscious of ends and purposes, who could disprove it? And we must either do this, must view them as highly intelligent, or we must find the cause of their peculiar activity in the peculiar determination of their nature. But whence this determination? It can only rest upon an intelligent activity behind it. If we grant intelligence and purpose to the animal, the objection based on the so-called instinct vanishes. If we deny them to the animal, there is all the more necessity of attributing them to the Creator.

We must, then, conceive the absolute as intelligent and personal. With this proof we have implicitly answered the question concerning its knowability. There is no warrant for believing in any other notion of the absolute. We are not forced to conceive it out of relation, as Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer teach; but, on the contrary, we are forced to conceive it in actual causal relation to the universe. Hence all the logical bugbears which have been conjured up concerning the incompatibility of the idea of absolute and of first cause are quietly disposed of by the fact, that the absolute is, and can be, known only in causal relation to the world. To the objection which these philosophers urge, that intelligence is incompatible with the absolute, because intelligence is a limitation, we may say that it is one of those dreary logical puzzles which need no answer. The objection is contradictory in itself, for if the power to know be a limitation, the inability to know would be much more a limitation. The same contradiction lies in the notion that the absolute cannot be conscious, because consciousness is a limitation; for if consciousness is a limitation, surely unconsciousness would be a much greater one. But apart from the inherent contradiction of these objections, they all rest upon the mistake of attempting to construe the absolute *a priori*. We have already seen that the content of the notion of the absolute can only be determined from the facts of experience as interpreted by the laws of thought. Begin-

ning with these facts, we find ourselves forced to conceive the absolute as intelligent and personal. This is the only absolute for whose objective existence there is a shade of proof. If philosophers choose to amuse themselves, and frighten people of weak nerves, by constructing absolutes out of contradictions, in order to win great renown by afterward proving that the manufactured mermaid is unthinkable, they are at perfect liberty to do so ; but before they carry the conclusions won by this logical jugglery over to the Creator, they must first prove that their home-made notion represents the Creator as the laws of thought and the facts of experience force us to conceive Him. When they have done this, these logical jugglers will find their occupation gone. Of course, no rationale of the Divine nature can ever be given, but the same is true of our own nature. We are forced to conceive ourselves as free intelligences, but how we can be either free or intelligent, no one can tell ; indeed, it is impossible to explain how we can be at all. How anything whatever can be, is a question which none can answer. All the facts of sensation and perception are of this order. We know them as facts and as facts only ; and yet, though it is utterly impossible to explain how they can be facts, we feel no hesitation in accepting them as real. So we are forced to conceive God as intelligent and personal. As such He is an ultimate fact of knowledge. How He can be either intelligent or personal, we leave to those who love such riddles, to solve. It is sufficient that we are forced to conceive Him in this way, and no contradiction can be shown in the conception. Until this can be shown, we must admit the fact as we admit any other fact, though we can give no further explanation.

Thus we have come to the conclusion that apart from the conditioned forces of nature, we must assume an immaterial, omnipresent, intelligent force, as that which coördinates nature and gives it all its specific determinations. The word which Paul pronounced upon Mars Hill, is echoed and reiterated by science: In Him we live and move and have our being. This view, however, is not pantheism, as the author proceeds to show: "So long as the condition of the sciences allowed one to conceive matter as one and continuous, and as obtain-

ing the manifold form and quality of different things through a force within or over it, so long was it possible to view that spiritual First-force pantheistically . . . , i. e., as world-soul, or world-spirit. But since it has been scientifically established that matter in itself consists in an immeasurable multitude of distinct and different atoms, every pantheistic theory is scientifically impossible, and can only be held by thoughtlessness. At the present time, one has only the choice between the extreme materialism, which ascribes the origin of the world to a harmonious concourse of atoms which happened by a fortunate accident, and that idealism, which leads it back to the activity of a spiritual, self-conscious absolute, which works by plan, or purpose. The ground-conception of pantheism is the substantial identity of God and Nature. According to this view, God has created the world out of his own substance and essence, or, in the process of self-realization, has passed into the manifold of terrestrial existence. Hence the absolute substance is identical with the substance of the world and natural things. But this notion becomes self-contradictory when it is applied to matter in the scientific sense, i. e., to the multitude of atoms and their conditioned forces. It is unthinkable, because self-contradictory, that a mass of atoms which are separated from one another, and have manifold differences, should be the bearer of the one spiritual First-force, which posits and maintains its unity in self-consciousness. It is no less unthinkable, because equally contradictory, to assume that the divine Substance, while originally, and in itself, one and continuous, has disrupted itself, for the building of the world, into the plurality of the manifold atoms. For apart from the question whether such an act is conceivable at all, still, in consequence of this disruption, the one divine force with the unity of its self-consciousness would again have only the plural and diverse atoms for its support—the contradiction would remain the same. Finally, it is just as impossible to help ourselves with another theory which is sometimes ventured, viz: that the atoms are not material points, but have a like spiritual nature, are animated by the same thought, and, in a joint activity, like a multitude of little gods, have built up the world. For it not only contradicts all experience, to attribute to the atoms, without distinction, per-

ception, consciousness, thought; but it is also self-contradictory to assume, that beings which are qualitatively different and are furnished with diverse conditioned forces, could be moved by one and the same thought, and work together for the realization of one purpose." (S. 520.) That is, we cannot view the conditioned as a part of the unconditioned; because the conception involves irreconcilable contradictions. Matter and its forces are all conditioned, and hence cannot be independent or eternal. With this proof, materialism loses all scientific value as a philosophy. No more can they be viewed as emanations from the absolute; the moment we attempt to think out this proposition, we meet insuperable difficulties, which make the pantheistic theory untenable. There is only one other alternative—that of creation, in the purest and strongest sense of the word. But what if this, too, should land us in contradiction?

The notion of a creation from nothing has always been a great scandal to philosophers, many of whom, as Sir Wm. Hamilton, have not hesitated to declare it a pure impossibility; and yet if we banish it, pantheism seems to be the inevitable consequence. To escape this danger, Mr. Martineau, in one of his collected essays, suggests that matter, as simple resistance, should be viewed as a kind of datum objective to God, and constituting an eternal object of his activity. The author on purely philosophical grounds disputes the pretended impossibility; and shows, first, that the same difficulties lie against both the atheistic and pantheistic theories; and, next, that the difficulties vanish upon examination.

As materialists even, we cannot escape the notion of a creation out of nothing; "for upon closer examination, every event, every working, every motion irresistibly demands it. For suppose we should lead the present condition of the world back to the motions of an original manifold of atoms, still is this motion absolutely unthinkable without the assumption of a prime-mover. . . . Every commencement of motion, every causal motion, is necessarily self-motion; and every pure self-motion is in fact a creation out of nothing. For the motion which originates from no other, but from and through itself, is an absolute beginning which has nothing for its antecedent. . . . And if the prime-mover has the power to

cancel the dead rest, the negation of motion, and bring about a first motion; we can with the same right attribute to it the power to cancel the negation of things, that is, to create the world out of nothing. For the one is just as unthinkable as the other." (S. 638)

It fares no better with the pantheist in his attempt to escape the doctrine of creation. He conceives that the one absolute substance sundered itself in some way or other into the diversity of the actual world. But, "how one and the same substance could divide itself into diverse substances is, at least, full as inconceivable as a creation out of nothing; since, indeed, the diversity of the substances proceeds from their pure identity, therefore from the negation of all diversity, consequently from nothing. What difference does it make whether we assume that the diverse substances proceed from the absolute unity of God or are posited by Him?" (S. 649.) No pantheist would assume that the present determinations, powers, and quantities of things existed, as such, in God; yet if not, then, in their origination, there was a passage from their not being to their being—that is, a creation. The pantheist may object that they existed potentially in God, but this can only mean that God had the power to produce them. But, as such, they did not exist, and when they were brought forth, that which before was not, was made to be. But this is all that the theist understands by creation. "We by no means contest the principle: out of nothing, nothing comes. We must assert, however, that it lacks the dignity of a logical law, according to which our thinking must proceed. It is much more a limitation of our thought, because of which we are unable to represent the origination of a thing which does not yet exist. But such an origination in nowise contradicts the two logical laws of our thinking. For the law of identity and of contradiction determines only that we must think $A=A$ and cannot think $A=\text{non-}A$; and the law of causality only says that all that happens or becomes . . . must have a cause of its happening or becoming. The first law, therefore, only demands that nothing (if it were thinkable) must be thought as nothing, something as something, this as not that, &c. The second law demands that, when anything originates, no matter how or

whence, a cause of its origination be assumed. But a cause is present, when through any force whatever a negation is cancelled and a something put in its place. In truth, therefore, the sentence, out of nothing comes nothing, has been falsely opposed to the notion of creation, as if the two were logically incompatible. The notion of creation in nowise involves that something comes out of nothing, or that nothing of itself passes into something; but that through something, God, the negation of the world is cancelled, and thereby the world established. Only the sentence, something is originated by nothing, would contradict the laws of causation, and render the notion of creation impossible. But this notion in nowise affirms that something is produced by nothing; but rather that through God the world was originated. And to this assertion it is plainly impossible to oppose either the maxim, from nothing comes nothing, or any logical law whatever. For it lies neither in the principle of identity and contradiction, nor in the law of causation or the sufficient ground, that the *through* (the causal power) is not sufficient for the production of anything, but that an *out-of* (a stuff) must be also added." (S. 651.)

"By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made." By His power that which was not, was made to be. The notion involves no contradiction; all that can be said is that it is incomprehensible. This is indeed true, but we are beset on every side with incomprehensibilities. Every change, every event, every becoming involves riddles which neither philosophy nor science can answer. We know the fact and nothing more. Who can tell how, from the union of oxygen and hydrogen, water can be produced? What science can make it in the slightest degree comprehensible? Who knows what happens with these gases when they suddenly lose all their peculiar properties, exchange their powers of repulsion for the contradictory ones of attraction, and that too under the influence of a force of repulsion (heat)? Who has the slightest insight into the sudden production, through these incomprehensible processes, of qualities which did not exist before? We see the fact and are forced to admit it, but all attempts fail to explain or comprehend it. Now we are in no worse position with reference to the doctrine of creation. It

involves no contradiction, and is hence possible. It does involve incomprehensibilities, but so does every fact. The opposing theories of atheism and pantheism involve, first, the same difficulties, and second, involve also decided and insuperable contradictions. It is, then, impossible to hold them in the light of clear and steady thought. We must, then, admit the only remaining doctrine, as one which, while we cannot explain or comprehend it, must still be held as the only lasting plan upon which our thought can rest.

In the section upon the relation of God to the world, the author seems at times to waver a little in his determination not to construct the absolute *a priori*. Along with much acute criticism, the *a priori* conception of the absolute sometimes presents itself. We agreed, at the start, to determine the content of this notion entirely from the facts of experience, as interpreted by the laws of thought. By a rigorous interpretation of these facts, in accordance with these laws, we find ourselves forced to assume the existence of an omnipresent, ever-working supernatural Force, who once established, and now co-ordinates and controls, all nature according to the methods of a rational mind. This is the only content which the facts warrant us in putting into the notion of the absolute: and this content we are forced to attribute to it. We hardly think it necessary, therefore, to answer the objection (p. 662) that the absolute must necessarily be the one and only being. For by the law of causation, we cannot view a thing as at once cause and effect; hence for the conditioned existences of nature, we are forced to assume an unconditioned existence separate from them. What need, then, to reply to the objection, which can only be raised by the theoriser on the *a priori* conception of the absolute, that the absolute must be the only being, when we are forced to conceive the absolute as distinct from the conditioned. Equally unnecessary is it, from our point of view, to reply to the objection (a. 664) that the absolute as such excludes all relativity; and therefore can stand in no relation to the world. This objection is completely answered when we remember that we know the absolute only in relation and in causal relation. There is no warrant for believing in an absolute which excludes all relation. We postulate the absolute

for the express purpose of standing in causal relation to the conditioned facts of nature ; and it would be a strange piece of ingratitude, if, after we have affirmed it upon the sole authority of the relative, it should now grow proud and disclaim all possibility of connection with the relative. In that case, the absolute and not the relative must vanish ; for we made the former only to support the latter ; and if it refuses to do so, it is not worth keeping. The same reply holds for the objection considered (s. 665) that the relativity of God and the world involves the dependence of the former. We have been forced to postulate God as cause and world as effect ; and it is certainly a remarkable discovery that an effect can in any wise condition its cause, at least so as to reduce it to dependence. We first posit the effect in absolute dependence upon its cause, and then suggest that such a relation is destructive of the latter's independence ! The question (s. 666) whether the existence of the world is compatible with the infinity and eternity of God, is equally inadmissible, for whatever content these words may have, it must be determined entirely from the facts. Surely to reason from the finite to the infinite, and then, after having reached the infinite by the aid of the finite, to insist that the latter is irreconcilable with the former, is a queer specimen of logic. Objections drawn from the notion of the omnipotence of the absolute move us less yet. A moment's reflection upon the way in which we come to this notion, relieves it of all difficulty. The facts of experience compel us to assume a power above all and which controls all ; but there is no warrant for believing in that wretched concoction of contradictory nonsense which can accomplish with equal ease the reasonable and the unreasonable, the thinkable and the unthinkable, the possible and the impossible. We by no means assert that the author does not give sufficient answers to these questions ; on the contrary, they are all acute and convincing. We do think, however, that a shorter way was possible. All these questions are inadmissible from our standpoint. They all rest upon an *a priori* construction of the absolute, which we have seen to be impossible. It is sufficient to say to all such objections that they are based on subjective nonsense, which has been mistaken for objective fact.

See, then, the point to which we have come. We began by listening to science as it expounded its first principles and its conclusions. We found them very unsatisfactory, and in sad need of rectification. The notions of matter and force, and of their mutual relations, were seen to be utterly indefinite and in many cases contradictory. Upon inquiring into the teachings of science concerning the atoms, we again found much that was unthinkable, while the so-called explanations turned out, upon examination, to be only subjective confusion. We next found that scientific theories all postulate something above the conditioned forces with which science deals. Indeed, we are compelled to postulate an omnipresent, ever-active Intelligence, who is not only author, but also administrator, of the steady laws of nature. Instead of the deistic conception of God as apart from the world, we find ourselves forced to assume not only that by Him are all things, but also that in Him are all things. The attempt to make mechanically intelligible the phenomena of nature, was seen to be an utter failure; while the notion of an eternal mechanism was found to be a contradiction. How the phenomena of nature are produced, no science can tell; we know but this: the Power from whom nature flows works intelligently, and according to the methods of a rational mind. We are forced to conceive it as intelligent, self-conscious, and personal. In the attempt to think out this conception, we found that it does, indeed, involve incomprehensibilities, but no contradiction, and that it is the only conception which does not involve insuperable contradiction, and the only one upon which our thought can rest.

We cannot follow the author in his proof that science postulates God not only as free and intelligent, but also as having an ethical nature. The discussion of the relation of God to humanity, of the old problem of evil and its bearing upon God's power and goodness, and of the vexed question of freedom, must also be omitted. Indeed, we have given only the faintest hints of the author's extended discussions. But if any one wishes to see how confused the metaphysics of physics are, and how weak its atheistic arguments, we commend to him this work as a storehouse of scientific facts, of acute criticism, and of just speculation.

ARTICLE III.—ESCHATOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE want of a consistent and satisfactory view of the eschatology of the Old Testament has been widely felt. To avoid certain traditional errors which are fraught with serious mischief, we have run into anomalies of interpretation which have the appearance of caprice or of subterfuge. It is time to open the question again, whether it is not possible to carry a uniform system of interpretation through the Bible without violating the unity of its doctrine. To offer some suggestions pertinent to this inquiry will be the object of the present Article.

FIRST PRESENTATION.

The first mention of death is in the law of Eden. Man is presented to view as made in the image of his God, and but a little lower than the angels. The penalty of death is denounced to hold him back from disobedience.

FIRST NECESSARY CONCEPTIONS.

His conceptions of death as thus denounced, so long as his innocence remained, must have been wholly dark. It carried with it, of course, the displeasure of God; and he knew nothing of the dispensation of mercy kept in reserve. We cannot suppose that the sense of immortality in man, as at first endowed by his Creator, and in his condition of sinless purity, was weaker than in the best of his descendants.

Dying, then, as a penal consequence of sin, could not have seemed to him any thing less than a painful exit from the known to the unknown; from the enjoyable to the terrible. Some sort of a death-realm was inseparable from the thought. Some of the miseries of that death-realm must have been obvious to his mind; such as the loss of a foot-hold in the visible, the privation of known good, the possibility of unknown evil, the distance of self-banishment from God, the pangs of conscious guilt, and that fear of God "which hath torment." In brief, the sentence "dying thou shalt die," as he must have:

apprehended it, meant thou shalt suffer the pains of dying, and the known and unknown miseries of a death-realm.

CHANGE CONSEQUENT UPON THE APOSTASY.

It is not necessary for our purpose to insist on either of the different explanations that have been offered of the divine communication that attended the expulsion from paradise. So much as this seems to have been substantially admitted by all. There was at least a partial execution of the penalty. But the order was inverted. Some of the dread horrors of the untried death-realm came in advance and seized upon the human pair at once. To that extent, the soul passed from life to death: it lost communion with God, and felt the misery of conscious guilt. The body took its death-wound with a limited lease of life. Under this modification of the sentence, the economy of redemption was introduced. This brings back the promise of life to the soul, and ultimate resurrection to the body. Under this economy comes the conflict between righteousness and sin. The sentence, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return," stands as the permanent doom of the race. The body perishes as at first decreed. How stands the case now with the soul? Is there any deliverance from the death-realm? If so, with what conditions and limitations? Is the promise, at best, only that of a partial relief from the darkness and horrors of that state, or is it that of a prompt and complete deliverance? Is there any lifting off of the divine displeasure for this life? Even Balaam saw that it must make a vast difference with every individual whether his life, and equally whether his death, should be under God's smile or under his frown. In what relation does the soul stand to God in the one case, and in the other, and what is the issue? How is it presented in the Hebrew Scriptures? Is there a consistent and uniform representation of the matter? Can the shade of a *limbus patrum*, that under various thin disguises is ever and anon thrusting itself forward in the interpretations that are given of the Old Testament, be successfully laid, and the whole Word of God be shown to be in entire harmony on this subject.

SOURCES OF ERROR.

1. Prominent among these are some of the obscure renderings of the current translation ; and some that are worse than obscure. In no other line of important doctrine is our translation so faulty as in this. Some proofs of this will appear in these pages. To this is due much of the prevalent impression that the Old Testament does not appeal to motives derived from the future world, and teaches very doubtfully, if at all, that there is a future state. An educated and thoughtful Christian layman recently stated to the writer that this was his impression derived from the study of the Old Testament.

2. The comparative frequency with which we find good men in the Old Testament speaking gloomily of their prospects beyond the present life.

3. The dogma so widely believed to be taught in the Scriptures, that Christ descended into hell.

4. A needless confusion in regard to the primary and ruling idea of the death-realm.

COMMON GROUNDS.

1. It will be admitted by all that there is a clear, sharply drawn line of discrimination between the righteous and the wicked. This is quite as marked and striking in the Old Testament as in the New. It begins in Eden, where we see man upright, and man fallen ; it re-appears in the history of Cain and Abel, and Noah, and Abraham ; we are especially struck with its broad delineation in the plea for Sodom, both in Abraham's petitions and God's answers ; and we nowhere lose sight of it from Genesis to Malachi.

No other distinction is so familiar and so constant as this.

2. There is a vein of admonition running through the Hebrew Scriptures that implies consequences beyond those that come in the present life. It will be sufficient here to point to two classes of admonitory representations the meaning of which cannot easily be mistaken. The one class shows us a death denounced against the wicked (Deut. xxx, 15, 19 ; Prov. viii, 36, and xiv, 2 ; Ezek. xviii, 20, 23, 31, 32, and xxxiii, 8, 9, 11), from which the righteous are expressly exempted, and from which the wicked are exhorted to escape by

turning from their evil ways—a second death as clearly revealed in the Old Testament as in the New. The other class points to a future existence in the sense of a hereafter;* sometimes distinctly a hereafter of menace for the wicked, and sometimes as distinctly a hereafter of promise for the righteous. The following familiar examples should not be overlooked. “Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my hereafter be like his.” (Num. xxiii, 10.) “O that they were wise, that they understood this, that they would consider their hereafter.” (Deut. xxxii, 29. See also xxxii, 20.) “Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright; for the hereafter of that man is peace. But the transgressors shall be destroyed together; the hereafter of the wicked (i. e., the blessed hereafter that might have been his) shall be cut off.” (Ps. xxxvii, 37, 38.) “There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but its hereafter are the ways of death.” (Prov. xiv, 12.) “Be thou in the fear of the Lord all the day long; for surely there is a hereafter, and thine expectation shall not be cut off.” (Prov. xxiii, 17, 18.) “So shall the knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul (i. e., sweet); when thou hast arrived at it, then there shall be a hereafter; and thine expectation shall not be cut off.” (Prov. xxiv, 14.) “Neither be thou envious at the wicked; for there shall be no (blessed) hereafter to the evil man.” (Prov. xxiv, 19, 50.)

This kind of admonition has other and more striking forms, which will appear in another line of argument. Enough for the present that we may claim, as generally conceded points, this uniform and unambiguous “discerning between the righteous and the wicked,” and this carrying of the discrimination onward in consequences that reach beyond the present life. We have a right to infer that the teachings of the Hebrew Scriptures, when rightly understood, will all fall into line with these, and only serve to render the doctrine more emphatic and clear. Let us see whether this straight path can be found through the labyrinth that has seemed so formidable.

* For this translation of *אַחֲרָיָהוּ*, the reader of the Hebrew will find ample warrant in its derivation (from *אַחַר*) and its constant use in the sense of *after-part*, or *last part*, (of things) and *end* or *event* (of any course of things) and *final lot*, as in Prov. v, 4, where it is said of the adulteress “*her end is bitter*,” i. e., the end to which she brings those whom she seduces—their *final lot*.

The Hebrew Scriptures present nearly all the points which it will be found necessary to discuss, in connection with the following words ; מוֹת (death), שְׁאוֹל (hades, the death-realm), צֶלְמֹת (death-shade), אֲבֵרֹן (destruction), רְשָׁעִים (the shades, inhabitants of hades), בּוֹר (pit), and תְּהוֹמוֹת (the lower regions). Between these there is an intimate connection ; especially the first two : leading occasionally to something like interchange and the appearance of identity. This grows out of the penal quality of death in the original doom of sin. Death in that sense was not complete without the death-realm ; it opened the door to that realm, and as a monarch, held dominion in that realm. The introducing of the soul to that realm was only the beginning of his work. In this sense the redeeming work of Christ brought relief and deliverance from death to the righteous ; he took away the penalty ; he “abolished death and brought life and immortality to light.” It was only the dissolution of the body that remained for the righteous. But being attended with the phenomena of death,—being a true death as regards the body, the name was retained ; applied as we constantly do in other things, when we put the part for the whole. A familiar example is seen in our use of the word *man*. We commonly mean the man complete, body and soul ; we sometimes mean the body only, as when we look upon the corpse and say the man is dead ; we sometimes mean the soul only, as when we say the man is greater than his stature.

So death, as connected with the present investigation, has three meanings.

1. Its entire original sense ; including the cessation of man's animal life, and the woes of the death-realm ; e. g., “I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked : but rather that he turn from his evil way and live.”

2. The physical change only : or that which comes upon man and the whole animal kingdom alike. e. g., “He will be our guide even unto death.”

3. The miseries of the death-realm. e. g., “Her house is the way to Sheol, going down to the chambers of death.”

This distinction, though not new, is important. It is in the first sense that we find the personification of מוֹת (death) as the master of שְׁאוֹל and its inhabitants. This is a mastery in which

he is seen to be endowed with a fearful power to reach over into this world and claim his own among the living. Disease is his servant and his offspring;—"the first-born of death." He has his "snares" by which mortals are suddenly caught. None but God can "redeem men from his power." He is the shepherd of Sheol and has command of its gates. He is the "king of terrors." He sweeps through the world as if he had an unrestricted right, and might gather all mankind into his domain. But when he lays hold upon the righteous, he is met by one stronger than he, and his victory is wrested away with a note of triumph, before which "the last enemy quails": "O ~~mo~~ I will be thy plague, O ~~hine~~ I will be thy destruction." Of this triumph the New Testament has at once its echo and its interpretation, "O *Sávaros*, where is thy sting; O *ᾠδης*, where is thy victory?"

Having found ~~mo~~ thus located in his own realm and in possession and control of its gates, we are led to inquire if the Hebrew Scriptures contain as distinct a recognition of the domain; and if the representations of it can be cleared of ambiguity. This demands some account of the name ~~hine~~.

It is to the Hebrew scholar of our times as clearly the name of an identified and unmistakable realm as is Assyria or Egypt. It is most unfortunate that in giving us our noble English Bible, the translators did not place this word among those that are left to declare their own meaning by their use. Instead of this, we find its place supplied by the word "hell" thirty-one times, by the word "grave" thirty-one times, and by the word "pit" three times: there being sixty-five instances of its use. This introduces a confusion that is both needless and gratuitous, besides essentially weakening the testimony of the Old Testament for a future state. ~~hine~~ no more means "the grave" in the Hebrew Scriptures than does hades or gehenna in the New Testament, or orcus, or infernus in the Latin poets. The Hebrew has a word ~~up~~ used sixty-seven times, and ~~rup~~ used fourteen times to denote "the grave" or "sepulcher." No two things are kept more distinct than the receptacle for the body and the abode for the soul.

The lexicons exhibit no confusion here. ~~hine~~ is the underworld, orcus, hades, the abode of the rephaim, and nothing else.

The Septuagint renders it sixty-one times by *ᾅδης*, twice by *Σάραρος*, and has two lacunae in the text where the word occurs; where, of course, we obtain no testimony in either direction. The Vulgate renders it forty-eight times by *infernus*, and seventeen times by *inferus* or *inferi*. The ancient versions are in singular harmony in regard to this subject. They know no other sense or meaning for the word. The idea of locality is prominent. But this is in such harmony, as we shall see, with our necessary moral ideas, that we may well believe that its origin was from these. This brings us to the conception of

TIME AS THE UNDERWORLD.

That the Scriptures agree with the uniform habit of the ancient world in locating Sheol in a vast subterranean space comparable to that of the open heavens above, there can be no doubt. "High as heaven, what canst thou know? deeper than Sheol, what canst thou do?" (Job xi, 8.) "A fire is kindled in mine anger that shall burn to the lowest Sheol." (Deut. xxxii, 22.) "Though they dig into Sheol, thence shall my hand take them: though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down." (Amos ix, 2.)

The same divine wisdom that did not contend with the prevailing notions of mankind in regard to the rising and setting of the sun, left undisturbed the universal idea as to the location of Sheol. The one is phenomenal—the suggestion of external nature through the senses. The other, though ideal, is not the less the suggestion of our inner nature and its inevitable expression. In obedience to the one, even philosophers, and men of the highest intelligence, will continue, as long as time shall last, to speak of the sun as rising and setting. And in obedience to the other, language and art will represent hope and faith and joy in God, as looking upward; and grief, misery, fear, guilt, shame, and despair as looking downward; and something stronger than caprice will constrain human thought and human language to the old forms; and mankind will continue to say and to write "up to heaven," and "down to hell."

Modern astronomy has brought an end to the belief in a literal underworld: but all "the frightful spaces of the universe" remain, and our ignorance of the locality of Sheol

abates nothing from its terrors. It rather throws us back into the mental state indicated by the most obvious etymology of the name;* a condition of irrepressible, ever starting, but never answered inquiry. Its answer lies in the unfathomed purpose and infinite resources of the Almighty. One has but to read what the best Christian writers of our age have written on this subject, to feel that the question which was too hard for Job (chap. xxxviii, 17) has not yet become irrelevant. Sheol has not yet yielded up its secrets, its gloom, or its terrors; "the bottomless pit" has not been sounded; the light of human knowledge has not penetrated "the blackness of darkness forever."

Assuming that with this idea of locality, the Hebrew Scriptures make Sheol the death-realm of the wicked, we should naturally look for some figurative uses of the word, and some examples, in which with an obvious recognition of its primary meaning it would yet include but a part of that meaning. An illustration occurs in the first name that is applied to God, Elohim. Its most familiar and constant use is as the name of the only living and true God. Yet we find it used to denote the idols worshiped by the heathen and applied to princes who receive a qualified worship from their fellow-men.

It is easy to trace the process of thought by which the word passed to these inferior uses—dropping out, in the first instance, everything that belongs to God, except the worship rendered; and in the second instance dropping out even from the worship that which is properly divine.

So we find Sheol used commonly with the complete and most inclusive meaning of *the underworld to which the wicked are consigned at death*; secondly, dropping everything but the locality, as we sometimes speak of a country without including its inhabitants; and thirdly, with the license of poetry dropping everything that is properly characteristic of Sheol except its darkness and silence as contrasted with the feverish activity and turmoil of the present life; and so very nearly the equivalent of death in its lowest or physical sense. With these distinctions in mind, we shall find the subject cleared of many of

* See note of Prof. Taylor Lewis, p. 585 of *Lange's Commentary on Genesis*.

its difficulties, and the way opened to an easy solution of the rest.

Before entering upon these, let us look at those companion words of Sheol that have been already mentioned. We have found death enthroned in his own realm, and in possession and control of its gates. It would not be strange if we should find his kingdom in a sense mapped down, and some one or more features of it boldly delineated. Something like this appears in the discovery of an inner province of the death-realm; perhaps we may better say an inner dungeon; for it has its doors. (Job xxxviii, 17.) Its name

צלמות

occurs in the Hebrew Scriptures eighteen times. As it is always translated, it is commonly passed with no distinct recognition. The most familiar attribute of Sheol is darkness. Job could not make it dark enough. He called it "a land of darkness as darkness itself." The New Testament calls it "the blackness of darkness forever." Yet the Hebrew Scriptures had something to be added to this to make the idea of the death-realm complete. They lead us to look within upon a lower deep; a gorge or prison of such unearthly terrors that it seemed to be under the special brooding of death. "Have the gates of death been opened to thee? or hast thou seen the doors of *Tzalmaveth*?"

This home of the deepest horrors of the death-realm is a ready resource of the sacred writers when the boldest possible imagery is required to set forth a condition of gloom and misery on earth—very much as when we are led to speak of "a hell upon earth." Thus when Job would show what an enemy the daylight is to the house-breaker and the robber, he says "The morning is to them even as *Tzalmaveth*; if one discover them, they are in the terrors of *Tzalmaveth*." A hyperbole that leaves us no possible conception of a bolder figure of speech.

The twenty-third psalm gains vastly in intensity if we recognize the presence of the same imagery there. The sacred writer had just called to mind the goodness of the Great Shepherd in restoring his soul. Whether this was a restoration from sickness, in which he had been brought near to death, or a spiritual restoration from a condition in which "the pains of

Sheol got hold on him," it was alike natural that in this joyous outburst of faith he should declare himself ready to trust the Lord in greater straits; even the greatest the mind can conceive. His imagination runs on beyond all that is dark in this world, and braves the terrors of the most fearful glen of Sheol. "Yea though I walk through the valley of *Tzalmaveth* I will fear no evil; for thou art with me." A faith like that which was expressed by the fervid preacher who declared that "the believing soul could stand without fear over the dreadful gulf of hell upon a single promise."

אבדון

We glance at another name which has also its importance, as it presents the death-realm under another aspect. It is recognized in the New Testament, and declared to be the name of the angel of the bottomless pit, called in the Hebrew tongue *'Αβδδων*. This name in the Old Testament is translated destruction. Derived from the verb *אבד*, "to lose oneself, to be lost, to wander about, to perish, to be destroyed, to be miserable," &c., it seems to be very nearly the equivalent of Sheol, and was doubtless intended to present that world specifically as the abode of the lost. We find it in such expressions as these: "Sheol and Avaddon are never full." (Prov. xxvii, 20.) "Sheol and Avaddon are before the Lord." (Prov. xv, 11.) "Shall thy loving kindness be declared in Sheol; or thy faithfulness in Avaddon?" (Ps. lxxxviii, 11.) "Sheol is naked before him, and Avaddon hath no covering." (Job xxvi, 6.) "Death and Avaddon say, we have heard the fame thereof with our ears." (Job xxviii, 22.)

באר

Of this word, it is sufficient to say that while it has many applications to pits and excavations that are of human origin, there are also unmistakable examples of its use in the sense of Sheol (e. g., Ps. lxxxviii, 6, and Prov. xxviii, 17), and those numerous instances in which the expression occurs, "them that go down to the pit."

קבר

This word is repeatedly used in connection with *קבר* in such a way as clearly to identify it with Sheol (e. g., Ps. lxiii, 10; Ezek. xxxi, 14, 16, 18, and xxxii, 18, 24).

With these various designations of the death-realm before us, we are prepared for some glimpse of its inhabitants. But these, too, elude the common reader in our English Bible. Perhaps the difficulty encountered by the translators was to find an English word that would not convey a heathen idea. Why not, then, give us Rephaim as well as cherubim? A glossary would have sufficed to render the one intelligible as well as the other. Indeed, several of the passages in which it occurs would determine for us, by their obvious sense, what the meaning must be: e. g., "Sheol from beneath is moved at thy coming; it stirreth up the rephaim for thee. . . . They also shall speak and say unto thee, 'art thou also become weak as we?'" "Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the rephaim arise and praise thee?" "Her house inclineth unto death; and her paths to the rephaim." "He knoweth not that the rephaim are there and her guests are in the depths of Sheol." "The man that wandereth out of the way of understanding shall remain in the congregation of the rephaim." "The rephaim tremble beneath the waters. . . . Sheol is naked;" &c.

These examples make it clear that Sheol is to be understood as the abode of the rephaim; and these were conceived of as the shades or ghosts of mortals who once lived and sinned on earth.

It is worthy to be noticed in regard to all these representations, that while the Hebrew Scriptures have gone these lengths in depicting the gloom of the death-realm, and the wretched condition of its inhabitants, they have wholly abstained from those grotesque and puerile fancies that sink the ancient mythologies beneath our respect. There are no details; there is nothing for the painter or the sculptor. There are only the darkness and the brooding terrors that answer to what the guilty soul finds within.

In addition to the representations which have thus far engaged our attention, there are other and varied forms of language that clearly point to Sheol without introducing that or any of the equivalent names: e. g., "The way of the ungodly shall perish." i. e., "like the way that is terminated by a precipice or a fatal pit-fall, it shall come to an end in Sheol." "Men of the world that have their portion in this life"; the very thought which

was afterwards expressed by our Lord in the parable of Dives; "thou in thy life-time receivedst thy good things;" the one implying, and the other directly teaching that nothing remained for such but Sheol. "Gather not my soul with sinners," i. e., in Sheol, "nor my life with bloody men." "Then understood I their end; surely thou didst set them on slippery places; thou castedst them down to destruction," i. e., into Sheol. "Let them be confounded and troubled forever; yea let them be put to shame and perish;" clearly the doom of Sheol. "When the wicked spring as the grass, . . . it is that they shall be destroyed forever," i. e., in Sheol. "When a wicked man dieth his expectation shall perish; and the hope of unjust men perisheth," i. e., in their coming to Sheol.

We come next to contemplate more distinctly the proof that

SHEOL IS NOT THE ABODE OF THE RIGHTEOUS.

We have already seen that the Hebrew Scriptures show a different hereafter for the righteous from that of the wicked. It remains to show that this includes deliverance from Sheol. This is implied in those passages that present Sheol as the lot of the wicked, e. g., "The wicked shall be turned into Sheol and all the nations that forget God." (Ps. ix, 17.) "Let death seize upon them, and let them go down quick into Sheol; for wickedness is in their dwellings and among them." (Ps. lv, 15.) "Her feet go down to death; her steps take hold on Sheol." (Prov. v, 5.) "Her house is the way to Sheol." (Prov. vii, 27.)

That which is so distinctly implied in these Scriptures, is distinctly declared in others, e. g., "The way of life is upward to the wise, that he may depart from Sheol beneath." (Prov. xv, 24.) "Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver his soul from Sheol." (Prov. xxiii, 14.) "Let me not be ashamed, O Lord, for I have called upon thee; let the wicked be ashamed, and let him be silent in Sheol." (Ps. xxxi, 17.)

More striking still is that remarkable passage in the forty-ninth Psalm, so effectually obscured in our English translation.

Speaking of those who are so absorbed in their worldly honors and their wealth that their inward thought is that "their houses shall continue forever, and their dwelling places to all generations," the sacred writer declares, "Like a flock to Sheol

shall they gather; death shall be their shepherd; the righteous shall have dominion over them in the morning,* and their form (visible presence) shall Sheol cause to vanish from the dwelling which was theirs. But God will redeem my soul from the hand of Sheol; for he will receive me." Here is Sheol under the shepherding of death for the one, and deliverance from Sheol for the other. Mark also the expression, "for he will receive me." Compare Ps. lxxiii, 24, "Thou wilt guide me by thy counsel and afterward receive me to glory." Also John xiv, 3, "I will come again and receive you to myself;" *λήψομαι*, the same verb by which the Septuagint translates *ἔρπ* in the above two quotations from the Psalms.

We are now prepared to consider that important passage in the sixteenth Psalm, which was quoted by Peter on the day of Pentecost. "Thou wilt not abandon my soul to Sheol; neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption."

Dr. Carl Bernhard Moll, the annotator on the Psalms in Lange's series, says of this text, "the speaker is not the Messiah, either as a pre-existing person, or as a figure of speech; still less a merely pious poet who expresses obscure hopes in poetical hyperbole; but he is David as a prophet. . . . His expressions have an entirely personal reference; yet not in the form of an application of a general truth to the psalmist himself or others like him, but in such a way that it directly breaks through the reference to David, and must have called forth thoughts of prophetic illumination and Messianic meaning. . . . There is here in subject and in form more than 'the flashing up of the hope of immortality in the Old Testament.' He knows that he, the favored friend of God, will even in death go to God, and will attain that which is in the presence of the angels at the right hand of the only living God."

It should be noticed that the force of the preposition *ἐν* in *ἐν*, which is fully recognized by the Septuagint and the New Testament and by all scholars of our day, is overlooked in our translation. Gesenius says, "to, toward, unto, Gr. *eis*, *πρός*." Hengstenberg, after Michaelis, says "*Sheol* is here personified

* Evidently the morning that succeeds the night implied in verse 12, "man being in honor does not lodge;" i. e., through the entire night. The righteous is master of the situation in the morning.

and represented as an insatiable animal." The idea of "in Sheol," is not here. Neither is it in Acts ii, 27,* where the passage is quoted by Peter from the Septuagint. There is nothing to show, then, that David entered into Sheol; still less the Messiah. "Thou wilt not abandon me to the rapacious Sheol," certainly does not mean "thou wilt cast me into the jaws of Sheol," whether for three days, or for any other period of time. Interpreted by the obvious sense of the words and the usage of the Psalms, it means "thou wilt not leave my soul to become the prey of Sheol, but wilt receive me to glory." Sheol was no fit place for David, still less for the Son of God.†

With these various denials, direct and indirect, that the righteous were to go to Sheol, in mind, let us approach the difficulty that presents itself in the case of certain good men who spoke of themselves as going to Sheol. In the case of Jacob who spoke of himself as going Sheol-ward, (גִּידְוָה,)‡ we may

* *ἐγκαταλείπω* is used in the New Testament 10 times, including the two examples in question from the mouth of Peter, viz: "My God, why hast thou forsaken me." (Mat. xxvii, 46; and Mark xv, 34.) "Persecuted but not forsaken." (2 Cor. iv, 9.) "Demos hath forsaken me." (2 Tim. iv, 10.) "At my first answer no man stood with me, but all forsook me." (2 Tim. iv, 16.) "Not forsaking the assembling of yourselves together." (Heb. x, 25.) "I will never leave thee." (Heb. xiii, 6.) "Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed," i.e., left remaining. With the exception of this last example, the meaning is uniformly to abandon or desert. No example of leaving in a place, as "in Sheol."

† Two other passages in the New Testament have been regarded as having a bearing on this point. The most prominent is that locus veratissimus, 1 Pet. iii, 19-20, for a most satisfactory interpretation of which we may refer to Prof. Bartlett's invaluable Article in the *New Englander*, Oct., 1872. There remains only Eph. iv, 9: "Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended into the lower parts of the earth." It is sufficient for our purpose that Winer, Alford, Ellicott, and others have admitted that the genitive here employed may be the genitive of apposition; making "the lower parts identical with the earth." "Ascending" implies a lower as well as a higher, a humiliation as well as an exaltation of the Son of God. The New Testament loses no opportunity to bring out these indirect teachings of the Old. But it must not escape our notice that we have here only the comparative degree "lower." There are no depths set over against the superlative heights of the succeeding verse. This is the more noteworthy as the Septuagint employs the same word in the superlative degree to translate Ps. lxxiii, 9. "*τα κατωτατα τῆς γῆς*." There is a descent that there may be an ascent; but the one is only to the earth below; the other is "up far above all heavens."

‡ See Rodiger's Gesenius' *Heb. Grammar* § 90, 2; also Prof. Taylor Lewis' note, *Lange's Gen.* p. 587.

recall the distinction already made, in which it was shown that Sheol is occasionally used in a sense very nearly equivalent to that of death. In the original sense, as we have seen, death unmitigated by the covenant of mercy, was the passage to Sheol. This entered into human thought as the law. Deliverance from Sheol was the exception introduced by Divine grace. Hence to die, to depart out of life, was to go Sheol-ward; to start on the way; to travel the first stage of the journey: leaving the next undeclared. In this view it has been exceedingly common in all ages to arrest the thought at the bare point of the closing up of the present life; the departure out of this world. Jacob saw, with a troubled spirit and a clouded hope, the journey losing itself as in a dream, but not ended.* He had fallen into a morbid state; and could not speak of his own prospects, as he did years afterward when, close upon the borders of heaven, he broke out "I have waited for thy salvation O Lord." We must not make the mistake of attributing to divine inspiration that which was the inspiration of an unjustifiable and unhealthy mood of mind. The divine inspiration is in the history; and many of Jacob's sayings, like many of his acts, are but events which the inspired history narrates, and to be judged as we judge other sayings and acts. The feeling of morbid depression that drew out this form of language from the patriarch, and led him to say "all these things are against me," is illustrated at great length in the speeches of Job. He said "God was pursuing him like an enemy; he had spread his net for him; he had kindled his wrath against him; he had taken him by the neck and shaken him to pieces; he had broken him with breach upon breach; he had fenced up his way, and set darkness in his paths; he could find no access to God to plead

* The language of Hezekiah (Isa. xxxviii, 10) is to the same effect. "I said in the cutting off of my days, I shall go to the gates of Sheol;"—not within the gates. It was Sheolah with him, too, though differently expressed. A journey toward Sheol with a faintly glimmering hope of deliverance. This is the key to his subsequent exclamation: "Sheol cannot praise thee; death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down to the pit cannot hope for thy truth; the living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day." A certainty is better than an uncertainty. His faith was low, and he evidently had no slight fear of Sheol before his eyes. While he could keep a footing with the living, there was the privilege of praise and an opportunity to gain a surer hope.

his cause before him." He represented his case as wholly desperate. What else should we expect but that in the midst of these dark effusions he would say that Sheol was to be his home? We have examples enough of the same thing now. Good men fall into moods of melancholy in which they speak of their prospects for the life to come every whit as hopelessly as did these patriarchs of the Old Testament. Whatever was said by any of them in their despairing moods, we may place in the balances to be weighed against what was said by themselves or others under the inspiration of faith and hope and of the Spirit of God. When the Lord said to Satan, "Behold he (Job) is in thine hand, but save his life," we are not to suppose that the adversary lost any part of his opportunity. What he could do to break down the faith and hope of his victim was done. Is it too much to suppose that dark temptations from the evil one, not so successfully resisted as that which came from his wife, controlled many of his utterances? Shall we set that which may have been the inspiration of Satan,—which was at best the emanation of a morbid tone of mind,—to overweigh that which was evidently the inspiration of God? Is Job in the hands of the adversary as safe an interpreter of God's truth as Asaph in the sanctuary? Or to make the case still stronger, take the latter, as he himself sketches the two contradictory moods in his own experience. The one he utterly condemns, as Job did at last. He says he was "foolish and ignorant, and as a beast before God." "His feet were almost gone; his steps had well nigh slipped." In the other state of mind he found that it was good to draw nigh to God, and put his trust in him. In the one he complained of the prosperity of the wicked, and the afflictions of the righteous. He went so far as to say of the one, "there are no bands in their death," and of himself, "Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain and washed my hands in innocency." A step further and he would have said "we go to a common Sheol," or with the writer of Ecclesiastes, "That which befallerth the sons of men, befallerth beasts; even one thing befallerth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preëminence above a beast; for all is vanity."

But before he came to this he "went into the sanctuary of God, and then understood he their end." He saw the "slippery places, the casting down into destruction, the consuming with terrors." And then, after some deep and salutary throes of penitence and conviction, his faith and joy in God blossomed again, and he exclaimed "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none on earth that I desire beside thee; my flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion forever." It is in this state of mind that he says "Thou wilt guide me by thy counsel and afterward receive me to glory." In which of these states of mind is he declaring his own darkness; and in which the truth of God, and the doctrine of the Old Testament?

THE CASE OF SAMUEL

is so far exceptional as perhaps to demand a word. We are to bear in mind that the narrative is chiefly concerned with the fortunes of Saul. He had fallen out of communication with God, and could obtain no answer to his appeals when ruin was staring him in the face. In his despair he lets himself down into the odious and forbidden realm of necromancy and witchcraft. He must now think the thoughts and speak the dialect of the abominable atmosphere he has entered. As we should expect, the vision accommodates itself to the state of mind it is to encounter. The necromancers of his day did not propose to call spirits down from heaven. It is not certain that Saul had Samuel in mind, when he first opened his case to the woman. He is led on step by step. The vision, or actual presence of Samuel, if any insist that it was such, and the words that are uttered, show a designed adaptation to the circumstances of new and aggravated guilt unto which the king has ventured. He was to eat the fruit of his own doings, and drink the bitter cup to the dregs. It is proposed to call Samuel up from the earth; and Samuel appears to come up from the earth; and he reproves Saul for disquieting and calling him up. If he wants witchcraft, he shall have witchcraft to the full; and more than he asks. But does not this show the existence of a popular impression at that time, that the underworld was the abode of good men like Samuel, as well as of

the wicked? Not quite: it shows what representations prevailed among necromancers and those who consulted them. A very poor authority on so grave a question! Everything seems to have been so ordered as to awaken no new and startling apprehensions in the mind of Saul to drive him from his course, and to create no diverting issue. Everything must contribute to bring the sentence of doom down upon the heart of the king hard and heavy and unrelieved. As an instance of the remarkable latitude that was given to visions in the Old Testament times, we may refer to that of Micaiah recorded in I Kings xxii, 19-22. If the theory of a vision appearing both to the woman and to Saul be discarded, it will still be impossible to admit that there was any efficacy in the incantations of the woman in this case.

If Samuel actually came to the interview, it could have been no other than God who sent him, and who supplied to him the oracle which he delivered, and ordered all the striking adaptations of manner and speech and appearance. There is nothing here, on either theory, to prove that Samuel was in fact an inhabitant of Sheol.

THE NOTIONS OF THE JEWS IN THE TIME OF CHRIST.

The ideas that prevailed among the Jews in the time of Christ are of no importance in the discussion of this subject, except so far as he or his apostles may be supposed to have sanctioned them.

Three centuries of Greek domination in the world of letters and of thought had not been without their fruit. Not to insist on the spuriousness of Josephus' celebrated discourse on Hades, in whole or in part,—admitting that he correctly represents the Jews of his time in his idea of a divided Hades, an idea which we find elsewhere in his writings,—it is the easiest thing in the world to see how they should have come in possession of the idea, without inferring that they found it in their Scriptures.

We have their Scriptures, and do not find it there. No more can we find any support for the notion in the New Testament. We are familiar with it as a pagan idea, and know how it was floating about them in the atmosphere of thought for hundreds

of years; and must have been strongly suggested by the very word which the Septuagint writers employed as the Greek equivalent of Sheol. It could not be otherwise than that it should have its influence in their interpretation of their Scriptures. We are in a condition to let the pagan notions pass for what they are worth, and interpret the Scriptures by themselves.

We find ourselves thus happily relieved from all necessity of maintaining the dogma of a divided Sheol as a doctrine taught in the Old Testament. We find no trace there of a *limbus patrum*, or a *limbus infantum*. We find a contradiction instead of an affirmation of the thesis that our Lord "descended into hell." We do not find Sheol so enlarging herself as to take in the third heaven, where Paul found the paradise into which he was "caught up;" and we are able to vindicate our Lord's declaration to the crucified thief, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise," without supposing that Sheol contained a paradise, or was equivalent to "the world of departed spirits without discrimination of character." We are held to the declaration of Augustine that Sheol is never used in a good sense. We find as sharp a discrimination at its gates as that which is given us in the divine oracles between the characters of men.

The Old Testament is found to be in entire accord with the New in this matter. As we are able to discover nothing in the quality or relations of the pre-Messianic ages that implied a different administration of the destinies of the departed from that which is made known under the gospel, so we are able to find no difference in fact. Appeals drawn from the motives of the eternal world, the same in kind as now, were addressed to mankind; and "the fear of the Lord was the beginning of wisdom" in the same sense, and with the same vast reach of meaning, as when the Great Teacher said, "Fear not them that kill the body and after that have no more that they can do; but fear him that after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him." Death means no more now, and thought travels no further into the unknown depths than when Balaam said, "Let me die the death of the righteous and let my last end be like his."

ARTICLE IV.—NATURAL LAW, AND SPIRITUAL AGENCY.

THROUGH the influence of that phase of scientific thought known as the New Philosophy, it is becoming the fashion to speak of everything as coming about by the operation of law ; as if having traced anything back to one or more of those constant forces which we term laws of nature, as its " proximate cause," we had attained the limit of scientific inquiry concerning it, and were by some inherent necessity precluded from supposing a personal or spiritual agency in the case

This is by no means a new doctrine, but whereas it was once held subject to grave doubts, owing to the imperfect and uncertain knowledge which men had of that Nature in which they sought to discover the origin of things, now we are told it stands immovably fixed upon that epitome of science the Correlation and Conservation of Force.

Prof. Tyndall, in his *Fragments of Science for Unscientific People*, says, in expounding this law : " And why should a perpetual motion, even under modern conditions, be impossible ? The answer to this question is the statement of that great generalization of modern science, which is known under the name of the Conservation of Energy. This principle asserts that no power can make its appearance in nature without an equivalent expenditure of some other power ; that natural agents are so related to each other as to be mutually convertible, but that no new agency is created. Light runs into heat, heat into electricity, electricity into magnetism, magnetism into mechanical force, and mechanical force again into heat and light. The Proteus changes, but he is ever the same ; *and his changes in Nature, supposing no miracle to supervene, are the expression, not of spontaneity but of physical necessity.*" (p. 38.) And in the same connection, continuing the argument, he says : " In the application of law in Nature, the terms great and small are unknown. Thus the principle referred to teaches us that the Italian wind gliding over the crest of the Matterhorn is as

firmly ruled as the earth in its orbital revolutions round the sun ; and that the fall of its vapor into clouds is exactly as much a matter of *necessity* as the return of the seasons. The dispersion, therefore, of the slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal, would be as much a miracle as the rolling of the Rhone over the Grimsel precipices and down Haslithal to Brientz." (p. 39.)

And from such an argument the conclusion is natural, "that without a disturbance of natural law quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the rolling of the waters of the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven, or deflect towards us a single beam of the sun." (p. 39.) Accordingly, on the following page he says : "Granting the power of free will in man so strongly claimed by Prof. Mansel, and assuming the efficacy of free prayer to produce changes in external Nature, it necessarily follows that natural laws are more or less at the mercy of man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the permanency of those laws would be worthy of confidence." And it is noted as a "wholesome sign for England that she numbers among her clergy men wise enough to understand all this, and courageous enough to act up to their knowledge." (p. 40.)

Extending this conception of law, again, into the facts of organic existence (where, indeed, it must lead us if we adopt it), he says, speaking of the formation of a grain of corn : "We have in succession the bud, the stalk, the ear, the full corn in the ear ; the cycle of molecular action being completed by the production of grains similar to that with which the process began. Now there is nothing in this process which necessarily eludes the conceptive or imagining power of the purely human mind. An intellect the same in kind as our own would, if only sufficiently expanded, be able to follow the whole process from beginning to end. It would see every molecule placed in its position by the specific attractions and repulsions exerted between it and other molecules, the whole process and its consummation being an instance of the play of molecular force. Given the grain and its environment, the purely human intellect might, if sufficiently expanded, trace out *a priori* every step

of the process of growth, and by the application of purely mechanical principles, demonstrate that the cycle must end, as it is seen to end, in the reproduction of forms like that with which it began. *A similar necessity rules here to that which rules the planets in their circuits round the sun.*" (pp. 114-117.) Supposing the view of nature set forth in these passages to be the true one, we should be compelled to conclude, with Prof. Tyndall, that "it ought to be known and avowed that the physical philosopher as such must be a pure materialist." For there would be no room to doubt that "his inquiries deal with matter and force, and with them alone;" and that "the action which he has to investigate, is necessary action, not spontaneous action." (p. 92.)

Neither are these the views of Prof. Tyndall alone, but they are the legitimate and inevitable result of what are assumed to be the materialistic tendencies of modern science, and appear with equal distinctness in the works of other writers. For example, Prof. Huxley says: "I have endeavored in the first part of this discourse to give you a conception of the direction towards which modern physiology is tending; and I ask you what is the difference between the conception of life as the product of a certain disposition of material molecules and the old notion of an archæus governing and directing blind matter within each living body, except this—that here as elsewhere matter and law have devoured spirit and spontaneity? And as surely as every future grows out of, past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law, until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action." (*Essays selected from Lay Sermons, etc.*, p. 87.) Mr. Herbert Spencer, too, in his hypothesis of Evolution, assumes to find in matter and the necessary interaction of its inherent forces a sufficient means of accounting for all the works of nature, including life and mind, with all their phenomena. In his own words: "Given the persistence of Force, and given the various derivative laws of Force, and there has to be shown, not only how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result the more numerous and involved traits, exhibited by organic and superorganic existences—how

an organism is evolved? what is the genesis of human intelligence? whence social progress arises?" (*First Principles*, 555.)

That these views are in themselves a denial of the immediate personal agency of God in nature, on the ground that nothing takes place except by the spontaneous action of matter and force, is sufficiently set forth in the passages quoted: but whether they really constitute an era in the progress of science by virtue of which we are compelled, as those who advocate them claim that we are, to abandon our belief in a personal God, and in a spiritual agency in material nature, and so to give up the groundwork of the Christian faith, by confessing that Christ and a divine revelation were impossible; in short, whether we are compelled by them to conclude with a distinguished writer, that "Faith is bankrupt, and Science is called to administer her effects," is a question which we shall be better able to decide when we clearly understand the true relation of natural law to the works of nature. With this end in view, it is the purpose of this Article, bearing in mind Prof. Tyndall's assurance that "in the application of law in Nature the terms great and small are unknown," to review some of the more familiar principles of science in the light of some of the facts of our common experience—facts so common as not to be easily misunderstood. The question to be inquired into is as to the cause of things. Materialism affirms that it is to be found in matter and its laws; while we say that it is in mind, by the power of thought and will. What, then, is the testimony of Nature?

When a tea-kettle boils it is necessarily by the act of a being possessed of intelligence and will; for without the exercise of these, it could neither have been filled with water nor placed over the fire; neither could there have been a tea-kettle, nor the fire over which it is placed. Then it is a voluntary action. But when the steam from its spout rises into the air, it becomes a part of the clouds and augments by so much the fall of rain. Thus the will of man may be, at least in part, the cause of rain. But we have been told by men of science, nobody can say how often, that men may cause an entire fall of rain by the burning of a forest, or a city, or by the cannonading of a battle; and that they may even permanently affect the aver-

age annual fall of rain by clearing away forests, or draining swamps, or by bringing wild lands under cultivation. Man may thus cause the very phenomenon to which Prof. Tyndall's argument relates. Is it the voice of science then or of some other divinity with which he speaks when he denies to God a power in nature which it is impossible to deny to man?

But when the rain in question falls, the artificially evaporated water in part composing it, does not change its character as being a natural phenomenon, for it is as completely a work of natural law as if no human agency had found a place among the causes which produced it, and it had been evaporated entirely by the heat of the sun. For science teaches, to use the language of Prof. Tyndall, that "here, as elsewhere throughout Nature, if matter moves it is force that moves it." (p. 86.) And the Correlation and Conservation of Force is only an expression of the fact that every motion is exactly equal in quantity to the force which produced it. If, then, every motion of matter is the work of an exactly equivalent force, it is impossible to separate phenomena into different classes on account of any difference in their relations to natural law, and say that one is natural and the other artificial. For so far as natural law is concerned there is no such difference between them; and they are in every conceivable sense of the term absolutely alike. And if all our knowledge of phenomena consists, as our materialistic friends affirm that it does, of a knowledge of their relations to natural law, it becomes necessary for them to admit that *every motion of matter is a natural phenomenon*. Then the artificial evaporation of water is a work of nature, and there is no reason why we should say, on account of it, that the rain is not a completely natural phenomenon. But the evaporation of a part of the rain in the tea-kettle, which is thus seen to be a natural phenomenon, is nevertheless a voluntary action, and had its origin, not in matter, nor in any of its laws, but in mind. Thus artificial, and what we call natural causes, may be jointly concerned in the production of a phenomenon, without lessening the fact that it is purely a work of natural law; and the phenomenon itself may be wholly the work of mind and at the same time wholly the work of natural law. If then we find that the boiling of the tea-kettle is wholly the work of

natural law, it is because it was wholly dependent upon the forces of nature for its occurrence; and if it is, at the same time, wholly the work of mind, it is because the forces of nature, which can do any conceivable thing at the bidding of mind, can do nothing of themselves. What we call natural causes, then, have precisely as much to do with artificial as with natural phenomena, and there is no agency which could be attributed to them, which they do not as a fact exercise in the works of men. Yet they are not the cause of them, inasmuch as we know that so far as the forces are concerned, they do not act of themselves, but as the servants of mind. If then an absolute dependence upon natural law may co-exist in the same phenomenon, with an equal dependence upon voluntary agency, who shall say that the uniformity of law is opposed to volition? It being established that there is a spiritual agency in those human actions which involve changes in the condition of matter, it becomes necessary for the believers in materialism to *find somewhere among the laws of nature, something which will permit the admission of the fact, without at the same time compelling the admission of it with respect to every motion of matter*: for it is evident that materialism explains nothing with respect to which it does not enable us to dispense with spiritual agency. Let these men, then, who are acquainted with nature and can speak understandingly of her laws, instruct us in this matter by showing us what it is which natural laws do in the works of nature, which they do not do in the works of man; let them explain to us how we may rationally admit what we know of a spiritual agency in one, and deny it in the other. If the sphere of law may be completely filled without in the least abating the necessity for the interposition of mind, by what authority is it said, that Matter and Law, have devoured Spirit and Spontaneity?

But it is held to be on account of a certain necessity inhering in the operation of natural laws, that it is opposed to voluntary action. If the force be permanent the phenomena are necessary (p. 64), says Prof. Tyndall; and again he opposes the necessity of law to the spontaneity of mind (p. 92); and in still another passage: "And unless the existence of law in these matters be denied and the element of caprice introduced, we

must conclude that, given the relations of any molecule of the body to its environment, its position in the body might be determined mathematically." (p. 118.) The proposition in the latter form is much as if we should say, forgetting the office of the rudder and the minds of the pilot and the captain, that with a sufficient knowledge of the engine and the sea we could predict the destination of the ship. But in whatever form it is stated, it is clear that it is a necessary part of the system of materialism and equally clear that it is utterly untenable. In a passage already quoted (p. 39) it is held by authority of this conception of the reign of law in nature, that for God to send rain or fair weather by the exercise of his will, would involve the creation of force and would therefore be a miracle. The meaning of the proposition, when rendered into plain language, is neither more nor less than this: to do anything is to create the force involved in the act, and its correlate is that to make anything is to create the matter composing it. To make a house, then, is to create the wood and stone, no less than the force which brings them together. It would be a waste of time to refute so utterly groundless a proposition, except for the fact that the advocates of Materialism rely so implicitly upon its soundness.

According to the doctrine of the passage quoted, Mr. Spencer, assuming that all phenomena are the natural and necessary outcome of the "persistence of force," speaks of "matter and force" as manifestations to us of an unknowable cause, as if having done this he had made a place in his system for the belief that God is the author of the works of Nature. Yet by his own showing, the eternal existence of matter and force in the past is as legitimate a conclusion from his argument as their continued existence in the future, which he terms their persistence. (See *First Principles*, p. 182, § 56.) If, then, the phenomena of organic and superorganic existences necessarily result from the persistence of force, the belief in a first cause outside of matter and force, or beyond them, or in any way distinct from them, is only alternative to the belief that matter and force are self-existent from eternity, of which Mr. Spencer thinks that his argument proves the contrary to be inconceivable. But slender as the necessity is which arises from Mr.

Spencer's argument for supposing "the unknowable cause," how does it affect the case if we suppose it proven, according to the argument, as the cause only of the existence of matter and force? We still find that matter and force are independent, as they were in the other case, and, being in existence no matter how, have it in them to be the cause of whatever takes place in nature. Supposing matter and force to persist—to be indestructible—how is the case changed if we drop out the unknowable cause? All phenomena resulted necessarily from the persistence of these prime factors of the case before, why shall they not result from the same persistence now? Manifestly the supposition of the unknowable cause is already dropped out, so far as it implies the being of God, for it is folly to call that an acknowledgment of God which begins its argument with an attempt to demonstrate the utter uselessness of his existence. But having thus excluded God from his scheme of nature, except as to the original constitution of matter and force, he completes the circle of his argument by denying his personal existence. Having thus denied to God all present interest in the order of nature, it has been seen that as he might proceed to deny his existence in direct terms without changing the case in any way, so he has already, by a mere artifice of words, denied his existence while seeming to affirm it.

Again, it is evident that to be the cause of the existence of matter and force, is not the same thing as to be the cause of those forms of existence which are derived from them. The creation of man, for example, did not imply the creation of either matter or force, neither would his destruction imply their destruction. The acceptance of Mr. Spencer's proposition demands our acceptance, therefore, of two antecedent propositions; the one, that organic and superorganic existences could result from the exercise of powers conferred upon matter; the other, that such changes in nature as we know, or at least some of them, do as a fact so occur. That neither of these propositions can be established will more fully appear by the way.

But the force being permanent, Prof. Tyndall tells us, the phenomena are necessary, and the necessary action of natural law is opposed to the spontaneity of mind. What is meant by this is undoubtedly, that when rain falls it is as a necessary

effect of gravitation. But after a little while, the conditions being changed, the same law, by an equal necessity, causes it to rise again into the air. Is the force then not constant, or is Prof. Tyndall in error as to the alleged necessity? For we see that whatever the necessity may be, we may know the law, without being able to say on account of it whether at a particular time and place there will be rain or dry weather. Again, as a ball rises into the air as a necessary effect of the force impelling it, a necessary effect of gravitation is to retard its motion; but when the projecting force is exhausted, it is an equally necessary effect of gravitation to accelerate its progress towards the ground. Prof. Huxley scouts the idea of necessity, and says: "Fact I know and Law I know, but what is this Necessity save an empty shadow of my own mind's throwing?" (p. 89.) Yet, that the motions supposed are, under the circumstances prevailing at the time, necessary effects of the forces producing them, Prof. Huxley could not but admit. And that they, all of them, occur by transformations of force, Prof. Tyndall will not deny. Nevertheless they are caused not by any necessity inhering in the forces themselves, but by the conditions which determine what the forces shall do. A locomotive, too, moves as it does on account of necessities inhering in the very nature of things. But if the engineer chooses he may so change the positions of some of its parts relatively to each other, that it shall from an equal necessity move either faster or slower than it does, or in the opposite direction, or stop altogether. The necessity alleged is not in the laws of nature then, for they are seen to be utterly indifferent as to what they shall do or whether they shall do anything or not. It is in the conditions rather, by the establishment of which the particular actions which we attribute to laws are rendered necessary, and it is determined what they shall do. So while the laws of nature are constant and unvarying in their operation, the conditions which call them into play and control their activities are infinitely variable; and it becomes possible to do an infinite diversity of things, not by changing the laws, as Prof. Tyndall supposes, but by varying the conditions. When, therefore, we conclude that forces do not act of themselves, but only at the bidding of a superior power, we confirm the words of Mr. Spencer, when he

truly says, that the tendency of forces is to equilibrium. (*Spont. Generation and Hypoth. of Phys. Unis.*) Equilibrium is rest, and a tendency to rest cannot easily be construed into a power of motion. And when we say that the order of events is determined, not by the uniformity of law, but by some power having control of the conditions which render the forces of nature active, we only admit what we must do, if we interpret the law of correlation according to the facts of human experience.

Prof. Tyndall discloses another aspect of the materialistic conception of the prevalence of law in nature when, in bespeaking our toleration for the hypothesis of Evolution, he says: "For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena, were once latent in a fiery cloud. Surely the mere statement of such a notion is more than a refutation. But the hypothesis would probably go even further than this. Many who hold it would probably assent to the position, that at the present moment all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, Raphael—are potential in the fires of the sun." In the hypothesis of Evolution, then, to discover that a thing was once latent somewhere in nature, or that it was potential in something, is somehow the same as to have discovered the cause of its present existence. But a house is one of the things which may be made out of wood; it is therefore potential in wood. And it may also be made by the use of force; thus it is potential also in force. Nevertheless, a little philosophical reflection shows, that if it did not first become actual in thought, and not potential only, it might remain potential in matter and force alone through an endless succession of geological epochs, without suggesting even a potentiality of becoming an actual house. If it could be proven, then, that "mind, emotion, will, and all their phenomena, were once latent in a fiery cloud," we should still be as far as we were before from knowing how they came to be the facts which we know them to be. Latent then, why

are they not latent now? like the infinity of other things which being potential only are no less potential now, but are likely to remain forever latent. Substituting for the heat of the sun or our fiery cloud a heap of coal, in which a great number of industries lie latent in the form of potential heat, we might know the fact, without involving a knowledge of the actual cooking, or house warming, or spinning, or forging, or journeying by land or sea, in which it will sometime bear a part. And we know without even a conscious effort of thought that it could never bear a part in any of them in any other capacity than as a servant of mind. Essential, therefore, as the conception may be, as a part of the materialistic philosophy, we might admit its truth, without making any real progress towards the materialistic conclusion. The question would still remain as it was before, How came these things to be as they are? Is it the work of mind or matter? Evolution, as expounded by Mr. Spencer, answers that it is the work of matter and its forces. But that the potentialities of matter and force form a sufficient groundwork for the answer, is a proposition to the admission of which we shall never be able to see our way, until we find that all the good things have come to pass which might have been.

It will be observed that the argument of materialism at this point, as well as at every other, claims to be an outgrowth of the Correlation and Conservation of Force. Accordingly it assumes to account for mind and thought by the "combination and resolution of the ideas of matter and force." By a primary necessity of the case, therefore, it affirms a correlation of vital and mental with physical forces. Consequently, not only Prof. Tyndall, but Prof. Huxl y, and Mr. Spencer, are strenuous in denying that we can know any radical distinction between mind and matter. Says Prof. Tyndall, in relation to this point: "These Evolution notions are absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gibbet, in relation to the ideas concerning matter drilled into us while young. Spirit and matter have ever been presented to us in the rudest contrast, the one as all noble, the other as all vile. But is this correct?" (p. 160.) And again, speaking of the notion that life is the product of molecular action, he says: "If these statements startle, it is because

matter has been defined and maligned by philosophers and theologians who were equally unaware that it is at bottom essentially mystical and transcendental." Prof Huxley, too, conceiving it to be proven that all vital action may with propriety be said to be the result of molecular forces, says: "And if so it must be true, and in the same sense, and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." (p. 88.) A sufficient examination of the subject will show how inadequate a view of it these passages disclose. What then does correlation teach concerning it? This cardinal doctrine of materialism cannot be true unless all the actions of matter can be resolved into motions. According to it no motion arises except by the conversion of some other motion into it, and no motion disappears except by being transformed into some other motion. Accordingly both Mr. Spencer and Prof. Barker hold that correlation implies convertibility. (*First Prin.*, p. 217; *Cor. V. and Phys. Forces*, p. 7.) If then the actions of the mind are not convertible into material motions, the case breaks down. But the convertibility of correlation implies that the correlated motion is converted out of that which caused it, and again into some other motion of which it thus becomes the cause. Suppose then we affirm that the motion of a locomotive is the act of a man! The proposition is indubitable; but it is not implied that it is the act of his body, but of his mind. If now it can be shown that the mental action which causes the motion is transformed into it, and causes it by a transformation into it, then there is a correlation of mental with physical forces. But on no other terms is the idea admissible for a moment. Yet correlation teaches that the force concerned is not derived from mind, but from matter, by the combustion of fuel under the boiler. Then the actions of mind are not transformed into the actions of matter, and do not reappear in that which mind does, as correlation requires.

But if the actions of mind are not converted into physical motions, neither are the motions of matter converted into thought. Yet Mr. Spencer tells us: "That no idea or feeling arises save as a result of some physical force expended in producing:

it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science ; and whoever duly weighs the evidence will see that nothing but an overwhelming bias in favor of a preconceived theory can explain its non-acceptance." If we duly weigh the evidence then, we shall end by admitting the truth of Mr. Spencer's proposition. Let us see! He is here speaking of a correlation, and a consequent convertibility of vital and mental with physical forces; and his proposition is identical with saying, that when a book excites thought or feeling in the mind, it is by the expenditure of a physical force upon the mind. Thus by the terms of the law of correlation, it is by communicating some motion of its own to the mind of the reader; and as it cannot both communicate and retain it, its power to excite mental action must suffer a proportional diminution at each successive reading, and become exhausted at last like the motion of a top. Or if the motion is supposed to proceed from a force residing in the book, it must proceed from a centre through a distance, of which its intensity must be inversely as the square. This may not look exactly like the law by which a book acts upon the mind, but if there is a correlation of mental with physical forces, it does look like that, and we make bold to affirm that nothing less can satisfy the requirements of Mr. Spencer's proposition. If it is what Mr. Spencer means, then he believes in the alleged correlation; but otherwise, what does he mean? And the case is no better if we consider any other mode of exciting mental action. For the thing to be accounted for is not some vague and objectless vibration of the substance of the brain, like the producing of a heated state in a piece of metal, which might indeed be accounted for by a sufficient physical force. But when thoughts are addressed to the mind through the ear by spoken words, or through the eye by writing, while the eye or the ear is affected by those vibrations which we call light or sound, the mind is affected only by the meaning. And as the sensations of sight and sound are alike impassible to that which alone affects the mind, so the mind is not excited to think as it does by light or sound, but only by the meaning with which they are invested by mind itself.

Materialism cannot maintain an existence as a system of thought unless it can show an identity of mind with matter

through a correlation of thought with material motions. But the entire effort to establish such an identity is estopped at the outset by the discovery to which the law of correlation itself leads the way, that mind and matter have two distinct and inconvertible modes of action. It is an insoluble mystery then how the implied conversion can take place, for the completely satisfactory reason, that it is not in the nature of things that it could take place. When Prof. Huxley speaks of matter and law, therefore, as having devoured spirit and spontaneity, he might as well have said, on account of the impenetrability of matter, that our knowledge of matter tends to banish our belief in space.

If we class the motions of the locomotive among human actions, it is because we see in them a use of natural means for the accomplishment of human purposes, and we know that it is man who uses these forces of nature as the servants of his thought and will. The materialistic denial of miracles is in itself an admission, that this subjection of matter to the dominion of mind is in the order of nature. For if nothing takes place out of the established order, we may at least have the benefit of believing that what does take place is a part of that order. Nevertheless Prof. Tyndall thinks that science teaches a doctrine different from that of our proposition, and that we can accomplish our purposes only by changing the laws of nature. He says: "Granting the power of free will in man, and assuming the efficacy of free prayer to produce changes in external nature, it necessarily follows that natural laws are more or less at the mercy of man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the assumed permanency of those laws would be worthy of confidence." (p. 40.) But we have in the locomotive an example of the way in which the forces of nature are evoked from their latent form (the equilibrium of Mr. Spencer) and made to do the will of mind.

The physical energy which moves it is generated within itself, from the store of forces existing beforehand in external nature, and laid up in the wood or coal consumed under its boiler: and it is done in a manner precisely analogous to that in which the strength of our bodies is developed from the food we eat. When it moves itself and the train, therefore, the

motion is fully accounted for, under the law of Conservation, modicum for modicum, by the heat of the fire.

So far the supremacy of physical law is complete and renders its testimony to the fact, that the motion of the locomotive is a work of Nature in as complete a sense as that of a comet. But if the force which moves it is derived from the fire, it is not at the same time derived from some other source. Yet we see that when it moves, its motion is like the boiling of the tea-kettle, the creature of thought, and that it starts or stops, goes fast or slow, forward or back, doing great feats of strength and swiftness, precisely as if it were a part of the physical organization of the thinking being whose acts its motions have become. We have in it an example then of the way in which the powers of nature are made obedient to mind and will, without being emancipated from the dominion of law.

A further examination will show, that the agency of mind in causing the motion is not of the nature of a physical action as defined by the law of Correlation. What mind does in the case is done by the use of physical force, from the mining of the coal to the turning on of the steam. Yet thought imparts nothing beyond the condition of activity to any of these forces, for each of them is tracable to some material source. But mind is nevertheless, by this fact alone, the author of all the actions which we attribute to them; and not one of these actions could occur without this intervention of an intelligent cause. Yet neither the thought which causes them, nor the motions themselves, can be said to be connected by conservation with the motion of the train, for not one of them is to be found reproduced in it. They are all of them actions of which matter is incapable, and even the material motions concerned have no conceivable relation to the moving of a locomotive, except as that relation is established by mind, and exists, as it can only exist, in thought. It is not even a relation of matter to matter, and does not proceed from material laws, and it could not even have an existence apart from thought; for drop any material factor out of the case, and mind can replace it; but drop mind out, and the case itself disappears. And it matters not at what stage of it we dispense with mind, whether before the locomotive was invented, or as it stands upon the track with

steam up, and every capacity of a locomotive complete and perfect in it, the moment mind ceases to be a factor in it, its existence as a locomotive is as completely at an end as is that of a man who has become a corpse, and nothing would be added to the completeness of its destruction if it were reduced back into the original dust from which it was evolved by the power of thought. Mind is absolutely the cause of its existence; and it is no less absolutely the cause of every one of its motions; but it is not the cause of either the one or the other by virtue of any motion which is transferred from itself to matter, for it is clear that no such transfer takes place, inasmuch as all the motions concerned are known to proceed from some material source distinct from mind. What mind does in the case is to know the nature of matter and its forces, and by means of its knowledge of them, to devise and establish such relations between them, inventing the locomotive and constructing it, adapted in the formation and arrangement of its parts to be moved by steam, and afterwards bringing together the fuel and water, so as to render them the means of doing its will in moving the train. While, then, the physical entity, which we call a locomotive, would not be deprived of its existence as a physical entity by the fact of being separated from mind, that is, would not part with its physical existence, yet that very existence was derived from mind, and could not have been derived from any other source; and it could not have become the thing that it is, even through the agency of mind, except for the conscious power of mind to use such a thing as it is: and as it could not have come into existence, except as mind was both the author and the end of its being, so it cannot even be imagined to exist as a locomotive, that is, to have a power of moving from place to place, unless we can first suppose that there is a power in mind to move it. There must be a mind in it. Its physical powers are neither greater nor less from the fact that mind is in it or not; but when mind is in it, it has a power to move; but such a power is otherwise inconceivable.

It is seen then that the very process of thought by which the locomotive was brought out of nonentity into being, presupposes a power which could be superadded to those of matter—which not being of them was superior to them, and able to

make them the means of doing things of which they are of themselves incapable.

It has been observed that the motions of the locomotive are like those of a living being, inasmuch as they partake of the volitions of the engineer. It has been seen, too, that they are like them in the fact that when his mind is separated from the control of them they cease, and the locomotive becomes like an inanimate, lifeless body. That most wonderful of the works of man, the product of a thousand inventions, which was before instinct with life and motion in every part, with a power of self-continuance, is reduced in an instant to the helplessness of a rock. Mind, then, is a vital force in the locomotive, and by adding it or taking it away, we are enabled to determine the very point at which mind and matter come together in the production of vital phenomena. It may be as the scientists affirm, that not an action of the mind takes place without some accompanying physical affection of the vital apparatus, involving the expenditure of force. But as in the locomotive the pressure of steam in the boiler is only an instrument by the use of which the engineer moves the train, so the physical forces of the body are seen to be only the instruments by the use of which the mind causes the motions of the body. And there is the same reason to conclude that the heat in the boiler emanates from the mind of the engineer, from the fact that it is a manifestation to us of the action of his mind, as there is to infer from those flushes of heat in the body which accompany the actions of the mind, that animal heat is correlated with the vital force. But as the heat in the boiler might remain forever without diminution or abatement, without so much as raising a presumption of a power in it to move the locomotive, so it is seen that in whatever forms physical energy may accompany the actions of the mind, there does not arise even a presumption of a community of functions between mind and matter. If they were inseparable in experience they could not be confounded in the understanding; but the locomotive enables us to separate them, and so to study them apart, and afterwards to verify our conclusions by reuniting their functions in what is, for all the purposes of the argument, a single living being.

We find in vitality, then, no departure from that order of nature according to which mind is the real author of what matter seems to do ; but on the other hand, a striking example of it, as we do in the formation of rain.

If we may believe Prof. Tyndall, "the physical philosopher as such must be a pure materialist;" and Prof. Huxley tells us that: "If there is one thing clear about the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to reduce all scientific problems, except those which are purely mathematical, to questions of molecular physics—that is to say, to the attractions, repulsions, and coördination of the ultimate particles of matter." (p. 111.) But the boiling of the tea-kettle and the motion of the locomotive are clearly a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry. Suppose, then, we ask these masters in science to tell us how the philosophers can describe all that we know about the cause of them, by "the combination and resolution of the ideas of matter and force," or by what means we may compress all of it into a "problem of molecular physics." And this is no idle request, for we find that so far as we are at present instructed by science, we may exhaust every conceivable resource of molecular physics upon them, without reaching, or even approaching, the weightiest question of all concerning them. And Prof. Tyndall himself admits as much when in speaking of the ultimate cause of things, he says: "As far as I can see, there is no quality in the human intellect which is fit to be applied to the solution of the problem. It entirely transcends us." (p. 93.) Yet by some means or other we do know that these things have a cause which lies beyond those laws which materialism discourses to us about, and which, transcending matter and its laws, uses them to make these works of art, and afterwards to do its will with them. This is a piece of science, too, "which may be verified experimentally as often as we like to try." Can Materialism deny the fact ; or can it tell us how to treat it as a question of the "interplay of matter and force?"

It has been said that the motion of the locomotive is like every other motion of matter, a natural phenomenon. The authority for the statement is to be found in the law of correlation, which affirms that every motion of matter is the work of an exactly commensurate force, and that so far as a depend-

ence of phenomena upon the laws of nature for their occurrence is concerned, there is an absolute uniformity in every department of nature's work. The proposition is unassailable, unless it can be shown that natural phenomena are more completely the work of force or natural law than those which we call artificial. If materialists choose to deny it they are at liberty to do so, but they must at the same time deny the law of correlation—the only foundation stone upon which their philosophical habitation can be made to stand. But whatever materialism may say, in such phenomena as we clearly understand, as we do the motion of the locomotive, we know that there is an intelligent cause without whose intervention the forces concerned could not have had any connection with their occurrence. Extending this rudiment of science into the interpretation of the larger facts of nature, we infer such a cause when we cannot directly see it; and such a cause being a necessary factor in such phenomena as are completely within our knowledge, let him show who can how it can be otherwise than necessary in those more difficult problems of science which surpass our immediate knowledge.

But Mr. Spencer, in his hypothesis of Evolution, reasoning backward as it were, from the more occult to the more familiar facts of science, seeks to explain the origin of the works of nature, including man, by the self-instituted action of material forces, without the intervention of mind. "Some two years ago, I expressed to my friend Prof. Huxley my dissatisfaction with the current expression 'Conservation of Force;' assigning as reasons, first, that the word '*conservation*' implies a *conserving* and an act of *conserving*, and second, that it does not imply the existence of the force before the particular manifestation of it with which we commenced. In place of conservation Prof. Huxley suggested persistence. This entirely meets the first of the two objections," &c. (Note, *First Prin.*, p. 185.) His exposition of the theory recognizes the fact, that Evolution could not be complete as a scheme of nature without being able to assimilate mind with material things, but it cannot begin to be true unless it can first find a power in matter to move itself. Such a power Mr. Spencer accordingly assumes to find in those material forces which act under the law of the Correlation and Conservation of Force.

A system which thus begins at the top of its edifice to build downwards, reasoning from the unknown and the unknowable to that which is familiarly known, may be one of the phenomena of philosophy, but that it is utterly opposed to science is shown, among other proofs, by what is involved in the doctrine of inertia.

Some seeing the difficulty and interpreting the law of Correlation by the hypothesis of Evolution, have imagined a conflict between Correlation and Inertia ; and, seeking to untie the knot, have made haste to deny inertia in behalf of molecular motion. (*Nicholl's Dictionary of Physical Science*, Art. *Inertia*.) The doctrine of Inertia implies, say they, that the natural condition of matter is that of absolute rest, whereas no particle of matter was ever known or even supposed to be in such a state of rest. Inertia, therefore, cannot be true. Molecular Evolution, as has been said, cannot begin to be true unless there is a power in matter to move itself. That there neither is nor can be such a power in matter, has been already shown from one point of view, in the fact, that none of those phenomena of which we certainly know the cause could occur without the intervention of mind. That the same conclusion is rendered necessary by the impossibility of asserting a power in matter to move itself, will appear when it is seen what the doctrine of inertia really teaches.

Suppose a body of matter then, as a ball, subject to all the molecular and other motions incident to matter. Whether there is only one or any conceivable number of these, does not affect the fact either one way or the other, that another motion may be imparted to it, say by throwing. But before the act of throwing begins, the ball is, with respect to the motion about to be imparted to it, in a state of absolute rest, as much as if it neither had nor was capable of having any other motion but this one. Here, then, is the state of rest required by the idea of inertia, and the ball is necessarily inert with respect to a motion which does not yet exist. But when the motion begins the ball is inert from necessity with respect to it, inasmuch as it had no agency in producing it ; and while it continues it is inert with respect to it again from necessity, having no agency but a passive one in continuing it ; and when it comes to rest,

it is again inert from necessity with respect to a motion which no longer exists. Matter is necessarily inert, then, with respect to a motion which is imparted to it, for with respect to every such motion its natural condition is that of absolute rest; and it remains only to show that all motions are imparted to matter, to render it certain that it is inert with respect to them all and incapable of moving except as it is moved by some power extraneous to itself.

The contrary supposition implies, that matter may move itself. But if it moves itself, how can it be in any more intimate and perfect sense than that in which an animal body moves itself? Yet if it carries a load, it is with a part of the same strength with which it moves itself. Again, one part of the body moves another, and while it does so, is forced also to move itself, and whether it moves itself or an extraneous load, it is done with strength derived from extraneous sources, as food and air. Then it is done under the law of conservation by the use of forces which existed beforehand in external nature, and in a manner in no respect differing from that in which a steam engine moves itself. The motions of an animal body are then as much imparted to it as to the load which it carries. And, unless we resort, to the unscientific and irrational supposition of a power of spontaneous motion in matter which correlation denies to living beings, there is no escape from the conclusion that all motions are imparted to matter and that it is inert with respect to them all. For matter is necessarily inert with respect to motions imparted to it, and while nothing less than life can enable us to assert for it a power to move itself, we see that life itself has not even a tendency in the required direction, and may be either affirmed or denied with respect to matter—may be either present or absent in it without affecting the case either one way or the other.

Evolution could not begin its existence as a scheme of nature, without finding in matter a power to move itself, for the reason that its entire stock in trade consists of matter and force. This precludes it from attempting to explain anything except by "the combination and resolution of the ideas of matter and force." But as its fundamental postulate, the law of the Correlation and Conservation of Force, teaches,

by a necessity of its existence, that all the actions of matter are resolvable into motions, and that matter can do anything only by communicating some motion of its own to other matter, it follows, that if we attribute anything to matter as its cause, it must be upon the supposition that it first originated the motion which it imparts. But correlation also teaches that force is like matter, indestructible. Then whatever powers matter may have, are the same with which it was endowed at the beginning of its existence. Yet inertia shows that matter could not be the recipient of such a gift—that it could not be made to move itself. And correlation agrees with inertia in showing that no motion of matter has its origin in the body affected by it, but arises from the transformation of some other motion into it.

It is not a part of the system of Evolution to deny that there is a power somewhere in nature to originate phenomena. How could it be denied? But it cannot admit that it is to be found in mind, without rational suicide; it seeks therefore to confer it upon matter—failing to discover it in the only quarter where it was ever known to be, and vainly imagining that it sees it where it could not possibly go. But the attempt ends, as the expedients of desperation sometimes will, in the very suicide which it seeks to avoid. In order to account for a power of derivative motion in living beings, which is all that Correlation will any way allow, it invents an immeasurably higher power of spontaneous motion in matter. Endeavoring to get upon its feet, the utmost it can do is to stand upon its head. For that is surely the reverse of evolution which, assuming to account for the higher forms of existence by progressive development from those which are lower, is forced to assume, to begin with, as the basis of what it calls Evolution, a higher condition of existence in matter than that which it proposes to end with in organized beings. Neither is this our view alone: for both Mr. Spencer and Prof. Tyndall unconsciously recognize the justness of it, the former when he speaks of mind as compared with matter as the "so-called higher," and the latter when he deprecates the summary rejection of Evolution on the ground, not that it may rationally account for the origin of things from matter considered as the lowest form of existence, but rather

on the supposition that we may, if we will, regard its powers as equal to those of mind. He says, "These Evolution notions are absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gibbet, in relation to the ideas concerning matter which were drilled into us while young. Spirit and matter have ever been presented to us in the rudest contrast, the one as all noble, the other as all vile. But is this correct? Does it represent what our mightiest spiritual teacher would call the Eternal Fact of the Universe? Upon the answer to this question all depends. Supposing, instead of having the foregoing antithesis presented to our youthful minds, we had been taught to regard them as *equally worthy* and *equally wonderful*; to consider them, in fact, as two opposite faces of the self-same mystery. 'Supposing that in youth we had been impregnated with the notion of the poet Goethe, instead of the poet Young, looking at matter, not as 'brute matter' but as 'the living garment of God': do you not think that under these altered circumstances, the law of Relativity might have had an outcome different from its present one?" (p. 160.) And again, "If these statements startle, it is because matter has been defined and maligned by philosophers and theologians, who were equally unaware that it is at bottom essentially mystical and transcendental." (p. 415.) And "*without this total revolution of the notions now prevalent* (he tells us) *the Evolution hypothesis must stand condemned.*" And so it must, and there is not even a gleam of hope in the proposed alternative. If Evolution has nothing better to offer as an excuse for its existence than a hope of incorporating into the body of human knowledge an inversion of the nature of things, it may as well roll up its scroll and flit away into the region of the "Unknowable." Science cannot permit Evolution nor its parent Materialism to reverse that order of nature in which the common sense of mankind has always seen, and must always see whether it will or not, that there is behind every one of those phenomena which our common language attributes to material forces, an intelligent, thinking agency, of whose craft they are but the implements; for if in any case we fail to see such an agent, we know that it is what we fail to see and not what we see—our ignorance and not our knowledge of Nature—which makes it seem to be an exception to the rule.

Again, inertia is but the obverse side of correlation, and when we say that "matter moves only as it is moved," we state a truth which lies at the very centre of both doctrines. Yet Evolution cannot bring its great problem of the universe within the compass of its formula without eliminating one of its factors by denying inertia, while it is forbidden on pain of death to dispense with the troublesome element by the terms of the law of correlation upon which alone it can stand.

It has been premised, that that mode of causation implied in Molecular Evolution,—a causing of particular things to come to pass by means of conferring certain powers upon matter at its creation, is contrary to the nature of things and impossible. The proof has appeared in the argument in two ways. It has been shown that no such mode of causation is known to our experience, and that it has on that account no legitimate place in science; and again, from the considerations involved in the doctrine of inertia, which show that no such power could be conferred upon matter, but that, on the other hand, its absolute incapacity to do anything of itself is inseparable from the very idea of its existence. And the force of the first of these considerations is multiplied by infinity when we take into account the uniformity of Nature. If there are two modes of causation, there are two Natures; and uniformity is a myth. Evolution must of necessity then assert such a duality of nature, or, on the other hand, deny causation by mind, and along with it the validity of experience.

In further illustration of the errors of materialism concerning the idea of Causation, we quote again from Prof. Huxley. He says: "Let us suppose that knowledge is absolute and not relative, and therefore, that our conception of matter represents that which it really is. Let us suppose further, that we do know more of cause and effect than a certain definite order and succession among facts, and that we have a knowledge of the necessity of that succession,—and hence of necessary laws,—and I for my part do not see what escape there is from utter materialism and necessarianism. For it is obvious that our knowledge of what we call the material world is to begin with, at least, as certain and definite as that of the spiritual world, and that our acquaintance with law is of as old a date as our

knowledge of spontaneity. Further, I take it to be demonstrable, that it is utterly impossible to prove that anything whatever may not be the effect of a material and necessary cause, and that human logic is equally incompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous. A really spontaneous act is one which by the assumption has no cause; and the attempt to prove such a negative as this is on the face of the matter absurd. And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to demonstrate that any given phenomenon is not the effect of a material cause, anyone who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment, from all regions of human thought, of what we call spirit and spontaneity." (p. 86.)

Suppose then we say that the boiling of a tea-kettle is the work of mind, it is the same as to say that it is caused by mind; and our knowledge of the fact asserted is not relative but absolute, and we do know more about the cause of it than a definite order of succession; for although mind might have failed in the effort to cause it, and it was not therefore a necessary effect of the action of mind, we know that it was by a necessity inseparable from the nature of things—that when it occurred it was as a result of mental action; but having duly weighed the whole matter in the light of all that materialistic science has to say in the premises, we find nothing in it which hints at either materialism or necessarianism. For it is obvious that our knowledge of what we call the material world is to be interpreted by what we know of the spiritual world, and that being so interpreted, it renders our acquaintance with law of no effect, as against our knowledge of spontaneity. Further, it being demonstrable that the boiling of the tea-kettle is the effect of a material and necessary cause, it is nevertheless within the power of human logic to show, that it is at the same time a truly spontaneous action. For such an act is not one which by the assumption has no cause, and the attempt to fasten upon us such a contradiction is on the face of the matter absurd. And while it is thus impossible that anything should become an act, or what is the same thing, perhaps a fact

without a cause—a doer, it is idle to say that anything but the folly of men has had a tendency to banish from any region of human thought what we call spirit and spontaneity. And further, it is evident that the difficulty which Prof. Huxley finds in this matter of causation lies in the vain endeavor to interpret it as if it were a function of matter, whereas experience, and therefore science, shows that it is in its ultimate nature exclusively a function of mind. And strange to say, Prof. Huxley himself points the way to this very conclusion, when in speaking of the growth of knowledge in a child, he says “And having thus good evidence for believing that many of the most interesting occurrences about it are explicable on the hypothesis that they are the work of intelligences like itself—having discovered a *vera causa* for many phenomena, why should the child limit the application of so fruitful an hypothesis?” (p. 106.) And why, we ask, should the philosopher limit it? And we do not charge Prof. Huxley with any inconsistency of which he is not himself aware, for he frankly tells us that his materialistic reasoning is at war with his anti-materialistic convictions when he says, “Nevertheless two things are certain: the one, that I hold the statements to be substantially true; the other, that I individually am no materialist, but, on the contrary, believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error.” (p. 84.) And he emphasizes the conclusion, when he says, “the errors of systematic materialism may paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of a life.” Nothing need be added to the force of such a condemnation. But when we are told, nevertheless, that views which involve such deplorable consequences are “not only consistent with, but necessitated by sound logic,”—that there is thus a necessity to teach “grave philosophical error” as a means of advancing the truth, it must be that Prof. Huxley means it only as one of those purely subjective truths which have no existence, except relatively to the mind, and which is not much of a truth after all unless we believe it.

When we survey the works of nature we may find abundant ignorance of spiritual agency; but where is the knowledge of its absence? In which part of the rain is it that we discern the agency of man? Yet we know it is there. And there is

none of the agency of his body in it, for all the force concerned is accounted for from other sources. Why then should we expect, by the examination of other phenomena, to know that there is a spiritual agency in them? We know the fact, but we did not gain our knowledge of it by the study of "Molecular Physics," nor by the "combination and resolution of the ideas of matter and force," but from the knowledge of such an agency in ourselves. Without the knowledge thus acquired, we should be compelled to say as Prof. Tyndall does, that there is not a power in the human intellect fit to be applied to the solution of the problem (p. 98); yet we have solved it. But He who has hid this mystery "from the wise and prudent," who boast their knowledge of nature and her laws (pp. 121 and 162), has "revealed it unto babes;" as Prof. Huxley admits, and it is only by becoming a philosopher that any one can help understanding it.

When the materialists discovered the Correlation of Force, that wonderful law which at a stroke projects the idea of force into every fact of external nature, they seemed to themselves to have gained an invincible ally in the contest of matter and law against spirit and spontaneity; and so they never cease proclaiming the reign of Law in the name of Matter and Causation, and the consequent banishment of their ancient enemy from the domain of thought. But they proclaim their victory too soon. Vainly imagining that they have inclosed science with a wall high enough to shut out mind, they have only succeeded in erecting an impassable barrier of distinction between mind and matter; and that which was to have been to them a sign of speedy triumph, turns out to be the instrument of their sure destruction. Correlation teaches that mind does not exert itself as a physical force, inasmuch as all force known to us existed in some form beforehand in matter, and that whatever mind does must therefore be done by the use of preëxisting force; while, on the other hand, it shows that matter cannot think, inasmuch as all its activities are fully accounted for as motions. Correlation, then, upon which materialism professes to be founded, is the very law by authority of which it is forbidden to exist. For we find that while it shows the universal prevalence of law in nature, and that force is the price inexor-

ably exacted for every motion, it also shows the nature of its agency in phenomena, and that having exhausted all its capacities in accounting for them, we have only arrived at the discovery that no action can take place in nature, so far as we know, until it is caused by mind. After admitting all that *science* has to say about the necessity of law, we find that there lies behind that a necessity of thought, which transcends matter and its laws, and that if force is necessary as a condition of motion it is only necessary as an implement of the great master-workman mind. And, however far we may extend our conception of the province of matter, and the necessary action of its laws, we may still see beyond it and including it a precedent necessity of spiritual agency.

We conclude, then, that so much of the New Philosophy as would find the constitution of nature in matter and its laws, and is thus defined as the natural outcome of materialistic thought, is not as it claims to be, a result of the law of Correlation, and the consequent uniformity of nature, inasmuch as it is compelled, contrary to the law of Correlation, to affirm that thought which is inconvertible into material motion, is nevertheless a function of matter, and contrary to the uniformity of nature, that in addition to the causative agency of mind there is another and distinct mode of causation by natural law. (See Huxley as above, p. 187.)

It is not then from any hostility to the truths of science, nor from any want of appreciation of the dignity and importance of its pursuits, neither is it from any misconception of the nature and dignity of matter, that we distrust the teachings of those to whom science reveals the world only through the interplay of matter and force; neither is it, as Prof. Tyndall supposes, because we are ignorant of natural law; but rather for the reason that when we consider the nature of matter and its laws as science reveals them to us, we find that matter is distinct from mind, and that its motions are not converted into thought; and that the essence of things is not in the matter composing them, and that the secret of phenomena is not in the force involved in them; that the real explanation of them all is in a kind of action which cannot be weighed in material balances, nor measured by material standards and

does not proceed from a material agent, and cannot be resolved into material motions; and because we find that the true meaning of the things which science busies itself in examining, whether we call them works of nature or of art, lies not in the things themselves, but in their relations to that thinking agency which formed them and is the author of what they seem to do. Let him who doubts the proposition explain to himself, the meaning of the locomotive and its motions without referring them to the mind of man; and when he can bring us a rational explanation of them in terms drawn from the vocabulary of matter and force alone, let him afterwards tell us, if he will, about the material origin of thought. Meantime, finding in the known agency of mind in nature a clearly defined mode of causation by the action of mind using matter and its forces for the accomplishment of its purposes, and remembering that science teaches the uniformity of nature, we shall feel bound by the teachings of science itself to adhere to that oldest and most deeply rooted of scientific beliefs, that Mind and not Matter is the great fact and the moving power in nature; and that God is the author of the works of nature, not by the exertion of blind force, but by the power of thought, according to the counsels of his will.

ARTICLE V.—OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY CHARLES E. GRINNELL.

BEFORE proceeding with what I have to say upon self-consciousness, I wish to come to an understanding with the reader about the way in which I approach the subject. My motive is not controversial. It is not my object to defend or to attack any school or any opinion. I wish to form an opinion of my own, and whatever, in the course of my remarks, may agree or disagree with one or another side is, in either of those aspects, merely incidental to my purpose to come to a sound conclusion concerning what is true. Consequently, for the examination of self-consciousness I lay down no rules, metaphysical or logical, and I reserve no doctrines of science or theology. To begin with a system would not be to seek, or to appreciate when given, the primitive facts, whatever they may be, upon which any systematic view that I shall acquire must depend. To be sure, as Schleiermacher* said in criticizing Des Cartes, one needs to stand in the historic line and to use the results of the progress of others; and I am not so absurd as to ignore such necessary relations and such evident advantages. But the most unpretending thinkers, nevertheless, themselves constitute their particular part of the historic line, and the worth to them and their successors of the methods and convictions of others must be largely determined by their own original thought. I should despair of getting clean facts if I borrowed the fashion of any other man's thinking. The difficulties of such a beginning I feel, but they are real and must be met. Even moral considerations must be put aside, and the search for what is or is not to be discovered to be true must be undertaken at the risk of every interest, external and internal, of the individual who makes it. Whatever may be the inherited or acquired tendency of his mind, and the intellectual and social atmosphere about him, he must ignore all the probable and possible

* *Geschichte der Philosophie.*

results of what his conclusions may be, and seek what facts he can find simply to know them as truths. Until his conclusions are reached he should be indifferent to what they may be, and not until he has definitely settled upon his convictions in philosophy should he distract his attention and disturb his judgment by discussing their consequences in society. They who will not pursue this course are not of the refined temper which psychology requires, a philosophical spirit analogous to the childlikeness recognized as essential to entrance into another sphere. And it may be added, to prevent a misunderstanding on the score of morals, such as are fit to pursue the course described will do it, as their predecessors have done their thinking, with due regard meanwhile to whatever state of affairs may surround them. Or, to use a vulgar maxim with an esoteric interpretation, they will think twice before they act, thinking first as philosophers, what may be, or is, true; thinking next as men who, even during their doubts, are something more than philosophers, what is expedient for the healthy life of themselves and the community, without a regard for which sound philosophy would be rendered impossible and even the most popular superficially moral and pretentiously religious efforts for universal improvement would be vain. The relevancy of these preliminary remarks to what follows will be evident to such as try to live the life in which speculative opinions become of importance. But if to any it seem superfluous for one who is about to express a prevailing opinion to begin with a declaration of mental freedom, they need to be reminded that, in order to be thoroughly understood, every one must state his point of view; and that without such genuine declarations on the part of those who freely reach generally received opinions, they would not necessarily be understood to belong to the fellowship of all honest thinkers of whatever conclusions, the truthful influence of which fellowship is so much needed amid the strife of partisans; and some readers might fall into the error of supposing freedom to be in the sole possession of one or another party.

The question—Are actual phenomena known to have essential being? or, Is Being known?—which both Spencer and Hamilton would have us believe to have been finally answered

by Kant in the negative, is, nevertheless, still asked as naturally as before by many a philosopher, and answered as naturally in the affirmative. "Being is not known; only phenomena are known," say the school of Kant and the empiricists with Comte. Being is known with its phenomena, say we. This general statement, however, is not intended as an introduction to a philosophy of the Absolute; on the contrary, it is to be defined according to my most concrete experience.

What I mean can only be explained by beginning with what must be the commencement of all sound philosophy—psychology—and within psychology by beginning with self-consciousness; for the claim that one knows anything needs the warrant of a knowledge of him who knows. Consciousness proper I define to be simply the knowledge of self in its various states. I am conscious of the Ego; I am not conscious of the non-Ego. My knowledge of the phenomena of the non-Ego comes through perception, not through what I have defined as consciousness; and any conception of an absolute Ego it is not within my present purpose to consider. Consciousness, then, in my use of the term, means only self-consciousness. And in asserting that I am conscious of myself, I mean that I have an intuition of my own being, an immediate, original knowledge of the entity which, phenomena and essence, I find to be myself. By the words *my own Being* I intend to signify that which I unconditionally and invariably find, whenever I am conscious, to be permanently adequate to the production of all the phenomena of my actual experience, under whatever conditions those phenomena may be produced. When using the term *Being* in such a general statement as *Being is known*, I intend to include under the one word both the self of which I am immediately conscious, and whatever besides myself there may be which I infer from my intuition of my own being and from my perception of phenomena not of my own being to be permanently adequate to the production of those phenomena. My knowledge of my own being I am obliged, for want of a better word, to call *absolute*, with the hope that this will be understood if I explain that it neither implies with Fichte, a knowledge of an absolute Ego, nor is intended to assert that I know all that

is ever to be known about myself, but means that so far as I am a self, and know it, there is a perfect knowledge of that fact without condition, limitation, relation, or dependence. This intuitive knowledge of self as a being is without condition, for, although it is preceded in time by the growth of the body, when at last self-consciousness comes it is unchangeable; it is without limitation, for the simple idea of self is evidently exhaustive; it is without relation, for, according to the above definition, I am not conscious of self as distinguished from the not-self, but, on the contrary, I am conscious of self positively, without regard to the not-self. This will be explained more fully in the sequel with reference to the doctrine of Hamilton. Finally, the intuitive knowledge of self is without dependence, for, whatever view of causation may be involved in my doctrine of self-consciousness, all that we have to consider at present is the conscious fact that, so soon as I know myself to be, I know this knowledge to be of my own original motion. I myself, being a concrete Ego, cause my own knowledge of the fact, and this intuitive knowledge of my being is the evidence that I am, in this respect, an independent cause upon whatever cause or causes my being depends. The knowledge of self, then, in which I have defined consciousness to consist, may itself be defined as an absolute relation between essence and actuality, or between being and the action of being, by which absolute relation between the concrete thing, self, and its concrete experience, consciousness, the noumenon is immediately evident in, and evidently identical with, even if not exhausted by, its phenomena.

In this connection I may quote the "rule of true psychological analysis" laid down by Cousin, according to which I have acted, while dissenting from the author's conclusions. "Before passing," he says, "to the question of the origin of an idea, a notion, a belief, any principle whatever, the actual characters of this idea, this notion, this belief, this principle, must have been a long time studied and well-established, with the firm resolution of not altering them under any pretext whatever in wishing to explain them."* To this may be added a precau-

* *Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.* Translated by O. W. Wight. N. Y., 1861. Note, p. 53.

tion which I think might well be heeded by thinkers of all schools, even of those who are averse to ontology and most impatient of some of the doctrines of metaphysicians, namely: that each person should speak for himself alone when giving the testimony of self-consciousness, and avoid the besetting philosophical sin of mistaking one's own consciousness for that of all mankind. Accordingly, in my interpretation of my own consciousness I shall not pretend to speak for others, nor do I deny that I may be mistaken, for it would be absurd to claim infallibility in an investigation into that very claim among other claims. But in order to give these admissions any value in the discussion, it is requisite that I insist—and here I differ from all sceptics—I insist upon the present testimony of my consciousness as evidence upon which I can rely as not only actually veracious as most phenomenologists would grant, but absolutely true in the sense above set forth.

To begin then, we must begin with the beginner. I think with Des Cartes that I am. I try with him to doubt the truth of this thought, but finding it necessary to think that I am, howsoever I may explain the fact or whether I can explain it or not, I return with Des Cartes to the belief that I am. But I do not accept his formula *cogito ergo sum*, for although the context of his writings where that formula is used shows that Des Cartes* probably intended no argument by the *ergo*, and simply meant to express, without giving a reason, the inevitable fact—I who think am, or I who experience the phenomena of consciousness, know in that experience, or in those phenomena, or in that actual consciousness that I have essential being, yet the *ergo* is misleading. I give no reason for my being, I simply find that I am; and this knowledge is my ultimate thought, my first principle. I do not believe that I am because I think, although the believing which I do is a thinking of mine, nor am I guilty of the absurdity of saying that I think that I am because I think I am. It is true that my self-consciousness which I express by the words *I am* is a thought, but this thought is not a reason for the fact of which it is the consciousness; it simply expresses that fact, or is the actual form

* *Principiorum Philosophiæ Pars Prima*, VII, et seq.; *Dissertatio de Methodo*, IV.

of its essential being thus acting in intuition. I am looking for ultimate facts, and if I found a reason for what I had supposed to be an ultimate fact I should take that reason as a fact beyond what I had imagined to be the limits of my thinking, and no longer regard its consequent as ultimate. In that case I should agree with Kant that "I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being I am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought."* But I explain the action of my mind by the fundamental fact of its being, the knowledge of which truth I find to be essential to all such action. And with reference to the Kantian view I will quote a very sensible observation of Ueberweg's: "The distinction of truth in the 'empirical' and in the 'transcendental' sense, which is valid of sense-perception, can only be applied by a false analogy to internal perception. There is meaning not only in seeking to know what are the external, but also what are the internal conditions of the origin of a mental act; but when the mental image as such is the object of my apprehension, there is no meaning in seeking to distinguish its existence in my consciousness (in me) from its existence out of my consciousness (in itself); for the object apprehended is, in this case, one which does not even exist, as the objects of external perception do, in itself outside my consciousness. It exists only within me.† Reverse the Cartesian formula, omit its argumentative form, and add to it thus: *Sum, cogitans, sentiens, volens*. This expresses the fact upon which I insist as present in my consciousness now and so far back as I can remember. I cannot get behind myself. As I examine all my various states of mind, I go along from one to the other, and in one as in the other, until now at the end of the series the Ego faces the Ego; I know me, or I am simply conscious of myself. Like the string of a necklace which has no ends, a circle of thread joined everywhere together, but on which one can begin at any bead to count the whole number and can go round until he comes to the point on the string just opposite

* *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Meiklejohn, Bohn's Lib., 1871, p. 96; *Kant's Sämmtliche Werke*, herausgeg. von G. Hartenstein, 1867, Dritter Bd. s. 130.

† *System of Logic*, translated by Lindsay, London, 1871, p. 86.

the point from which he started, but which is not to be distinguished from that point, so in a full and perfect sense I, who begin with self-consciousness and go through the many thoughts which I think, in my search for the end of my thoughts return to the beginning, where I thought and think simply of myself, not because I think, but because I am who think, and thinking know I am.

This familiar discovery shows that it is not necessary to make the logical preparation of the rules of necessity, universality, persistence, and inconceivability of the opposite or any such generalizations, to come to the knowledge that I am, or exist. To begin with such rules is to begin with a theory of some sort formed on no matter what induction, even though it may have been formed by another who began with this very same psychological self-examination with which we have begun. If the logical rules of other thinkers are to be concluded from our thoughts, then we shall get them when they belong to us as results of our progress, made of course by the assistance of the masters, but until then we have nothing to draw from them for our own convictions. If I find any fact to be necessary, I shall learn from that the idea of necessity; if I find any fact persistent, I shall learn from that the idea of persistence; if I find any fact whose opposite I am unable to conceive, I shall learn from that the idea of the test of the inconceivability of the opposite; and if I shall come to such a generalization as the assertion of any fact's universality, I shall have enough to do to take care of that claim without undertaking to borrow such a burden. Indeed I do find in the ultimate character of my self-consciousness most of these features. My intuition of my being is necessary; I can not avoid it: it is persistent; I am never conscious without it: and whatever I think, I think explicitly or implicitly that I am; its opposite is inconceivable to me, whatever others may be able to conceive about me. I can not conceive of myself as not being what I am, or in other words, I am unable to think of my real self as nothing. To think I was not, would be to know that I was while thinking that I was not. Logic is required for systems of thought, but not to find the facts which the systems try to explain, and from whose essential nature in its actual manifestation logic is learned.

Opposed to the absolute knowledge of self just set forth is the doctrine of the relativity of all our knowledge, well known as advocated by Sir William Hamilton. "All our knowledge is only relative," . . . he says, ". . . Because existence is not cognizable absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes," etc. Again, "in so far as mind is the common name for the states of knowing, feeling, desiring, etc., of which I am conscious, it is only the name for a certain series of connected phenomena or qualities, and consequently expresses only what is known. But in so far as it denotes that subject or substance in which the phenomena of knowing, willing, etc., inhere—something behind or under these phenomena—it expresses what, in itself, or in its absolute existence, is unknown." * But what Hamilton calls the mind "in itself" is not merely unknown; it is an unnecessary creature of the imagination. By the phenomena of consciousness I know my mind as itself; I do not know all about it, but in so far as it is, or has being, and that being acts in the revelation of itself in self-consciousness, my knowledge of self is real and absolute. This intuition could be called relative only in the sense that, in comparison with absolute ignorance, the idea of which is relative to absolute knowledge, it is the latter. And here I quote with pleasure the words of Dr. McCosh, who expresses with simplicity and clearness the belief which I maintain. "The connection between thought and existence," he says, "is involved in our knowledge of self as existing, rather than that the knowledge of self issues from the perception of the connection between thought and personal existence. . . . We gaze at once on the mind thinking, imagining, feeling, resolving. . . . But let it be carefully observed that this knowledge is not of an abstract being, or substance, or of an Ego, or of an essence, but of the concrete self in the particular state in which it may be, with the particular thoughts, sensations, or purposes which it may be entertaining at the time. . . . The existence of self is a position to be assumed, and not to be proven. It does not need proof, and no proof should be offered; no mediate evidence could possibly be clearer than the truth which it is brought to support." †

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Edinburgh and London, 1859, vol. i, pp. 148, 138.

† *The Intuitions of the Mind*, N. Y., 1869, pp. 131, 134, 128, 130.

A brief comparison of Hamilton's doctrine of perception with that which I have already suggested will serve to bring out still more clearly my view of consciousness. "How is it possible," writes Hamilton, "that we can be conscious of an operation of perception unless consciousness be coextensive with that act; and how can it be coextensive with that act and not also conversant with its object?"* I do not know how it is possible; I am simply looking for the facts, which do not support Hamilton's definition of consciousness as coextensive with our knowledge. The facts are these: In consciousness, as I have defined it, I know that I am, and what I am; in perception I know what is not I, in so far as its phenomena are perceived by me, but I do not know what it is as I know what I am. I am conscious of my own being, but I am not conscious of other being; I perceive its phenomena and infer it to be. If, for instance, I perceive a book, I know that perception, not, as Hamilton asserts, through knowing the book, for my knowing the book is that perception, and while my perception is in consciousness, the book is not in consciousness. I am conscious, not of the book, but of perceiving the book. I would apply Hamilton's law of Parsimony to his own doctrine. This law is "That no fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and simple." As an instance of an ultimate and simple fact he gives "the distinction of the Ego and the non-Ego." But the ultimate and simple fact of consciousness, as I define it, is the Ego knowing itself. My intuition of my own being is not a distinction between what I am and what I am not; it has no negative character; it is a simple, positive assertion—I am. My perception of the phenomena of material being is not the perception of a distinction between what is myself and not myself, but simply a positive knowledge of what is perceived as such. After I have experienced both the perception of the not-self and the consciousness of self, I compare these two acts of knowledge and make the distinction with which Hamilton starts. This view is similar to Reid's doctrine, to which Hamilton answers that "the knowledge of opposites is one." But they are not known to be opposites until each is known as itself. The precise moments of such knowledge and comparison I cannot fix. I doubt if the

* *Lectures*, vol. i, p. 228.

infant, when it first perceives the light, is conscious of itself as itself. When a person first becomes clearly conscious of self he has then already experienced the phenomena of the not-self, but his self-consciousness, while following the previous experience, is not what it finally becomes in virtue of a negative distinction, but in consequence of the positive self-assurance of self to self that self exists. I admit that negative distinctions serve to clarify self-consciousness, but that is not equivalent to furnishing it.

Among the difficulties raised upon the distinction between the Ego and the non-Ego as the foundation of consciousness are the following remarks of Mr. Herbert Spencer :

"The conception of a state of consciousness implies the conception of an existence which has the state. When, on decomposing certain of our feelings, we find them formed of minute shocks, succeeding one another with different rapidities and in different combinations; and when we conclude that all our feelings are probably formed of such units of consciousness variously combined, we are still obliged to conceive this unit of consciousness as a change wrought by some force in something. No effort of imagination enables us to think of a shock, however minute, except as undergone by an entity. We are compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of mind that is affected before we can think of its affections. But we can form no notion of a substance of mind absolutely divested of attributes connoted by the word substance; and all such attributes are abstracted from our experiences of material phenomena. Expel from the conception of mind every one of those attributes by which we distinguish an external something from an external nothing, and the conception of mind becomes nothing. If to escape this difficulty we repudiate the expression 'state of consciousness,' and call each indecomposable feeling 'a consciousness,' we merely get out of one difficulty into another. A consciousness, if not the state of a thing, is itself a thing. And as many different consciousnesses as there are, so many different things there are. How shall we think of these so many independent things, having their differential characters, when we have excluded all conceptions derived from external phenomena? We can think of entities that differ from one

another and from non-entity, only by bringing into our thoughts the remembrance of entities which we distinguished as objective and material. Again, how are we to conceive these consciousnesses as either being changed one into another, or as being replaced one by another? We cannot do this without conceiving of cause, and we know nothing of cause save as manifested in existences we class as material—either our own bodies or surrounding things.

See then our predicament. We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y , then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so we might continue forever without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Reality, in which subject and object are united.”*

Mr. Spencer here offers us this alternative: “A consciousness, if not the state of a thing, is itself a thing.” But we are not confined to this alternative; we may hold as before that a consciousness is a thing in a state. And when Mr. Spencer asks how we shall think of these things, I reply as I replied to Hamilton, from whom Mr. Spencer derives so many of his metaphysical difficulties, I do not know how I think of them; but I know that I do think of them, that I know myself in my various states of mind. Mr. Spencer’s test of truth is: *first*, the conceivability of a proposition; *second*, its indissolubility; *third*, the inconceivability of the opposite, which is the negative form of the indissolubility. Now when I know I am, I do not think of mind in terms of matter, for as I have already shown, I got my idea of the being of matter from my immediate knowledge of the being of mind. I can conceive then of myself as an entity. In the second place, it has already been shown that this knowledge is persistent and indissoluble. In the third place, it has been shown that it is inconceivable to me

* *The Principles of Psychology*, N. Y., 1872, vol. i, pp. 626-7.

that I do not exist. According to Mr. Spencer's test of truth, then, my knowledge that I am a thing in one or another state, a thinking, feeling, willing person, is correct. And instead of there being in consciousness what Spencer claims with Hamilton that there is, the antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while consciousness lasts, and rendering impossible all knowledge of the ultimate reality in which subject and object are united; there is in consciousness simply the one fact with which we started, the self—or *ego*—alone, in which, by which, from which, and through which I know the reality of my being, and having learned the fact of being there, am able to infer it as elsewhere, on grounds which Mr. Spencer lacks to be sure that it is anywhere. Indeed, when Mr. Spencer speaks of an "ultimate reality" he explicitly announces a fact which he implicitly assumes as known throughout his reasoning. His belief in an "unknown reality," like Hamilton's "faith," really means that he knows phenomena to be apparent being, and, as the Rev. James Martineau* has ably shown, Mr. Spencer's doctrine that all our knowledge is relative implies a knowledge of the correlative absolute to the extent of its relation to our knowledge.

Opposed to Mr. Spencer's doctrine that "we can think of mind only in terms of matter," is John Stuart Mill's assertion that "memory and expectation have no equivalent in matter." (*An Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th edition, London, 1872, p. 280.) And it is in the facts of memory and expectation that Mill finds "the intrinsic difficulties which no one has been able to remove" from the psychological theory by which Mill reduced matter to "a permanent possibility of sensation," and attempted to resolve mind into "a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feeling." Although, in the last edition of the work referred to, Mill with his usual candor confessed his failure,—“I do not profess to have adequately accounted for the belief in mind” (p. 251); his attempt serves to bring out more vividly the truth for which we are seeking. “If,” he says, . . . “we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement

* *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*, Boston, 1866, pp. 186-7.

by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or *ego*, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." (p. 248.)

This peculiar difficulty, however, is constructed by Mill himself when he makes the above alternative. The mind of which I am conscious is neither a series nor something different from a series. I am not a series of feelings, or possibilities of them, nor am I who feel one feeling after another, different from the feelings which inhere in me. If I were not conscious of myself I should not feel, and if I did not feel I should not be conscious of myself, and yet it would be an incomplete description of consciousness to merge the *ego* in the feelings as "a series," though a series "aware of itself," whatever that might mean, or the feelings in the *ego* as "something different from any series." "The truth is," continues Mill, "that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts; and, in general, one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another, because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one and is so incongruous with the other, that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth." (p. 248.)

Although the opinion which I maintain is thus accommodated by the whole of human language, I prefer to use Mr. Mill's words, so far as they go, in the expression of my consciousness of self, since the point at which he stops will be a new indication of what I hold beyond. "Whatever be the nature of the real existence we are compelled to acknowledge in Mind, the mind is only known to itself phenomenally, as the series of its feelings or consciousnesses. We are forced to apprehend every part of the series as linked with the other parts by something in common, which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the

first and in the fiftieth, this common element is a permanent element. But beyond this we can affirm nothing of it except the states of consciousness themselves. The feelings or consciousnesses which belong or have belonged to it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be attested of self—the only positive attributes, except permanence, which we can ascribe to it" (p. 263). But we can and do ascribe to self the being which is necessary to our belief in its permanence; we can and do affirm of self its essential being, without which we should lack "the belief of reality," which leads Mill to declare that "this permanent element" "must be the same in the first and in the fiftieth" of its feelings. "The real stumbling block," Mill says, "is perhaps not in any theory of the fact, but in the fact itself." But it is his theory of phenomenology and the relativity of all human knowledge which inclines Mill to find in the absolute knowledge of the essential being of self which we have by nature, "a stumbling block," instead of a foundation for philosophy. I think with Mill that "by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory how it takes place" (p. 248); but it is not to assume a theory, if we accept self not merely, with Mill, as "the inexplicable tie or law" among the phenomena of mind, but also as it naturally asserts itself, as a being causing and knowing phenomena, and regarding itself not as "a stumbling block" among phenomena but as a reason for them.

The way of the Berkeleian is usually hard, but it is exceptionally so for one who like Mill does not hold to Berkeley's strong point, but doubts the doctrine of his master, that "besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind*, *spirit*, *soul*, or *myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, *wherein they exist*, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived."*

The phenomenon of self-consciousness, which Sir W. Hamilton explained by a nescient faith, which Mr. Spencer explains by a faithful nescience, and which J. S. Mill found inexplicable on account of "the fact which alone necessitates the belief in an ego . . . the fact of memory," for expectation he held to be "both psychologically and logically a consequence of memory" (pp. 261-2), is treated in a very different way by philosophers who will have nothing to do with ontology, and confine themselves to a positivist theory. Mr. Chauncey Wright, in a very interesting essay ("Evolution of Self-Consciousness," *North American Review*, April, 1873), has presented a theory of the animal origin of self-consciousness, in which, so far from sharing Mill's puzzle with memory, he uses that fact where-with to explain self-consciousness, according to the theory of evolution. "Memory," says Mr. Wright, "in the effects of its more powerful and vivid revivals with the more intelligent animals, and especially in the case of large-brained man, presents this new world"—("the world of self-conscious, intellectual activity")—"in which the same faculties of observation, analysis, and generalization, or those employed by intelligent beings in general, ascertain the marks and classes of phenomena strictly mental, and divide them, as a whole class or *summum* genus, from those of the outward world. The distinction of subject and object becomes thus a classification through observation and analysis, instead of the intuitive distinction it is supposed to be by most metaphysicians." If we ask: what remembers? the question is considered vain. But while refraining from that point at present, I wish to state in passing, in order that the reader may understand that I do not share the common idle sentiment against evolution as a pedigree, that in my opinion, if I am descended from apes it is so much the better for the apes, and the only trouble worth taking about them is to try to understand them. At this moment, however, I shall offer no views upon that subject, and I propose to discuss only a few points among the many important matters in Mr. Wright's essay.

The origin of self-consciousness is supposed by Mr. Wright to be as follows:

"As soon, then, as the progress of animal intelligence through an extension of the range in its powers of memory, or in revived impressions, together with a corresponding increase in the vividness of these impressions, has reached a certain point (a progress in itself useful, and therefore likely to be secured in some part of nature, as one among its numerous grounds of selection, or lines of advantage), it becomes possible for such an intelligence to fix its attention on a vivid outward sign, without losing sight of, or dropping out of distinct attention, an image or revived impression, . . . whatever the character of this outward sign may be, provided the representative image or inward sign still retains, in distinct consciousness, its power as such, then the outward sign may be consciously recognized as a substitute for the inward one, and a consciousness of simultaneous internal and external suggestion, or significance, might be realized; and the contrast of thoughts and things, at least in their power of suggesting that of which they may be coincident signs, could, for the first time, be perceptible. This would plant the germ of the distinctively human form of self-consciousness." (pp. 255-6.)

The barbarous man, then, who was somewhat above the animal in whom "the germ of the distinctively human form of self-consciousness" had appeared, had sensations; remembered them; had similar sensations at another time, and was then conscious of three things,—of the present sensation, of his memory of the past sensation, and of the coincidence of the present sensation outside and the memory inside as two signs of the past sensation. Thus the inside phenomena became classed as the ego or subject, and the outside phenomena became classed as the non-ego or object. "The outward sign, the image, or inward sign, and the suggested thought, or image, form a train, like a train which might be wholly within the imagination." (p. 258.) Mr. Wright admits that "no act of self-consciousness, however elementary, may have been realized before man's first self-conscious act in the animal world," yet he maintains that "the act may have been involved potentially in pre-existing powers or causes," which he uses as equivalent to "previous phenomena." (p. 247.) Among such phenomena may have been "a form of self-consciousness more

immediate and simple than the intellectual one," which he thinks is apparently realized in dumb animals. "They probably do not have, or have only in an indistinct and ineffective form, the intellectual cognitions of *cogito* and *sum*; but having reached the cognition of a contrast in subject and object as *causes* both in inward and outward events, they have already acquired a form of subjective consciousness, or a knowledge of the *ego*. That they do not, and cannot name it, at least by a general name, or understand it by the general name of "I" or *ego*, comes from the absence of the attributes of *ego* which constitute the intellectual self-consciousness." (pp. 269-70.) And with man "the language of gestures may . . . have been sufficient for the realization of the faculty of self-consciousness in all that the metaphysician regards as essential to it. The primitive man might, by pointing to himself in a meditative attitude, have expressed in effect to himself and others the 'I think.'" (pp. 298-9.) But we must remember that the theory of evolution, like all other theories, runs more smoothly between the greatest difficulties of speculation than it does when it reaches them. The theory of evolution depends not merely upon the explicable development of known powers, but also upon its mysterious law of *spontaneity*, which evolutionists may not call inexplicable, but which they do not explain, and yet to which they have to resort when the first birds that fly begin to fly, or when the men who are first self-conscious begin to know themselves. When we ask why the birds venture upon the first flight of all birds, or why men first of all men begin to be self-conscious, the answer is not that there is a real being developing its powers in the bird or in the man; on the contrary, Mr. Wright answers, "The new ones are related to older powers only as *accidents*, so far as the special services of the older powers are concerned, although, from the more general points of view of natural law, their relations to older uses have not the character of accidents, since these relations are, for the most part, determined by universal properties and laws, which are not specially related to the needs and conditions of living beings." (p. 246.) In other words, man and his consciousness of self are, when regarded individually, accidental novelties among phenomena, about the real existence of which

he is accidentally mistaken, but about the regular appearance of which, "according to universal properties and laws," he is probably on the whole a correct believer, notwithstanding the fact that these "universal properties and laws" are not specially related to the physical, intellectual, moral, or spiritual needs and conditions of any living beings. Accordingly, we are not self-conscious because we are real beings, but because in our ancestors there came, by the law of *spontaneity* not specially related to them, a self-consciousness more or less distinct among the other phenomena which made up what seemed to their barbarous minds to be real existences, and we have inherited a strong tendency to their erroneous interpretation of this consciousness, imagining from our lack of power of analysis that we really are what we know we are.

But the fact of my self-consciousness, a knowledge of my real being by my real being, although constituted by thoughts which are phenomena to me, and expressed by words which are phenomena to me and to others, this fact is not to be so easily disposed of as is attempted by a theory of phenomenal evolution, which no more accounts for the idea of *being* by the use of the words *spontaneity* and "inheritance of tendency," than the word *Bible* accounts for the authorship of the several books of the canon. When evolutionists say "spontaneity," they merely mean it is so, it takes place, and such a phenomenon we cannot account for. And in telling us how events occur they may perhaps be on the whole correct; at all events, it is not to our present purpose to criticize them. But when Mr. Wright leaves physical evolution and takes simple phenomenal actuality as his account of all ontological and metaphysical truth, he fails to do justice even to spontaneity by failing to do justice to the spontaneous knowledge of self. For spontaneity which can give such a result amidst evolution thus explains itself in man's self-consciousness as being, what it seems to be, the ontological fact in psychology, revealing the true meaning of the life of the highest animal, or man, who thus directly learns, or absolutely knows, that, besides being evolved unconsciously in his body, he is an involved conscious self, an actual and essential being. But Mr. Wright says that "the invention of *noumena* to account for ultimate and uni-

versal properties and relations in phenomena arises from no other necessity than the action of a desire urged beyond the normal promptings of its power." (p. 292.) Rather, we reply, the discovery of the fact of being, to which belong ultimate and universal properties and relations in phenomena, arises from the normal necessity of real being to develop beyond the mere animal promptings of its power into the human consciousness of self as the reason for all that has preceded it. The strength of the Phenomenologists, represented by Mr. Wright, lies in their attack upon the Natural Realists, who admit that we only know phenomena, and claim that we should put faith in noumena. But against one who claims to know in the phenomena of mind the being of mind also, and thence to infer from the phenomena of matter the being of matter, howsoever analysis may present material forces to our understanding, the idea of being having sprung from the immediate knowledge of self, the Phenomenologist can merely disclaim for himself any such knowledge, or deny the probability of its correctness, and attempt to account for its origin, as Mr. Wright admits, "on its own ground, that is, dogmatically, or by theory" (p. 250) by phenomenal evolution, for instance, into which he is obliged to introduce a mystery certainly no less than the absolute knowledge of self, namely: the *spontaneity* by which man first becomes conscious of self, the readiness with which he makes the mistake of believing in being, and the persistence with which even philosophers cherish this offspring of the barbarian mind.

The dilemma between the empiricists and the school of Kant concerning self-consciousness is—doubt of, or faith in what is not absolutely known; but I am convinced that between all the deniers of an absolute knowledge of self on the one side, and all who affirm an absolute knowledge of self on the other, lies the more correct dilemma—ignorance, or knowledge of essential being in self-consciousness.

ARTICLE VI.—“IS SCHISM A NECESSITY?”

AN OPEN LETTER, IN FRIENDLY REPLY, TO THE REVEREND
LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON, M.A., ETC.

MY DEAR CHRISTIAN BROTHER:

YOUR Letter, addressed to me in the *New Englander* of April last, deserved an earlier notice. I will not waste words in explaining the fact that until now I have had no time to give it the attention it merits. I feel that it contains much which does great honor to its writer; I feel thankful to God for the solemn and far-reaching inquiry suggested by its title—“Is Schism a Necessity?” But it is a great question, and how shall I answer it? God help me to say what I can under a deep and constant sense of responsibility to Him.

It is a good token that such a question is not only put forward, in the *New Englander*, in a large and liberal spirit, but that, in the same spirit, a reply is admitted into its pages from the pen of a “prelate” who believes in the divine origin of his order, and who has never been backward in asserting it. Deeply do I feel that such liberality imposes on me the duty of saying nothing offensive, and, in short, of doing something less negatively to freshen an old subject, and to present it in a manner entirely free from the old quarrel about “Bishops, Priests, and Deacons.”

It is not difficult to do this. In some respects you have set me an example. Yet let me be very candid, in order to excuse my serious line of thought, in replying to a letter which is often very merry, if not in fact witty, at our expense. I asked a friend, a Presbyterian pastor of great respectability, to read your letter and to give me any suggestion that might occur to him as to the kind of answer it would seem to require. He gratified me by complying with my request, but he dropped the remark, “Some of the points are meant to be stinging.” Such, then, was the impression of an unprejudiced party. A word, therefore, on that feature.

There are nettles which can only be treated as such and grasped with the proverbial pluck that deprives them of much of their power to inflict a wound. But, occasionally, one describes a nettle in a very fragrant hedge which does no harm if let alone. Now, your nettles are of the latter class, and I see no need of disturbing them. I am regaled by the flavor of brotherly-kindness that exhales, as from a garden, in most of what you have addressed to me, and I trust I may present you with nothing less agreeable in return. Let a new spirit, if nothing more, be begotten of our correspondence, and may the Holy Spirit enlarge it in all future discussions between those whom we may represent, respectively. Oh, that we might be baptized with the spirit which St. Paul commends to Timothy: "The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men."

The time that has passed since you did me the honor to write to me has rendered the matter which was the occasion of your letter to some extent a thing of the past. Even were it otherwise, I should be compelled to say very little on that point, in view of the fact that it has been assigned to another bishop for settlement, under our Canons, so that I could not, without indelicacy, prejudge the questions it involves. You will appreciate this fact and excuse me for applying my thoughts chiefly to the large and abstract bearings of your inquiry—"Is Schism a Necessity?"

And here let me thank you for your very courteous reference to my little book, "*Apollos, or the Way of God.*" When you do me the favor to read it, you will find how deeply we are one in the fundamental spirit of your inquiry, which, I trust, God sees to be even in me, as I am sure it is in you—the spirit of that genuine *Agape* without which we are nothing. You are eloquent on the shame and disgrace of "*running rival churches,*" of sustaining them by rivalries in "*fancy fairs and pious lotteries,*" and on the effect produced in foreign parts, by such specimens of "*American Christianity.*" You will find that what so justly shocks you abroad is much more distressing to me, on the vast scale which afflicts us at home: but you will observe that much which I have said in "*Apollos,*" in entire sympathy with you, has been directed to the consciences of hundreds of

our pious countrymen who regard this as a beautiful development of Christianity, and who lose no opportunity of commending it, as a desirable state of things, to our Evangelical countrymen. Seldom have I met with a view of the hideousness and folly of this idea more forcible and convincing than your own. "Is Schism a Necessity?" I answer No, in the name of God and of His Christ. When our countrymen see their actual condition as you do, we shall have gained half the battle against the spirit of schism. I think the Spirit of Wisdom can lead us to the rest.

When we come to consider the remedies, no doubt we shall differ discouragingly at first. For all that, I do not despair of at least two results: (1) We shall begin to know and respect one another and to be profoundly convinced that there are new views to be taken of old subjects; and (2) this mutual confidence must beget a happier social Christianity, at least, out of which more and better things will come, under the plastic hand of a loving Master, to whom all true believers are so unspeakably dear.

Let me look the worst difficulties full in the face. You discuss in a manly way the three things which, in your opinion, "hinder Episcopalians from common worship with their fellow Christians, generally." Now, I feel that should I take them up in the order and outline of your own discussion of them, I should find myself running into the old ruts of "Church-Polity," which since the days of Cartwright and Hooker have been worn so deep, with so little apparent progress. I must avoid this mistake, and yet, conceding that the points you make ought not to be disregarded, I must give them something more than a general reply. And, upon reflection, I have thought it best, and most just to our common convictions, to remark upon them by reducing them to their underlying principle, and then discussing that. For it is true that our hinderances have much to do with your "three heads: (1) Conditions of Communion, (2) Ritual, and (3) the Authority of the Ministry." But, again, it is true, as you do not seem to see, that these hinderances result not from any feelings, or even principles, personal to ourselves, but from the fact that we maintain them in fidelity to a trust which we share with others on so large a scale, that our

very insignificance, if you will, forbids us to modify or break what we regard as common property, without the common consent. Conceding, then, for argument's sake, that what we thus find objectionable to many of our fellow Christians, are things mutable in themselves, you will perceive that conscience may have much to do with the inquiries—when, how, and by what processes, shall the changes be made, which have so much to say for themselves on the score of expediency. Thus our Thirty-fourth Article maintains that “Whosoever, through his private judgment, willingly and purposely doth openly break the traditions and ceremonies of the Church *which be not repugnant to the Word of God*, and be ordained and approved by common authority, ought to be rebuked,” &c. Let me, first, ask you to observe, then, that if we accept this principle, as possibly you do not, we may, as conscientious Christian men, and not as sentimentalists or mere bigots, be forced to do, on principle, many things, accordingly, which cost us dear, in view of private interests and most natural feelings. In this way, then, dear brother, I answer a question very frankly, which you put very squarely and plumply. You ask: “After all, is the divisive, schismatic course so often pursued in the name of the Episcopal Church *really a matter of principle at all?*” I answer, no “divisive, schismatic course” can have any principle in it; but if you give such hard names to the real difficulties created by the great principle of law and order to which I have referred, then, I must say, you do us a great injustice; because, *from our point of view*, such is not a principle of division and schism, but of unity and love. Our differences here grow out of the different views of Christendom and of Christian relations, which are habitual to us, respectively, in our different positions.

Here, then, is the place for me to say how thoroughly I agree in your opinion of the snobbery which you seem to have encountered somewhere, in a very offensive form, but which you too hastily conclude to be common and operative among us on a large scale, if not in a predominant degree. You would not adhere to such an idea, however, and it would be mere bathos to argue on the want of charity which would be involved in pressing it seriously. Let us suppose that fools and snobs may be found in both camps, and that since Horace

took his walk in the *Via Sacra*, every earnest man is occasionally pestered with their impertinence. And then, if there are parsons of the "cream-cheese" variety among our traveling clergy, it will be readily allowed that the more forward and anxious to "occupy pulpits" among yours, are not precisely of the Robert Hall and Dr. Chalmers type: it being generally the case that for one such character whom our ill-deserts deprive us of hearing, we are delivered, on the other hand, if not by our merits, still by our circumstances, from many such inflictions of persistent volunteers, as are incessantly served up in our newspapers, no doubt to the intense admiration of their authors. All this may be regarded as foreign to the subject: we are dealing with matters which have exercised the minds and hearts of Leightons and Jeremy Taylors, on the one side, and of Doddridges and Dwights on the other. Let us keep to the great ideas on which they formed their opinions and took their sides, in the fear of God.

I return, then, to my position that nothing but principle could "hinder" any true and loving Christian from indulging his natural impulses of social feeling, by complying with proposals so generously and handsomely made, as they would be by you, I am sure, in circumstances such as those to which you have referred. The principle which operates with us, in such a case, would lead us to give no offense in maintaining it; because, as I have found by experience, what one holds as truth can be "spoken in love," and so happily balanced by social compliances and friendly offices as to lead to no misunderstandings. Thus, if it were necessary to explain a position, in itself trying enough, I should say, that the principle which forces us, at home, to be in some respects "a peculiar people," must be the same when we have crossed the sea. Here, we are in a minority which you represent as inconsiderable, and I concede that if there be no principle in our position, we are sinful in maintaining our "denominational" system, at home. To curse one's country with an unnecessary sect is a crime of the darkest character, as well against the republic as against God. These divisions disintegrate society and "hurt the authority of the magistrate." We must have a *raison d'être*, an excuse for our existence, or we deserve the reprobation of all good men.

Why then do we exist? Let me quote an author with whom you will not disagree. He says of our Church: "I regard it as the only effective, practical protest extant, against the prevailing 'Evangelical' heresy, that the normal state of the Church Universal is schism; that sects are a good thing, so that the more sects you can have within reasonable limits the better; and that the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, consists properly of a series of strenuously competing denominations, maintaining diplomatic relations and exchange of pulpits; 'sinking their differences' in a Tract Society that agrees to be mum on all controverted points; and meeting occasionally in an 'Alliance.' So long as this continues to be the highest prevalent conception of Christian fellowship, we need the protest of High-Churchism, in its most uncompromising form, in favor of the organic unity of the Christian Church."

Of this admirable passage you are the author, in the large-hearted letter to which I am now replying. I could not use language so sharp, except as borrowing it from you. I do not like the word "High-Churchism," but what you mean by it is what I know by another name and what I might call Historic Catholicity. Let me thank you for the thoughts you have so powerfully expressed, and let me say that such is our apology for existence as a Church, whether here, or in Europe.

But, you say, "I do not believe that a protest against schism is less effective for not being made in a schismatic spirit." There, too, I cordially agree with you, and I concede that it is quite possible to bear one's testimony even to God's truth in a spirit which God abhors. I fear you would infer a schismatic spirit, however, from a course dictated by a spirit the very reverse of schismatic, in fact, alive with charity and ardent with fraternal love towards all believers. It is here that I recur to my own remark that our habitual views of Christendom and Christian relations create our differences at this point. I shall endeavour to demonstrate this, and to do so believing that a schismatic spirit is alike impossible in your views of duty and in mine.

Your letter proves, in fact, that animated by the same spirit, but starting from divers premises, we may logically reach our divers positions. You regard us as an inconsiderable body of

"Episcopalians," asserting for ourselves many high pretensions; and you regard all Christian sects as equally blest with us, in all good things of Christ, and some of them as much better than we are, more fruitful in good works and richer in everything that can impress the popular mind and strengthen their hold on its sympathies and prepossessions. God forbid that I should undervalue the good works and blessed examples of others, or say anything against these views of their worth and influence. But, let me say something to explain our own position and to relieve it from the odious look you give it, in your portraiture.

Whether correctly or incorrectly, we, on the other hand, seldom think of ourselves as "Episcopalians," and it is only subordnately that our local and national character comes into our view, at all. The *outside* of our Prayer Book bears a local and national label, it is true; but *inside*, we see and hear of nothing but the Holy Catholic Church, and to this *interior* doctrine all our habits of worship and thought are conformed. We are educated into it by our worship and by the atmosphere of our churches. "The Holy Church throughout all the world doth acknowledge Thee": such is the idea that is ever with us and that shapes itself into our convictions, our praises, and our prayers. It lives with us and we live in it; and while we rejoice in the blessed ascription "Thou didst open the kingdom of Heaven to all believers," we are daily inspired by thoughts of that kingdom on earth, as an organized, continuous, historical society, dear in its very ruins, and entitled to our ardent prayers and efforts for its restoration, as was Jerusalem when Daniel prayed for it in Babylon, with his windows opened towards its desolated temple, or when Nehemiah went forth by night to survey its precious walls and fragmentary bulwarks. Theirs was no sentimental grief over these desolations. Those relics were chartered with unfulfilled promises; they were to be builded again and filled with the glory of Messiah's presence and atoning sacrifice; therefore it was faith to say, "Thy servants think upon her stones and it pitieth them to see her in the dust."

I thank you for the vigorous rebuke you administer to those in whom this spirit works itself out into an opposite extreme.

Doubtless there is danger of such results as you hit off with such power of caricature. You say: "They have so worthy a desire for fellowship with the Church of the fourth century that they are ready for the sake of it to live in practical isolation from the Church of the nineteenth century. They are so earnestly, though hitherto vainly, desirous to open some special relations of communion with Old Catholics, or Greeks or Armenians, three or four thousand miles away, that they tear themselves, with alacrity, from their own countrymen and fellow Protestants."

If there are such, you have given them not one word too much, nor too harsh, in this sarcastic flagellation. And such men there may be. One idea, you know, often takes possession of pious minds, and frames and fashions the whole man accordingly. Were I gifted with your powers of ridicule and were this the proper opportunity, I might possibly show you the portrait of other men of one idea, who make themselves equally pitiable, by opposite follies. But, we have agreed to let the fools alone. I confess the obligation we owe to you for pointing out our perils, and I thank you for recognizing the good and great principle which we are in danger of carrying too far and of making too exclusively prominent. You own that we do thus live in the continuous life of a historic church, with the fourth century and with all centuries, and you admit our brotherly yearnings towards the Greeks and Armenians. This feature of our piety, such as it is, is thus recognized. But, my dear brother, you do not appreciate it, nor the motives on which it operates, or you would not so speak of it, nor of us.

The spirit of the sentimentalist may take this form, as I have allowed, but the spirit of a Daniel or of a Nehemiah may be involved in unjust censures provoked by the extravagances of the unreal and the unloving. I claim that there are among us true Daniels and true Nehemiahs; and I shall soon show that they are not justly liable to the reproach of forgetting brethren nearer home for the sake of cultivating foreign relations. For the moment, let me illustrate my plea in their behalf.

I have said that the genuine spirit of our communion is formed and educated by our interior Christian life, not by our

external relations, nor by our immediate surroundings. Hence, we daily and hourly feel our unity with the whole historic Church of Christ; and truly as we cherish our fellow Christians of the Evangelical sects and love them for their Christian example, it must be allowed that we feel ourselves identified with the ancient churches as such, while as such we have no organic relations with these sects. Hence, while we are personally allied with many beloved brethren of the latter description, we are constitutionally and organically interknit with the former, and urged by the Spirit that dwelleth in us to seek their welfare as a duty which the providence of God is making more and more apparent, every day.

"What!" says one, "you forget the excellent Dr.—, and cultivate no fellowship with the pure and lovely Mr.—, and send forth your sympathies towards the degraded, superstitious, &c., &c." I answer, God forbid! I draw as near to Dr.— and Mr.— as they will allow me to do, in consistency with my duties elsewhere; but while Dr.— and Mr.— have no need of my aid and counsels, or at least do not feel any desire for them, God has opened a door for me towards these others, and enabled me to do something in them and with them, for the healing of the breach and the repairing of many desolations. On your own principles, I do right to leave the sheep that are whole to their own green pastures, and to send forth my heart and my hand towards these wandering and torn and bleeding sheep in the wilderness. It is the Good Shepherd's example that we follow in so doing, and we believe it to be our mission to awaken all Christians to this fearfully neglected duty.

One word here, on the spirit which at least in its ill-regulated forms provokes your ridicule. You are aware that the missionary spirit is subjected to the same sarcastic animadversion, on the part of men of the world. "The Greeks are at your doors," said John Randolph to the lady whose wretched servants were neglected, while she made fanciful *camases* and *capotes* for the patriots of Suli and Parga. Doubtless, we answer—these things should be done, while we should not leave the other undone. The "missionary spirit" is, after all, the spirit of life and fruitfulness in the Church: it is simply the love without which we are nothing. But, there is something logi-

cally before this "missionary spirit," as ordinarily understood, and it is more essential to the Christian. I speak of that "unfeigned love of the brethren" which practically recognizes the brotherhood of Christ's family, and acts on the principle that when one member suffers, all suffer with it. "Let us do good unto all men," says the precept, "*especially unto those that are of the household of faith.*"

Hence, I say this love of the Christians of all ancient churches, in their present torn and bleeding condition, is logically first and foremost in the Christian's duty. He is hardly a Christian who does not habitually regard *all mankind* as infinitely precious in the eyes of the Redeemer: they are the purchase of His blood. Redeemed humanity is daily and hourly near to the Christian's heart, on this grand principle. But, if the heathen, then much more the children of the kingdom: "the Churches of Christ," and every member of the same wherever they are scattered abroad and perishing for lack of knowledge. This last idea is *not* prevalent among Christians: but, we feel it our mission to make it more and more palpable. "*Especially* unto them that are of the household of faith." There's our commission. "Yes, but"—says one—"they are so degraded: we see no *household of faith.*"

In the year 95 of our era you would have seen no faith in Sardis, none in Thyatira; perhaps none in Laodicea. To your eyes—I speak to the supposed objector—there was nothing to be seen in them but Jezebel and Balaam and Balac and the Nicolaitans. Yet, it was on a mission to just such churches that the Good Shepherd came down from heaven: his last exhibition of divine love to sinners, his last mission to mankind, bids us "go and do likewise."

"But, not"—says another—"while so many heathen stretch forth their hands," &c. Let us look at this objection. Why do these heathen still walk in darkness? Why is it that Buddha alone has, at this moment, five millions more of disciples than the Messiah—all nominal Christians included? Now, on the answer to this question hinges our prime difference in practical operations. We believe that the divisions among Christians check the outpouring of the Spirit upon all flesh. We believe that the advance of the Christian army

upon paganism will be as when the walls of Jericho fell down, but that, first, long and circuitous paths of faith must be trodden, to give unity and efficiency to the hosts of Israel. In a word, we believe that positive, organic unity, was in the mind of Christ when He said—"that they all may be one *that the world may believe* that Thou hast sent Me."

In our view, then, the missionary spirit, before all things, must take the direction of Christ's mission to the Seven Churches. The Spirit of Christ must work out in this direction. Revive the Reformation in Europe, and *start it in America*; go to the Churches of Armenia and Chaldea, of Greece and of Russia; go, not to rend and tear, on any pretext, but to bind up and heal and to pour in oil and wine; go recognizing Christ's presence, yea, even in Sardis, and enforcing his message on the "few names," even there, that "walk in white." Go, thus, like Ezra and Nehemiah to rebuild and recover; and when God revives His work, by your instrumentality, among these ancient churches, then be sure the set time will have come: then Buddha's temples will become churches of the Lord and of His Christ; then, and not till then, "God's way will be made known upon earth, and his saving health among all nations."

Now, I do not ask you to accept these views, but I state them as *ours*, and ask you to see that they are not without strength, as viewed from our position. Admit this, and you will see that all our instincts must animate us, in working for the revival of primitive Christianity among the ancient churches. You say, "*hitherto vainly*." Oh, my brother, how little you have informed yourself as to facts which warm our faith and new kindle our hopes, and stimulate our prayers every day. Hitherto, *not vainly*, thank God! Even if we saw no encouragement, it would not alter our duties: "*forasmuch as we know that our labor is not in vain, in the Lord*." If we may trust that we are as Smyrna, or as Philadelphia, in any degree, we know that to feel as the Master does and to work as He does, for Sardis and for Laodicea, are conditions of our own reward. "*Hitherto vainly*"—the angel of Smyrna might have said, perhaps: but "*Lord, increase our faith*." Christ saw "*a few names*," where man could see none; and he

who leavened the three continents with the little leaven of the first Pentecost, has power to do greater things, in Sardis, even by us, in these latter days.

I come back, then, to our mission and our ways of working in it. We assert our *organic* unity with the ancient churches, and we pray for a restoration of *functional* unity, in God's good time. The sentimental "Catholic," who thinks of hierarchies and all the parade of patriarchates and provinces, may become impatient of delays, and even despair of his principles, when he finds Greeks and Latins encased in ignorance and prejudice and incapable of moving, at a single bound, from the habits and prejudices of ages. Not so the true Ezra and the genuine Nehemiah. Sure of our own organic position and deeply sensible of what God has done for us, in giving us superior knowledge and a restoration to primitive principles, we are far from feeling any impatience for the revival of *functional* Catholicity. We know and respect our own position, and we leave it to the Master to make them feel it, all in His good time. Our advantages are obvious to ourselves and even to our worst enemies. "If ever Christians reunite," said the Ultramontane de Maistre, "it would seem that the movement must go forth from the Anglican Communion." Even he recognized something "precious" in our peculiar "intermediary" position, and he predicted results in 1820 which in 1874 are already beginning to be realized. It is not for me to boast, for are such things to be, prematurely, exhibited; but, it is simple fact, that a degree of progress has been made towards a world-wide revival and restoration of primitive Christianity, which goes far beyond all that was dreamed of by the most ardent Restorationist, twenty years ago. In this movement, the Anglican churches have been most active and to a wonderful degree have been blessed. Even such books as Stanley's "*Eastern Church*" and Neale's learned and elaborate works of similar title, are bearing fruits, this day, in Constantinople and in Tiflis, which God may readily make, in answer to prayer, a hundredfold more plentiful. "Hitherto, then, hath the Lord helped us."

It will be plain to you, then, that certain principles of action which would be illogical and absurd, if we regarded ourselves,

only, from your standpoint, are not so when viewed from ours. We must carry out and maintain the organic principles which unite us historically and actually with those ancient churches of Christ, to which we have such a mission, "if for no other reason, then, for this,"—as Hooker speaks,—because our influence and power for good, with these ancient churches, depends on our *keeping these organic principles unimpaired*. We find that when we approach them and call on them to be reformed, we can draw near to them and gain their confidence, on this ground. We do not come to you as Protestants, but as Catholics—so we address them. We do not ask you to abolish your ancient Episcopate, we revere it: we do not make war on your Ritual—we would only conjure you to restore it to its earliest form: we do not propose any alteration in your creed, we recite it with you; nor in your festivals, we keep them with you; nor in anything that is truly ancient, we would share it with you. If in anything you are more primitive than we are, we will conform to you; but, coming to you, in the fellowship of the one Apostolic Church, we entreat you to work with us, to make it in all things as it was, when it "overcame the world."

If the nearest way to evangelize the heathen be to begin by restoring and reuniting the churches, we maintain then, that we have vast advantages, and hence commensurate responsibilities, in pointing "Evangelical" Christians to this way, as well as in gaining access to the Greeks and Latins. The more you reflect upon it, I think a person with your spirit will be led to see the importance of a new and thorough work of reformation. How sickening the apathy that permits the work of the sixteenth century to be a thing of the past. Is the Lord's arm shortened? Are the Italians, the Spaniards, the French, never to be reformed, because we failed in the first onslaught? Are we, supinely, to receive the immigrant Irish into our America, and give over our inheritance to them, instead of converting them and all that is good in their pastors with them, and so doing a work which God's providence has thrust upon us? Shame on our "American Christianity" that it has no spirit and no *strength* for such an undertaking. Surely, it is high time for us to do something. First of all, "Physician, heal thyself."

What stopped the Reformation of Luther? Read Ranke; read the history of the Jesuits. All history thunders the answer—"The divisions of the reformed killed the Reformation." Once, its tides washed the walls of the Vatican itself, and undermined the Conclave. Read the stories of Contarini, and of Sadolet in the court of Paul III, of Victoria Colonna, of Olympia Morata, and of "The Oratory of Divine Love." What might not have been done had the reformers kept to the work of *reform*, and forbore to start each his petty sect, on some paltry personal peculiarity or hobby. But, not to dwell on the past, two things are evident now, and they echo, as with the voice that was "as the sound of many waters," your own outcry—"Is Schism a Necessity?" (1.) Those peculiarities and hobbies have lost their force: they are no longer dear to the sects which they created. (2.) *The Reformation is actually renewed*; the "Old Catholic" movement begins where the work of the sixteenth century was arrested. We are all called, in God's providence, to recognize it, and to unite in it with ardent zeal and faith.

Now, what is our position and appeal to our "Evangelical" brethren? I shall show very soon, that it involves none of the odious absurdities to which you point. No! thank God. But it does begin with this principle, viz., we have no right to ask the ancient churches to draw towards us in things scriptural, and hence essential, without ourselves drawing towards them in things which all regard as by no means contrary to Holy Scripture, and in which they are without fault. In other words, the work of reformation will be vastly promoted, and we shall have gained what ages may not, otherwise, enable us to effect of actual progress, towards reform, when once we meet them on the common ground actually occupied, in a good degree, by Anglicans, and then undertake the rest in the might of the Holy Ghost.

Richard Baxter and his allies, in 1660, confessed that this would be "*the readiest way to the reunion of Christians*," and they actually proposed to adopt it as expedient and lawful, provided only presbyters and laymen might be admitted to church synods, and thus a *despotic hierarchy* rendered impossible. What they wanted is before you, in our American

Church ; but, I do not say this as asking you to join us. This you will presently see. I only state the fact that elements of unity are already visible, if only we might make use of them ; and I state as another *raison d'être*, or excuse for our existence and our position, this fact, viz., that we occupy a commanding position, to say nothing of principle, to which all considerations of scriptural expediency invite Evangelical Christians, if they are, indeed, to make a common cause, and renew their efforts for the reformation of Christendom, and the evangelization of mankind.

Dismissing all questions of the *jus divinum* as out of place here, I thus confine myself to a principle which I am sure you will confess to have something in it. In the sense in which the apostle became "all things to all men," I hold we are now called to take away, out of the highway of world-wide Reformation, the scandal of needless divisions ; and I call all those divisions needless which rest on differences with the ancient churches, for which *no conscience is pretended*. In reforming them, we must meet them half-way by reforming ourselves in this respect. This done, the eighty millions of wrangling Protestants will be transformed, *Deo juvante*, into a catholic and apostolic phalanx, which can go to the ancient churches with a strong case, and propose to them, what *millions among them* are getting ready to accept, a thorough restoration to the scriptural orthodoxy and practical piety of the Primitive ages.

Such is our way of looking at the case, at our duties, and our relations. As seen from your position, we are a petty "pinfold"—a "little sister" to the Methodist giantess—a mere crab-stock, proposing to "graft upon itself vast branches, bigger than the stock itself;" and so all our outgoings to you-ward are seen only in a ludicrous aspect, which it is easy to represent as involving an absurdity. But, as between believer and believer, I ask, was not the world of the Gentiles grafted upon the little stock of the remnant of Israel ? And may not a little stock of the old apostolic root, by any possibility, possess an olive fatness and essential vigor, into which many branches, having no common root, would find it for the common advantage to be "grafted again ?" We are not simpletons, then, when we feel that there is something precious within us which

we long to see our neighbors share. It would give them organic unity, not with us only, but with the eighty millions of Orientals, whom we long to re-animate and to launch as evangelists upon the hordes of Asia; it would give them the key to millions of estranged hearts, and convert their missions into friendly embassages, which the East would welcome to its bosom. We do not speak of unity, therefore, with any reference to "Protestant Episcopalianism;" we would see ourselves and you known and recognized together as one in the visible communion of the Historic Church of Christ.

And here I come to your kindly and yet reproachful words. You ask—"Will you not explain to me wherein consists the good faith of those urgent invitations and exhortations repeated, by yourself among others, to brethren of other ministries, to remove the one great hindrance to Christian union by accepting the free gift of the laying on of apostolic hands . . . ? I am persuaded that there was an honest meaning in it. It is impossible to think that *all that was intended in that affectionate appeal* was simply an invitation to come out of Babylon, pass a year's quarantine and then reappear in search of an Episcopal parish." Yes, my dear brother, thank God, you at least have discovered it, at last; *much more was intended*. For twenty years, ever since I buried my youth and with it, I trust, many youthful mistakes and errors, I have toiled and labored to make this apparent, both to ourselves and to you, that there is "a more excellent way." In isolated cases, the way of our existing Canons is open enough, perhaps, for those who wish to come to us as we are; but for a movement of minds and hearts, as towards a common goal, I have argued, again and again, that something widely diverse is necessary. Our mission is accomplished, as a church imperfectly organized and not yet developed, when once we have inspired our fellow Christians, of America, to recur to the grand principles of organic unity to which I have referred. When they will meet us, and let us meet them, on the base of a common faith, of which the Scriptures and the Nicene Creed must be the ground, then will be seen something better than "alliance": it will be a conference that means work, and which, under God, may shape the future of American Christianity. Remember, that

concerning the creed I have mentioned as our common ground, Dr. Shedd thus speaks in his "*History of Christian Doctrine*:" "It was the work of two Œcumenical Councils, and had authority in both the Greek and Latin Churches, and, *in modern times is the received creed-statement among all Trinitarian churches.*" If this be so, why not meet us, to take steps, under "the fiery pillar," for the furtherance of this faith, in the unity of an "army with banners," "*striving together* for the faith of the Gospel?" You will vastly outnumber us: you may graft yourself on other apostolic roots and may prefer their ways to ours. But it will be impossible for us, on our own principles, to propose any narrow conformity to our brethren. There may be room for divers rites and large varieties—in one communion: and when, by God's blessing, the work is accomplished, which, more than all things the condition of religion in America demands—then, quite possibly, it will be discovered that, in one sense, we shall have come over to you, as in another you will have come over to us: and who, that is a Christian indeed, will care which of these ideas shall be most real and most true, the grand result being realized and there being no longer any room for the question, "Is Schism a Necessity?"

In proof of our "good faith" in all this, and to show that other than my individual views are expressed in much that I have said, let me remind you that so far from neglecting the pursuit of unity at home, while seeking it with those "afar off," we have had, for nearly twenty years, a special committee of our House of Bishops, charged to confer with other Christians on these subjects. Of this committee the late Bishop McIlvaine was chairman. In 1868 a "Christian Unity Society" was formed among us, which still exists. Its members are pledged to efforts such as I am making in this Letter: and it has had several public conferences, in New York, with brethren of the Dutch, Presbyterian, Moravian and other communions. It published, in 1864, an "*Address to our Brethren in Christ*," and, in 1868, the little tractate of Robert Leighton on a "*Moderate Episcopacy*." The few who have read these pamphlets have privately expressed surprise and delight, at the lengths to which "High-Churchmen" have, therein, shown themselves

willing to go. But, hitherto, they have met with no response, and hardly with a single "notice" in the journals and periodicals of those thus affectionately addressed. Have we not shown some brotherly yearnings towards you?

In conclusion, while I thank you for recognizing my spirit as fraternal and full of warmth towards all "Evangelical" Christians, let me beg you not to regard it as exceptionally so. Many reasons, which I need not specify, justify the tenderest outgoings of my own heart towards "my own friends and my father's friends," whom I have known as such from my boyhood; but, in our House of Bishops, and in other councils among us, I rejoice to say that the spirit which animates their deliberations on such subjects as we have now discussed, is not different from that which it has been my aim to identify with this Letter. Those whom you would classify as "High-Churchmen" are not a whit behind their brethren, in this respect. They have often recognized, in words and efforts, the principle to which you give another turn, namely that a "High-Church" position must carry with it a responsibility "towards those without," which is not involved in that of professed "Low-Churchmen;" and, I bear them record, that, on many occasions, when in council together, and surveying the fields and the want of laborers, in America, their language and their prayers have been full of self-abnegation; full of the spirit which would even consent to die, would God only raise up others, in the Primitive way, to go in and possess the land, and fill it with the institutions and the blessings of the Primitive Gospel.

You mistake us, brother; you entirely mistake us, yet perhaps you are less to blame than we are. We ought to feel our own deficiencies rather than speak of yours. Yet, if you will do me the favor to read "*Apollos*," as you so kindly suggest, I think you will see these things in a less repulsive light. You will see how I propose, therein, to remedy not the schisms of our European *diaspora*, but rather those from which they spring, here, in our chaotic America. You will see, at least, how profitable we might make the brotherly discussion of these matters, if we were willing to approach them in a new spirit, and with a single desire to discover the base of a genuine reno-
vation and reunion. There are those, I know, who laugh at

the idea, and who persuade themselves that these wretched "denominational" differences are to be multiplied and to be perpetuated. God forbid! For I at least would go to my grave believing that "there is a good time coming," and praying for it, with my last breath. I doubt not that the Holy Spirit is able to effect what the word of God enjoins: and whether the result is to be realized or not, I see in that injunction the spirit required in me and which is necessary to the completeness of my own manhood in Christ Jesus. Yes, and, I say daily, "Lord, increase our faith." For I believe the faith of Abraham is that which pleases God: "Whom he believed, even God who *quickeneth the dead* and calleth those things which be not, as though they were: who against hope believed in hope . . . and being not weak in faith, *considered not his own body now dead* . . . neither yet the deadness of Sarah's womb; he staggered not at the promise of God, through unbelief . . . being fully persuaded that *what He had promised, He was able, also, to perform.*" In that persuasion I have written, to you, concerning dead unity and the deadness of popular piety. In that spirit I beg you, and the editors of the *New Englander*, to accept this Letter as a true *Irenicum*; an olive branch which, should it be accepted, may lead to further conferences and correspondences, and to blessings more than we are able to ask, or worthy to receive. God grant it for Christ's sake.

Your friend and brother,

A. CLEVELAND COXE.

BUFFALO, August 19th, 1874.

P. S.—On page 735 I have said—the Reformation is actually renewed. Events are rapidly moving in the line I have pointed out. It is now announced that on the 14th of September the "Old Catholic" Conference, at Bonn, "will be attended by divers representative men, of different confessions, animated by a common desire to promote the cause of Ecclesiastical Concord and Union." Then, we read as follows:

"The discussions will proceed on the base of what was taught and believed in the Ancient Church; and *common ground* will be sought in the doctrines and institutions of Christianity and in the formularies of Faith, as they existed before the disruption of Christendom, by the breach between East and West."

ARTICLE VII.—MR. DARWIN AND THE THEORY OF
NATURAL SELECTION.*

1. THE GENESIS OF THE DOCTRINE.

IN the year 1825 a joint arrangement was made by the British and French governments for a survey of the coasts of South America, the French taking the coast of Brazil, the British that of the southern extremity of the continent from the mouth of the river Plata to the island of Chiloe. The British expedition, consisting of the *Adventure*, commanded by Captain King, and the *Beagle*, commanded by Captain Stokes, sailed for the first time in May, 1826, and returned in October, 1830. Capt. Stokes died in *Tierra del Fuego* in 1828, and was ultimately succeeded by Captain, afterwards Admiral, Robert Fitzroy, who was again appointed to the *Beagle*, recommissioned in 1831 to continue the survey of South America, with orders to circumnavigate the globe on her return home. Capt. Fitzroy, a man of great intelligence and of scientific training, had been much impressed during the first voyage by his observations in the natural history of the continent, and before re-embarking in 1831 he wrote to the Hydrographer of the Navy, proposing that "some scientific person should be sought for who would be willing to share such accommodation as he had to offer for the sake of visiting distant countries as yet little known."† The Hydrographer approved the suggestion and wrote to Prof. Peacock of Cambridge, who again referred the matter to his colleague, the Rev. J. S. Henslow, Professor of Botany. The latter at once recommended a pupil of his own, and the result was that "Mr. Charles Darwin, grandson of Dr. Darwin the poet, a young man of promising ability, extremely fond of

* The excellent description and just criticism of the Darwinian theory, which this Article contains, give to it a special value. If, however, the author is to be understood as implying, in two or three places, a necessary incompatibility between the theory of Darwin and the doctrine of Christian Theism, his position in this particular is open to question.—*Eds. New Englander*.

† *Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of H. M. ships Adventure and Beagle*. 3 vols. London: Henry Colburn. 1839. Introd.

geology, and indeed of all branches of natural history," was attached to the expedition as Capt. Fitzroy's guest and naturalist to the *Beagle*, stipulating, however, that he should be at liberty to retire whenever he thought proper and to pay a fair share of the expenses of the table. The two fell into a great friendship at once, and Mr. Darwin continued to pay his mess bills regularly until the *Beagle* returned from her five years' voyage round the world in 1836.

Mr. Darwin at this time was a young gentleman not quite twenty-three years old, who, after a course of two years at Edinburgh and another of four at Cambridge, had just taken his degree at the latter university. The most noticeable thing about him was that he had inherited, by "reversion" as he would afterwards have called it himself, the biological tastes of his ancestor, a fantastic poet but a very able naturalist of the eighteenth century, who had actually anticipated both Lamarck and the grandson in enunciating the conception of the genesis of organic forms by adaptive modifications.* The pedigree and the *penchant* together won the heart of Professor Henslow, and that worthy clergyman, who, says Mr. Darwin in the preface to his *Journal*, "was one chief means of giving me a taste for natural history—who during my absence took charge of the collections I sent home—and by his correspondence directed my endeavors," and who, as we have seen, procured him the appointment to the expedition, must bear the responsibility of having contributed more than any other man except its author to the doctrine of Natural Selection.

The results of the voyage are duly recorded in the *Journals* of Capt. Fitzroy, who also edited Capt. King's notes on the first voyage, and Mr. Darwin. The former has long since been forgotten, although the work of an able man and an entertaining writer. It is still worth referring to, if for nothing else, as an amusing illustration of the old formula *quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis*. A man sees only what he brings the eye to see. The same phenomena which drove Mr.

* H. Spencer, *Sociology. Zoonomia*, vol. i, pp. 500-510, ed. 1794. Mr. Darwin alludes to his grandfather's speculations with evident satisfaction in the Historical Sketch prefixed to the 6th edition of the *Origin of Species*. An amusing burlesque of them will be found, of all places in the world, in Canning and Frere's "*Poetry of the Anti-Jacobin*."

Darwin into Darwinism, led back Capt. Fitzroy in the most comfortable manner from scepticism to orthodoxy. At the end of his narrative the curious reader will find two essays, of a sort much in vogue a generation ago, in which the Biblical account of the Deluge and of the dispersion of the human races is confirmed by the captain's own observations in ethnology and fossil geology. As might be expected, the exegesis is of the most innocent, nautical fashion, while some of the speculations have a positive value because founded on real professional training and experience. Mr. Darwin's Journal, since published separately in several editions, has been famous from the first, and, considering the age at which it was written, is still the most remarkable of his works. It shows everywhere, and already at their best, the mental vigilance and promptitude, the swift discrimination among confusing multitudes of facts, and the curious insight into minute details, remote suggestions, and wide, unsuspected relations, which are Mr. Darwin's special characteristics as a naturalist; together with a narrative and descriptive power which he has hardly equalled anywhere else. Having as yet no theory of his own to maintain, it is unencumbered with the laborious polemic which seriously affects the literary value of his later works, and is throughout one of the most fascinating records of travel in the language.

On his departure from England in 1831, and, so far as can be gathered from his own allusions to the matter, down to his return in 1836, Mr. Darwin held all the traditional beliefs of the natural science of the day; the immutability of species, the origin of each species by a separate creation, and variation within specific limits under the action of the natural conditions of life. That the uniformities of structure and character which pervade the organic world are an indication of a common ancestry and not of creative design—proofs of pedigree and not of plan—had never seriously occurred to him. It may be added that he was not only an orthodox believer but a devout man. Throughout the voyage, in South America, in the Falkland Islands, the Galapagos and the coral islands of the Pacific, in New Zealand and Australia, he went on interpreting, in perfect unconsciousness and good faith, the new phenomena by the old principles, and finding in every fresh

puzzle only another illustration of the variety of the universe. Not that the puzzle was not fully recognized, but that the habit was still strong upon him of invoking creative power to account for all anomalies and surprises. Thus, remarking upon the absence of trees from the plains of Banda Oriental, which, although too far south to receive migration from the forests of Brazil, are well fitted by climate and soil to support forests of their own, he concludes that herbaceous plants instead of trees were specially created to occupy the area on its emergence from the sea. In Patagonia he found a strange bird, the *Tinochorus*, which almost equally partakes of the characters of the quail and the snipe, two widely contrasted birds. It is difficult to doubt that some suspicion of the possible significance of such an intermediate form must have crossed his mind, but his only comment is that, while the varied relations of the *Tinochorus* perplex the systematic naturalist, they may hereafter assist in revealing the grand scheme common to present and past ages on which organic beings have been created; a remark precisely in the spirit of Agassiz's *Essay on Classification* and a striking indication of the bent of his thinking at the time. To much the same purpose are his observations on two very singular birds which abound in Chiloe and other islands off the west coast of Patagonia. "From the great preponderance in most countries of certain kinds of birds, such as the finches, one feels surprised at meeting such peculiar forms as the commonest birds in any district. When finding, as in this case, any animal which seems to play so insignificant a part in the great scheme of nature, one is apt to wonder why a distinct species should have been created." His suggestion is "that in some other country it is perhaps an essential member of society or at some former period may have been so." Again, with reference to the slow deterioration in the types characteristic of a zoological district, as in South America, and the extermination of indigenous races by foreign races recently introduced, as in Australia, both of which facts seem to indicate an imperfect adaptation of forms as originally created to their conditions of life, his inference is that the adaptation is not alone to peculiarities of climate and country, but to other conditions also, as yet unknown; and in general that we are profoundly ignorant of the physiological relations on which the life of any species

depends. In man, however, he finds an instance of notable adaptation. "Of the most destructive diseases which bear an evident relation to climate, nearly all originate in the hotter regions of the earth. As geological induction shows that the climate during the periods antecedent to the present had an extra tropical (i. e., an unusual tropical) character, so in all probability there would be an extra tendency to disease, and we can therefore see that the recent introduction of man is an adaptation to the existing conditions of the world." What Mr. Darwin's ideas were of the first condition of man is indicated in his reflections on the Fuegians, whom he carefully studied. "One's mind hurries back over past centuries and then asks, Could our progenitors have been such as these? Men whose very signs and expressions are less intelligible to us than those of the domesticated animals; men who do not possess the instincts of those animals nor yet appear to boast of human reason. I do not believe it is possible to describe or paint the difference between savage and civilized man;" a remark which may have some connection with Capt. Fitzroy's theory that man was created in perfect condition, and that savages are simply wanderers of one blood who have been variously degraded during migration from the centre of the primitive civilization. But perhaps the most interesting of all these passages occurs in the Australian notes, and is worth giving entire:

"A little time before this I had been lying on a sunny bank and was reflecting on the strange character of the animals of this country as compared with the rest of the world. An unbeliever in everything beyond his own reason might exclaim, 'Two distinct Creators must have been at work; the object, however, has been the same, and certainly the end in each case is complete.' While thus thinking I observed the hollow conical pitfall of the lion-ant; first, a fly fell down the treacherous slope and immediately disappeared; then came a large but unwary ant; its struggles to escape being very violent, those curious little jets of sand, described by Kirby as being flirtd by the insect's tail, were promptly directed against the expected victim. But the ant enjoyed a better fate than the fly, and escaped the fatal jaws which lay concealed at the base

of the conical hollow. There can be no doubt that this predacious larva belongs to the same genus with the European kind, though to a different species. Now what would the sceptic say to this? Would any two workmen have hit upon so beautiful, so simple, and yet so artificial a contrivance? It cannot be thought so: one Hand has surely worked throughout the universe."

This sincere and cordial use of the old-fashioned theory in the hands of the author of the *Origin of Species and the Descent of Man*, extremely interesting in itself, is of historical importance as a guaranty, not of Mr. Darwin's good faith, for no one ever dreamt of questioning that, but of the perfectly unpremeditated and spontaneous manner in which the theory of development through natural selection arose. During all these years he went on construing nature as the direct product of creative power and the distinct expression of creative design, unaware, so far as we can see, of the silent arrival and reception from all quarters of phenomena bearing the other way, and of the slow transformation of his own mental states under their continuous action. It is as good an example of unconscious cerebration as can be found anywhere. The old structure of thought and feeling stood erect and intact, propped up by the sheer force of habit and association, while its foundations were wearing away by imperceptible attrition and a new philosophy was rising beneath it in the dark. Yet such is the alertness and sensitiveness of the writer's intelligence and the transparency of the atmosphere in which it wrought, that any careful reader to-day can detect with precision the successive points at which the old ideas were disturbed and the impulse towards new speculations communicated; down to the very discovery, a mere trifle in itself, which concentrated the effects of all the others; the exact moment when the silent mental induction discharged itself into consciousness; as two hundred years before the vision of the universal law of gravitation flashed after the fall of an apple.

The principal facts recorded in the Journal which determined the change in Mr. Darwin's opinions are of four kinds. The first are facts, gathered indiscriminately throughout the voyage, illustrating the immense efficiency of natural means for

the dispersion of living forms, active not only in present times, but continuously through past geological ages; together with the limitations of their action by natural barriers, such as mountain ranges, seas, climate, and soil. Such facts are of course consistent with the doctrine of the origin of species by creation, but they show that in many cases the forms peculiar to any region were not specially created upon it and for it, but have arrived there by migration from other quarters; that the definite range of any given form and the geographical distribution of living beings in general are the results of secondary causes and not of supernatural adjustment. Beyond this they are of no special significance until the immutability of species is disproved, when their significance becomes great. If it is possible for a species to produce by successive modifications a new species distinct from itself, then these facts provide the natural conditions for effecting such modifications in abundance, upon the broadest scale.

The second class of facts bears directly on this question of the mutability or immutability of species. If anywhere an intermediate form or a series of such can be found filling up the gap between two distinct species of the same genus, the suspicion arises that instead of a separate creation of each of the graduated forms there has been variation out of one into the other, or descent with variation from ancestors common to all. Such suggestive forms are the *Tinochorus*, spoken of above, and many others. In Buenos Ayres Mr. Darwin came upon a venomous snake, the *Trigonocephalus*, which had already been classified by Cuvier as a subgenus of the rattle-snake, and intermediate between it and the viper. "In confirmation of this opinion I observed a fact which appears to me very curious and instructive, as showing how every character, even though it may be independent of structure, has a tendency to vary by slow degrees. The extremity of the tail of this snake is terminated by a point, which is slightly enlarged, and as the animal glided along it constantly vibrated the last inch; and this part striking against the dry grass and brush-wood produced a rattling noise which could be distinctly heard at the distance of six feet. This *Trigonocephalus*, therefore, has in some respects the structure of *Vipera* with the habits of a *Crotalus*."

Different and more direct indications of specific origin by descent were afforded by the third class of facts, drawn from a comparison of the living with the extinct mammalia of South America. The type of both groups is the same, that is, distinctly South American, but reduced and degraded in the latest representatives. It is of course conceivable that the Creator, without abandoning his general plan, should have substituted an inferior for a superior race to meet some changed conditions of the continent; but Mr. Darwin convinced himself that in climate, soil, and configuration South America has been for ages very nearly what it is to-day. Why then should the nobler race have perished and the degraded race have succeeded? This law of succession of types was well known to Mr. Darwin, having been already observed in Australia; but, as he observes in the *Origin of Species*, it was not until he dug out of the cliffs of Buenos Ayres and Patagonia, with his own hands, the bones of the ancient races, that he felt its full force. "It is impossible to reflect without the deepest astonishment on the changed state of this continent. Formerly it must have swarmed with great monsters, but now we find only mere pigmies compared with the antecedent races. Since their loss no very great physical changes can have taken place in the nature of the country. What then has exterminated so many living creatures? . . . All that at present can be said with certainty is that, as with the individual so with the species, the hour of life has run its course and is spent." How near this surprise and perplexity were to the distinct conviction that the modern races are the degraded posterity of their ancient prototypes, we know from the *Origin of Species*.

But the fourth class of facts seem to have had the most decisive influence, probably because they came later than most of the others, and revived the old perplexity under the most startling conditions. After spending nearly four years along the coasts of South America, the Beagle sailed from Callas in the autumn of 1835, homeward bound by the Cape of Good Hope, and on the 16th of September anchored off the southernmost of the Galapagos islands. This archipelago consists of ten or twelve islands lying under the equator, between five and six hundred miles west of the nearest point of the continent. The constitution of the whole is volcanic, and owing to the

nature of the soil and the relatively low temperature of the surrounding sea, vegetation is confined to the summits of the ancient craters. The consequence is that the zoology of the islands is unmasked and its very peculiar character apparent at once. Mr. Darwin enumerates 2 species of mammalia, 26 of land birds, 10 of reptiles, a few aquatic birds, and a few insects. This poverty of species corresponds with inferiority of structure and appearance. With the exception of the aquatic birds, which are great wanderers, the forms are highly localized, but the general type is strictly South American. In other words, the fauna of the archipelago is to the contemporary fauna of the continent what the latter is to its extinct fauna. In the one case there is persistence of type and degradation of character during geological ages; in the other across an intervening sea; the same relations manifested by succession in time and distribution in space. It is evident that Mr. Darwin's perplexity had now become a serious doubt. "I will not here attempt, he says, to come to any definite conclusions, as the species have not been accurately examined; but we may infer that with the exception of a few wanderers, the organic beings found on this archipelago are peculiar to it, and yet that their general form strongly partakes of an American character. . . . This similarity of type between distant islands and continents, while the species are distinct, has scarcely been sufficiently noticed. The circumstance would be explained according to the views of some authors by saying that the creative power had acted according to the same law over a wide area." The doubt was deepened by a still more startling fact which came to his knowledge on the eve of departure, and just too late for full investigation. Not only are the fauna and flora of the archipelago peculiar to it, but in some, perhaps in all cases, each island has distinct forms of its own. That is, the type is continental, the group archipelagic, and the species insular. Here again we are reminded of the saying that a man sees only what he brings the eye to see. These fine differentiations of a general form for delicate adjustment to the slight peculiarities of separate localities would have given Agassiz a fresh illustration of the consummate art of the Creator, balancing simplicity of conception by endless variety of execution, adapting a few

types of life to the differing conditions of successive ages in all parts of the world. What Mr. Darwin began to suspect was the plasticity of life and the force of circumstances; the self-adjustment in all time of the organic and inorganic worlds.

"Unfortunately I was not aware of these facts until my collection was nearly completed: it never occurred to me that the productions of islands only a few miles apart and placed under the same physical conditions would be dissimilar. I therefore did not attempt to make a series of specimens from the separate islands. It is the fate of every voyager, when he has just discovered what object in any place is more particularly worthy of his attention, to be hurried away from it."

So Mr. Darwin put his discovery into his portfolio for investigation at a later day. But practically the question was decided here. The theory of development through natural selection, which in its widest applications includes the whole evolution of the universe, is the rugged foundling of the Galapagos Archipelago.

2. THE GROWTH OF THE DOCTRINE.

The voyages of the *Adventure* and the *Beagle* had been fatal to more than one member of the expedition, and Mr. Darwin himself arrived in England in the autumn of 1836 greatly broken in health. The first years after his return were largely spent in slowly working up the general results of his explorations. His *Journal* appeared in 1839 as the third volume of the *Narrative*; the *Zoology of the Voyage of the Beagle*, to which he contributed the introduction and the notes, in 1841; *The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs*, in 1842; *Geological Observations on Volcanic Islands*, in 1844; *Geological Observations on South America*, in 1846; and the *Monograph of the Cirripedia*, in 1851. He published besides occasional papers in the scientific journals of the day. All these studies, however, were but the closing up of an old account. The real task of his life was the solution of the problem he had brought back with him from the Galapagos Archipelago.

"On my return home," he tells us in his introduction to the *Origin of Species*, "it occurred to me in 1837 that something

might perhaps be made out on this question by patiently accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts which could possibly have any bearing on it. After five years work I allowed myself to speculate on the subject and drew up some notes." This was in 1842. In 1844 appeared the *Vestiges of Creation*, a work which had an immediate celebrity and which must have startled Mr. Darwin as a perilous approach to his own line of speculation. At any rate in that year he drew up a general sketch of the conclusions which seemed to him probable at the time and submitted it to Dr. Hooker, curator of the Kew Gardens, who communicated some of the conclusions to Sir Charles Lyell. Both saw the full significance of the new ideas and urged Mr. Darwin to publish without delay, but in vain, as he was always unwilling to interrupt the course of his investigations.* The slow toil of accumulation and reflection, re-enforced from this time by the immense botanical learning of Dr. Hooker, went on for fifteen years more, and to all appearance might have gone on in silence indefinitely, had not Mr. Darwin at last received a much sharper reminder than the *Vestiges of Creation*. In the year 1848 Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace, a young amateur naturalist, had thrown up his business in England, and gone to the valley of the Amazon, where he spent three years supporting himself by his collections in natural history. His curiosity was evidently excited by several of the phenomena of the geographical distribution of animals which had been observed by Mr. Darwin farther south,† and in 1854 he went to the Malay Archipelago, where he spent no less than eight years in a careful study of the zoology of a region upon which, more than any other on the globe, the forces of life have been concentrated, and where more obviously than anywhere else the geographical distribution and the localization of races have been determined by purely natural causes. His conclusion was precisely the one reached twenty years before in the Galapagos Archipelago, namely, that existing species have originated by descent through variation from extinct species. He drew up a state-

* *Antiquity of Man*, ch. xxi.

† Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro*, ch. xvi.

ment of the grounds of his belief and of the mode in which he supposed variation to have been guided, in two papers dated respectively at Sarawak in February, 1855, and Ternate in February, 1858. The latter he forwarded to Mr. Darwin, with the request that if it were found of sufficient importance it should be sent to Sir Charles Lyell. Mr. Darwin saw at once that his hand had been forced, and after consultation with Dr. Hooker and Sir Charles Lyell Mr. Wallace's paper* was sent to the Linnæan Society for publication, and on the 24th of November, 1859, appeared the first edition of the *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection; or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*.

In order to understand clearly the successive stages of what has been perhaps the most formidable single-handed undertaking of our time, it will be well here to distinguish exactly what it was which Mr. Darwin began in 1837 by rejecting, and what it was he accepted instead. From the time of Aristotle the individual beings which compose the organic world have been distributed by naturalists into groups according to their resemblances to one another. This grouping, or classification, has been in large measure arbitrary, every observer selecting his own points of resemblance, so that no two systems which have been elaborated exactly coincide throughout. The nearest approach to agreement has been in distinguishing the groups which are called species. Even here there has been no real unanimity, naturalists differing not only in their enumeration of species but even fundamentally in their definitions of what a species really is. On the whole, however, in the midst of much confusion there has been a substantial consent that a species of plants or animals consists of all those individuals which are fertile when crossed with each other and whose offspring are fertile; infertile when crossed with other individuals or producing offspring which are infertile. Fertility is the character common to all members of the group; infertility, in the first crossing or in the hybrid, the sign of the natural barrier separating the group from all others outside of it. It follows that the members of any group thus strictly circumscribed are descended from common progenitors of the same

* Wallace, *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection*.

kind, and that their offspring will resemble themselves; in other words, that the species is persistent and immutable. At no point of the line has it ever by any possibility received any of the slightest admixture of foreign blood; and *a fortiori*, at the initial point of all it could not have been derived from any pre-existing species, for such pre-existing species was incapable of fertility beyond its own limits. Therefore, since derivation in any form is impossible, each species must have originated *de novo*; that is, must have been created. All the living beings of the world to-day are descended each from beings of its own kind, created from the first with perfect adaptation to their conditions of life; and the sum-total of species in any given age is precisely equal to the sum-total of species in any other age *plus* the species which have been created in the mean time. It is obvious that this theory is coherent and consistent throughout, the persistence of species, the immutability of species, and the origin of species by creation, all following from the fundamental assumption that a species consists of individuals fertile between themselves, immediately or remotely infertile with all individuals outside. Its weak point, if it have one, is the failure to allow for the possible effects of long continued variation begun within specific limits; an oversight due to the belief, nearly universal until lately, that the first appearance of life on the globe was a recent event.

This was the doctrine which Mr. Darwin held, down at least to 1858; which was shaken in South America and the Galapagos Islands; and distinctly rejected at least as early as 1887. Why was it rejected? Remembering the logical consistence of its parts with each other, the answer ought to be that a new group had been found endowed with all specific characters, derived from another endowed with the same characters; that is, two distinct species incapable of intercrossing, one of which was descended from the other, or both from a third pre-existing species. No such discovery was made or could have been made, as will be seen in a moment, even if the fact existed. What Mr. Darwin saw was substantially what had been seen elsewhere before without suspicion or surprise, and the effect of his discovery on his beliefs is to be accounted for by the psychological states of his own mind. He saw that the fauna of

the Galapagos Archipelago is a degraded form of the type more perfectly represented by the existing fauna of South America, and the latter of the same type magnificently developed in the extinct fauna of South America; he found here and there signs of variation away from one species in the direction of another; and all over the world a potent agency providing the conditions for variation. His decision was that the species of the islands were descended by ordinary generation from the allied but distinct species of the continent, and they again from the allied but distinct species of their geological predecessors: in general, that all species now living are descended from a smaller number of pre-existing species, mostly lost, but which had they survived would be distinct from their posterity; and ultimately, that the whole realm of organic beings throughout its history has descended from a few primordial forms, or it may be from one, about whose origin, however, he abstains from speculation. It was evident that this generalization, however satisfactory to the author, could have been satisfactory as it stood to no one else not in the same state of mind. His psychological predispositions could not have been put *en evidence*, and as to his facts all naturalists would have replied that they were well known before and had already been construed as the expression of a great creative law carried out over wide areas through successive ages. It was incumbent on him, therefore, for self-vindication, to go to the root of the matter; on the one hand, to break down, if he could, the immutability of species; on the other, to find some natural process by which variation has produced the adaptive structures found in plants and animals, and by which all species have been derived from primordial forms. Here it must be felt that Mr. Darwin's unpremeditation and impartiality abandon him. His first conviction had come to him unawares, it may be said in spite of himself; but once committed to it, it was necessary to find the conditions which rendered origin by descent possible; and his subsequent life-toil, in many respects as noble a devotion as has been seen in our day, has been a long endeavor to construe the phenomena of nature to fit a foregone conclusion.

The direction of his new studies is a mark, partly of the necessity of the situation, but partly also of the surpassing intelligence and originality of the man. It was unavailing to

go directly to nature for the new facts wanted by the theory, for under her air of entire candor and communicativeness nature maintains an impenetrable reserve. Her results are open to anybody, but the processes by which they are reached are too gradual and protracted for detection and measurement. There was no hope of being able to surprise her anywhere, under ordinary circumstances, in the act of elaborating a complicated structure, like the human eye or ear, out of the simple structure of some lower form; or of carrying by slow successive modifications one type of life into another. It was necessary to find her acting under conditions other than her own, in which all processes were accelerated and the intermediate stages of development left on record. With the promptitude of true genius, Mr. Darwin began his great study of the variation of plants and animals under domestication. Considering the accessibility and importance of the facts, it is remarkable that this should have been so largely an unexplored territory to science. The arts of domestication are among the earliest of man, for it is as a rude farmer and herdsman that he first passes out of barbarism; they have always been the fundamental arts of civilization; and the proportion to-day of domesticated plants and animals to those in a state of nature is very great. We must suppose that the economical importance of the subject has obscured its scientific interest, or that the artificial conditions under which the phenomena are presented tend to unfit them for scientific treatment. Mr. Darwin thought otherwise; and it may be said at once that whatever the fate of his theory, it has left behind it by far the most important addition made to biological science in our time.

The first and most obvious effect of domestication is an increased sensitiveness and variability in the organisms subjected to it. Domestication means restraint, confinement, protection, high feeding, stimulation, and often entire change of domicile. Under these potent influences any race taken by man from nature after a few generations begins to show extreme instability, a tendency to the abundant production of new characters. Among other notable changes effected is a partial elimination of sterility; for there is reason to believe that many species which are incapable of interbreeding when wild are perfectly

fertile together when domesticated. Yet this apparently unregulated and indefinite variation acting through long ages has not resulted in a confusion of organic forms, but, on the contrary, in forms almost as systematically allied and as easily classified as natural forms. Thus we have at one end of the line the scanty collection of plants and animals won from the wilderness by the first human societies, with the subsequent additions made to them; at the other the multitude of well discriminated forms in man's possession to-day; and the historical certainty that the latter have descended from the former.

What is the power which has thus regulated variability and directed descent? Partly, no doubt, it is the long-continued action of fixed conditions of life; partly also the action of other known and unknown forces. But principally it is beyond any question the power of man over his dependents. The various domesticated breeds have been made what they are simply by the process of breeding. Variability has been kept in order in the long run because out of the aggregate of variations presented to him man has selected each new one useful or pleasing to himself and has perpetuated it by availing himself of the law of heredity, according to which any character, as soon as it appears, tends to transmission and increment from generation to generation. In this way, by selecting for breeding individuals which show any desirable character, and by continuing to breed from their selected offspring, he has produced out of the merest germs and hints the most elaborate structures and adaptations; and new groups of beings which, so far as organization, habits, and appearance are concerned, must be classed not only as distinct species, but in many cases as distinct species of different genera. In short, like the magician mimicking Moses, he has done over again everything that nature has done—with one momentous exception; he has never yet derived from one species a new one infertile when crossed with the parent form, or two new species infertile when crossed with each other. All the so-called varieties, species, and genera of domesticated beings which are known to be descended from common progenitors, however widely they differ in other characters, are persistently fertile with each other.

This is one side of the art of selection. On the other hand, man has neglected or destroyed all variations injurious, useless, or uninteresting, and such variations have in consequence tended to extinction. In this way many intermediate forms have perished, and the whole result of the three processes of extinction, survival, and divergence of character is the present systematic distribution of domesticated plants and animals.

With this clue in his hand Mr. Darwin went back to the labyrinth of nature. Given at the beginning, let us say by creation, a few primordial forms of life, and at the end the numerous highly differentiated groups of living beings existing to-day; is there any conceivable process analogous to man's selection by which the latter may have been derived from the former; and if so has nature provided the conditions for its action?

In the first place, the sensitiveness of organization so conspicuous in domesticated animals and plants, and the extraordinary amount of variation they undergo, are not originated by domestication itself. Artificial conditions of life have simply intensified a character common to all living beings. Organized material itself, in its lowest and simplest states, is at once discriminated from inorganic matter by great instability; and all the way up the ascending scale of organization to the most complex and highly specialized structures, where stability would be found if anywhere, the same phenomena recur. No child exactly resembles its parents; no individual at two successive periods exactly resembles itself. Changes are ceaselessly induced in each cell or atom of organized matter, in each organ or set of organs, in the whole structure and character of the individual, in all groups of individuals throughout the world of living beings. These changes are less accentuated and rapid than changes under domestication, because, in the absence of artificial conditions, disturbance has been less powerful and profound. But change there is universal throughout the world and continuous through time. Its causes are obscure, for they belong to the inner mystery of life, and all we can say is that there is something in the nature of organized matter which renders it sensitive after its own fashion to the influences

of the surrounding world ; but its effects are obvious, and if in nature there is anything resembling man's art of selection it provides the first condition for its action.

In the second place, these variations, however they may be induced and wherever they occur, tend to be inherited. There are, doubtless, limits to the tendency, so that many of them go as they come ; not being transmitted, they disappear ; but the exceptions do not disprove the rule. The most striking fulfillment of the great law of heredity is the persistence of slight modifications from generation to generation.

If now we inquire, as before, what is the power which has regulated variability and guided descent ; which, on the one hand, has withheld this universal movement away from fixed forms, this ceaseless production of minute, indefinite, and characterless variations from ending in confusion worse confounded ; which, on the other, has determined development along certain lines into a well-defined and orderly whole : the old answer at once would be, the Creator has done it by fixing the type of the species in the beginning, and by confining all change within specific limits, so that the multiplication of new forms results only in a wider harmony than before. When the spirit of rationalism, which began by rejecting the miracles of Scripture and the Church, ended in the domain of biological science by rejecting the more stupendous miracles of creation, other answers had to be found. Geoffroy St. Hilaire looked for the controlling power in the "*monde ambiant*," the combined action of the forces of the surrounding world on organisms, gradually modifying them to suit the situations in which they are found. Goethe nearly at the same time came to the same conclusion. To the action of external conditions Lamarck added the force of habit, or of use and disuse of particular parts, while beneath both he recognized an innate tendency in living matter towards progressive development. With the exception of the last, the efficiency of all these influences and others of the kind besides has been acknowledged by Mr. Darwin from the first. But many of them, or all together, are clearly inadequate, whether qualitatively or quantitatively, to account for the phenomena, which imply on the very face of them the action of some one universal and persistent power as discriminating, rigorous, and efficient as providence itself.

His first hint here came from a work, nearly obsolete not so many years ago, but now returning to celebrity on the flood tide of Darwinism, the *Essay of Malthus on the Principles of Population*. It is certain that all living beings multiply in a geometrical progression, with a varying ratio which, however, is high in the slowest breeders. The successive additions of each generation to the numbers of any race would suffice, if unchecked, to stock the whole world in a few centuries, or even in many cases in a few years. In point of fact, however, the number of any race is as nearly as possible a fixed quantity, the limit of population having been reached early in its history, and practically never varying afterwards. It follows, therefore, that enormous destruction is going on throughout the living world; that of all the individuals born at any given time only a few survive, the remainder perishing from exposure, lack of food, the attacks of enemies, or other of the natural checks upon population. From birth life is a struggle for existence, with the odds heavily against the struggler. What determines the issue? In many cases the merest accident will determine it, but in general we may be sure that the favored individuals will be the superior individuals; the survivors will be precisely the "fittest" for survival; those which in structure, constitution, or appearance, have any advantage over their competitors. Since all the new born of any race are of necessity closely alike, superiority will be determined, not by great differences, but by small ones. Any variation, no matter how slight, which is favorable to the possessor by increasing its strength or endurance, by aiding it in the search for food, concealment, or shelter, will increase its chances of escape and longevity. Thus out of the whole number of new births a few will be *selected* for survival and the vast remainder for extinction, and the discrimination between the two by the forces of nature will be as searching and rigorous as man's selection among domesticated beings, and will be determined by analagous causes, namely, the presence or absence of useful variations. Such variations, furthermore, will be likely to descend by inheritance from parent to offspring, who again may add useful variations of their own; and so on in series, with a continuous, increasing tendency to differentiation and

advancement of organization ; until a new variety is produced, which on the one hand will be able to beat competing varieties in the struggle for existence, and on the other to live under new conditions, to seize upon a new district from which its progenitors were excluded ; the whole process ending at last in a new species incapable of crossing with the parent form, or with any of the other allied species descended from it.

Such is the process of Natural Selection, or as Mr. Herbert Spencer calls it, dropping the metaphor, of survival of the fittest, which together with the auxiliary process of sexual selection and coöperating with the minor laws of variation, has presided, if not over the origin, at least over the entire development of life upon the globe. The whole system in nature and the whole expression of the system in science, or classification, are purely genealogical from first to last. We have but to assume the then well ascertained facts of the variability of living beings, inheritance, and reproduction in geometrical ratio, and everything follows in intelligible sequence. The first individual germ or cell of organized matter varying for any reason, in any degree, however slight, in a manner profitable to itself, will be more likely to survive than others not varying at all, or not varying usefully ; and surviving, will be likely to transmit the beneficial variation to its offspring. Departure from the primitive forms sets in in every direction, never to cease, until in their remote posterity we reach through cycles of deterioration and extermination, of improvement, survival, and divergence of character, a world of diversified beings ranging from the lowest plant to the highest animal, fitted with wonderful adaptations to their conditions of life, and grouped together in orderly distribution of varieties, species, genera, families, orders, classes, and branches.

Not only so. We have but to carry the analogy across the barrier between animate and inanimate matter to account for the evolution of the entire universe from the homogeneity of primitive being ; a generalization, as it stands, as impressive as any devised by the wit of man.

3. THE DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THEORY.

The first edition of the *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859 as an abstract of a larger work, which would require many years to complete. The sixth and last edition (1872) repeats the same announcement. The *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication* was published in 1868; also a first installment of works which have never appeared. Beside these we have the essay on the *Fertilization of Orchids* (1862); the *Descent of Man and Selection in relation to Sex* (1871); and the *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872).

If anyone will take the trouble, not a light one by any means, to follow the first draft of the new theory step by step through the storm of subsequent controversy, he will leave his studies convinced, if not of the durability of the theory, at least of the constancy of the author. No other speculation so daring and revolutionary has ever been produced with more foresight and precaution, or maintained with more candor and conscientiousness. Mr. Darwin has been accused more than once in high quarters of treating his friends with exceptional tenderness and of ignoring all the more formidable of his adversaries; the simple fact being that the difficulties in his way have been as carefully considered and as powerfully stated by himself as by any other man. The larger part of them are already anticipated and fully discussed in the first edition of the *Origin of Species*. Others that have arisen since have been met either by a frank change of front or by an extension of his original lines. Of the former there are only two or three instances to be found. In reply to several criticisms and more particularly to an Article in the *North British Review* for 1867, he at once admitted that he had overrated the importance of natural selection by attributing to it effects undoubtedly due to other laws of variation. The best example of the latter will be found in the reply to Mr. St. George Mivart's *Genesis of Species*, published in 1872, an attack so formidable that it drew from Mr. Darwin's serenity, for the first time in the controversy, a flash of temper—and, perhaps, the most powerful rejoinder of recent polemics.* But for the most part the Dar-

* *Origin of Species*, 6th ed., ch. vii.

winian doctrine stands to-day where it stood in 1859. Natural selection has been withdrawn to admit a somewhat larger action of mere spontaneous variability, of the conditions of life, of habit or the use and disuse of parts, and of sexual selection in the discrimination of races. It has been extended to take in the origin and descent of man, and is still maintained to the full as the great law which has presided over the whole development of the living world.

Setting aside the entire teleological argument, with which, whether logically or not, no evolutionist now concerns himself, the acknowledged difficulties of the theory are all reducible to three classes. The first are certain postulates or implications necessarily involved which seem to be incredible. Natural selection is simply an accumulation of such minute successive variations as are useful to organisms and the neglect or rejection of those which are useless or hurtful. The incipient stages, of useful structures, including every organ by which any living being communicates with the surrounding world, must have consisted of some slight modification of previous structure. How could such slight modifications have been useful to the organism in any way; much more how could they have been useful in the direction of the remote perfected organ? And if not useful they could not have been naturally selected. The difficulty is vastly increased when we reflect that many individuals must have begun to vary in the same manner at the same time, for in the deadly struggle for existence going on everywhere a slight useful variation in one individual would soon disappear among its competitors. This indeed is an objection so serious that Mr. Darwin, as has been said, at once admitted a far larger action of the conditions of life to account for simultaneous variations of the same kind. But even then, unless we suppose that the whole species began to vary at once, how are we to account for the persistence of a new, slightly discriminated variety side by side with the parent and other competing forms? And when this competition is escaped, there are later transitional states in which persistence is equally inconceivable. According to the necessary lines of descent many species now living under one set of conditions must formerly have lived under widely different ones. How could

any of them survive the stage between the two? the transition, for example, from an aquatic to a terrestrial life? In any event, all these processes are incalculably slow, and the sum-total of them must far more than exhaust the whole time allowed either by astronomy or geology.

In the second place, there are certain facts wanting in nature which are required by the theory. Thus there are organs of general utility which have been granted to one animal or plant only and denied to many others in equal need of them and equally capable of receiving them; and characters found nowhere which, if utility to the organism alone is considered, ought to occur. Again, the necessary result of long-continued divergence of character would seem to be an indefinite multiplication of specific forms. Species no doubt are numerous and are not always easily distinguished, but the confusion is in our ignorance and not in nature itself. Lastly, between two distinct allied species there must at some time have existed many intermediate forms, some of which, at least, ought to have survived. Yet they cannot be found in the world to-day, and what is more, they cannot be found in the geological record of past ages.

In the third place, there are certain facts in nature which cannot be accounted for by natural selection. How is it that an universal process of improvement and divergence of character has after all left behind it unchanged so vast a portion of living beings? Below the tribes of relatively high organization there is a populous world of plants and animals which show hardly any organization at all, and, we have reason to believe, are now what they were ages ago at the very dawn of life. Their progenitors have been the common progenitors of all. Why have the one been taken and the other left? Furthermore, the first appearance in the geological record of beings of a higher order is very abrupt. Already in the earliest fossiliferous strata we find, not single individuals alone, but allied groups of at least three of the four great types of the animal kingdom. We are compelled to infer either instantaneous creation, or sudden development, or an enormous lapse of time between the first appearance of life on the globe and its first appearance in the record. Not only so, but the record is similarly interrupted

all the way down, so that natural selection must have got over its heaviest work in eras entirely unrepresented. Or, taking the world as it stands to-day, we are confronted everywhere with phenomena whose origin does not seem to be in the least provided for by allowing unlimited time to natural selection. Such are the organs of great complexity and perfection in the higher races, on the one hand, and useless or unimportant organs, on the other; the occurrence of similar organs in widely contrasted races; the instincts and motions of animals; the reason, the conscience, and the self-consciousness of man; and the geographical distribution of living beings over the globe.

All these, or many of them, as Mr. Darwin remarks in his candid way, are difficulties grave enough to stagger and confound any man. He has met them with inexhaustible learning and ingenuity, either by producing the very facts, or facts of the very order, disputed; or by suggesting conditions under which the presence or absence of certain facts may be accounted for consistently with his theory; or by frankly turning the objection out of court on the plea of insufficient evidence; as in his argument that the testimony of geology is admissible because the record is imperfect. Every thinker will have his own opinion of the adequacy of the defence, but supposing it to have been perfectly successful there still remains the earliest difficulty of all, the old fact, or dogma, of the immutability of species, affirmed as it seems to be by the phenomena of hybridism and confirmed by the suspicious absence of immediate forms. This has been the Hougoumont of the fight from the very first, and nobody has been better aware of it than Mr. Darwin, for the effect of it is to break down the analogy between domesticated and natural races, on which he relies. He has planted his heaviest batteries and marshalled his strongest squadrons around this one obstacle, and so far there can be no doubt that he has failed to carry it. His argument, briefly stated, is that the alleged fact, while it exists, is relative and not absolute, for there are all degrees of infertility between distinct species, ranging from perfect sterility very nearly, if not quite up to, perfect fecundity; that the infertility of the first cross and that of the hybrid are two very different things; that there is a closely corresponding series of phe-

nomena in the crossing of varieties, which therefore may be considered incipient species; and finally, that the character, whatever else may be said of it, is not a supernatural endowment of species to preserve their distinctness, but a result of secondary causes, probably of the long-continued action of fixed conditions of life on the reproductive system. Meanwhile the fact remains, and obviously is to be got rid of only in one way, namely, by producing an actual case of two distinct species infertile when crossed, one of which has been derived from the other, or both from a common parent form; which has never yet been done. Mr. St. George Mivart, it is to be feared, has been overthrown like Blucher at Ligny, but so far the obstinate sterility of the mule is very nearly—where it was.

The commanding importance of this point is likely to be still more evident in the sequel, for it suggests an ulterior question which has not been very prominent in the discussion hitherto. Are the ambiguous phenomena of variation the only phenomena involved? Admitting, as we must, the incessant changes which all organisms have undergone and are undergoing to-day; admitting, as we may, that some such law as that of natural selection has controled and directed them; still we are entitled to ask, is this the whole of the matter and is there nothing beyond? In this continual changefulness is there nothing unchanging? Are there no phenomena anterior to variability, persistent in the midst of it, and so not to be accounted for by any of its laws?

Now there is at least one such fixed and constant factor involved which natural selection, so far from accounting for, is obliged to assume as the condition of its own efficiency; namely, the law of inheritance, the absolutely universal fact that like produces like, that each being gives birth, directly as in sexual generation, indirectly as in alternate generation, to new beings resembling itself. In the very beginning of life, before natural selection began to act, as the indispensable preliminary to its action, all organisms whatsoever were already endowed with this function, and from that day to this every child born into the world has inherited the nature of its parents. Not only so, but to increase the mystery, there is a latent tendency to inherit, through parents and grandparents, the lost

characters of remote ancestors. This is a fact so obtrusive and significant that Mr. Darwin himself has attempted an explanation of it in what he has called the "provisional hypothesis of Pangenesis. Starting from the admitted fact that the cells or units of organized bodies propagate themselves by self-division, he assumes, first, that such cells are continually throwing off minute particles, which circulate freely through the system, each again multiplying by self-division, and subsequently developing new cells like those from which they were derived: secondly, that these freely circulating particles, or "gemmules," have elective affinities for each other, leading in the one direction to the continued growth and repair of the substances of the body, in the other to their aggregation into the buds of plants or the ovules of animals. Every bud, or seed, or ovule, is thus made up of particles derived from all the cells of all parts of the parent body in all stages of growth, each with its own tendency to development and union with other particles, and the result is similarity of structure, constitution, and character between parent and offspring. The objection to this hypothesis is not that it is false, for the probabilities are that in some form it is true; but that it leaves the original mystery more complex and impenetrable than ever. How came the cells to be endowed at the outset with these astounding functions of proliferation, discriminating union with each other, and aggregation *either* into new tissue *or* into the germ of a new being? How have the *additional* affinities and discriminations involved in every fresh advancement of organization been acquired?*

Again, as natural selection is obliged to assume the law of inheritance as a previous fact, so is sexual selection obliged to assume the distinction of the sexes. This, it may be objected, is not an universal fact like the other, for there are low forms of life in which reproduction is asexual. But Mr. Darwin himself has shown that the structure of every organism whatsoever appears to be especially adapted for the concurrence, at least occasionally, of two individuals. The distinction, therefore, is essential; and at any rate it appears whenever we reach organ-

* The Evolutionists themselves are rather shy of Pangenesis. See the "*Genetics of Species*" and Dr. Bastian's "*Beginnings of Life*," ch. xiv.

ization of any complexity, after which it is the law alike of all plants and all animals. Of course, inasmuch as important ends are gained by the concurrence of the sexes, it is conceivable that sex has arisen, like other useful characters, through natural selection. But the strong presumption is that we have here a constant, universal fact anterior to and independent of all ordinary variation.

What, once more, are we to say of the division of living beings into the two kingdoms of plants and animals? It is certain, if anything is, that this is a chasm traversing the whole organic world from top to bottom and from first to last. Biologists have thrown a vast deal of dust into our eyes of late by the affirmation that the lowest forms of life are indistinguishable in character, which is true; and by the inference that being indistinguishable they are one, which is false. An animal of any grade is an animal and not a plant, because it possesses the faculty of voluntary motion. It is what it is, and not something else by virtue of *will*. A being may easily be found so low in organization and so obscure in character that no human senses or scientific tests can say whether it is one thing or the other; but this we can always say, that it either is capable of voluntary motion or is not. If it is, it is an animal; if it is not, it is a plant. It must be one and it can't be both. The distinction is primordial, persistent, and absolute; a third of the great constants anterior to and independent of all ordinary variation.

One is tempted to add, although the fact is less available for argument, that as the animal is distinguished from the vegetable world by the faculty of will, so is man from all other animals by the faculty of self-consciousness. It will at once be replied that self-consciousness is a late development and not a primitive fact, for we cannot imagine an unborn child or an undeveloped germ as conscious of itself. But we may at least avail ourselves of the analogy of Pangenesis to affirm that a character inseparable from human nature sooner or later, exists in some obscure form, some determining predisposition or condition, at the very root and beginning of human life; and the first predisposition is as unaccountable as the ultimate fact.

It is impossible to reflect upon these and other great uniformities of the living world without the suspicion that Darwinism is an incomplete induction ; that back of the phenomena it deals with there resides in organic beings some power which is the principal factor involved, which has controlled all the secondary causes and laws of variability and has probably originated variation itself. This after all is the weak point of the new philosophy, that it refuses to offer any explanation of the fundamental fact of organic variability. Mr. Darwin has ingeniously cut off all discussion in this direction by insisting that whatever may have been the obscure causes of variation they have had no relation to the structure which natural selection has built up out of them. "If an architect," he says, "were to rear an edifice without the use of uncut stone by selecting from the fragments at the base of a precipice wedged-formed stones for his arches, elongated stones for his lintels, and flat stones for his roof, we should regard him as the paramount power. Such fragments bear to the edifice built the same relation as the fluctuating variations of each organic being bear to the structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants? Definite causes no doubt have given to each fragment its shape, but they have acted without reference to the edifice into which it has been built. But what shall we say of edifice and architect if at the base of his precipice he finds not merely a heap of uncut stones, but foundations and arches, framework and outlines already erected and waiting for him? And this is what natural selection finds, a power anterior and superior to its own, which not only provides its building material, but prescribes the limits and the character of its work. Moreover, the illustration breaks down at the essential point of all, for in reality the fitness of the uncut stones for the use of the architect has no true analogy with the fitness of organic variations for the use of natural selection. We may be sure that no atom of organized material has been put into a contrivance like the human eye for any other cause than its adaptation to the one specific purpose of vision. We may dissect the most complete structure into its simplest elements, and we get at the very last, in each constituent particle, not a fluctuating, characterless variation, but perfect fitness for an end ;

a relation not to be accounted for or disposed of by any theory of subsequent aggregation and co-ordination. It is here again as with the theory of Pangenesis; we are no better off at the end of our analysis than we were at the beginning. The original mystery of the complex organ has simply retreated behind the ultimate atom as dark and unfathomable as ever.

It is, therefore, precisely within the region which Mr. Darwin has closed to us as both impenetrable and irrelevant that the whole controversy lies in its last analysis, and whither it must be carried sooner or later as to a court of last resort. Why is organic material variable at all and how does it vary? The most obvious answer is that it varies according to the action of external conditions, the incident forces of the universe around it. But all those forces act too upon inorganic matter. Does the one respond to the action as the other does or differently? We know that it responds differently. The moment we pass from an inorganic molecule to an organized germ we get a new, dissimilar reply to the appeal of the surrounding universe; we have now the responsive phenomena of vitality. There is therefore something within the nature of organic material itself which determines its behavior under the action of incident forces; a power, or necessity, or tendency, whatever we choose to call it, which adapts variation to organization and conducts it along particular lines in definite directions; producing at once, or sooner or later, the facts of heredity, the discrimination of plants and animals, the discrimination of the sexes, it may be the immutability of species, the spiritual nature of man, the innermost individuality of each living being and of every group of such. We may allow to natural selection the largest latitude it can maintain: here at least, it would seem, is an ultimate verity which does not crumble under its analysis or fit into its synthesis; which therefore compels us to supplement its action by the larger generalizations of some comprehensive theory of evolution: or *that*, failing to revert to the ancient postulate of some power, other and higher than the forces and properties of matter, which is the principal factor in the product of the universe.

ARTICLE VIII.—CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND SOME OF THEIR OBSTACLES.*

It was a bitter thing, as the Apostle Paul traveled from city to city, that the race to which he belonged, to which were given the promises, which was made God's instrument for upholding the true religion in the world, should oppose and persecute their fellow-believers in the old covenant, when they made known how it had come to its perfect form in Christ Jesus. But his consolation was that the gospel was for mankind. To save the Gentiles was more glorious for Christ than to raise up the depressed Jewish people. It was this feeling which was in his mind when the Jews, in their synagogue, at Antioch, in Pisidia, rejected him and his message. In his address to them, he quoted the latter part of the grand passage in Isaiah: "It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth."

This enlargement of the plan of the Mosaic religion, this promise, that instead of the field of Palestine it should have for its field the world, was in a manner necessary. The whole strain of the old Scriptures showed a preparation for a universal religion, and called the devout Israelite to wait in hope for something nobler in the future. His was eminently a system of promises, pointing he knew not just whither, but to something great; and especially was it the way with the prophets at the darkest moment of national depression to keep hope alive by new, more heavenly food. At the opening of the dreadful Assyrian period came the inspiring message that told of the "wonderful Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace." Just before the captivity at Babylon, the new covenant or dispensation of the future was made known, under which God's law should be written on the people's hearts and

* The substance of this Article was delivered as a sermon by Dr. Woolsey, May 3, 1874, at the ordination of Robert Allen Hume as a missionary to India.

their sins be remembered no more. Just as the time for closing the record of the old Scriptures had arrived, the last promise told of the messenger who was to prepare God's way, and how the messenger of the covenant, the Lord whom they all sought, should suddenly come to his temple.

Nor did promises and hopes alone point forward to something brighter than either past or present would justify ; there was an inward and spiritual preparation for a higher form of religion. The narrow rites of the law excited a sense of sin and of obligation, without unfolding character into the perfection of the filial spirit. Sinai with its thunderings kept sounding through all the history of the Jewish people. Nor, again, were the great questionings of the mind and heart in regard to the eternal future at all met or answered. Promises there were enough to sustain national life, but what a marked silence respecting the eternal life of the soul. We have thus in the old economy the strange spectacle of a nation living on God from day to day, believing in a present Providence and in immediate rewards, but receiving little more than dark hints respecting a future world ; waiting, as it were, until another trumpet, louder than Sinai's, should proclaim a new law that told of immortality.

While thus the godly Jew was fed on great hope and on dissatisfaction with the imperfect things around him, Providence, by disappointing his hopes and ending his dream of national greatness, paved the way for the revival of hope, and the fulfillment of all and more than the substance of his dreams. The king of Babylon overthrew the civil state, but idolatry received its death blow at the same time ; the restored Jews were no longer proud, lonely dwellers in the old home, but revolution after revolution scattered them over the world, and thus they served to transmit the religious ideas, the precious treasure of the nation from land to land, and to prepare the soil for Christ and his missionaries even to the far west of Europe.

Thus the plan of God in its beginnings and its course pointed forward, as we now can see, to something, not different from the old religion, but nobler, and better, of the same kind. How much of all this which is open to the eye of history, as it compares epochs and discovers results, entered into the reflections

of Paul, we cannot say. He has not thought it worth his while to speak of himself or of his development of opinions, except so far as it bore upon that object of preaching and explaining the pure gospel to which his life was given. But there is one aspect of the gospel, as a universal religion of God, under which we may be sure that he viewed it with the liveliest interest. It manifested its adaptation for all mankind by its power within his own soul. He knew by experience what faith was, what its power was, what had made him a new creature, what had caused him to consecrate himself to the service of Christ, what had filled him with joy and hope. He made the safest, most natural, most involuntary inference, that if the gospel was true at all,—of which he never doubted from the moment of his conversion—it was for mankind, and a general provision for the sins of all men. That which saved him by faith was able to save other Jews by faith as well. That which was God's power unto salvation for the Jew was such for the Gentile. Christ's coming had to his thoughtful mind a necessary bearing on mankind, so that if prophecy had not foretold a union of mankind in one kingdom of God on earth, the gospel would in the end of necessity have spread by preaching among the Gentiles. And these convictions of the universal character of the gospel are potentially in every mind. The most ignorant disciple feels that the remedy for his sin is a remedy for all sin, that he was saved by the gospel, not because he had sinned less than others, or is in a better condition for being saved, but because the gospel had in it a saving efficacy. When the woman who had the issue of blood for twelve years was healed by the touch of Christ's garment, she could tell any other with perfect assurance, that by approaching the Master with the same faith they could find a like cure. By one such cure Christ showed forth his moral glory before the eyes of all,—that "He is rich unto all that call upon Him."

With this persuasion the Christian believer has a faith in missions. The missionary spirit lives essentially in every Christian, and cannot but be in him, if he believes that Christ is the Saviour of the world. There was no absolute need of the command "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature:" the spirit of a Christian is of itself and essentially

propagating. It seeks to communicate to all the blessings fitted for all. In any church, at any age, a principal criterion of the power of the gospel as a living force in the world, is the desire and sense of obligation to make Christ known to those who have never heard of him. "Thy kingdom come," is as essential a part of the shortest prayer as "thy will be done." If long ages elapsed after the first triumphs of Christianity, when it was paralyzed, unable to make conquests, forced to yield up large regions of the world to Mohammedanism, the cause lay in the corruptions of external institutional Christianity itself. This indeed is the great marvel, the mystery of mysteries attending the spread of the world-religion, that it stopped for ages on its course; but as we look on this dark chapter of Christian history we ought to remember that Christ foresaw and foretold this, that it was distinctly predicted by the prophetic spirit in his apostles.

But in spite of this long, sad record of stagnation in the Church, we go on to say that not only experience in the Christian mind, but *experiment* in the world has proved that Christianity is for all and able to reach all. The first experiment of a few men in a despised race going forth and telling mankind a story about Jesus Christ, who was crucified and rose again—how small were its means, how great its result! Who in the apostolic age that looked on, as a cool spectator, calculating human probabilities, dreamed of anything but failure. So, again, *after* the apostolic age had past, and the leaven of falsehood had corrupted the Church in a measure, the conversion of the Goths, the Franks, the Saxons, with the rest of Britain and Ireland, of interior Germany, of Scandinavia, of the Slavonic nations, showed that the old life was not extinct, that the gospel could root out religions and idolatries of various forms, that it could begin that new civilization in Europe which has continued its progress until now. And as for the modern movement, what shall we say of this latest missionary experiment? To say nothing of Catholic missions, where worldly policy and reliance on outward forms spread little more than an outward conformity to the ordinances of the Church, we can point with confidence to what the Protestant churches have accomplished, small as the scale of effort has been, as

showing that this last trial of the diffusive power of Christianity has shown the universal character of the gospel. In some respects the illustration in this case is better and more satisfactory than in those which preceded, for the fields have been scattered among all races, all kinds of religion, all forms of culture or want of culture. The Danes in Southern India,—and since the beginning made by them, others, especially the Church Missionary Society,—the Moravians in Greenland, Eliot among the Natick Indians, the London Missionary Society and the American Board in Polynesia and elsewhere, the Baptists among the Karens, many Christian sects through Africa, to say nothing of missions in China and among the Mohammedan nations—these, by way of examples, show a degree of success which is greater than we should have expected. But what is more, these varied experiments, pursued on different plans by members of the Christian body, differing among themselves in their system of policy and modes of presenting the truth,—these practical trials of the gospel among the most refined, as well as among the least refined heathen tribes and races, do show most conclusively that it is not worn out; that the human soul is receptive of it and can be made to feel a need of it; that the same effects follow modern missions which followed apostolic preaching—in short, it is proved that the gospel and only the gospel is the world-religion.

But the world is not yet converted to Christ. As was said to Joshua after the tribes had for years had a foothold in Caanan, “there remaineth yet very much land to be possessed.” China and the neighborhood lands, Hindostan, the Mohammedan world, with large masses of uncivilized men, are almost untouched by the religion which we fondly call the world-religion. And meanwhile the gospel is losing its hold on great multitudes in lands nominally Christian. There have been free-thinking and sceptical periods before, but never since the days of Christ have so many, on philosophical, or historical, or scientific grounds, and for the most part without scoff or scorn, rejected his authority. Just as the conquest of the world seemed to be in the hands of the Church of Christ, came this new dark cloud of unbelief, to dishearten many minds and to fill with apprehension the most thoughtful.

Here we have started up two doubts in regard to the universal power of the gospel. The one last mentioned will lead many to inquire, how our religion, if it is losing and is going to lose ground at home, can spread itself abroad. If at this high point of civilization the foundations of Christianity are shaking, does not this fact show that, while it could maintain itself against the imperfect science and methods of investigation of past generations, it will not stand its ground against the thorough research of the nineteenth century. It may have been a temporary necessity, a benefactor when there was no other for oppressed and ignorant man, but it cannot bear inspection under the calcium light of our day. It must give up its place and its claim of saving mankind. We seem to hear the same taunt uttered against it that was aimed at its Founder, "Ah, thou that destroyest the temple and buildest it in three days, save thyself and come down from the cross."

In regard to this suspicion of some and boast of others that Christianity cannot save itself from extinction, that it was good for a time but not for all time, and therefore not universal, we have but one word to say. Christ's errand was for *this*—to save men from their sins, to bring about a state of reconciliation and peace between God and a race of fallen beings. His meaning and importance is not measured by sacraments, and churches, and forms of order, and the well-being of society and public morality, but by the endless life of the soul, by his power of bringing men out of their sins into the love and holiness of God. If he cannot do that, he and his religion must fall. If man needs no such salvation, he and his religion must fall. But if he can do it, and has done it, heretofore, he can do it now; if he can deliver me from my sins, I know that he can save my neighbor, can save the Chinese or Hindoo, can save the world. Therefore I care not how many stars in their courses fight against him, how many Hegels or La Places deny him,—this is nothing to me so long as I have this inner light in my soul. And I know that if men are sinners like me, whoever they are, they can be made to feel the same.

Of course there may be philosophies that teach that there is no such thing as sin, and if they could be universal, all sense of sin would die out from the minds of their adherents or be

buried under the ashes of false dogmas. But there is no great fear of this, for civilization itself, as it produces refinement and raises the standard of life, creates a sense of imperfection, so that men must come back again to the old doctrine of sin; the very substitutes for the gospel will become themselves school-masters to bring men to the gospel.

But another and a very practical part of our subject remains. If Christianity be universal in its design, what are we to say of the prospect of converting to Christ those more civilized races that yet remain outside of the pale of his religion? We say *the more civilized races*—for vast as is the area which the yet unconverted heathen occupy, their numbers are too few, and the possibility of acting on them too apparent, to affect our argument. If *China* or *Hindustan* were seen coming to Christ, it would *show* him to be a Saviour for all the ends of the earth, with *far more* convincing power than it would *show the contrary*, if all the savages in the world should refuse to open to him their hearts.

Let us look then at the great centres of non-Christian thought in the world, and see whether they are impenetrable and inaccessible to the gospel.

And, first, as it respects Mohammedanism, it may be said that the strength of this religion has always lain in a certain rigid monotheism, which did honor to the sovereignty and majesty of God, which acknowledged in a degree the reality of the divine revelations made to Moses and to Christ, and brought the devout Mussulman under the influence of many religious feelings that elevated the individual and were the safety of society. Add to this that the fanaticism of the early faith was long kept up by the rancor which strife between the Mohammedan and the Christian had generated. But a new time has come. With the exception of certain outbreaks of zeal among the believers in the prophet in Hindostan and Arabia, and of slow conquests in Africa among the negro tribes, this religion is in great measure dead and without heart. Politically it has little force or weight in the world. It seems to be aware of an approaching downfall; and certainly *that* nation which has been its bulwark in modern times is the weakest, the sickliest of all political powers. Modern ideas, also; new modes of inter-

course; the appearance of Protestant Christianity among the Armenians as a reforming and a reviving spirit; the necessity gradually growing up of allowing free thought and even free profession of faith to all classes of subjects; the purifying process now going on among the Armenian, Nestorian, Syrian Christians, making them models of life, as well as new centers of thought,—all this is ground for strong hope that the next age will see a new order of things, a sway of Christianity in Turkey. Or if that power should be overthrown, we may hope that the general awe which would pervade a large part of the east on account of its fall would make access to the Mussulmen in the various countries which they have ruled easier than it is now.

The obstacles among the Mohammedans in the way of the spiritual reception of the gospel lie chiefly in the cardinal facts of Christianity, in the incarnation of Christ, his atonement, and the offense to their stiff monotheistic idea presented by the doctrine of the Trinity. Here is a citadel which no political or social forces can take. They are contented with their religion because it embraces half the truth, and because the other half requires a deeper sense of sin, greater energy of will, and less self-satisfaction than they possess. In one respect they are like the Jews to whom Paul preached with so little success: "they go about to establish their own righteousness." Is there, however, any reason why we should not hope that, as there was a select body of Jewish Christians, through whom the gospel in its written and its preached form came to us, so among the Mohammedans earnest believers will arise, to become the founders again of the gospel at Iconium, at Edessa, and through all the lands. They are now religious, and, if converted, will be among the most devout believers in Christ.

In the next place we ask whether *China* is accessible or inaccessible to the gospel? We include in what we have to say of this vast empire the countries to the west and south of it, Cochin-China, Cambodia, Laos, Tonquin, as well as those lying to the north-east, Corea and Japan, to which also Thibet may be added. For whatever great social or spiritual change shall affect China, we may be sure that all these other nations will feel the same movement. And in addition to this the vast

emigration out of China in Malay countries and islands will be still more susceptible to influences acting upon the mother country.

In some respects China seems to be more hopeless, to be a more dead, inert mass for the gospel to act upon, than any other part of the world. The causes for this lie in its isolation, in the national character, and in the political institutions. It is a world within itself. Possibly with some help from western mechanical and engineering skill it might reach a point of still more absolute independence, and defy foreign ideas to touch it in any vital part. The government, again, reflects and will continue to reflect the national jealousy of foreigners. Although bound by the treaties of 1856 to grant residence and liberty of travel to Christians and even to missionaries, there seems to be a party eager to return to the old policy of seclusion. But the national character, fixed by the habits of ages, and keeping its rigidity through the sway of various dynasties,—some of them native, some foreign,—presents the most serious obstacle to everything from abroad. One of the national traits is extreme attachment to old usages, that veneration of the received and the traditional that resists all innovation. The worship of deceased ancestors is nowhere else in the world carried to such an excess. Another trait is self-conceit, under-valuation of everything foreign, the unwillingness to learn from strangers. Another still, a certain earthliness which contents itself with living on the motives of a prudential morality, with the smallest regard to considerations drawn from another life. In fact the Chinese, with the Mongolian race, seem to have less religious capacity, a feebler development of those feelings which are necessary to bind man to some object of worship than any other nation the whole world over. Good sense, good nature, kindness, prudence, rationality, filial piety, are the foundations of their character, which thus is well fitted for this life, but does not at all incline them to seek for, or to enter into, the kingdom of heaven. The forms under which *unworldliness* elsewhere appears, *asceticism*, *idealism*, *devoutness* and *reverence*, *gratitude* for salvation, *consecration* to the divine service, all these seem to have scarcely entered the Chinese mind. The old national religion has contented itself with the worship of

heaven; and whether you decide that by Shang-ti an *impersonal* or a *personal* object is denoted, you must admit that, to a very great extent, the feelings belonging to the worship of a personal God are wanting. The Chinese literati for ages have fallen, as they naturally would, into pantheism. The sect of Tao, founded by Lao-tee as far back as the time when Confucius was young, has indeed a mystical philosophy and a doctrine of the absorption of the individual into the great unity of things, out of which conceivably a religion of the people might grow; but the Tao has had no such history, it has been rejected on the whole by the Chinese mind, and now seems to exert the smallest religious influence either upon philosopher or people.

The introduction, however, of Buddhism, or the Fo religion, as it is called, is a fact of great significance, if we would estimate the capacity of foreign religions to penetrate into China. Buddhism, after long struggle at home, was rooted out of India by the Brahminical system,—the most thorough and wholesale instance of a faith driven totally away from its birthplace by persistent efforts of persecution, that the world affords. But it had a vitality within itself which would not let it die. It sought new abodes, among others Ceylon and Thibet; and in the first century of our era, when the Apostles were preaching Christ and his resurrection, it entered into China. Its spread has been immense; by some it is estimated that more than a third of the population are addicted to this religion from abroad. And to what has the success of its propagators been owing? If we were to stop with secondary causes, we should say, to the mildness of its moral precepts, to its religious forms and ceremonial, and to the accommodating way in which it has united some elements of the old Chinese religion with its own. But a deeper cause must be found for its spread in the intense dullness of the old Confucianism, its want of warmth, its earthliness. And yet the Fo religion itself in the course of centuries has lost its own first vitality to a great extent; it has no favor with the educated classes, and being thrown upon the ignorant as its adherents, it plays such a part as to suit their formality, and their superstition. It even stoops to the practice of magic arts, in order to retain its influence.

We must say, I think, as we look at these things, that the success of Buddhism in China is a proof that a foreign religion, proceeding from a race as unlike the Chinese as possible, *can* get a footing in that empire. Nor, in the nature of the case, is it likely that foreign ideas should not more and more mix themselves with the thinking of the educated in that country. On the other hand, the religious soil is as barren, as unpropitious, as any in the world. It seems as if the gospel of Christ was untranslatable, as if the Chinaman would need to have his mind made over in order to apprehend the first principles of Christ. But the difficulties, I apprehend, are greater in appearance than in reality. Numbers of Christian converts have shown that same sense of sin, conscientiousness, devoutness, heavenly-mindedness, which appears in old Christian lands; so that the question whether China will enter into the ranks of Christian nations is one of time. It is hard to penetrate, still harder to leaven such a mass, but we have no reason for despair.

Let us turn, in the last place, to India, and enquire whether there is any permanent obstacle to the general diffusion of the gospel over this vast country. I must confess that in the conversion of India the gospel would appear to me to win its highest triumph. This is, in one sense, the oldest branch of the gifted Indo-European family, the first to form a religion of nature, and to develop a philosophy. It is a race religious beyond all others, and endowed with an imagination to which vastness of space and of time, and monstrous exaggerations in mythological fiction, were no obstacles. In fact it has no historic landmarks, knows less of its own past than any thoughtful race, because religious reverie, a sacred scorn of everything visible, tangible and actual, an asceticism which has aimed at absorption in the divine existence, made it regardless of the passing events of time. Its philosophy, growing out of its early religion, explored the same problems that occupy modern philosophy. The religion of Brahminical India proceeded from the conviction that individual existence is an evil and an illusion, from which prayer and offering, and still more contemplation and self-tortures, could procure deliverance; but the deliverance could not be reached until, by way of retribution for past misdeeds,

new forms of existence were passed through. The goal lay in being swallowed up in the universal soul or Brahma. The philosophies were either orthodox or heterodox. The principal orthodox philosophy carried out the leading ideas of the religion,—that Brahma was the only real existence, that the world is unreality or illusion, that all evil for man arises out of his mistaking this world of finite things for reality, and his own personal self for something separate from and independent of the great world-soul; and that therefore salvation can come only through the discovery of the unity of things. The principal heterodox philosophy seems to declare the reality of the soul, and of material substance: it denies the existence of a supreme soul, and affirms the gods of the Indian pantheon (Brahma included) to be souls like those of men or to have no reality. The aim of this philosophy is to purify men by speculative knowledge.

It will be perceived, by what has been said, that the Indian people have had an immense burden on their souls, an unspeakable sense of want, if not a sense of sin. The old moral feeling has been perverted by the pantheistic religion, and yet the religion has not been able to drive sin away. Certainly a Hindoo ascetic, swinging on hooks that run into his flesh, killing his body by self-torment, is terribly in earnest, although he may be as self-righteous as Simon Stylites. Here then is a point at which the religion can be assailed. Whatever callousness of conscience philosophers in India may have attained to, the *people* who believe in long transmigrations, the *ascetic* who believes in expelling self by self-infliction, must be alive to the righteousness which is by faith in Christ, for it points them to an *end*, where the soul, still keeping its personal existence, can be forever *at rest*.

There is another great feature of Indian life which we must take into account. At the very first entrance of the race into the country which they have occupied for ages, the system of caste began, which thus has proved more lasting than any other institution in the history of the world. It has been more burdensome, in some respects, than any domestic or prædial slavery. It was, together with transmigration, the moving cause of the rise of Buddhism, and the reason for its great success. It was strong enough, as we have seen, to overcome and

to expel Buddhism: when the Mohammedans of Persia invaded and reconstituted large tracts of Hindostan, it still kept its ground, so that when the first Christian missionaries from the west came into the country, it was about as strong as ever.

And, now, see how this almost primeval system of caste, which has withstood such blows without seeming to be weakened, is approaching to its fall. Perhaps nowhere has Divine Providence ever showed its guiding hand more manifestly than in giving the control over Indian society to a western nation, a quarter of the earth's surface removed from the governed country. It used to be said that the continent of Asia, while it gave birth to all religions and sent them westward, repelled all shocks from the western nations by a kind of stolid inertia. Thus Alexander's conquests after centuries left only legends in the lands overrun by the Greeks; thus the Romans were practically kept back from passing beyond the Euphrates by the Parthian kings; thus the crusades, after nearly two centuries of struggle, left the Saracens in possession of all the Holy Land. But here we have the strange spectacle of a voluntary commercial company, planted on the other side of the world, with no political, no religious purposes whatever, forced into the position of a military power; swallowing up in the course of time all other companies of the same sort; and by degrees reducing or controlling a large part of the Indian peninsula. So irreligious, so purely and selfishly money-making was this company, that it dreaded and sought to drive out Christian missions; and one of its friends in the House of Commons said, in 1793, "that to allow missionaries in India was a measure which ought to be sternly resisted, as likely to bring Christianity and idolatry into deadly conflict, imminently dangerous to the peace and safety of the country and the East India Company." But the gospel went, because religion was revived in England and in the United States; opinions grew more enlightened and more Christian; many of the civil servants of the company and of the military officers were God-fearing men; at length the dominion passed over to the British government. All this while conversions were increasing in number, until several hundred thousand, who were formerly heathen, have professed to believe in Christianity. The government, being administered on the principles of righteousness,

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rests on strong foundations. It is binding India together by railroads, and enlightening it by systems of education. Caste shows signs of giving way in various quarters.

This exposition of the historical progress of British power in India, while it helps us to see the hand held out by God to his Church in the work of spreading the gospel, shows also how the problem of converting India meets with no obstacle that is insurmountable. *Caste*, like slavery, must fall before social ideas and enlightenment. A religion built on keeping the mass of society down, on degrading men and holding them in degradation, will give way before changes of thought and institutions which circulate among the lower classes. *The popular religions*, grossly obscene as some of them are, are no greater obstacle than the beautiful Greek religion was in the days of Paul and Apollos. Disgusting sin does not enthrall the soul more than polished sin. *The philosophies*, so far as they uphold Brahminism, are a strong weapon of defence; they tax the mind of the western missionaries to no slight extent, many of whom go into their Indian fields, it is believed, unaware of the acuteness as well as the depth of Indian thought. But these systems depend for their strength mainly on the turn the religion of India has given to thought, on the underlying principle of the old faith. If this gives way, the philosophies cannot sustain it, but must give way themselves. And finally, *the pantheistic character* of the religion, although it prevents the reception of Christianity by weakening the sense of personal ill-desert, is no such obstacle as to call for our dread. For, as we have seen, the sense of want, of imperfection, is not extinguished even in the Yogis or ascetics, and the popular faith acknowledges sin abundantly—sin in the present life, sin in some past existence.

From all that has been said it appears that our missionaries can go forth in full hope that nothing that is most strong in the world, whether old, fixed social habit and institutions, or old religions, or old philosophies, can effectually resist the gospel; that it has the same power now that it had when preached by the apostles; and that heathenism must inevitably fall before the light which will sooner or later shine into its darkness. Whether it is to be superseded by Christianity, or to leave a religious vacuum in the lands where it reigned so many ages, must be decided by God's blessing on the Christian efforts of his people.

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

FARRAR'S LIFE OF CHRIST.*—"Who, indeed, would venture, after John, to write the Life of Christ," said Herder, as quoted by Neander, in his great work on the life of Jesus. But John is not the sole biographer; there are three other Evangelists. Hence there is room for a biography of the Great Teacher, which shall be founded on all these original documents. Of the modern lives, Neander's, in our judgment, is the best—the most candid, the most discreet in its solution of difficult problems, the most profound in its interpretations. Many other similar attempts have been made in Germany, by writers widely differing in their theology, and with various degrees of success. The works of Hase, Lange, Keim, Ewald, and the famous attack by Strauss, are among them. In France, De Pressensé has written a valuable book on this subject. The biography by Andrews is one of the most judicious and able productions of this class. The work of Dr. Farrar, which lies before us, was composed at the request of the publishers, and they have given it a beautiful dress. Although written, in a sense, to order, it has been done *con amore*, by a learned scholar who, as a supplement to his preparatory studies, has traveled over Palestine. It is intended primarily for ordinary readers; yet the author introduces, especially in the notes, much matter adapted only to scholars and divines. His aim has evidently been to produce an animated, picturesque narrative, which should interest the better class of readers, and, at the same time, make a religious impression upon them. The poets are drawn upon for mottoes and illustrative sentiments. The writing is often elaborate. There is a mingling, or rather association, of critical discussion with portraiture; but the former element is so disposed generally that it can be skipped over by uncritical readers. In considering the reference to Quirinus in Luke, he says (p. 8): "I hold no theory of inspiration which would prevent me from frankly admitting, in such matters as these, any mistake or

* *The Life of Christ*. By FREDERIC A. FARRAR, D.D., F.R.S. In two vols. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.

inaccuracy which could be shown really to exist." Again he says (vol. ii, p. 484): "No reasonable reader will be troubled by differences which do *not* affect the truthfulness, though, of course, they affect the *accuracy* of the narrative; and which, without a direct and wholly needless miraculous intervention, *must* have occurred, as they actually *do* occur, in the narratives of the Evangelists, as in those of all other truthful witnesses." Dr. Farrar holds that the statement of John, that the Last Supper was the evening before the Passover, is opposed to the statement of the first three gospels, but is, nevertheless, to be accepted. He manifests a freedom from dogmatic bias which is not so common among English orthodox theologians as on the continent. He is fair and courteous in his tone in dealing with skeptics. While his work is written in a manner to engage the interest of uncritical readers, we do not find in it the critical acumen and thorough application of critical canons, which are requisite for the satisfaction of investigators who wish to go to the bottom of the subject. The influence of theories of inspiration which he professes to discard is still very manifest in his treatment of the Gospel narratives. For example, he holds that there were two similar scourgings of the money-changers in the temple. His work cannot be considered an important contribution to theological science.

WALKER'S DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.*—We had meant to give an earlier place in our pages to this work, in a former edition, which we read with interest. This is the fourth edition, and, apart from the enlargement, more pleasing in the mechanical appearance. In the meantime, if it has not made so general an impression as the author's former work on the "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation," it has attracted the attention of many thoughtful readers. Some judgment may be formed by others of the range and importance of the discussion from the outline of the "Contents." The first chapter treats of "the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament;" the second, of "the relative place of the Spirit and the Word in the economy of the divine mind;" the third, of the Spirit "in the personality of Christ;" the fourth, of "the endowment and supervision of the apostles" by the Spirit;

* *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, or Philosophy of the divine operation in the redemption of man.* By Rev. JAMES B. WALKER, D.D. Fourth edition, revised and enlarged. Chicago: S. O. Griggs & Co. 1874. 12mo, 255 pp.

the fifth, of "the union of the Word and Spirit in the process of sanctification;" the sixth, of "the work of Christ" by the Spirit "in the minds of believers;" the seventh, of "the work of the Spirit with the minds of the impenitent;" while the eighth, supplementary, is on prayer and miraculous gifts. Under these heads the author brings forward a great deal of important truth, giving the Scriptures their rightful place in the discussion, and clearly stating his conclusions, which in the main are not at variance with received doctrine, though more carefully defined and discriminated on some points not generally brought to view in briefer treatises. We first took up the work for the sake of the subject, believing that it called for fresh statements and presentations, and we think the reading of it will do good service in this direction. Yet we should question some of his positions. He is broader and less technical than most writers on the same theme, yet we should complain of him somewhat, as still more of them, that he allows it to be still hampered by limitations and restrictions which have not the authority of the Bible, but rather originated in "the wisdom of the world." We agree with him when he says, in the introduction, that "the Friends or Quakers have, perhaps, had the most scriptural apprehensions of the doctrine, in its cardinal principles," and we think it was their distinction, their "mission," to set forth the agency of the Spirit with peculiar emphasis and freedom, leaving it where the Scriptures leave it instead of philosophising about it, and hence treating of divine guidance as a vital operation rather than a mere doctrine. Dr. Walker's aim favors also such an effect, though, as we have intimated, with more limitations. We observe, too, that like most writers, he distinguishes more sharply than the Scriptures seem to us to warrant, between the "gifts" recognized by the apostles, and what are called "the ordinary operations" of the Spirit. The supplementary chapter and the appendix contain interesting and valuable suggestions. Though we have intimated some exceptions, we recommend the work as a timely and thoughtful monograph on one of the principal themes of the Christian revelation.

FRASER'S BLENDING LIGHTS.*—The subject of this work, of which we have here the second edition, is fairly defined on the

* *Blending Lights*: or, The Relations of Natural Science, Archaeology, and History, to the Bible. By the Rev. WILLIAM FRASER, LL.D., Paisley, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1874. 376 pp.

title-page, and in a prefatory note the author tells us it "originated in a desire to provide thoughtful and inquiring young men with an antidote to errors which the experience of the author has led him to regard as widely prevalent." A part of two of the sixteen chapters had before appeared in the "*British and Foreign Evangelical Review*." Among the questions discussed, as indicated in the headings of the chapters, are those relating to the first chapter of Genesis, particularly the origination of matter and of light and life, the creative days; the Bible account of man's origin; the unity of our race; "were our first parents savages?" the antiquity of man, and the chronology of the Bible, and of Geologists; Egyptian, Chaldean, and Assyrian testimonials to the truth of the Scriptures; Bible history in relation to prophecy; recent theories regarding the supernatural and the reign of law; evidence in nature, and in Christianity, of the supernatural; results in the history of Christianity. The author has made himself familiar with both sides of the recent controversies on these subjects, and treats of them with care, discrimination, and candor, in a clear and manly style. Aiming to harmonize Christianity and modern science, he abates nothing from the distinctive doctrines of the former, nor from the value of the latter. We are pleased to see that he dissents from the hasty and excessive concessions of some Christian apologists. While conversant with the latest aspects of these controversies, he describes "British thinkers" as shrinking from "a course whose inevitable issue is materialism," "which French writers have taken and defended," a conclusion which he says "must be repudiated or accepted;" yet, since his work was issued, Prof. Tyndall, in his latest utterance, has "confessed" his own acceptance of what bears this name. Discerning readers of this last utterance have not failed to notice a use of terms and accompanying admissions that make the position very unlike the old French materialism. Unbelief is ever in a transition state, and often, even with the show of novelty, repeating the old substance under new names and forms. Dr. Fraser has not wholly escaped the fault we find in most of the late defenders of revelation, that of exaggerating the prevalence of infidelity in our time as compared with the past. Yet he confronts those forms of it which are now uppermost with so much knowledge and ability, that we cheerfully commend his work, and hope for it a wide circulation.

RAINY'S LECTURES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.*—After a preliminary chapter, Dr. Rainy considers "the Delivery of Doctrine in the Old Testament," "the Delivery of Doctrine in the New Testament," "Function of Christian Mind with reference to Doctrine," "Development of Doctrine," and "Creeds." The general subject is the rise and progress of doctrinal theology and its relation to the Scriptures. The author handles this important subject in a more philosophical and liberal spirit than is usually found in the schools of Scottish orthodoxy. He holds, for example, that the patriarchs and Old Testament saints were saved by having the dispositions, which in a higher state of knowledge issue in the evangelical experience, rather than by a distinct apprehension of Christ. The progress of Divine revelation is fully admitted, as well as the progress in men's understanding of it. He, also, maintains that creeds are subject to revision, and that a body of Christians should hold themselves ready to modify their confession of faith wherever there is an occasion for it. Dr. Rainy's work is written in a perspicuous style, and on various accounts deserves commendation.

SOLAR HIEROGLYPHICS.†—It may be presumed from the title of this work that the author holds in due reverence the doctrine of the Trinity, not only in its Biblical forms but in the ancient Church creeds, and is also addicted to scientific studies. His name does not appear, but Dr. Ralston in the introduction refers to him as "the learned author" and as having "eminent qualifications" "for the discussion." In a modest preface he refers to himself as "now seventy years of age," expressing the hope that "some mind of higher culture and greater vigor may be induced to investigate the subject more thoroughly and minutely." The work, he says, "is but an essay; and does not pretend to be exhaustive," though "intended as a contribution to the interests and literature of 'Christian evidence.'" It is refreshing in these days to meet with strong convictions and genuine enthusiasm at once in theol-

* *Delivery and Development of Christian Doctrine.* The fifth series of Cunningham Lectures. By ROBERT RAINY, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Church History, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. For sale by Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway, New York.

† *Solar Hieroglyphics*; or the emblematic illustrations of the revealed doctrine of the tri-personal Godhead which are discernible in the solar light. With an introduction by Rev. J. GRIER RALSTON, D.D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1874. pp. 136.

ogy and science. To attempt the illustration of the Trinity from nature, and especially from the sun and light, is by no means new, but it is carried further here than we remember to have seen it elsewhere. The line of thought, if not yielding positive evidence, may yet disclose analogies and aid meditation, besides entertaining a curious reader. We give a specimen of this work from p. 34: "The Godhead is a Tri-personal Unity, and the light is a Trinity. Being immaterial and homogeneous, and thus essentially one in its nature, the light includes a plurality of constituents, or, in other words, is essentially three in constitution, its constituent principles being the actinic, the luminiferous, and the calorific. And in glorious manifestation the light is one, and is the created, constituted and ordained emblem of the Tri-personal God."

MEMENTOS OF DR. PAYSON.*—Dr. Payson died in 1827, only forty-four years old, having filled no other station than that of a pastor, with his church in Portland for his only charge. Besides his high place among the ministers of New England while he lived, time has shown that even of those contemporaries who might then be said to attract more attention, none left a deeper or more lasting impression beyond the bounds of his own communion. Giving himself with the earnestness of his nature to the work of a preacher and pastor, he printed nothing beyond occasional discourses; but some years after his death his Memoir, including extracts from his journal, and two large volumes of his sermons, were published, with the effect of extending and establishing his reputation. An abridged Memoir also has been long in circulation. And now appears this duodecimo volume, properly called "Mementos," containing the editor's "Sketch of his Life and Character," in thirty-three pages, the bulk of the book, or two hundred and fifty pages, being selections from his works, with a pleasant and graceful Introduction by Dr. Sprague, whose honorable memory in years to come is insured by his many tributes to his fathers and brethren in the ministry. The interest and significance of the work are enhanced by the fact that the editor is a well-known Methodist divine, as may be learned from his other writings named on the title-page, "Wesley his own Historian," and

* *Mementos of Rev. Edward Payson, D.D.*, embracing a Sketch of his Life and Character, and Selections from his Works. By Rev. EDWIN L. JAMES. With an Introduction by W. B. SPRAGUE, D.D., LL.D. New York: Nelson & Phillips. 1873. pp. 351.

"Character and Career of Francis Asbury." The compilation from such a source, with the accompanying tribute, shows how far the attractions of Payson's mind and heart transcend the sympathies of his theological creed, and will extend his fame and influence through a larger circle of devout readers. We welcome the publication for another reason. Payson is distinguished for the fervid imaginative type of his piety, which at the same time lost nothing of the sobriety and severity that characterize the doctrinal school to which he belonged. With the exception of Edwards and Brainerd—the latter no doubt largely moulded under the influence of the former—he may be said to stand more conspicuously than any other of the New England divines since the Puritans as a representative of this class. The depth of his religious experience, the glow of his devotional feelings, the ascetic element appearing in his training, his intense earnestness of conviction and purpose, the zeal and unction of his ministry, mark him out among the theologians, teachers, and philanthropists, that have not been wanting in this country; nor can there be a question as to the extraordinary power and success of his pastoral work. In some aspects he was not so symmetrical nor so happy as he might have been, nor should he be studied in his conflicts and raptures as a model by which others ought to try or to mould their own experience, as some readers of his memoirs have been tempted to do; but a like caution is to be used as to religious biographies generally, and it has been often enough reiterated as to Payson by critics who seem to forget that neither can a safe standard be drawn from their own colder natures and easy-going religiousness. It remains true that his life and ministry was a rich blessing not only to the people of his charge but to the Church in general, and the more to be prized in New England for the elements we have noted as not generally predominant among her clergy. Piety of his type needs the more to be recurred to in our day in counteraction of prevailing tendencies to compromising and superficial notions of Christian character. And there seems to be some reaction towards it in the public mind, if we may judge by the frequent references to him and citations from him almost half a century after his death, and especially by such a compilation as this, which the editor felt to be wanted in the large and influential denomination to which he belongs, as we feel it to be also in our own. We would call the attention of ministers also to the power and eminence of Payson in public prayer. Such as are left of his

parishioners remember him not less in this department than in preaching. Of course it cannot be so well represented on the printed page, yet the freshness, fervor and vivacity of his devotional services, as abundant testimony shows, gave him power with men as well as with God. Young men entering the ministry, especially in the absence of prescribed forms, if not so richly endowed as Payson, may yet well consider what it behooves them to do and what promise there is of success in this part of their work. We have not gone into any comparison with the larger volumes to test the judgment of the editor in his work of selection, but it is safe to say that he could not well go amiss in attempting a valuable compilation from such materials, and any glance into its pages rewards us with some glimpse of the gifted and saintly subject.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

LIFE OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: Vol. II.*—The present volume continues the Diary of Mr. Adams down to August, 1814, when in conjunction with Clay, Gallatin, and Russel, he began the negotiation which ended in the Treaty terminating the last war with Great Britain. It embraces an account of his mission and residence at the Russian Court. Few stirring incidents are recorded, and not many persons which excite a high degree of interest are brought upon the stage. The character and manners of the Russian Court at that time are, however, well depicted. The volume is replete with manifestations of personal feelings and traits. Whatever faults and follies may be attributed to John Quincy Adams, his conscientious patriotism admits of no question.

PROFESSOR HOPPIN'S LIFE OF ADMIRAL FOOTE.†—At the breaking out of the war of the slaveholder's rebellion, one of the most widely known and one of the most trusted officers of our navy was Andrew Hull Foote—soon raised to the rank of Rear-Admiral. His services in the organization of a naval flotilla on the western waters, and his subsequent brilliant successes, gave him at the time a reputation through the whole country second to that of no

* *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, comprising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by Charles Francis Adams. J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1874.

† *Life of Andrew Hull Foote*, Rear-Admiral United States Navy. By JAMES MASON HOPPIN, Professor in Yale College. With a portrait and illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874. 12mo, 411 pp.

officer either in the army or in the navy. He was one of the men to whom we owe it, that the tide of rebel successes was at last turned. His early death in 1863, hastened by the labors and hardships incident to the work which fell to him, deprived the country of one of its very best defenders. Other men, after him, came more prominently to the front, in the concluding days of the war, but of no one of them has the country more reason to be proud than "the hero of Fort Donelson."

Prof. Hoppin has been successful in preparing a biography of Admiral Foote which deserves to be widely read. He has brought out distinctly the important events by which his career was marked—prominent among which are his storming of the "Barrier Forts" in China, his visit to Japan, his visit to Siam, his cruise on the shores of Africa; but the special excellence of the book is his presentation of the character of the Admiral. He says that "the central element of his character was an immutable resolution, under a sense of religious duty, to pursue the right. The principles he had deliberately chosen he carried to sea with him, and into public life, and into his intercourse with men everywhere and under all circumstances." This led him to be active in efforts for the promotion of temperance in the navy and among sailors; this led him to take an interest in Christian missions; this led him to labor to expose the atrocities of the slave trade on the coast of Africa. Prof. Hoppin has evidently been engaged in a labor of love in writing the life of this brave, earnest, accomplished Christian sailor, and he has done his work with care, with fidelity, and with rare good taste.

ANDERSON'S "MISSION IN INDIA."*—Our readers know that since his retirement from the more active duties of the post he so long and ably occupied, Dr. Anderson has been doing an invaluable work, not only for the American Board but for Christian missions at large. No man is better qualified by experience, opportunity, zeal, and judgment, to be the historian of the Board and its operations to the present time. His name is a guaranty for fulness and accuracy of information in the compilations he has given to the churches. Having begun with missions to the Sandwich Islands, he next took up those to the Oriental Churches, and devotes the

* *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, in India.* By RUFUS ANDERSON, D.D., LL.D., lately Foreign Secretary of the Board. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 1874. 12mo, pp. 443.

present volume to India. Of the three volumes he regards this as properly standing first in order, the Board having begun its work in that country. "Advancing years," he tells us, "deter him from undertaking the history of other missions," though there remain those "to the North American Indians, and to Africa, China, and Japan." We hope that the present senior secretary, or some other equally competent hand, if there is another, will yet complete the series. It occurs to us that every pastor's library ought to be supplied with these volumes. The intelligent members of our churches may find their faith "in the future of the missionary work" strengthened, as the author tells us his own has been, by the facts here recorded.

EPOCHS OF HISTORY.*—Brief summaries in history are valuable for advanced students, but the worst possible books as manuals for beginners. They can give only the bones, and of these only the largest, in the skeleton. Dry, fleshless compends excite little interest, and make little impression on the reader. On the contrary, students who are somewhat advanced in historical studies find such works very useful. They serve as maps of the country which they are traveling over. The little volumes before us have decided merits for works of this class. Mr. Seebohm is a scholarly and well-informed writer. He looks at the Reformation out of the eyes of an Anglican and Erasmian; and the reader must make the proper discount for this bias.

BLACKIE'S HORÆ HELLENICÆ.†—Professor Blackie is not only an accomplished scholar; he is, also, a strong thinker, who is, at the same time, master of a vigorous and racy style. The Essays and Discussions which are collected in this very handsome volume are ripe products of sound learning. Several of them—for example, the first, on "the Theology of Homer"—are fine examples of condensation. The results of long study are presented in a brief space, and yet lucidly presented. One of the attractions of these essays is the occasional references to modern men and affairs, which serve to give vividness to the portraiture of ancient

* *Epochs of History*. Edited by EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A. *The Era of the Protestant Revolution*, by F. SEEBOHM. *The Crusaders*, by GEORGE W. COX, M.A. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

† *Horæ Hellenicæ: Essays and Discussions on some important points of Greek Philology and Antiquity*. By JOHN STUART BLACKIE, F.R.S.E., &c., &c. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

men and things. The author is a stout polemic: he would not be a Scotchman if he were not. But he is courteous. He finds reason to combat some of the theories of his "distinguished friend," Max Müller. Of Grote he writes, in the Preface: "Highly as I value the apology for the Athenian democracy which is the characteristic feature of his great work, it has always appeared to me that there are some matters in the intellectual history of the Hellenic people with which the unpoetical character of his mind, and the negative philosophy which he preferred, rendered him incompetent to deal." This is a just criticism. Grote was not the man to appreciate Plato, and, therefore, not the man thoroughly to understand him. One of the best things in Prof. Blackie's book is his Reply to Grote, on the Sophists. Grote's discussion of the Sophists is a truly sophistical treatment of this chapter in Athenian history. It is marked by inconsistencies, and wears throughout the aspect of an effort at special pleading. Grote's concessions, if they are closely observed, really overthrow his main position on this question. Those who have been misled by his specious argumentation on this subject, would be profited by reading the effectual confutation which it receives at the hands of the author of the interesting volume before us.

THE INDIAN QUESTION.*—In this book are republished the Articles contributed by Gen. Walker to the "North American Review," April, 1873, entitled "The Indian Question," and that which appeared in "The International Review," May, 1874, entitled "Indian Citizenship." To these is appended "An account of the numbers, location, and social and industrial condition of each important tribe of Indians within the United States," extracted from General Walker's report as Commissioner of Indian affairs in 1872. It is quite within bounds to say that the book forms a timely, interesting and valuable contribution to the discussion of an important subject. Gen. Walker here exhibits a thorough and accurate acquaintance with the history of legislation in Indian affairs, and recounts the stages of its progress down to the complete abrogation of the treaty system by Congress in 1871, and the shiftless, do-nothing policy of Congress since. The difficulties of the problems to be solved in legislation for the Indians, so as to do full justice both to them and to the growing

* *The Indian Question.* By FRANCIS A. WALKER, late U. S. Commissioner of Indian affairs. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1874.

claims of civilization, are clearly set forth. So also are the principles and the general methods by which, in the author's opinion, the solution of these difficulties should be approached in the spirit of statesmanship and philanthropy alike. He is no one-sided advocate either of the red man or the white. He is as far removed from the superficial sentimentalism of that class of talkers on "the Indian question," who look upon "the poor Indian" as the ever wronged victim of white injustice, as from that of the other class, equally superficial, who regard him as a mere wild beast, fit only to be improved off from the face of the earth. Here is his admirable picture of the Indian character. "Voluptuary and stoic; swept by gusts of fury too terrible to be witnessed, yet imperturbable beyond all men under the ordinary excitements and accidents of life; garrulous, yet impenetrable; curious, yet himself reserved; proud and mean alike beyond compare; superior to torture and the presence of certain death, yet by the standards of all other peoples a coward in battle; capable of magnanimous actions, which when uncovered of all romance are worthy of the best days of Roman virtue, yet more cunning, false, and cruel than the Bengalee—this copper-colored sphinx—this riddle unread of men, equally fascinates and foils the inquirer." (p. 15.)

Gen. Walker fully believes that the experiment of Indian civilization is worthy of a thorough and patient trial. He favors the continuance of the reservation system, in some improved and carefully devised and guarded form. He urges in this connection judicious provision for the seclusion, protection and guardianship of the Indians under government control, with their education in the arts of civilization and the duties of citizenship. That the Indian character is capable of development in civilization he abundantly proves by examples. Speaking of "that body of Indians, about 55,000 in number, which occupy chiefly the regions known as the Indian Territory," he says, "They are self-supporting, independent, and even wealthy. Their cereal crops exceed those of all the territories of the United States combined. In the number and value of horses and cattle they are surpassed by the people of but one Territory, in expenditures for education by the people of no Territory."

We commend the book most fully to the attention of every American citizen who believes, with Gen. Walker, that this country has duties in this matter to its own honor and to the human race. It will be impossible to read his instructive pages without feeling a new interest in the questions and arguments which he so lucidly and eloquently presents.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

The Bible Regained, and the God of the Bible ours; or, the system of religious truth in outline. By Samuel Lee. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1874. 12mo, pp. 285.

Passages in the Life of the Fair's Gospeller, Mistress Anne Askew. By the author of "Mary Powell." New edition. Dodd & Mead. New York. 16mo.

The Household of Sir Thomas Moore. By the author of "Mary Powell." New edition. New York: Dodd & Mead. 16mo.

Doors Outward. A Tale. By the author of the "Win & Wear" Series. New York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1875. 12mo, pp. 404.

Golden Apples; or, Fair Words for the Young. By the Rev. Edgar Woods. New York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1875. 12mo, pp. 269.

The Giants and How to Fight Them; and Wonderful Things. By the Rev. Richard Newton, D.D. 1875. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 12mo, pp. 425.

Sceptres and Crowns. By the author of the "Wide, Wide World." New York, 1875. R. Carter & Brothers. 12mo, pp. 427.

Uncle John. A Novel. By G. J. Whyte-Melville. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo, pp. 329.

Valentine, the Countess; or, Between Father and Son. Translated from the German of Carl Detlef. By M. S. Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1874. 12mo, pp. 377.

Lost of Himself. A Novel. By Frances H. Underwood. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1874. 12mo, pp. 512.

A Golden Sunset: Being an account of the last days of Hannah Broomfield. By the Rev. J. R. Macduff, D.D. New York: R. Carter & Brothers, 1874. 16mo, pp. 99.

The Gospel and its Fruits. A Book for the Young. By J. H. Wilson, M.A., Barclay Church, Edinburgh. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 16mo, pp. 312.

Crossing the River. By the author of the Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 16mo, pp. 119.

From Four to Fourteen. By Jeannie Harrison. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 16mo, pp. 294.









